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Abstract
This thesis examines the nature of property rights in historical and 
contemporary China. The principal question addressed in the study is: what is the 
nature and significance of the re-emergence of private property in the context of 
rapid socio-economic change in post-Mao China? In examining this issue the 
dissertation looks beyond established dichotomies in Chinese law such as ‘public 
versus private’, and explores the manner in which the Chinese define ownership and 
leave the boundaries between the public and the private in property rights unclear.
This study concludes that while there is a limited move towards the recognition 
of private property in real estate in contemporary China, ownership in the law, and 
ownership as understood and practised socially, often diverge significantly. Since the 
late Qing, ‘modernist’ law and entrenched social practice have often opposed each 
other. In contrast to the official, and indeed legal, support for unitary and exclusive 
property rights, the reality of the property regime (from late imperial China to the 
present) has seen the fragmentation of property rights.
The reasons for the contradiction between the legal and the social understanding 
of property rights include tensions between economic reform and ideological 
commitment to socialism, and blurred boundaries between formal and informal 
institutions in post-Mao China. ‘Modem’ conceptions and theories of property rights 
emerged in the context of nation-building from the late Qing onwards, and unitary 
and exclusive property rights were Considered as ‘badges’ of modernity. These 
conceptions and theories served (and still serve) the purposes of control and 
governance but were, and still are, often resisted in social practice and popular 
thinking, leading to alienation and conflict. As such, the nature of private property 
and its social and political implications provide an important vehicle for analysing 
the changing nature of modem China.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1. Introduction
This thesis examines the nature of property rights in historical and contemporary 
China. The principal question addressed in the study is: what is the nature and 
significance of the re-emergence of private property (private property in ‘land’ in 
particular) in the context of rapid socio-economic change in post-Mao China? The 
specific questions that this study deals with are: what does ownership mean in 
present-day China? What are the boundaries between the public (gong 4*) and the 
private (si fA) in property rights?1 And how are such boundaries being drawn in 
relation to governance and socio-economic conditions in post-Mao China? This 
thesis should be of interest to the audience in the field of Chinese law and politics, 
socio-legal studies, and law and development. The present chapter lays out the 
research question, the hypotheses, relevant themes in the literature, sources and 
methods, and the thesis structure.
The legal reforms in the late Qing dynasty (1840-1911) and Republican China 
(1911-1949) introduced many aspects of the Civil Law system to China from 
Germany, via Japan. The Civil Code formulated by the Guomindang in 1929-1931 
was based on the German law framework, but this code was abolished in 1949. 
Between 1949 and 1978, the means of production in the Chinese central planned 
economy was based on the former Soviet model, that is, public ownership (including 
state and collective ownership), while private ownership was virtually abandoned.
1 Although ownership is the focus o f this study, this study does not suppose that the public/private 
distinction is just limited to ownership. This distinction also includes, for example, state intervention 
in people’s lives as opposed to the emergence o f the ‘private sphere’ as demonstrated and analysed by 
Yan Yunxiang and other scholars. See e.g., Yan Yunxiang, Private Life under Socialism: Love, 
Intimacy, and Family Change since the Great Leap Famine (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1996). But property perhaps provides the most significant instantiation o f the new private in China.
2 Private ownership was not formally abolished in 1949, and a mixed economy was adopted between 
1949 and 1956 as a prelude to nationalisation of private capital. Whether nor not a complete system of  
public ownership was established is unclear. For example, Article 11 o f the 1954 Constitution 
recognised private property: ‘the State protects the right of citizens to own lawfully-earned incomes,
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It should be noted that after the collapse of the relationship between the Soviet Union 
and China in the late 1950s, China began to seek and emphasise indigenous legal 
resources such as mediation (tiaojie3 i l l? ) ,  although the Soviet legacy did persist.
In the Mao era (1949-1978), the conception of ownership in China was 
overwhelmingly influenced by former Soviet jurisprudence. Ownership was regarded 
as indivisible and absolute. Public and collective interests were superior to individual 
interests; acquisition and management of property was under an overarching 
administrative fiat.4 Although civil law-making in the post-1978 era returned to the 
German Civil Law framework, a clear boundary between public ownership and 
private ownership still existed in law, and a tri-ownership system including state 
ownership, collective ownership and private ownership has evolved and persisted. 
The Property Law (2007) provides equal protection for public property and private 
property for the first time since 1949, but there is much debate over whether private 
property should be given the same status as public property. Property law reform and 
revival of ‘the private’ in law in post-Mao China should be understood in the context 
of socio-economic transformation.5
Since Deng’s economic reforms commenced in 1978, the trend has been towards 
decollectivisation. In light of the changes in the property regime, since 1978, after 
almost three decades in which private property was abolished, ‘a revival’ of private
savings, houses and other means o f life’. Article 12 o f the 1954 Constitution provides: ‘the State 
protects the right o f citizens to inherit private property according to law’. See the English version o f  
the 1954 Constitution, in Albert P. Blaustein, ed., Fundamental Legal Documents o f  Communist China 
(South Hackensack, New Jersey: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1962). The content o f Article 11 o f the 
1954 Constitution was restated in Article 9 o f the 1975 Constitution, but ‘the right to inherit private 
property’ was abandoned in the 1975 Constitution.
3 In this thesis, the Pinyin ($ fe f ) system has been used in the romanisation o f Mandarin, including 
Chinese names. The Pinyin system is different from the Wade-Giles (now Taiwanese) system. Chinese 
names are cited in their Chinese order: family name comes first, followed by given name.
4 See Pitman Potter, ‘Globalization and Economic Regulation in China: Selective Adaptation o f  
Globalized Norms and Practices’, Washington University Global Studies Law Review 2, no. 119 
(2003), 126-127.
5 The term ‘transition’ implies a clear trend and a foreseeable outcome. For example, Athar Hussian 
argues that ‘the term “transition” embodied the hope that the economies in question would become 
well-functioning market economies in the foreseeable future’. See Athar Hussian, Lessons o f  the 
Transition fo r  Understanding the Function o f  Markets (2003), paper for the ADB (Vietnam) project on 
Making Markets Work for the Poor. ‘Transformation’ is used in this thesis rather than ‘transition’ to 
keep the analysis neutral and to leave the question of how much change open.
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property has been set in motion by market reform in three ownership sectors, 
conceptualised in the PRC as relatively distinct: through the processes of dismantling 
rural communes, the permitting of private enterprises, the reform of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and the emergence of urban property markets. Along with these 
processes, the status of private ownership has been gradually recognised by law.
Yet in contrast to the relatively neat distinction between public and private ownership 
defined in law, the forms of property in reality are not so clear cut. Absolute 
ownership has been fragmented into the ‘contractual management rights’ (chengbao 
jingying quart of collectively owned rural land, the ‘enterprise
management rights’ (qiye jingying quan of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), the ‘land use rights’ (LURs) {tudi shiyong quan of
state-owned urban land and so on. However, this process of property rights 
fragmentation is one of decollectivisation without the rise of individualism. Instead, 
decollectivisation has given rise to hybrid forms of property, and it is now difficult to 
draw clear boundaries between the public and the private in property rights. The gap 
between the legal definition of ownership and the social reality of ownership poses 
important questions: what do ‘the public’ and ‘the private’ in property rights really 
mean in light of ownership in modem China? Can we draw a clear line between the 
public and private in property rights? In the profound socio-economic transformation, 
identities and boundaries are being dismantled and reconfigured. Exploring the 
nature of ‘the public’ and ‘the private’ in China cannot avoid defining ‘the social’.
The thesis is divided into eight parts. The first part is this introductory chapter that is 
intended to fulfil three tasks: to make clear the method in this work; to clarify the 
theoretical perspectives adopted in this study; and to provide some historical 
background to the distinction between the public and private in traditional, Maoist 
and post-Mao China. Chapter Two explores property and property rights in their
historical and cultural contexts, and the focus is on late imperial6 and Republican 
China. Chapter Three looks at property law reform and current property law in China. 
Chapter Three gives readers especially those not familiar with Chinese property law 
reform and the property law system a clear view of the legal definition of ownership. 
Chapter Four explores the transformation of collective ownership in rural China. 
Chapter Five deals with the change of state ownership in market reform. Chapters 
Four and Five explore the in-depth reasons for property law reform. Moreover, 
comparing Chapter Three with Chapters Four and Five will highlight the fact that the 
legal understanding of property rights and property rights as understood and 
practised in society often diverge significantly. Chapter Six looks at emerging private 
ownership in urban China and the urban property market. Chapter Seven explores 
land disputes and conflicts in both urban and rural China. The conclusion (Chapter 
Eight) summarises the findings of this research, and makes some predictions about 
the future of private property in China and how private property in the future will 
affect China’s ongoing transformation. The postscript analyses recent changes to the 
rural land system and the urban-rural divide.
2. Brief reflections on Western discourses on Chinese law
Although a comparative approach is adopted throughout this thesis, this research is 
not an exercise in comparative law: this is a dissertation about China and about how 
China has selectively and unevenly readmitted some ideas of private property into 
different parts of its landscape in the post-1978 era. Here it is worthwhile to reflect 
briefly upon ‘Western’ discourses on Chinese law.
Albeit holding different points of view on Chinese law, one of the methods that such 
studies of Chinese law share is drawing comparisons between China and ‘the West’.
6 In this thesis, late imperial China refers to the late Yuan, Ming, and Qing. The main focus is on the 
Ming and the Qing.
Over the centuries, some influential social thinkers -  from Weber to contemporary 
legal thinkers such as Unger -  in the West have addressed the nature of the Chinese 
legal tradition. They regard Chinese law as a victim of ‘Oriental Despotism’ by using 
the Western/European standards, for example, the modemity-tradition dichotomy and 
‘rationality’ as the criteria. They argue that Chinese law does not measure up to the 
Western ideal of law, nor does it guarantee civil liberties and individual rights.
Current legal experts or the ‘law-and-society’ scholars (for example, Lubman or 
Peerenboom) on Chinese law now tend to look beyond legal rules and legal
Q
institutions when observing Chinese law. Lubman argues that ‘the legal bird [in 
China] remains in its own cage’, and China does not yet have a well-functioning 
legal system.9 Lubman has correctly pointed out the link between law and the role of 
the Party-state, in which Party control serves as the cage for the Chinese legal system. 
Peerenboom’s view on Chinese law is more optimistic. He argues that although there 
have been many problems with the Chinese legal system, China is moving towards a 
‘thin’ version of the rule of law.10 These scholars do stress the relation between law 
and society. However, they still counterpose China to ‘the West’ and adopt a limited 
approach—‘understanding China through Chinese law’.11 They tend to judge 
Chinese law by the expectations of Americans especially foreign investors in China. 
For example, Lubman adopts a functionalist approach for studying Chinese law. He 
looks for the functions of legal institutions while neglecting both informal 
institutions and socio-economic conditions that affect how law really works in China. 
Moreover, assuming that the transformation of China is a linear historical process,
7 See e.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism o f  Social Theory 
(New York: Free Press, 1976); Max Weber, The Religion o f  China: Confucianism and Taoism, trans. 
Hans H. Gerth (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951).
8 See e.g., Stanley Lubman, ed., Chinas Legal Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); 
Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reforms in China after Mao (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1999); Stanley Lubman [et al], ed., Enlarging the Law in China: State, Society, and Possibilities 
fo r  Justice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Randall Peerenboom, China s Long March 
toward Rule o f Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
9 See Lubman, Bird in a Cage, 2.
10 See generally Peerenboom, China’s Long March toward Rule o f  Law.
11 For example, Lubman argues that his work ‘seeks to enhance Western understanding o f China by 
studying its contemporary legal institutions’. See Lubman, Bird in the Cage, 1.
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Lubman uses dichotomies such as tradition versus modernity, and China versus the
19West when making the comparison.
11Potter reviews various perspectives on the role of law in China. By emphasising 
‘institutional capacity’ and ‘local legal culture’ when addressing the question of 
Chinese law, Potter argues that the Chinese legal regime (for example, property law) 
needs to be understood ‘by reference to a dynamic of selective adaptation of norms 
associated with globalization’.14 But Potter still uses the Western standards to judge 
Chinese law, and expects that in the long run, Chinese law should match expectations 
about ‘compliance with WTO and other norms of globalization’.15 To some extent, 
Potter’s analysis has polarised China and ‘the West’, the local and the global. 
Moreover, although Potter has analysed the institutional sphere such as governance 
of China,16 he sees legal reform in China as a ‘top-down’ project, while neglecting 
the grassroots initiatives and their implications for legal transformations in China.
3. Discourses, research sources and methods
In this study greatest attention is devoted to post-Mao China, although late imperial, 
Republican, and Mao’s China have also been discussed. Post-Mao China has been 
emphasised because as socialism is still predominant, at least at the ideological level, 
post-Mao China is often counterposed to capitalist countries in the West. 
Communism was meant to involve the supersession of private property and the
12 For example, Lubman argues that ‘Contemporary Chinese legal institutions must be understood 
against a background o f traditions and ways o f thought that long antedate the People’s Republic and 
markedly differ from their Western counterparts’. See ibid, 11.
13 See e.g., Pitman B. Potter, ‘Legal Reform in China— Institutions, Culture and Selective Adaptation’, 
Law & Social Inquiry 2, no. 4 (2004): 465-495.
14 See Pitman B. Potter, The Chinese Legal System: Globalization and Local Legal Culture (London: 
Routledge, 2001); Pitman B. Potter, ‘Globalization and Economic Regulation in China: Selective 
Adaptation o f  Globalized Norms and Practices’; Pitman B. Potter, ‘Legal Reform in
China— Institutions, Culture and Selective Adaptation’; Pitman B. Potter, ‘Selective Adaptation and 
Institutional Capacity: Perspectives on Human Rights in China’, International Journal 61, no. 2 
(2006): 389-407.
15 Potter,‘Globalization and Economic Regulation in China’: 150.
16 See e.g., Pitman B. Potter, ‘Governance o f China’s Periphery: Balancing Local Autonomy and 
National Polity’, Columbia Journal o f  Asian Law 19, no. 1 (2005): 293-322.
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organisation of social life in communal terms. Yet the revival of private property 
seems to have diverted post-Mao China from its commitment to socialism, and this 
trajectory of change provides an important perspective to examine what China is or is 
becoming. Land ownership has been selected as the focus of this study because it is a
17sensitive and critical issue especially in transforming countries such as China.
Land ownership is attached to ideology, and is one of the most important criteria to 
draw the lines between capitalism and socialism.
There is a large literature on the transformation of property rights and the 
re-emergence of private property in post-Mao China. Some studies have concentrated
1 fton Civil Law and property law reform in post-Mao China. Some studies have 
looked at the transformation of property rights in the context of economic reform,19
70especially in the state-owned sector. Some economists have also devoted
71themselves to the analysis of the ‘Chinese style of privatisation’. Some works have
77examined how changing institutions shape property rights in rural China. Some
7^
studies have explored emerging private ownership in the urban property market. 
Some works have examined the consequence of the revival of private business and
17 See Peter Ho, ‘Contesting Rural Spaces: Land Disputes, Customary Tenure and the State in China’, 
in Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, 2nd edition, ed. Elizabeth Perry and Mark Selden 
(London: Routledge, 2003), 93.
18 See e.g., Chen Jianfu, From Administrative Authorisation to Private Law: A Comparative 
Perspective o f  the Developing Civil Law in the People s Republic o f  China (Dordrecht; London: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1995c); Frank Xianfeng Huang, ‘The Path to Clarity: Development o f Property 
Rights in China’, Columbia Journal o f  Asian Law  17, no. 2 (2004): 191-223. On literature in Chinese, 
see Chapter Three on property law reform in detail.
19 See e.g., Jean C. Oi and Andrew G. Walder, eds. Property Rights and Economic Reform in China 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).
20 See e.g., Shahid Yusuf, Kaoru Nabeshima, and Dwight H. Perkins, Under New Ownership: 
Privatizing China’s State-Owned Enterprises (Washington: World Bank, 2006c).
21 See e.g., Cao Yuanzheng, Qian Yingyi and Barry R. Weingast, ‘From Federalism, Chinese Style to 
Privatization, Chinese Style’, Economic o f  Transition 7, no. 1 (1999): 103-131; Jeffrey Saches, Wing 
Thye Woo, and Yang Xiaokai, ‘Economic Reform and Constitutional Transition’, CID Working 
Papers, no. 43 (2000).
22 See e.g., Jay Chih-Jou Chen, Transforming Rural China: How Local Institutions Shape Property 
Rights in Rural China (New York: Routledge, 2004); Peter Ho, ‘Who Owns China’s Land? Policies, 
Property Rights and Deliberate Institution Ambiguity’, The China Quarterly, no. 166 (2001): 394-421; 
Hsing You-tien, ‘Broking Power and Property in China’s Townships’, The Pacific Review 19, no. 1 
(2006): 103-124.
23 See e.g., Ding Chengri and Song Yan eds., Emerging Land and Housing Markets in China 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Lincoln Institute o f Land Policy, 2005c); Li Ling Hin, Urban Land Reform in 
Shanghai (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996).
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its political implications.24 But reforms in the three sectors—the collective sector, 
the state-owned sector and the private sector—are not separate but related issues. 
Although there have been extensive studies that focus on each aspect of the 
transformation of property rights and the revival of private property, there has been a 
lack of a systematic and integrated study which grasps the overall picture. This thesis 
is intended to fill this gap in the existing literature.
The main research approach employed in this study is socio-legal. This approach 
emphasises that property rights,25 governance and socio-economic conditions are 
closely linked. Governance is defined as ‘the totality of processes and arrangements, 
both formal and informal, by which power and public authority are distributed and 
regulated’.26 The study of governance has two aspects: the study of formal political 
institutions including the government and the judiciary at central and local levels; 
and the study of informal institutions, for example, ‘patron-clientelism and 
networks’.27 In the examination of governance in China, this study focuses on the 
relationship between two levels of political power and public authority—central 
(Beijing) and local government (province/municipality, city at the prefectural level, 
county and city at the county level, and township/district).28 Although villages are
24 See e.g., Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalist in China: The Chinese Communist Party, Private 
Entrepreneurs, and Political Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Jonathan 
Unger, ‘ “Bridges”: Private Business, The Chinese Government and the Rise o f New Associations’, 
The China Quarterly, no. 147 (Sep., 1996): 795-819.
25 On the definition o f ownership and property rights in law, see Chapter Three.
26 Jude Howell, ‘Governance Matters: Key Challenges and Emerging Tendencies’, in Governance in 
China, ed. Jude Howell (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 2.
27 See ibid, 2.
28 Below the central government, the provincial level consists o f 22 provinces (sheng ^f), five 
autonomous regions (zizhi qu §  E ), four municipalities (zhixia shi Jf^tTtT) o f Beijing, Shanghai,
Tianjin, and Chongqing, and two special administrative regions (tebie xingzheng qu $ t E )  o f
Hong Kong and Macau. The prefectural level consists o f prefectures (di fife), autonomous prefectures
(zizhi zhou §  Vn jl’H), and prefecture-level cities (diji shi JtkiKTff), and leagues (meng SI). The county 
level includes counties (xian JL), autonomous counties (zizhi xian §  H-), county-level cities (xianji
shi Jr^TfJ), and districts (qu E )  in urban areas. Townships (xiangzhen .^IH) in rural areas are at the 
lowest level o f local governments. The grassroots level comprises o f village committees (cunmin 
weiyuanhui ^?) in rural areas and neighbourhood committees (jumin weiyuanhui
^ )  in urban areas. Village committees and neighbourhood committees are ‘self-governing mass 
organizations at the grassroots level’ (ficeng qunzhong zizhixing zuzhi 3SM!>¥;& §  f4£S.£R),
according to Article 111 o f  the 2004 Constitution. Also see Kellee S. Tsai, ‘Off Balance: The 
Unintended Consequences o f Fiscal Federalism in China’, Journal o f  Chinese Political Science 9, no.
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not considered a formal part of local governments, villages are also objects of study 
at the local level. This study illustrates how different forms of property and property 
rights have been shaped by governance. The ambiguity of property rights in China 
has been largely due to the complexity of governance.
Governance and socio-economic conditions are interrelated and interact on each 
other; both affect property rights. Governance and socio-economic conditions are 
both in dynamic change. This study finds that there is usually a gap between formal 
institutions and socio-economic conditions: the modification of formal institutions 
often lags behind changes in socio-economic conditions; socio-economic conditions 
generate informal institutions (for example, customary and informal land use), some 
of which stand in sharp contrast to formal political institutions and laws. In the 
context of post-Mao China, one of the important reasons for this is the tension 
between economic reform and the socialist legacy. The ambiguity of property rights 
in China is due largely to this tension. Moreover, there are grey areas that cross over 
the boundaries between formal and informal institutions, legal and extralegal 
property rights. This gap has been made use of by local officials and entrepreneurs.
Throughout the study a comparative approach is also adopted, but China and the 
West should not be treated as polar opposites. First, we need to examine the very
90meaning of ‘China’. We need to note how large and varied China remains. The
2 (2004): 4.
29 See e.g., Kerry Brown, Struggling Giant: China in the 21st Century (London: Anthem Press, 2007), 
Chapter 2.
In Translucent Mirror, Pamela Crossley argues that the Qing conquest represents a dramatic turn in 
the governance o f China. The mechanism o f Qing governance was an emperorship, which could rule a 
domain in parts. One o f the questions Qing governance provoked was how to define ‘China’ and the 
‘Chinese’. Pamela Crossley summarises the Qing regime in the eighteenth century as follows:
In the eighteenth century, the Qing reached its height o f political control (over Manchuria, 
Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, Tibet, and China, as well as the states recognizing Qing superiority 
in the system o f court visitation, sometimes called the “tributary system”); o f economic power 
(ensnaring Europe in an unbalanced trade relationship based on Qing exports o f tea, porcelain, 
silk, and other goods); and o f military expansion (with ongoing campaigns in Southeast Asia as 
well as suppression o f disaffected groups—whether “ethnically” or socially defined— within the 
empire). This golden age was represented in the rule o f the Qianlong emperor, the most 
“Confucian,” “sinified,” or simply grandest o f  the Qing rulers. After his abdication in 1796 and 
death in 1799, the empire went into a “decline,” during which it became vulnerable to the
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variations of localities are manifested in China’s geography, dialects, ethnic 
differences, political cultures, and so on. Therefore, to study China, the choice is 
usually between a macro-study of the system or the structure of the whole country 
and a micro-study of a locality (for example, a province, a city or a village, usually 
through fieldwork). The problem with the study of a specific locality is that a 
conclusion to a study that is relevant or useful for a locality (for example, Henan 
province) is not necessarily relevant or useful for another (for example, Hunan 
province).
Secondly, China, at least since market reform and ‘opening-up’ commenced in 1978, 
is no longer a closed society largely shut off from most of the outside world.30 
Post-Mao China has been transformed into a society that communicates and interacts 
with the outside world. It is thus necessary to rethink the dichotomy of global versus 
local: ‘global’ and ‘local’ perspectives do not stand in sharp contrast; rather, they 
interact with each other.31
Thirdly, the countries in the capitalist West are of course not homogenous. For 
example, law in ‘the West’ includes both common law and Civil Law traditions; we 
also need to distinguish the American and the Western European patterns of 
state-building and their relationships to social change. Similarly, China is an example 
of ‘the non-West’, but it cannot represent the totality. Categories such as ‘the West’ 
and ‘the non-West’ are therefore problematic, and are avoided wherever possible in 
the present study.32
expansionist, colonialist, and imperialist actions o f Europe, the United States, and eventually 
Japan.
Pamela Kyle Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology 
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2002), 3.
30 See W. T. Murphy, ‘Durkheim in China’, in Law and Sociology, ed., Michael Freeman (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 108-118.
31 See Sari Wastell, ‘Presuming Scale, Making Diversity’, Critique o f  Anthropology 21, no. 2 (2001): 
185
32 Quotation marks are used when referring to these categories.
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This research is based on primary and secondary sources, drawing on both English 
and Chinese language materials. Secondary sources are the major source due to the 
nature of this study, that is, a macro-study of the whole system. These secondary 
sources are available in textbooks, academic journals, reports by international 
organisations, public lectures, electronic databases, online resources and newspaper 
reports. Newspaper reports provide a valuable source of information on current cases 
in relation to property rights as understood and practiced in social reality, involving 
the enforcement of property right, land disputes and the role of local governments. 
Moreover, as practices vary in different localities, newspaper reports provide a wide 
coverage of different areas of China, and this is helpful for us to grasp the broad 
picture.
Although no fieldwork that uses surveys and questionnaires in a specific locality has 
been undertaken, primary sources have also been collected from interviews with 
Chinese government officials, judges, lawyers, retired cadres, enterprise employees, 
laid-off workers, farmers, and entrepreneurs. Primary sources also involve discussion 
with Chinese academics, and visits to villages, enterprises and chambers of 
commerce. I did an internship at the Higher-Level People’s Court in Henan Province 
between August 2003 and October 2003.1 worked with judges in a civil chamber 
(<minting where cases in relation to property and rural land disputes were dealt 
with. I audited trials and discussions of the collegiate bench (heyi ting - p iM ) .  I 
also carried out a two-week study of cases relating to property and land disputes at 
the same civil chamber in March 2006. The experiences of internship and study in 
the court provide materials on the sources of property disputes, dispute resolution 
and judicial practice.
As socialism is still the predominant ideology in China, both intended and 
unintended bias resulting from ideological viewpoints can be found in some Chinese 
literature. Media outside China also has some biased reporting due to the hostility 
towards socialism. The problems with accuracy and reliability of sources cannot be
2 0
easily overcome, but this study tries to draw on a wide range of literature, and does 
not confine itself to a few sources or any ideological orientation. Moreover, analysis 
of secondary sources is combined and compared with primary sources in order to 
achieve a relatively objective and impartial assessment. Primary sources have 
corroborated the choices of secondary sources. In terms of statistics, the data in this 
thesis is drawn from statistics released by the Chinese government and international 
organisations. But we should note that China is not a completely open society. The 
Chinese media are under control of the Party-state, and the reliability of polling and 
statistics is questionable. This clearly adds difficulties to this library-based study, and 
becomes one of the weaknesses of the sources collected for this study.
4. Theoretical Perspectives
Currently, controversies in China surrounding the revival of private property and its 
implications for what modem China is or is becoming can be grouped into three 
camps. The first is liberalism {ziyou zhuyi §  Ef3ifeJ«0 or neo-liberalism33 {xin ziyou 
zhuyi iff ^  & i  X ) that regards free markets, individual liberty and private property 
rights protected by ‘the rule of law’ as the sine qua non for sustained economic 
growth. Neo-liberalists have been largely influenced by the writings of Ronald Coase 
in which ‘transaction costs’ are the key to understanding of economic institutions.34 
The second is the so-called ‘new left’35 {xin zuopai §It2EM) who cherish some 
ill-defined new collectivism and warn against the dangers of diminishing
33 This side is influenced by mainstream economists in the West who interpret their mission as 
promoting ‘neo-classical’ ideas, including those o f Ronald Coase and Richard Posner. Also see F. A. 
Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement o f  the Liberal Principles o f  Justice and 
Political Economy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982). For the analysis on Chinese 
neo-liberalists see e.g. Wang Hui, China s New Order: Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition, 
ed. Theodore Huters (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).
34 See e.g., R. H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica 4, no. 16 (1937): 386-405; R. H. Coase, 
‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal o f  Law and Economics (Oct. 1960): 1-44.
35 The new-left in China is an ideological tendency in opposition to capitalism that first arose in the 
mid-1990s. It criticises the problems faced by China during its modernisation such as inequality and 
the widening gap between the rich and the poor. On the new-left see Wang Hui, ‘Contemporary 
Chinese Thought and the Question o f Modernity’, in Whither China: Intellectual Politics in 
Contemporary China, ed., Zhang Xudong (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 161-198; Zheng 
Yongnian, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization and International Relations 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 52-69.
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state-ownership and encroachments upon social equality. The third tendency is the 
rise of so-called ‘post-neo-Confucianism’ (hou xinruxue jp ‘which in some
cases has informed the attitudes’ of [so-called] “authoritarian pragmatists’” .36 Both 
post-neo-Confucianism and the new-lefit share a common attitude towards 
highlighting the role of the state and of corporatism as well as cherishing the past (for 
example, the possibility of a synthesis of socialism and Confucianism).
These three camps are all within the narratives of ‘linear History’. The 
transformation of China has been assumed to be an evolutionary process: the past has 
been packaged into ‘feudalism’, the present into ‘socialism’ (with Chinese 
characteristics), and the future perhaps into ‘capitalism’, although China ‘lacks the 
institutional apparatus that has accompanied the consolidation of capitalism in the 
West’. In addition, the transformation of China’s property regime has become a 
historical analysis emphasising ‘discontinuity’ and transition to ‘modernity’ (for 
example, nation-building).
Yet in fact there was as much discontinuity as continuity in Chinese history;39 
clarifying this point is important for an examination of the transformation of private 
property and revival of private property in post-Mao China. Examples in late 
imperial China include the Yuan-Ming-Qing transitions, and recent examples involve 
the turbulences in Maoist China, as well as Deng’s reforms that jettison the ‘class 
struggle’ in the Mao era. The Ming (AD 1368-1644) expelled the Yuan (AD 
1271-1368), and then the governance of the Ming was displaced by the rule of the 
Qing. The question of the Qing emperorship is how the Qing emperors then 
governed a multi-national and multicultural empire? Some works challenge the
36 See Geremie Barme, In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999), 4.
37 History with a capital H  emphasises the linear model o f Enlightenment History. See Prasenjit 
Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives o f  Modem China (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), 4.
38 W. T. Murphy, ‘China’s Laws and Flaws’, Modem Law Review 70, no. 6 (2007): 1008.
39 This is the method by which Professor Tim Murphy approaches Chinese history. See e.g., ibid: 
1008-1022.
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‘sinicisation model’ because these works reveal that the Manchu were conscious of 
their separate ethnicity.40 One of the Manchu’s important and innovative institutions 
was the bannermen system 41 The Qing divided civil and military functions along 
(partially) ethnic lines through the bannermen system,42 particularly in the Qianlong 
court (AD 1736-1795).
All governments and conquest regimes in particular need ideologies.43 Continuity 
and discontinuity have also been seen in these governmental ideologies. For example, 
there was continuity in legal thought in historical China, and the continuity was 
manifested in the dynastic legal codes from the Tang to the Qing. The first great 
Chinese code was enacted in AD 654 during the Tang dynasty. The subsequent great 
codes of the Song (AD 960-1279), Yuan and Ming followed the model of the Tang 
great code, and the Qing rulers began to re-edit the Ming code in 1646 and expanded 
it. The final form was renamed as Da Qing Ltl Li The Great Qing Code
with Substatutes) in 1740 44 Yet the Qing governmental system and its ideology 
were rather different from that of the Ming. For the Qing emperors, the question was 
how to escape from the predicament of being regarded as an alien people and how to 
manage the ‘forced integration of Chinese [hua and barbarians [yi M ]’.45 In the
Qianlong emperorship, when ‘the ideological relationship between the ruler and the 
ruled completed another turn’,46 cultural difference (in which race determined
40 See e.g., Evelyn Rawski, The Last Emperors: A Social History o f  Qing Imperial Institutions 
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1998); Pamela Kyle Crossley, Orphan Warriors: Three 
Manchu Generations and the End o f  the Qing World (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 
1990c); Crossley, A Translucent Mirror.
41 See the banner system in detail in Section 3.4 o f Chapter Two.
42 According to Crossley, when the ‘Eight Banners’ (baqi J \M )  began to form after 1601, Manchus, 
Mongol, and Chinese-martial were incorporated into the banners, and this classification was according 
to ‘race’ and ‘with little reference to ancestors’. See Crossley, Orphan Warriors, 5.
43 According to Crossley, ‘ideology’ is ‘the tendency o f an individual or group to organize its 
sensations, or knowledge, in particular ways and to attempt to express the resulting ideas’. See the 
analysis on the difference between ‘philosophy’ and ‘ideology’ in Crossley, A Translucent Mirror,
225.
44 See e.g., Fu Bingchang’s introduction in Hsia Ching-lin, James L. E. Chow, and Chang Yukon, The 
Civil Code o f  the Republic o f  China (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1930), ix; Derk Bodde and Clarence 
Morris, Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 Ch’ing Dynasty Cases (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1967), 5-63.
45 See Crossley, A Tranlucent Mirror, 247.
46 ibid, 2.
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culture) and ‘proof of universal competence’ were important.47 Ironically, the 
Manchu ethnic consciousness was reinforced during the Republican revolution and 
afterwards in opposition to Manchu rule.48
Similarly, continuity and discontinuity can also be found in political institutions. The 
Qing’s bureaucracy laid the foundation for China’s process of political 
modernisation,49 and the modernisation of the Chinese government began with the 
late Qing reforms and persisted through the Republican period and onwards.50 Both 
continuity and discontinuity in political institutions can be seen in Republican, Mao 
and post-Mao China, and this will be examined in detail in various chapters of this 
thesis. More discussion will be devoted to post-Mao China.
With regard to the distinction between the public and the private, there is as much 
continuity as discontinuity. Brown has argued that observers on China are divided 
into two camps. One camp believes that China has not been much affected by outside 
influence in the last century; nothing from outside can take root without being 
modified (for example, Marxism-Leninism is labelled as Marxism-Leninism with 
Chinese characteristics in China), and the borrowing of foreign law is also injected 
into Party policy considerations. Others regard China as ‘a complicated empty space 
highly receptive to external influence’.51 My study agrees with the first camp. There 
are mechanisms and institutions in China to modify Western influence, and one 
example is that the founders of the PRC absorbed a certain amount of Western 
rhetoric in creating their revolutionary discourses. To the extent the kind of 
discourses is still alive in the official rhetoric of the CPC in the post-1978 era. Thus, 
it is useful to explore the public/private distinction in Chinese thought and the space 
it made available for the creation of the revolutionary discourse and the reform
47 See ibid, 270.
48 Crossley, Orphan Warriors, 5.
49 See Thomas A. Metzger, The Internal Organization o f  Ch ’ing Bureaucracy: Legal, Normative, and 
Communication Aspects (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), 1.
50 See Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, 96.
51 See Brown, Struggling Giant, 98.
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discourse. This examination helps us to clarify certain aspects of the recent history of 
post-1978 China and the selective re-admission of private property into the 
socio-economic framework in the name of reform and opening-up. Governmental 
distinctions between city and countryside and between the public and private (for 
example, private and state-owned enterprises, public and private property rights), and 
how these distinctions have evolved and changed during the history of post-1949 
China, also tell us something about Chinese ideas of rulership or ‘the role of the 
state’. The transformation of the public/private distinction in property rights also 
contributes to our broader and comparative understanding of property law. It is thus 
necessary to give an historical account of the Chinese public/private distinction with 
special reference to ownership in the following section of this chapter.
Under the theoretical scheme of analysing China’s transformation, in which there is 
as much continuity and discontinuity, the hypotheses of this research are: if property 
rights were not clear cut in imperial China because of the blurred distinction between 
the public and the private, present-day China should also see the same fragmentation 
of property rights, despite ruptures and revolutions especially during the Maoist era. 
On the other hand, the nature of property rights may not remain unchanged in 
post-Mao China because of the socialist legacy and the injected new elements such 
as market forces and foreign legal institutions into the socialist property system. It is 
thus worth examining the changing nature of property rights in post-Mao China, and 
the manner in which the legal and governmental systems deal with this issue. In 
order to test these hypotheses, we also need to explore the rapid change in 
socio-economic conditions.
5. The public-private distinction, property rights and state-making: 
a historical background
Before introducing the public-private distinction in both historical and modem China, 
it is necessary to have a brief review of private property in ‘the West’. If ‘the West’
has a general prevailing theory of private property, it is often traced back to John 
Locke and labelled ‘possessive individualism’. In ‘the West’, there are many other 
theories of private property: property as expectation according to Bentham, property 
as mediation to recognition according to Hegel, the economic analysis of property 
and so on. However, the question about ‘private’ property in modem world is how 
‘private’ and how tied to ‘individuals’ private property is.52 For example, the idea of 
‘private property’ has been challenged by the rise of joint ventures, cultural property 
and the shift from ‘ownership’ to ‘access’.53 There are many critiques about 
‘possessive individualism’ in the modem world. For example, Arendt has labelled 
Locke’s ‘possessive individualism’ as ‘the modem equation of property and wealth 
on one side and propertylessness and poverty on the other’.54 Murphy, Roberts, and 
Flessas argue that ‘whatever our ideological commitments, [we need to] look beyond 
individualism’.55 Pottage borrows Arendt’s distinction between wealth and property, 
and argues that private property becomes ‘the much more modem problem of the 
accumulation and regulation of private and social wealth, or the political ordering of 
the social’.56 Alan Ryan also argues that ‘property rights are nowadays important 
because they are rights rather than because they are property rights’.57 In the 
Chinese context, concepts and connotations of private property and the private 
sphere keep changing, and are different from the ‘Western’ discourses.
52 W. T. Murphy, Simon Roberts, and Tatiana Flessas, Understanding Property Law, 4ed. (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), 22.
53 See e.g., Jeremy Rifkin, The Age o f  Access: The New Culture o f  Hypercapitalism, Where All o f  Life 
Is a Paid-for Experience (New York: J.R Tarcher/Putnam, 2000c).
54 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2ed. (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1998), 61. 
Arendt argues that: ‘.. .wealth and property, far from being the same, are o f an entirely different nature. 
Originally, property meant no more or less than to have one’s location in a particular part of the world 
and therefore to belong to the body politics, that is, to be head o f one o f the families which together 
constituted the public realm’.
55 See Murphy, Roberts, and Flessas, Understanding Property Law, 16.
56 Alain Pottage, ‘Property: Re-Appropriating Hegel’, The Modem Law Review 53, no.2 (1990): 259.
57 Alan Ryan, Property and Political Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 192. Italics are in the 
original.
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5.1. Pre-1949 China
The term ‘the private’ has differing connotations in English and in Chinese. In 
English, the private refers to the ‘personal, individual, and independent’ as opposed 
to the public. This is what underpins the notion of ‘private property’ and the theory of 
private property that is usually taken to start with Locke. In Chinese the nearest 
Chinese equivalent to the word private is si. Si refers to zisi (selfish §  fA) and often 
implies something shameful and illegitimate.59 This usage of zisi could trace its 
origin back to Huang Zongxi’s writings60 in the late Ming and early Qing. Zisi was 
inferior to gong (public), which means altruism, justice and fairness. Si was always 
negative, while gong was emphasised as a moral ideal.61 But although gong is the 
best equivalent in Chinese to ‘the public sphere’, elite and mass participation, such as 
it was, in local public affairs in the late Qing and Republican China did not equal 
the existence of the public sphere.
The Chinese locus classicus of the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ is found 
in the Confucian Book o f Poetry’s (shijing 1 ^ 5 ) ‘may it first rain on our public fields, 
and then upon our private’ (yu wo gongtian, sui j i  wosi EH, iHi&ffc^A),63 or
in Mencius’ (mengzi ‘and not till the public work is finished, may they 
presume to attend to their private affairs’ (gongshi bi ranhou ganzhi sis hi $$
jpl&^nfAlpQ.64 The moral ideal of Confucianism is ‘great altruism without 
selfishness’ (dagong wusi In these Confucian writings, gong (public
sphere) is nearly equivalent to guo (PH), the emperor’s family and the throne, and
58 See Philip C. C. Huang, ‘Biculturality in Modem China and in Chinese Studies’, Modem China 26, 
no. 1 (2000): 4.
59 See ibid: 5; Xiandai Hanyu Cidian [Modem Chinese Dictionary] (Beijing: Shanwu Yinshuguan, 
1991), 1030.
60 See Huang Zongxi’s ‘Yuanjun’ [On rulership], in Huang Zongxi, Mingyi Daifanglu [Waitingfor the 
Dawn: A Plan for the Prince] (Beijing: Guji Chubanshe, 1955 [1662]).
61 See Huang, Bichulturality in Modem China and in Chinese Studies’, 5; Xiandai Hanyu Cidian 
[M odem Chinese Dictionary], 386.
62 See e.g., William T. Rowe, Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796-1895 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989); David Strand, Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics 
in the 1920s (Berkeley: University o f California University Press, 1989).
63 Shijing-Xiaoya-Datian [Book o f Poetry-Book o f Odes-Farm Work], iW&t. • • ^EE|)>
64 Mengzi-Teng Weng Gong Shang [Mencius-Teng Weng Gong I], • 0 3 t£ -_ t ) )  , quoted in
Metzger, The Internal Organization o f  Ch ‘ing Bureaucracy, 281.
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with complex bureaucracy,65 while si (private sphere) is similar to min (the people 
|^).66 Gong is superior to si. Nevertheless, the boundaries between gong and si were 
vague in traditional China. As Elman puts it ‘where gentry associations based on 
nonkinship ties were defined as “private” [si]...social organizations based on descent
fnwere perceived as “public” [gong]'.
Guo does not deliver the same meanings as nation or state. The private (si) usually 
refers to kinship, not the individual.68 ‘The great rule of all by one emperor’ 
(dayitong —M) meant that China lacked the kind of civility and the division 
between public and private which took root in the West especially in the Civil Law 
tradition.69
The transition from ‘under heaven’ (tianxia ^c~F) to ‘the nation’ (guojia PSI^)70
71encapsulates much of the intellectual history of modem China, especially since the 
first Opium War (1839-1842). In the early twentieth century, the narratives of History 
and a new series of vocabularies such as feudalism (fengjian jfej"It), nation (guojia 0  
HC), revolution (geming p^L'np) and rights (quanli $(.^J) entered into the Chinese 
lexicon, especially through the intellectual discourses imported from Japan.72 The 
emergence of ‘rights’ in China was also a ‘translingual practice’ according to Lydia 
Liu: right (quanli) was used to translate ‘rights’ as early as the 1860s as a result of 
what might be termed ‘a round-trip diffusion’ of the Japanese kenri by Chinese
65 See e.g., Ray Huang, 1587, a Year o f  No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1981c).
66 See Metzger, The Internal Organization o f  Ch ’ing Bureaucracy, 281.
67 See Benjamin A. Elman, Classicism, Politics, and Kinship: The Ch 'ang-Chou School o f New Text 
Confucianism in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1990c), 34.
68 Liang Shuming, Zhongguo Wenhua Yaoyi [Gist o f  Chinese Culture] (Shanghai: Xuelin Chubanche, 
1986), 162-188.
69 In the common law systems this distinction has also remained fluid.
70 See Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modem Fate (London: Routledge, 2005), 
98-104.
71 ibid, 103. In the late 19th century Chinese intellectuals like Liang Qichao applied social Darwinism 
in Chinese political discourses, and introduced the ideas o f ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ to Chinese people. 
By using hanzu OiXJf^ ), the nation is ‘imagined’ by Chinese as a ‘Han lineage’. This could also be 
seen in the revolutionary discourses o f Sun Yat-sen, founder o f the Republican China. See Rawski, 
The Last Emperors, 2.
72 Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, 5.
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scholars visiting and returning from Japan.73 ‘The translation purged the classical 
Chinese term of its negative connotations associated with “power”, “money” and 
“privilege”’.74
Social Darwinism gave Chinese intellectuals opportunities to imagine Chinese 
history as an evolutionary progress towards a strong nation-state, while the past was 
labelled (and written off) as ‘feudalism’. However, the nation itself is ‘a highly
*JC 7 /T
contested phenomenon’, and it belongs to the realm of ‘imagined communities’, 
to borrow Anderson’s useful term. The narratives of History became even odder
77when the narratives of both ‘statist nationalism’ and a ‘fengjian (feudalism) —civil
70
society’ hybrid were joined together and entered the discourses of modernisation. 
According to Duara, the '‘fengjian—civil society’ hybrid was against the background 
that in ‘a revival of interest in civil society’, many scholars attempt to take the idea of 
civil society out of its modem Western context and place it in the context of Chinese
70history. This hybrid emerged in the late Ming and early Qing when gentry power in 
localities got consolidated, and served as a constraint and a critique of imperial
DA
power. The fengjian system was supported as gong because the fengjian system
could back up self-government and local autonomy, whereas the centralised imperial 
power was criticised as sz.81 In the case of the fengjian—civil society hybrid 
narrative, the modem is obsessed with the past—the Zhou feudal institutions.82 
However, the narratives of the fengjian—civil society hybrid which served as the
73 Lydia H. Liu, Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated 
Modernity—China, 1900-1937 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995c), 279.
74 ibid, 280.
75 Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, 3.
76 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Rejlections on the Origin and Spread o f  Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1991).
77 On ‘feudalism’ in relation to the public and the private see e.g., Duara, Rescuing History from the 
Nation, 147-175; Philip A. Kuhn, ‘Local Self-Government under the Republic: Problems o f Control, 
Autonomy, and Mobilization’, in Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China, ed. Frederic Wakeman 
Jr and Carolyn Grant (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1975), 257-298; Min Tu-ki, National 
Polity and Local Power: The Transformation o f  Late Imperial China, ed. Philip A. Kuhn and Timothy 
Brook (Boston, Mass.: Harvard University and the Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1989), 89-136.
78 Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, 161.
79 ibid, 147.
80 ibid, 153.
81 See Min, National Polity and Local Power, 89.
82 ibid, 90.
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counter-narrative of nationalism overlooked the complexity of China’s governance 
system—the tensions and interactions between the central government and local 
governments, and imagined nationalisms could be easily offset by equally imagined 
localisms.
Duara argues that if History is the condition on which modernity is possible, ‘the 
nation-state is the agency, the subject of History which will realize modernity’, and 
yet, as the subject of History, the nation-state is ‘never able to completely bridge the 
aporia between the past and the present’.84 Duara therefore proposes a method of 
historical narrative out of both constructionism (regarding the past as largely 
invented and imagined) and linear History. History-writing which serves the nation 
should be resisted.85
5.2. Mao and Now
In traditional China no clear legal and administrative distinction was drawn between 
cities and the countryside, even though symbolically or spatially the super status of 
the cities might be marked by surrounding city walls.86 Urbanisation and the 
formation of ‘modem’ cities in Republican China undermined such uniformity and 
gave birth to the urban-rural divide. The gap between the urban and the rural has 
become even wider in the post-1949 era. Mao’s revolutionary rhetoric was 
pro-village and anti-city, because the rural area in Southern China (for example, 
Jiangxi and Fujian) was his early revolutionary base. But in the post-1949 era, 
industrialisation was set, in emulation of the USSR, as the priority in state policy and 
state-building. The development of the city thereafter proceeded at the expense of the 
countryside, and the household registration system (huji zhidu made
83 Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, 20.
84 ibid, 29.
85 See generally ibid.
86 On rural-urban uniformity in traditional China see e.g., F. W. Mote, ‘The Transformation of 
Nanking, 1350-1400’, in The City in Late Imperial China, ed. G. William Skinner (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1977), 101-154.
87 Shortly after the free mobility at the beginning o f the new regime, the rigid household system was 
established in 1958. Mobility was prohibited, especially the mobility from the rural to the urban areas.
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the gap between the rural and the urban even wider. In parallel with consolidation of 
the rural-urban divide, the private sphere was contracted by the expansion of state 
intervention.
Notions of property consolidated in the Ming and Qing codes provide the backdrop 
for the Maoist definition of landlordism. Maoist rhetoric also absorbed Marxism to 
explain the historical development of Chinese society in terms of Marxist 
periodisation and the theory of ‘class struggle’.88 The definitions of ‘landlord’ and 
‘capitalist’ were examples of Mao’s governance technique— ‘making the past serve
OQ
the present and foreign things serve China’. All rural landowners were put into the 
category of ‘landlords’ {dizhu irrespective of the quantity and quality of the
land they owned; urban business owners were categorised as ‘capitalists’ (zibenjia 
and ‘petty proprietors’ (xiao yezhu Both landlordism and
capitalism were classified as private and evil.
Deng’s reform was based on Maoism but also registered a change of direction from 
Maoism. ‘The private’ has been gradually readmitted into the socio-economic 
framework, and the state has steadily retreated from the social welfare provision 
system that was led by the state during the Maoist era.90 In the post-1978 era, the 
long process of drafting a new property law (wuquanfa for China took
place against the backdrop of the development of the private sector and legislating to 
promote a ‘market economy’.91 The 1988 Constitution was amended to allow the
88 See e.g., Mao Zedong, ‘Hunan Nongmin Yundong Kaocha Baogao [Report on an Investigation of 
the Peasant Movement in Hunan’, ‘Zhongguo Gejieji de Fenxi [Analysis o f the Classes in Chinese 
Society’, in Mao Zedong Xuanji Diyijuan [Selected Works o f  Mao Zedong Vol. I] (Beijing: Remin 
Chubanche, 1961 [March 1927].
89 In a letter written to the Central Conservatoire in February 1964, Mao Zedong declared that in the 
realm o f culture, China has to ‘make the past serve the present and foreign things serve China’ (gu wei 
jin  yong, yang wei zhongyong  i*f Also see Geremie Barme, ‘History for the 
Masses’, in Using the Past to Serve the Present: Historiography and Politics in Contemporary China, 
260-286, ed. Jonathan Unger (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993c).
^  Here is the question is how to fill the gap left by the state-led provision system. We could look at 
the revival o f charity and charitable bodies in post-Mao China and the ‘internationalisation’ o f  
charitable efforts in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake disaster. This would be another interesting research 
topic in the future.
91 See Donald C. Clarke, ‘Legislating for a Market Economy in China’, The China Quarterly, no. 191
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transfer of land use rights, and the Provisional Regulation on the Grant and Transfer 
of Use Rights in Urban Land (1990) paved the way for the commodification of urban
09land. The Property Law came into effect in 2007; ownership is defined there as an 
absolute and supreme right.93 In formal, legal terms there is now a clear demarcation 
between state ownership, collective ownership and private ownership.
Yet the boundaries between the public and the private in reality are blurred in the 
complex relationship between central government and local government. Viewed in 
the light of Chinese history, the centre has had to deal with various ‘agents’ or 
‘middlemen’, especially local governments, and the tensions between the central and 
the local are even more obvious in the post-1978 era. The authority of the Party-state 
and the centralised control of Beijing have been weakened by marketisation, and 
economic power has been decentralised to local governments.94 The relationship 
between central and local government and its impact on property and governance 
will be examined in detail in the various chapters of this thesis.
(2007): 567-585.
92 The property law was promulgated by the National People’s Congress (NPC) on 16 March 2007, 
and implemented on 1 October 2007.
93 This conception o f ownership is based on the German Civil Law and adheres to the socialist
Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, ‘Dynamic Economy, Declining Party-State’, in 
The Paradox o f  China s Post-Mao Reform, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 17.
principles.
4 See Merle
Chapter 2: Property and Property Rights in Historical Context: Late 
Imperial and Republican China
1. Introduction
Most contemporary legal reformers in China confine themselves to the framework of 
Civil Law when they address questions arising from the property law reform (from 
1998 onwards in particular).1 This chapter challenges this approach by exploring 
property and property rights in their historical context, and argues that the unitary 
and exclusive property rights systems, imported during the late Qing and early 
Republican China from countries in the continent, were not driven by indigenous 
causes springing from Chinese society. Focusing on the fragmentation of the land 
tenure system2 in late imperial China, the aim of this chapter is not to fit the practice 
of fragmented landownership into the category of ‘property rights’, but to put 
fragmented landownership into its historical context and explore the emergence and 
nature of both the fragmented entities and the category of property rights itself.3
Late imperial China is quite an important period in China’s transformation: it is often 
said by Chinese intellectuals that China’s backward ‘feudal’ {fengjian or 
‘semi-feudal’ {ban fengjian H ) past was challenged by Westem-style
modernisation in this period.4 Various kinds of theories seek to explain the 
unprecedented social transformation in late imperial China, for example, ‘despotism’,
1 See Chapter Three in detail. The drafting o f a property law was put on the working agenda o f the 
Legislative Affairs Committee (LAC) o f the National People’s Congress in 1998.
2 In both historical and contemporary China, land is the most important form o f property. ‘Tenure’ 
refers to the relationship whereby a tenant ‘holds’ land o f a lord at the time o f Norman Conquest, and 
it could not be transposed to the description o f the Chinese land system, which is not based on 
feudalism. I use tenure here because it emphasises ‘holding’ as opposed to ‘owning’ and ‘a social fact’ 
as opposed to ‘a legal concept’. Therefore the term ‘tenure’ helps me to demonstrate the property 
relations in late imperial China; these property relations departed from dominium in civil law but to 
some extent resembled some aspects o f the common law practice. On feudal tenure see e.g., J. H. 
Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 4ed. (London: Butterworths, 2002), 223-243.
3 On this approach see Alain Pottage, ‘Introduction: The Fabrication o f Persons and Things’, in Law, 
Anthropology and the Constitution o f  the Social: Making Persons and Things, ed. Alain Pottage and 
Martha Mundy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3.
4 Peter C. Perdue, ‘Constructing Chinese Property Rights: East and West’, in Constituting Modernity: 
Private Property in the East and West, ed. Huri Islamoglu (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 39.
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‘the ultrastable structure of Chinese society’,5 ‘budding capitalism’, ‘civil society’, 
and ‘the third realm’. In the legal field, introduction of many aspects of continental 
Civil Law to China is considered one of the key elements constituting ‘modernity’ of 
China. However we need to question: does the transformation in late imperial China 
imply ‘the triumph of a universal project of modernity in China’? What role has ‘the 
past’ played and might yet play in the configuration of norms and orders?6
In terms of the property regime in late imperial China, there are also different schools 
of thoughts: one relies on the theory of ‘Oriental despotism’7 rather than on 
empirical research, the other presumes ‘a laissez-faire state’ and draws upon detailed 
examinations of archival sources in Chinese, especially land contracts and legal cases 
regarding land tenure. However, the social complexity in late imperial China cannot 
be fully captured by these two abstract models.8 In this chapter, the focus is on Qing 
and Republican China.9
2. Understanding civil ‘law’ in Qing and Republican China
In order to understand property and property rights in Qing and Republican China, it 
is necessary to look at civil ‘law’ in Qing and Republican China first. Civil translates 
as minshi in Chinese, literally ‘people’s matters’. The group of laws that
might be called ‘civil law’ in the Qing primarily concerned household and marriage 
(huhun #§), and also land and real estate {tiantu ffl i t ) ,  as well as money and debt 
(iqianzhai Such matters were often considered ‘minor things’ (xishi in
the Qing law.10 Specifically speaking, huhun refers to household, marriage, family
5 See generally Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, Xingshengyu Weiji: Lun Zhongguo Fengjian Shehui 
de Chao Wending Jiegou [The Cycle o f  Growth and Decline—On the Ultrastable Structure o f  Chinese 
Feudal Society] (Changsha: Hunan Renmin Chubanshe, 1984).
6 See Liang Zhiping, ‘Tradition and Change: Law and Order in a Pluralist Landscape’, Cultural 
Dynamics 11, no. 2 (1999): 215.
7 See generally Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study o f  Total Power (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).
8 See Perdue, ‘Constructing Chinese Property Rights’, 36-37.
9 Property in the Maoist era will be discussed in Chapter Five.
10 See Kathryn Bernhardt and Philip C. C. Huang, ‘Civil Law in Qing and Republican China: The 
Issues’, in Civil Law in Qing and Republican China, ed. Kathryn Bernhardt and Philip C. C. Huang
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division and inheritance,11 tiantu refers to land and houses, and qianzhai refers to
money, contract and debt. The Republican Civil Code very much bears the imprint of
the Qing code,12 including firstly a section of general principles, and then four
1 ^sections in respect to obligation, ownership, family, and inheritance.
Past scholarship before the 1980s on Chinese law assumed that the law in the Qing 
and the Republic dealt with few civil matters. Drawing on a casebook of the Qing 
highest-level court decisions named Xing ’an Huilan The Conspectus of
Penal Cases)14 and combining original cases with translations, commentary and 
extracts, Bodde and Morris argue that there was little civil law in the Qing:15
The penal emphasis of this law, for example, meant that matters of a civil nature were 
either ignored by it [the Qing legal system] entirely (for example, contracts), or were 
given only limited treatment within its penal format (for example, property rights, 
inheritance, marriage).16
Most Western scholars hold the same argument as that of Bodde and Morris.17 The 
research of Bodde and Morris was based on penal cases tried in the highest court in 
the Qing. These cases, however, are not sufficient to summarise the actual operations 
of the judicial process, nor can they capture the whole picture of the Qing legal 
system.18 There were not many civil cases shown up at the highest courts, instead, 
civil cases were handled by local magistrates.19 Among the scholarship before the
((Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 1.
11 Family division and inheritance will be explained in Section 3.3 o f this chapter.
12 On the Qing code, see e.g., The Great Qing Code, trans. William C. Jones (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993).
13 See Bernhardt and Huang, ‘Civil Law in Qing and Republican China’, 1.
14 Xing’an Huilan has 152 volumes, including more than 7600 penal cases from 1736 to 1885.
15 Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 Ch ’ing Dynasty 
Cases (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).
16 Bodde and Morris, Law in Imperial China, 4. This point o f view is partial if  we compare it with the 
work o f  Madeleine Zelin, Jonathan K. Ocko, and Robert Gardella, eds., Contract and Property in 
Early Modern China (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2004). This book contains detailed 
study o f the role of contacts and property rights in economic transactions in late imperial China.
17 There are exceptions. For example, David C. Buxbaum, ‘Some Aspects o f Civil Procedure and 
Practice at the Trial Level in Tanshui and Hsinchu from 1789 to 1895’, Journal o f  Asian Studies 30, no. 
2 (1971): 255-279. Buxbaum draws on the archives o f the Danshui Xinzhu court and argues that many 
civil cases were actually dealt with in the local court and in a way different from penal cases.
18 See Perdue, ‘Constructing Chinese Property Rights’, 53.
19 See e.g., Bernhardt and Huang, ‘Civil Law in Qing and Republican China’, 2.
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1980s, although some Chinese and Japanese scholars paid more attention to the civil 
matters in imperial Chinese law,20 they could not capture the whole picture about 
how courts actually handled civil matters, owing to the lack of court records.21
The opening of local archives in China to Western scholars in the 1980s has provided
an opportunity for scholars to reexamine assumptions about civil law in Qing and
00Republican China as well as access to documents never before seen. Among the 
documents newly available, we find survey reports of custom, unofficial contracts, 
and official archival documents.23 Many of the documents (for example, the studies 
of archive documents and legal practice) challenge earlier assumptions that the 
formal court system of the Qing dealt with few civil matters.24 For example, the 
Danshui-Xinzhu archive evidence suggests that ‘civil cases formed a major part of 
the caseload of local courts’. The same situation persisted into the Republic, where 
most of the cases were with a concern of land transactions, contracts, debt, marriage, 
and inheritance. In addition, ordinary people even farmers and the urban poor had 
access to civil litigations.26
Yet these empirical findings seem to further complicate our understanding of civil 
‘law’ and problematise the complex relationship between code and practice in the 
Qing and the Republic. Although civil matters did constitute much of the caseload in 
local courts, it was found that not all the case files included conclusive verdicts,
20 On these works, see e.g., Dai Yanhui, Zhongguo Fazhi Shi [History o f  the Chinese Legal System] 
(Taibei: Sanmin Shuju, 1966).
21 See Bernhardt and Huang, ‘Civil Law in Qing and Republican China’, 3.
22 See e.g., Philip C. C. Huang, ‘County Archives and the Study o f Local Social History: Report on a 
Year’s Research in China’, in Modem China 8, no. 1 (1982): 133-143; Philip C. C. Huang, The 
Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
1985); Madeleine Zelin, ‘The Rights o f Tenants in Mid-Qing Sichuan: A Study o f Land-Related 
Lawsuits in the Baxian Archives’, Journal o f  Asian Studies 45, no. 3 (1986): 499-526.
23 See Liang Zhiping, Qingdai Xiguanfa: Shehui yu Guojia [Customary Law in the Qing: Society and 
the State] (Beijing: Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Chubanshe, 1996), 45. On the study o f ‘customary law’, 
see Liang Zhiping’s work on customary law in the Qing above. On the study o f land contracts, see 
Yang Guozhen, Mingqing Tudi Qiyue Wenshu Yanjiu [The Research o f  Land Titles and Contracts in 
the Ming and Qing] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1988). On the archive research see Philip Huang’s 
empirical work on civil justice in Qing and Republican China.
24 Bernhardt and Huang, ‘Civil Law in Qing and Republican China’, 4.
25 ibid, 4.
26 ibid, 5.
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namely, ‘court verdicts’ or ‘court decisions’ (tangyu JiMf).27 This may suggest that 
in order to justify judicial decisions the court shifted responsibility for finding a 
resolution to other informal methods, among which embrace ‘three factors-written 
law, broad cultural norms, and local customs’.28 Moreover, inquiry into the civil law 
in the Qing requires going beyond codified law to examine both litigation and the 
court’s procedures, which were qualitatively different from those pertaining to penal 
cases.
Focusing on the study of legal practice and going beyond the dichotomy of state 
versus society, Philip Huang, a leading authority in this area, proposes ‘the third 
realm’ model primarily for the study of civil justice in the Qing. In Huang’s model, 
the entire justice system of the Qing and the Republic was composed of three parts: 
the formal realm represented by court adjudication, the informal realm represented 
by ‘community and kin mediation’, and a ‘third realm’ between the two, where the 
formal and the informal interacted with each other. Accordingly, most cases were 
settled in the middle stage of a lawsuit.29 Huang terms the processes of resolution 
and settlement during the middle stage of a lawsuit as ‘the third realm of the Qing 
justice system’.30
Although Huang’s ‘third realm’ model has made a significant contribution to the 
research into the Qing law and civil justice in China, and although it aims to go 
beyond the dichotomy of state versus society, the model still falls within the 
framework based on a clear division between formal justice and informal justice.31
27 Mark A. Allee, ‘Code, Culture, and Custom: Foundations o f Civil Case Verdicts in a 
Nineteenth-Century County Court’, in Civil Law in Qing and Republican China, ed., Kathryn 
Bernhardt and Philip C. C. Huang (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 124.
28 ibid.
29 See Philip C. C. Huang, ‘Between Informal Mediation and Formal Adjudication: The Third Realm 
o f Qing Justice’, Modem China 19, no. 3 (1993b): 251-298.
30 See Philip C. C. Huang, Civil Justice in China: Representation and Practice in the Qing (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1996), 110-137.
31 Huang modified his arguments in the book o f 2001 on civil law in Qing and Republican China, and 
he put more weight on confrontation and accommodation o f state law and customary practices and did 
not confine himself to the formal/informal model. See Philip C. C. Huang, Code, Custom and Legal 
Practice in China: The Qing and the Republic Compared (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
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The formal/informal justice system is not unique in China, and ‘the third realm’ of 
the civil justice system can also be found in the West (for example, the development 
of ADR32). Moreover, when Huang argues that ‘we must try to take into account the 
fundamental substantive difference between mediation and adjudication’,33 he 
actually emphasises a strict distinction between court adjudication arid civil 
mediation, and this puts his argument within the same dichotomy of state versus 
society while ignoring the interrelationship between the different realms. In terms of 
the relationship between code, culture and custom, Mark Allee’s point of view may 
be more comprehensive: magistrates in the Qing court, he says:
did not pick and choose from among three rigidly defined and exclusive modes of 
reasoning out their decisions; in good Confucian fashion they probably conceived their 
task as an attempt to harmonize and reconcile the three perspectives [of code, culture, 
and custom].34
Furthermore, when looking at the issues of law and custom in Qing and Republican 
China, we need to avoid equating custom with ‘customary law’ (xiguan fa  >]
We may even ask: is there a customary law? In the realm of custom and the so-called 
customary law, Huang has already noted some problems with this equation. He 
criticises Chen and Mayer’s studies of customary law and economic growth in the 
Qing,35 and argues that ‘the assumption that custom is or ought to be the source of 
all law, implicit to the Anglo-American tradition of common law, should not be 
projected onto China’. Chen and Myers’s premise ignores ‘state suppressions of
32 Alternative Dispute Resolution.
33 Philip C. C. Huang, ‘Court Mediation in China, Past and Present’, Modem China 32, no. 3 (2006): 
276.
34 Mark A. Allee, ‘Code, Culture, and Custom’, 125. Italics are added. On how magistrates dealt with 
civil matters, also see Liang Linxia, Delivering Justice in Qing China: Civil Trials in the Magistrate s 
Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). On Chinese legal tradition, see e.g., Geoffrey 
MacCormack, The Spirit o f  Traditional Chinese Law (Athens, Ga.; London: University o f Georgia 
Press, 1996b). But this book focuses on imperial Chinese penal law rather than civil law.
35 The point taken by Chen and Myers was that Qing was a laissez-faire state, and the Qing’s 
economic growth was upheld by the organisational foundations provided by customary law. See Chen 
Chang Fu-mei and Ramon H. Myers, ‘Customary Law and the Economic Growth o f China During the 
Ch’ing Period, Part 1 ’, Qingshi Wenti 3, no. 5 (1976): 1-32; Chen Chang Fu-mei and Ramon H. Myers, 
‘Customary law and the Economic Growth o f China During the Ch’ing Period, Part 2’, Qingshi Wenti 
3, no. 10(1978): 4-27.
36 Philip C. C. Huang, Code, Custom and Legal Practice in China, 5.
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custom and popular practice’ and puts too much stress on the autonomy and authority 
of the Qing custom.37 But the distinction between state law and custom does not 
mean that state law and custom stand in sharp contrast to each other. I would like 
to expand this dimension of the relationship between state law and custom further by 
examining governance and the land tenure system in late imperial China.
3. The socio-economic conditions in late imperial China
To deal with the fragmentation of the land tenure system in late imperial China, we 
need to distinguish between the institutions of yongdian (permanent tenancy39 7jcfffl), 
yitian erzhu (two lords to one field — ffl—ife), and yongdianquan (the rights to a 
permanent tenancy with regard to property in land. Yongdian and yitianerzhu
were customary practices, while yongdianquan was mainly a legislative creature that 
emerged from the late Qing legal reforms and developed with the introduction of 
Civil Law from Germany, via Japan to China, although it also combined some 
customary elements of yongdian. It is misleading to try to explain the customary 
practices in the Qing and the Republic simply by using the legal categories created 
by the legal reforms in the late Qing and the Republic. Thus, I would like to 
approach this question from a perspective that takes account of socio-economic 
conditions in late imperial China (from the 16th century to 1911). There are numerous 
reasons that could contribute to the emergence of permanent tenancy. In terms of the 
socio-economic conditions, I focus on the growth of commerce and the appearance
37 See ibid.
38 Other works include, for example, Liang Zhiping’s 1996 study o f ‘Customary Law’ in the Qing. 
Huang’s criticism on Liang’s study is that this study does not give enough weight on state law and the 
interaction between state law and custom: ‘[Liang]’s underlying message seems to be a political one: 
to find in customary law spaces for (Anglo-American style?) political pluralism, against absolutist 
state power. Though I share Liang’s political sympathies, I think he is mistaken to force such an 
equation between the two legal traditions’. Huang, Code, Custom and Legal Practice in China, 5.
39 A tenancy is ‘the exchange o f a right to receive payment o f rent for a right to exclusive possession’. 
See W. T. Murphy, Simon Roberts, and Tatiana Flessas, Understanding Property Law 4ed. (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), 77.
Yongdian means permanent tenancy, and it was also called changgeng (long-time cultivation 
yongzu (long-time rent TKffi). See Yang, Mingqing Tudi Qiyue Wenshu Yanjiu [the Research o f  Land 
Titles and Contracts in the Ming and Qing] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1988), 93; Liang, Qingdai 
Xiguanfa [Customary Law in the Qing], 82.
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of the fixed rent, inheritance and family division, and on demographic change and 
the population pressure with respect to governance, as well as rural-urban uniformity 
and mobility.
3.1. The growth of commerce in the Ming (1368-1644)
Commerce developed fast in the Ming, however it is misleading to label this 
development as ‘budding capitalism’. The economy was urban-centred in the Song 
(AD960-1279), but this urban-centred economic structure was largely destroyed 
during the Mongol conquest and the Yuan reign (AD1271-1368).40 With the 
founding of the Ming dynasty, the institutional focus turned away from an urban 
centred economy toward a rural centred economy. It also should be pointed out that 
the political and economic centres have already been split apart in China since the 
Sui (AD581-618) and Tang (AD618-907) dynasties.41
Possibly less confusion might have arisen to examine the land tenure in Ming and 
Qing China, if we get clear about the issue of ‘feudalism’ first. This 
misunderstanding of labelling the Ming’s commercial growth as ‘budding capitalism’ 
is based on the assumption that the Ming was a feudal society, which encompasses 
the ‘historical inevitability’ of class struggle within it.42 In fact ‘feudalism’ in China 
began in the Zhou (around BC1066-BC256), where there was a strict distinction 
between nobleman and the common people, and aristocrats controlled political 
power.43 But feudalism declined in the Qin (BC221-BC206) and Han 
(BC202-AD220) dynasties when political power was centralised. The effect of 
Confucianism was also an important attribute to the decline of the aristocracy.
40 On merchant associations in the Yuan see Elizabeth Endicott-West, ‘Merchant Associations in Yuan 
China: The Ortoy’, Asia Major 2, no. 2 (1989): 127-154.
41 See He Qinglian, Renkou, Zhongguo de Xuanjian [Population: The Sword over Chinese Head] 
(Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1988),16. We can see that in contemporary China, Beijing 
mainly serves as a political centre, and Shanghai is mainly an economic centre.
42 See Ray Huang, Taxation and Government Finance in Sixteenth-Century China (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1974), 311.
43 See Liang Qichao, History o f  Chinese Political Thought During the Early Tsin Period, trans. Chen 
L. T. (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1930), 160.
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Although Confucian himself was bom from low origin, he acknowledged his origin 
publicly, and achieved high official post through his ability.44
When the Ming emperor further consolidated the centralisation of power, there was 
no accommodation of the feudal institutions. In order to ensure that land became the 
primary source of state revenue, emperors in the early Ming split up large 
landholdings and conducted cadastral surveys.45 Through these measures the 
landholdings of landlords in the Ming (and in the Qing) generally remained small.46 
However, it usually happened that when new dynasties were founded, the central 
government had the power to restore small landholdings; in the periods of dynastic 
decline, small landholdings were replaced with large landholdings, and land was 
often monopolised by royal family members and large landlords, posing challenges 
to the authority of the central government.47 The same situation happened in the late 
Ming, where the measures of maintaining small landholdings could not sustain, and a 
large amount of land was thus monopolised 48 To explore the reasons for this needs 
to take account of ‘the lack of organisations’ in both the political and the economic 
institutions in the late imperial China’s governance system.
3.2. Self and (non-organisational’ (iwu zuzhi society
th thThe history of Europe since the 14 and 15 centuries has been marked by a gradual 
development of nationalism.49 By contrast, the Chinese people in imperial China did 
not prioritise the nation as the highest form of social organisations, and ‘the Chinese
44 ibid.
45 See Jonathan K. Ocko, ‘The Missing Metaphor: Applying Western Legal Scholarship to the Study 
o f Contract and Property in Early Modem China’, in Contract and Property in Early Modern China, 
ed., Madeleine Zelin, Jonathan K. Ocko, and Robert Gardella (2004), 178.
46 See Martin Heijdra, ‘The Socio-Economic Development o f Rural China During the Ming’, in The 
Cambridge History o f  China, Vol. 8, the Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part-11, ed. Denis Twitchett and 
Frederick W. Mote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 525; Liang Shuming, Zhongguo 
Wenhua Yaoyi [Gist o f  Chinese Culture] (Shanghai: Xuelin Chubanche, 1986), 149, 173.
47 See Huang, The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China, 86.
48 The Ming land consisted o f private land (win tian K ffl), official land (guan tian 'g’H), the land 
belonging to imperial estates (huang zhuang JiLfE), and the land o f a military colony {tun tian 4 lH ). 
Land monopoly was usually through the expansion o f official land and imperial estates.
49 On nationalism, see e.g., Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 2ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006 
[1983]), 1.
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people in the past has not been a nation’.50 For traditional China, there were no class 
divisions and class struggles of the kind formed in modem Chinese revolutionary 
thought.51
The structure of society in imperial China stood in sharp contrast to that of the 
Western society. According to Fei Xiaotong, the structure of Chinese society could be 
characterised as ‘the differential mode of association’ (chaxu geju H f f  :52 
Chinese society was composed not of discrete organisations but of overlapping 
networks of people linked together through social relationships such as kinship, and 
different networks spread out from each individual’s personal connections. In Fei’s 
observations of traditional mral China, society was ‘egocentric’ and people were 
‘selfish’, differing from Western society that is generally characterised as 
‘individualistic’:
The problem defined by this kind of selfishness is thus actually one of how to draw the 
line between the group and the individual, between others and our own selves. How 
this line has been drawn in China traditionally is obviously different from the way it is 
drawn in the West.54
It is also an oversimplification to say that Chinese society was collectivist, because it 
is not group-oriented. Chinese society lacked (and still lacks) social organisations 
that can transcend personal relations, and there was only an abstract entity the 
‘all-encompassing tianxia' (everything under heaven ^c~F).55 But in ‘a loosely 
organised mral society... it was not easy to find an all-encompassing ethical 
concept’.56 This is one of the most important reasons behind the chaos and ruptures
cn
that have occurred throughout Chinese history. The Confucian ideology was
50 Liang, History o f Chinese Political Thought During the Early Tsin Period, 7.
51 See Liang, Zhongguo Wenhua Yaoyi [Gist o f  Chinese Culture], 142-154.
52 Fei Xiaotong, From the Soil, the Foundations o f  Chinese Society: A Translation o f  Fei Xiaotong’s 
Xiangtu Zhongguo, trans. Gary G. Hamilton and Wang Zheng (Berkeley: University o f California 
Press, 1992c), 11; Liang, Zhongguo Wenhua Yaoyi [Gist o f  Chinese Culture].
53 Whether Western society is individualist is open to debate.
54 Fei, From the Soil, 61.
55 ibid, 76.
56 ibid, 75.
57 On this theme, see e.g., Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, Xingshengyu Weiji [the Cycle o f Growth
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crystallised in kinship, which could be regarded as a miniature version of the 
governance system in imperial China:
In Chinese society, the most important relationship—kinship—is similar to the 
concentric circles formed when a stone is thrown into a lake. Kinship is a social 
relationship formed through marriage and reproduction. The networks woven by 
marriage and reproduction can be extended to embrace countless numbers of 
people—in the past, present and future.58
3.3. Inheritance, household division and lineage property
Inheritance is an important issue in the examination of property and property rights. 
Inheritance in late imperial China should be understood by taking household division 
and succession in the sense of continuing the ancestral line into account. Although 
the Qing code emphasised ‘living together and sharing household property together’ 
{tongju gongcai and people were prohibited from separating household
and dividing family property (bieji yicai #!j when their parents were Still
alive,59 customary practices prevailed that even if the elder was still alive, fathers 
could divide the household assets equally among his sons. In this case, inheritance 
(jicheng in imperial China is better termed ‘household division’ {fenjia jfr
HQ 60
From the Tang and the Song onwards in imperial China, equal division of household 
assets among the sons of a family became one of the basic principles of inheritance, 
as opposed to the impartible inheritance, and primogeniture by which the eldest son 
inherited the entire estate in particular, among certain strata of the English landed
and Decline].
58 Fei, From the Soil, 76.
59 See Article 87, The Great Qing Code, trans. William C. Jones (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
This is one o f the Ten Great Wrongs— lack o f filial piety.
60 See Dai, Zhongguo Fazhi Shi [History o f  the Chinese Legal System], 266-267. On extended 
treatment o f household division in traditional China, also see e.g., Myron L. Cohen, House United, 
House Divided: The Chinese Family in Taiwan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); David 
Wakefield, Fenjia: Household Division and Inheritance in Qing and Republican China (Honolulu: 
University o f Hawaii Press, 1998).
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classes in the past.61 In the Qing Dynasty, the equal-male-division of household 
property (zhuzi junfen f<J^) had been recognised both legally and socially.62
Although equal division among the sons was the rule, living parents still continued to 
receive support. At the time of division, if any sibling remained unmarried, a son was 
entitled to marriage expenses and a daughter was entitled to a dowry. In addition, we 
should take variations of locality into account: for example, in some places the eldest 
sons or grandsons received extra property.63 In terms of women’s property,64 women 
did have control over individual, conjugal, and family property (for example, the 
dowry,65 the conjugal fund, and widow’s property), but the significance of that 
power should not be exaggerated.66 On the one hand, it could be argued that women 
did not have complete ‘individual property rights’, because women were not 
permitted to dispose of their property freely. For example, in terms of the property 
left to a widow without sons, whether or not the widow Could take charge of the 
property depended on ‘her maintenance of chastity’. If the widow remarried, her 
deceased husband’s property as well as her dowry would be disposed of at discretion 
of the deceased husband’s family (Substatute 78-2).67 On the other hand, it could be 
argued that, paradoxically, it was only women who could have individual property 
rights, because men’s property was integrated to the whole family property.
61 See the analysis o f wives and dependent children in the primogeniture regime in Murphy, Roberts, 
and Flessas, Understanding Property Law, 88.
62 On eldest son’s share, see e.g., Henry McAleavy, ‘Varieties o f Hu’o’ng-Hoa (Ifik.): A Problem of 
Vietnamese Law’, Bulletin o f  the School o f  Oriental and African Studies 21, no. 1/3 (1958): 608-619.
63 See David Wakefield, Fenjia, 1-2.
64 It should be pointed out that the Qing’s marriage policy was different from that o f the Ming. For 
example, in the Qing, marriage policy ‘amounted to political endogamy’, and intermarriage with the 
conquered Chinese population and their descendants was prohibited. See Evelyn Rawski, The Last 
Emperors: A Social History o f  Qing Imperial Institutions (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 
1998), 127-159. On women’s property in the Qing, also see Kathryn Bernhardt, Women and Property 
in China: 960-1949 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).
65 Here dowry (jiazhuang #|$t)refers to the property which a bride brings to her groom in marriage, 
it does not refer to the mediaeval rules in England in which a window to be entitled to a life interest in 
one third o f her husband’s freeholds after his death.
66 See Wakefield, Fenjia, 203-205.
67 See Philip C. C. Huang, ‘Codified Law and Magisterial Adjudication in the Qing’, in Civil Law in 
Qing and Republican China, ed., Kathryn Bernhard and Philip C. C. Huang (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1994), 167.
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As Kathryn Bernhardt argues, household division should be understood in the
Aftcontext of succession in the sense of continuing the ancestral line. In the household 
section {hulii W) of the Ming and Qing codes, numerous substatutes69 aimed at 
settling disputes over succession and household division. The Qing code provides 
‘establishing a son of the official wife [as one’s successor] contrary to the law’ 
(Article 78).70 In terms of choosing a successor in this case, to establish a successor 
among the sons of one’s brothers was the first resort, then to more distant relations. If 
there were still no eligible successors available, someone of the same surname would 
also be considered.71 In the Qing period, the court stressed the prohibition of 
succession by one of different surname (luanzong SLth) in banner households. 
Substatute 78-472 stipulated that an adopted son with a different surname did not 
have the same legal status as a successor. The adopted son might be entitled to some 
property, but could not succeed to the ancestral line, nor inherited the family 
property.73
Although succession in the sense of continuing the ancestral line was a priority in 
inheritance and family division, the fact that ‘wealth never survives more than three 
generations’ could not be easily avoided after equal-male-division. Large lineage or 
family estate was thus split up. Typical examples were Huizhou (in Anhui) and 
Fujian, where the economy prospered, but family firms did not grow large but rather 
small.74 Nevertheless, there were some measures to keep large family estates 
intact.75
68 Bernhardt, Women and Property in China, 11. According to Bernhardt, litigation over inheritance in 
imperial China was mainly over succession in the sense o f continuing the ancestral line not household 
division. See ibid, 3.
69 Substatutes will be examined in detail in Section 4.3 o f this chapter.
70 The Great Qing Code, 106.
71 See Huang, ‘Codified Law and Magisterial Adjudication in the Qing’, 167.
72 References to the Qing code is to the compilation by Xue Yunsheng, Du Li Cun Yi Chong Kan Ben 
Vol. 5 [a  Typeset Edition o f  the Concentration on Doubtful Matters While Perusing the Substatutes], 
ed. Huang Jingjia (Taibei: Chengwen Chubanshe, 1970 [1905]).
73 See Huang, ‘Codified Law and Magisterial Adjudication in the Qing’, 167.
74 See He, Renkou [Population], 182.
75 We can compare these measures in China with those in England. For example, settlement was a 
device for wealthy landed families in 17th -1 9 th England to maintain their family estate intact.
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Lineage property was one of the devices that could diminish the effects of the 
partible inheritance system and protect family property from fragmentation and sale. 
Families that could trace their descent back to a common ancestor grew into 
powerful lineages. The lineages compiled written genealogies (jiapu iUH) and held 
collective rituals to strengthen the links between members. Lineages also constructed 
ancestral halls (citang Both ancestral halls and genealogies demonstrated the
wealth and power of the lineage.76 Many lineages held commonly owned lineage 
properties (zuchan M f11). In practice, half or more of the land in a village was tied 
up in indivisible lineage estates.77
There were many kinds of lineage properties, here I focus on two kinds of real 
properties: ancestral estates {zuchan and scholar estates {xuetian ^ ff l) .78 
Ancestral estates were established in perpetuity and they were inalienable, thus they 
were an important source of rental land. The rental income from ancestral estates 
provided for the offerings of the estate’s founding ancestor, and the remainder was 
shared among the descendants of the founding or the focal ancestors (this does mean 
that they could dispose of their shares freely).79 The estate was usually managed by 
the member who had most experience and economic influence. Sharing the ancestral 
estate, having its membership, and controlling the estate were important not only in
ftnthe economic sense but also in the political sense. Scholar estates were preserved 
for the education of candidates in the lineage and prepared them for civil 
examinations in order to foster their examination success. Unlike ancestral estates
76 See Helen F. Siu, Agents and Victims in South China: Accomplices in Rural Revolution (London: 
Yale University Press, 1989), 4-5.
77 See Rubie S. Watson, ‘Corporate Property and Local Leadership in the Pearl River Delta, 
1898-1941’, in Chinese Local Elites and Patterns o f  Dominance, ed. Joseph W. Esherick and Mary 
Backus Rankin (Berkeley: Oxford University o f California Press, 1990), 241.
78 It is also interesting to compare ancestral estates and scholar estates with the trust in common law. 
But I have reservations to use ‘the trust’ to describe lineage property in late imperial China, because 
the institution in Chinese rural society did not equate the institution in common law. Also I use 
‘lineage property’ rather than ‘corporate property’.
79 See Watson, ‘Corporate Property and Local Leadership in Pearl River Delta, 1898-1941’, 243.
80 ibid, 244.
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that could bring rents, scholar estates were investment for the future and could bring 
the lineage prospective income.81
3.4. Population growth and landownership
In this section, I would like to stress the issue of ‘population boom’, which is an 
important perspective to explain a wide range of social and economic phenomena, 
especially the change to landownership in both the Ming and the Qing. Population 
grew fast in the Ming owning to the emancipation of labour. Agricultural labours in 
the Ming were once composed of farmers who had personalistic dependence on 
landlords, slavery and a few farmer proprietors. But labour had been emancipated 
since the sixteenth century.83 Farmers were gradually freed from their personalistic 
dependence on landlords and transformed into farmer proprietors after the Qing 
conquest, because in the early Qing, a lot of free labourers were needed to cultivate 
and develop wasteland after the long-time wars.84 Due to the deepening of 
commercialisation and urbanisation in the Yangzi River Delta (especially the south of 
the Yangzi River)85 in the Qing, personalistic ties of farmers with landlords were 
replaced with contractual relationship.86
In terms of the emancipation of labour, the exception was unfree workers most of
on
whom were bannermen. Bannermen were concentrated in garrison compounds (for
81 See He, Renkou [Population], 182.
82 See Wu Tingyu, Zhongguo Lidai Tudi Zhidu Shigang [the History o f  Land Institutions in China] ) 
(Jilin: Jilin Daxue Chubanshe, 1987), 220.
83 Philip A. Kuhn, Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare o f 1768 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), 34.
84 See Wu, Zhongguo Lidai Tudi Zhidu Shigang [the History o f  Land Institutions in China], 239-250.
85 In Chinese, the south o f the Yangzi River is called Jiangnan (UI^3), Jiangnan generally refers to the 
lower Yangzi Delta or the region o f Taihu Lake (taihu J^M).
86 See Kathryn Bernhardt, Rent, Taxes, and Peasant Resistance: The Lower Yangzi Region, 1840-1950 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 7.
87 The Qing governmental system was different from that o f the Ming. There are debates about 
whether the Qing rulers were ‘sinicised’. Opponents to the ‘sinicisation model’ argue that the Qing 
emperorship represents a creative adaptation to problems o f rulership. See Rawski, The Last Emperors, 
302; Pamela Kyle Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology 
(Berkely, Calif.: University o f California Press, 2002). One o f the important and innovative 
institutions o f the Qing was the bannermen system, through which the Qing divided civil and military 
functions along (partially) ethnic lines. Also see Pamela Kyle Crossley, Orphan Warriors: Three 
Manchu Generations and the End o f  the Qing World (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,
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example, in Manchuria, North China and along the Grand Canal)88 and were not 
freemen.89 Bannermen were granted bannerland (qitian ^ f f l )90 as opposed to 
private land. Local landholding and taxation policies had to be reconstructed in order 
to support the bannermen, but this reconstruction, in turn, led to a range of financial 
and social crises.91 For example, in ‘China’ bannermen did not engage in agricultural 
production. The sustenance of these bannermen was composed of land grants and 
regular stipends of rice and cash.92 Yet income of bannermen did not increase in 
proportion with the growth of population. Throughout the eighteenth century, the 
bannermen gradually lost their privileges and were impoverished and unemployed. 
The lands of many garrisons were transferred through illegal ways. In the eighteenth 
century, the lines between bannerland and private land had been blurred; by the end 
of the Qing, most bannerland had been sold to private owners.94
The population already grew fast in the period between the Song and the Ming. In 
the Ming the Yellow Book (huangce H flt)95 was inadequate to reflect the rapidly 
increased population: the local magistrates were reluctant to report the actual figures, 
fearing that reporting the increased population would make their regional tax quotas 
shoot upward accordingly,96 thus the population was outstripping what was recorded 
in official documents. By the eighteenth century, the land and head tax {di-ding 
qian-liang j & T w a s  the main funding resource of the bureaucracy.97 In 1713,
1990c).
88 The pre-conquest bannermen were left in the Northeast (Laodong and Jilin) and bannermen after 
the conquest were also in South China, where was the Qing expanded regime. See Crossley, Orphan 
Warriors, 49.
89 See ibid, 49.
90 Bannerland included imperial land and the land set aside for bannermen.
91 See Crossley, Orphan Warriors, 48.
92 See ibid, 49. Crossley also points out that bannermen in the Northeast were different. They lived in 
small villages and continued agricultural production.
93 See Kuhn, Soulstealers, 67; Crossley, Orphan Warriors, 49; Susan Naquin and Evelyn S. Rawski, 
Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1987), 141.
94 See Huang, The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China, 98-99; Kuhn, Soulstealers, 
67.
95 The Yellow Books are household registers, which showed tax liability for both land tax and labour 
service.
96 See Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China, 63.
97 See Madeleine Zelin, The Magistrate s Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-Century 
Ch ’ing China (Berkeley, Calif.: University o f California Press, 1984c), 6.
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head and land taxes began to be merged into a single land tax (tanding rumu W T  A  
S'), and the land tax became the largest single source of government revenue.98 The 
abolition of the head tax further stimulated the population boom. According to Ho 
Ping-ti, the population of China roughly doubled during the eighteenth century, from 
around 150 million in 1700 to around 313 million in 1794."
While the population kept increasing, new economic opportunities (for example, new 
economic and industrial sectors) did not grow in proportion. Overpopulation made 
families struggle to survive on small parcels of land; dispersion of ownership over 
land through larger groups of people was thus needed as a response to population 
pressure. The relation between population growth and the fragmentation of land 
ownership has also corroborated the view that commercial development is only part 
and parcel contributing to the fragmentation of land tenure in late imperial China.
For example, among the places where permanent tenancy was popular, only Fujian’s 
commerce developed fast.100 As Kuhn argues, ‘commercial growth may have meant, 
not the prospect of riches or security, but a scant margin of survival in a competitive 
and crowded society’.101 As a result of the continuing population boom and 
diminishing working opportunities, since the Qianlong court, displaced persons102 
(liumin including wandering monks and beggars) had been out of control and
had become the usual challenge to the stability of both the government and society.
3.5. Rural-urban uniformity and mobility
There was rural-urban legal and administrative uniformity in traditional China, and 
there was free mobility between the city and the countryside. The role of cities in 
Chinese traditional cultural life was different from that of Western cities in either 
premodem Europe or the Renaissance, in which cities generally monopolised cultural
98 See Naquin and Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century, 22.
99 See Ho Ping-ti, Studies on the Population o f  China, 1368-1953 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1974 [1959]), 278.
100 See He, Renkou [Population], 143.
101 Kuhn, Soulstealers, 36.
102 On the discussion o f displaced persons, see He, Renkou [Population], 95-129.
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1 (ttlife and performed the function of supporting cultural activities. Traditional 
Chinese cities did not perform the function of supporting cultural activities 
independently. For example, a few famous private academies {shuyuan ^  |^ ) were 
located in the city, being recipients of government subsidies and functioned as 
semi-official schools; But many of the shuyuan from the Song Dynasty (960-1279) to 
the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) were located in villages.104 Accordingly, publishing 
activities usually were done in the village. Private libraries and private art collections 
were often situated in the rural area.105
Yet rural gentry tended to move into towns and cities (in the South of the Yangzi 
River in particular) in the Qing.106 This trend led to changes in the relationship 
between landlords and farmers, as well as in the governance of villages. The 
examination of the fragmented tenure system107 shows that in the re-1949 China 
there were no such class contradictions as landlords versus peasants in Mao Zedong’s 
revolutionary rhetoric. Philip Huang’s work, for example, shows that ‘[in North 
China].. .many villages contained no landlords at all. The majority of big landlords in 
North China were absentee landlords, living in the towns or cities and not in the 
villages’.108 The Yangzi delta showed the same scenario that most landlords were in 
fact ‘absentee owners living in town’.109 Rent and wage labour relations were not 
often directly between landlords and tenants, but among different agents that 
collected rents in the middle.110 Nevertheless, the upper strata living in the urban
103 See F. W. Mote, ‘The Transformation o f Nanking, 1350-1400’, in The City in Late Imperial China, 
ed., G. William Skinner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), 118. In terms of Western cities, it 
is also worth mentioning that royal courts performed the functions such as supporting cultural 
activities and royal palaces were often in the countryside or were like mini-cities themselves.
Versailles is the showcase example. Thanks to Professor Tim Murphy for raising this point.
104 See Mote, ‘The Transformation o f Nanking, 1350-1400’, 117-118.
105 See ibid, 118.
106 Wu Tao, ‘Zai Cheng yu Zai Xiang: Qingdai Jiangnan Shishen de Shenghuo Kongjian ji dui 
Xiangcun de Yingxiang [in the City and in the Countryside: the Living Space o f the Qing Gentry in 
the South o f the Yangzi River and its Impact on the Countryside’, Zhongguo Xiangcun Yanjiu [Rural 
China] 2 (2003): 34-65.
107 This will be examined in detail in Section 4 o f this chapter.
108 Philip C. C. Huang, ‘Rural Class Struggle in the Chinese Revolution: Representational and 
Objective Realities from the Land Reform to the Cultural Revolution’, Modem China 21, no. 1 (1995): 
114-115.
109 See ibid, 116.
110 See ibid, 117.
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area were only urban sojourners rather than permanent city residents, because their 
roots and identities were still rural.111 As Ho Ping-ti argues, by the second half of the 
imperial era, urban residence and urban-based commercial activity were typical of 
upwardly-mobile families; however, if these families prospered, they preferred 
returning to their rural base.112 This is because their socio-economic base was the 
countryside, their family tomb and lineage temple also located in the countryside.113
Sojourners in the city also formed associations based on the common origin bearing 
on loyalties to their native-place. As Chinese people always say ‘blood is thicker than 
water’ (xue nongyu shui ifll^^TK), literally family relations are more important 
than any other relations. Native place was (and still is) the tie to keep people close,114 
especially when people moved from the rural to the urban area.115 The tong xiang 
(the same native-place was the bond to hold urban sojourners together, and it 
was one of the bases to fovm guanxi (social relationship and to develop 
trust.116 Making use of the tongxiang bond, the successful urban sojourners, the 
associations based on the native place, and the rural gentry supported for and 
benefited from each other. For example, native-place based associations in Beijing 
and provincial capitals improved the competitive position of candidates in local 
systems with respect to the imperial examinations and official appointments.117 
However, these associations were not equivalent to ‘the public sphere’. Although 
tong (|s]) and gong ( ^ )  in Chinese are equivalent to ‘public’, ‘collective’ and 
‘common’ in English, they are not the same. Tong and gong can be used to define a
1,1 See Max Weber, The City (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958), 81-82. Cited in Lu Hanchao, Beyond the 
Neon Lights: Everyday Shanghai in the Early Twentieth Century (Berkeley University o f California 
Press, 1999c), 4.
112 See Ho Ping-ti, The Ladder o f  Success in Imperial China: Aspects o f  Social Mobility, 1368-1911 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). Cited in Mote, ‘The Transformation o f Nanking, 
1350-1400’, 103.
113 See Lu, Beyond the Neon Lights, 4.
114 Chinese people usually exchange surname and native place when they meet at the first time in 
order to establish further contacts.
115 See G. William Skinner, ‘Urban Social Structure in Ch’ing China’, in The City in Late Imperial 
China, ed. G. William Skinner (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1977), 539.
1.6 See ibid, 541.
1.7 See ibid.
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small group’s interest.118 The native-place bond is one of, although among several, 
aspects to demonstrate the weak basis for contractual relationships among Chinese 
people. Traditional Chinese cities lack the sense of ‘individualism’ and ‘civility’, let 
alone ‘a public sphere’.119
4. Fragmentation of the land tenure system
4.1. Yongdian (Permanent tenancy)
These socio-economic conditions and the governance system laid the background for 
the emergence of permanent tenancy in the eighteenth century.120 It is often said that, 
in North China, farm proprietors (zigeng nong ll were more prevalent than 
those in the South due to the differences between the requirements for growing wheat
191and the demands for growing rice. In the South, where the climate was much 
better than the North, the population boom increased the demand for land, and 
agriculture was towards intensification and commercialisation. Permanent tenancy 
was popular.122
118 See Borge Bakken, The Exemplary Society: Human Improvement, Social Control, and the 
Dangers o f  Modernity in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 31-32.
119 In the late Qing and the Republic, guilds (hang or hui f f ,  ^ ) ,  trade guildhalls (hanghui t f  
and chambers o f commerce were founded by merchants and tradesmen. Guilds were founded by the 
combination o f occupational and regional factors. See Yu Zhisen, ‘The Relationship o f Guilds to 
Government in the Shanghai and Suzhou Area’, in Guild-Hall and Government: An Exploration o f  
Power, Control and Resistance in Britain and China, Volume I, a Preliminary Study o f  the Social 
Organization o f  Guilds in China, ed. Brian H. A. Ranson (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Baptist University, 
1997), 65. Trade guildhalls were organised by merchants who were not from the same region. See 
William T. Rowe, Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1984). As a result o f these developments, some historians have argued that these 
guilds, trade guildhalls, and chambers o f commerce constituted ‘the public sphere’, which is 
expressed through the Chinese word gong ( £ ) .  But ‘the public sphere’ is based on a clear distinction 
between state and society, and does not capture the complex interaction between the state and society 
in late imperial China.
120 Some scholars argue that permanent tenancy emerged as early as the South Song Dynasty 
(1127-1279). See e.g., Wu, Zhongguo Lidai Tudi Zhidu Shigang [the History o f  Land Institutions in 
China], 224; Michael Palmer, ‘The Surface-Subsoil Form o f Divided Ownership in Late Imperial 
China: Some Examples from the New Territories o f Hong Kong’, Modem Asian Studies 21, no. 1 
(1987): 1-119.
121 See Heijdra, ‘The Socio-Economic Development o f Rural China During the Ming’, 535.
122 See ibid.
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In the South, where the land was intensively cultivated and agricultural risks were 
fewer, the costs of supervision by the landlords were more expensive, since growing 
rice was more labour intensive.123 Permanent tenancy could help landlords avoid the 
costs of supervision and at the same time provide the incentive for tenants to improve 
the land and increase its value.124 Moreover, land was rent-yielding. It was thus 
favourable to the landlords to charge fixed rents in return for which the tenant could 
be given a permanent tenancy.125 A change in landlords could not deprive of the 
tenants’ right to the land (huandong buhuan dian but there were
restrictions on the tenants transferring their rights to others.
Yet in practice more and more rich tenants could transfer theirs rights to others 
without the landlord’s permission, which was called siquan xiangshou 
This practice was transformed into the practice of ‘two lords to one field’: the 
permanent rights to cultivate the land became de facto partial ownership over the 
land—the topsoil rights.126
4.2. Topsoil rights (tianmianquan
‘Two lords to one field’ (yitian erzhu —■ ffl—i )  was prevalent in south and 
southeast China (for example, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Anhui, Fujian and Taiwan): 
the subsoil rights were owned by the landlords, while complete topsoil rights were
1 97owned by tenants if they paid a fixed rent to the landlords. Transfer and lease of 
topsoil rights were allowed. There were several Chinese terms to describe topsoil and 
subsoil rights, and these terms varied from place to place, sometimes the meanings 
were entirely opposite even in neighbouring regions.128 To avoid confusion in 
understanding of the ‘two lords to one field’ system, in this chapter the term topsoil
123 See ibid, 526.
124 See ibid.
125 See ibid.
126 See Yang, Mingqing Tudi Qiyue Wenshu Yanjiu [the Research o f  Land Titles and Contracts in the 
Ming and Qing/ ,  100.
127 Also see Perdue, ‘Constructing Chinese Property Rights’, 51.
128 Heijdra, ‘The Socio-Economic Development o f Rural China During the Ming’, 533.
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refers to tianmian (topsoil or surface soil fflM) or tianpi (land skin E9 i£), subsoil 
refers to tiangen (land roots fflfH) or tiangu (land bones 15#).
The establishment of topsoil rights often led to the selling of these rights by topsoil 
owners.129 As topsoil owners did not need to pay taxes and were not controlled by 
government registers, they could circumvent the involvement of the government 
when selling topsoil rights. In the transactions, people used unofficial ‘white deeds’ 
(baiqi S  M, written on plain paper and unstamped) instead of official ‘red deeds’ 
(hongqi impressed with an official red seal) issued by the county
130magistrates.
. Multi landownership evolved from permanent tenancy and the ‘two lords to one
field’ later on also continued in Republican China. It was not accidental that the
practice of multi landownership was primarily in Fujian, because the land per person
ratio there was one of the worst in the empire. Moreover, merchants tended to invest
surplus capital in land and real estate rather than local industries.131 Multi
landownership, for example, ‘three lords to one field’ (yitian sanzhu — B £ i )  was
composed of at least three tiers: small rent landlords (xiaozuzhu <Mi.5i), large rent
landlords (dazuzhu ^51.5:), and the actual cultivators (diannong 132 These
three levels of participants in the multi landownership were closely linked to the
1issues concerning tax payment and rent. Small rent landlords were the original 
landowners, who sold both their rights of collecting rents from the cultivators and the 
tax obligations to large rent landlords, who then had the rights to collect rents from 
cultivators and became the taxpayers. Cultivators paid the rents and got the 
permanent rights to use the land. In some cases, the large rent landlords transmitted
129 See Huang, Code, Custom, and Legal Practice in China, 102.
130 See Michael Palmer, ‘The Surface-Subsoil Form of Divided Ownership in Late Imperial China: 
Some Examples from the New Territories o f Hong Kong’, Modem Asian Studies 21, no. 1 (1987): 25. 
On red and white deeds also see Peter C. Perdue, Exhausting the Earth: State and Peasant in Hunan, 
1500-1850 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 137.
131 Heijdra, ‘The Socio-Economic Development o f Rural China During the Ming’, 533.
132 There were different kinds o f  multi landownership, and this section focuses on one type.
133 Heijdra, ‘The Socio-Economic Development o f Rural China During the Ming’, 533.
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his tax obligation to a third person by giving him money collected from rents, and 
this kind of person was called baidui ( f=| JnL).134 Rents were often paid by the tenants 
to the taxpayers via the middleman.135 The middlemen therefore could manoeuvre 
between the original landowner and tenants, collecting rents but paying no taxes.136
Although the Qing code did not take up the issue of topsoil ownership, the 
government’s hostility toward the practice was expressed through local regulations 
mainly for the reasons of tax collection and the stable source of revenue. ‘Fujian 
Provincial Regulations’ concerned this issue; similar proscriptions were also issued by
t
the provincial authorities in Jiangxi and Jiangsu. According to ‘Fujian Provincial 
Regulations’:
Once the topsoil has been purchased by deed, it becomes permanent property. [The 
topsoil owner] unabashedly delays paying rent, and the land-owner is not able to retract 
the rented and lease [the land] to another.. .The landowner is left within unpaid rents year 
after year, bears the tax burden over and over again, and faces the ruin of the family 
fortune.138
The customary practice of multi landownership in Ming and Qing till Republican 
China had some similarity with the practice in the Medieval Europe, however they 
are not the same. The similarity between the two is this: in medieval Europe, ‘in 
theory, under the regime of lordship and vassalage, all land belonged to the
1 I QSovereign and everyone else held it conditionally’. Yet, over time, conditional 
tenure was transformed into outright property.140
134 See Noboru Niida, ‘Mingqing Shidai Yitian Erzhu Xiguan Jiqi Chengli [the Emergence o f the 
Customary Practice o f the Two Lords to One Field in the Ming and Qing’, in Riben Xuezhe Yanjiu 
Zhongguoshi Lunzhu Xuanyi [Translations o f  Selected Japanese Scholarly Articles on Chinese History, 
Vol. 8], ed. Liu Junwen (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1992), 414; Heijdra, ‘The Socio-Economic 
Development o f Rural China During the Ming’, 534.
135 See Heijdra, ‘The Socio-Economic Development o f Rural China During the Ming’, 534.
136 ibid, 533.
137 Yang, Mingqing Tudi Qiyue Wenshu Yanjiu [the Research o f  Land Titles and Contracts in the Ming 
and Qing], 114.
138 Fujian Shengli [Case Examples o f  Fujian Province] (Taipei: Bank o f Taiwan, 1964 [1874]), I: 445. 
Cited in Huang, Code, Custom and Legal Practice in China, 107.
139 Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom vol.l (New York: A. A. Knopf: Distributed by Random 
House, 1999), 106.
140 See ibid.
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Yet the difference is that the European practice was based on ‘feudalism’ and the 
system of lordship and subjection, which were characterised by a unique fusion of 
sovereignty and ownership. In the most perfectly feudalised England, as Pollock and 
Maitland puts it, ‘all that we call public law is merged in private law: jurisdiction is 
property, office is property, the kingship itself is property; the same word dominium 
has to stand now for ownership and now for lordship\ 141 The feudal lord was both 
sovereign and landlord to his vassal but he also assumed obligations toward him.142 
It was, in the words of Marc Bloch, ‘reciprocity in unequal obligations’, but ‘the 
element of mutuality was always present—it was a genuine contract’.143 This kind of 
scenario could not be seen in the practice of multi landownership in late imperial 
China.
4.3. Yongdianquan (the rights to permanent tenancy) in Republican China
I will not go into detailed accounts of legal practice in Qing and the Republican China, 
but some aspects of legal practice are crucial for our understanding of property and 
property rights especially the rights to permanent tenancy in Republican China. The 
Qing law had ‘an epistemological outlook’.144 Although about 30 to 40 percent of the 
Qing code was from the Tang code of 653, ‘the other 60 to 70 percent did change or 
were perhaps Qing’s creations’.145 The Qing code inherited the legacy of the 1585 
edition of the Ming code, in which lu statutes) and li (#ij146 substatutes or 
codified precedents) were combined for the first time.147 The 1723-1727 revision of 
the Qing code compiled the combination of statutes and substatutes into a single
141 Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History o f  English Law: Before the Time o f  
Edward I, vol.l (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1898), 230.
142 See ibid.
143 Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, trans. L. A. Manyon, vol. 1 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1965), 228.
144 Huang, ‘Civil Adjudication in China, Past and Present’, 138-139.
145 Bodde and Morris, Law in Imperial China, 63. From the fourth Code o f 1740 and onwards, the 
was little change to statutes {III), so ‘the Code’ usually refers to the 1740 version. See Liang, 
Delivering Justice in Qing China, 4.
146 It is different from Li (}L principles for morality and ceremonial behaviour) exalted by 
Confucians.
147 See Bodde and Morris, Law in Imperial China, 65.
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printed work: in the printed text, li were usually based on decisions or interpretations 
and followed the article of the Code to which they referred.148 By the end of the Qing 
dynasty, substatutes replaced the code as the direct basis for most cases.149 If there 
were an applicable substatute, it would be applied instead of the statute.150
In handling disputes over property in land, local officials tried to harmonise 
interpersonal relations such as ‘friendly relations’ (qingyi zhijiao and the
‘relationship of master and guest’ (zhubin zhifen and they had to balance
state law and social custom.151 The flexibility and pragmatism as demonstrated in the
1S9Qing law were developed in dispute settlement by local magistrates. The legal 
practice departed from the formalist Civil Law tradition, but was surprisingly close to 
the common law style. As Huang observes, the Chinese approach to law was ‘from 
fact to principle back to fact or practice’,153 and this feature of Chinese legal reasoning 
as practised in the Qing has persisted through the Republic even to the present.154
Yet the legal system in the Qing was challenged by Western imperialism.155 Japan 
defeated China in the war of 1894-95. From then on, Chinese statesmen and 
intellectuals believed that Japan got the superior power because it adopted the legal 
and political institutions borrowed from the Continental West.156 The late Qing thus 
adopted a Civil Law based system because Civil Law was then seen to be modem 
and in emulation of Japan. Furthermore, ‘extraterritoriality’ (zhiwai faquan 
$Q157 impaired the sovereignty of China. To overcome the problem of
148 See ibid, 66.
149 See The Great Qing Code, 3.
150 See Bodde and Morris, Law in Imperial China, 66-68.
151 See Perdue, Exhausting the Earth, 136-163.
152 See Perdue, ‘Constructing Chinese Property Rights’, 51.
153 Philip C. C. Huang, ‘Civil Adjudication in China, Past and Present’, Modem China 32, no. 2
(2006): 135. Also see Philip C. C. Huang, ‘Court Mediation in China, Past and Present’, Modem  
China 32, no. 3 (2006): 275.
154 See Huang, ‘Court Mediation in China, Past and Present’: 277.
155 See Huang, ‘Civil Adjudication in China, Past and Present’, 145.
156 See ibid.
157 Most authors use ‘the problem o f  extraterritoriality’, but ‘consular jurisdiction’ is more exact. 
‘Extraterritoriality’ is the state o f being exempt from the jurisdiction of local law under either 
diplomatic negotiations or unequal treaties. The meaning o f extraterritoriality is broader than consular
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extraterritoriality, legal reformers in the late Qing turned to Civil Law and they thought 
Civil Law could push China to its move toward modernisation. Those motivations
158were also evident in Republican lawmaking.
The Republican Civil Code in 1929-1931 was borrowed from the German and Swiss 
models, via Japan, and it was based on the continental pattern of Civil Law, rather than 
the Anglo-American common law model. The concept of ‘unitary and exclusive 
individual property rights’ based on the German Civil Code’s was adopted by the 1911 
draft civil code.159 This concept of ‘ownership’ was also defined in the first article of 
‘General Provisions’ of the chapter on ‘Ownership’ in the final Guomindang 1929-30 
version: ‘the owner of a thing has the right, within the limits of the law or ordinances, 
to use it, to receive its benefits, and to dispose of it freely, and to exclude others from 
interfering with it’ (Article 765).160 These legal provisions regarding landownership in 
Republican civil code stood in sharp contrast to the multi landownership in customary 
practices.
Yet the dilemma of adopting the imported civil code was the wide gap between the 
Republican civil code and actual legal practice. For example, the models of the civil 
codes for the legal reformers in the late Qing and the Republic—the civil laws of the 
Germany and Japan— did not have the equivalent institution with yongdian 
(permanent tenancy). For the German code, due to the Roman legacy, contained 
‘usufructus’: ‘the right to enjoy the property of another and to take the fruits, but not 
to destroy it, or fundamentally alter its character. It was usually for life, never more,
jurisdiction. Consular Jurisdiction (lingshi caipanquan existed in China between 1843
and 1948. It meant that foreign citizens in China were not subject to the jurisdiction o f the Qing courts 
and Qing law and this regime survived into the Republican period. It was this consular jurisdiction 
which was the great affront to Chinese sovereignty.
158 See Huang, ‘Civil Adjudication in China, Past and Present’, 146.
159 See Huang, Code, Custom and Legal Practice in China, 108.
160 See Fu Bingchang and Zhou Dingyu, eds., Zhonghua Minguo Liufa Liyou Panjie Huibian Xin 
Liushu [Compendium o f  the Six Laws o f  the Republican o f  China with Rationales, Judgments, and 
Explanations] ,  vol. 2 (Taibei: Xinlu Shuju, Minguo 53 [1964]), 412. English translation is based on 
The Civil Code o f  the Republican China, trans. Hsia Ching-lin, James L. E. Chow, and Chang Yukon 
(Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1930). Also see Huang, Code, Custom and Legal Practice in China, 108.
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but sometimes for a fixed term’.161 For the Japanese code, according to Huang,
‘ eikosakukeri* in Japanese (yongxiaozuo quart, right of permanent tenure),
similarly, despite the word ei (yong 7JC permanent), was defined with a specific 
period.162 Following its models, Article 1089 of the late Qing draft civil code provided 
that ‘the period of continuance of the right of yongdian will be no less than 20 years 
and no more than 50 years’, and this provision survived into the 1925-1926 draft 
(Article 867).163
Although there was confrontation between code and custom, the Republican legal 
reformers could not avoid the accommodation of custom in the code and the continuity 
of the legal practice from the Qing to the Republic. For example, despite the rejection 
of the custom of topsoil ownership, the Guomindang lawmakers tried to balance code 
and custom through a new legal category of yongdianquan (the right to a permanent 
tenancy), which seemed to stand in an intermediate position between yongdian in 
social custom and exclusive ownership defined in the imported law. The term 
yongdianquan, according to Huang, probably intended by Matsuoka Yoshimasa, 
author of the ‘Ownership Rights’ book of the 1911 draft, was to serve as the Chinese 
equivalent to the Japanese word eikosakuken. 1 6 4  The Guomindang lawmakers chose 
to use the term yongdianquan even in the official English version of the 1920-30 code, 
rather than to translate it ‘permanent tenancy’.165
Although codified laws in the late Qing and Republic tried to accommodate customary 
practices such as topsoil ownership, it was still not clear whether the topsoil was 
owned or leased. For example, in Article 842166 of the Guomindang Civil Code, 
yongdian was finally defined: ‘ Yung-tien [yongdian] is the right to cultivate or to raise
161 W. W. Buckland, A Text-Book o f  Roman Law: From Augustus to Justinian (Cambridge: At the 
University Press, 1950), 269.
162 See Huang, Code, Custom and Legal Practice in China, 110.
163 See ibid.
164 See ibid.
165 See ibid.
166 See Fu and Zhou, eds., Zhonghua Minguo Liufa Liyou Panjie Huibian Xin Liushu [Compendium 
o f  the Six Laws o f  the Republican o f  China with Rationales, Judgments, and Explanations], 450.
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livestock permanently on the land of another person by paying a rent’. In addition, 
yongdianquan was classified in the same book as ownership, and was in a separate 
chapter (Chapter IV) under ‘rights over things’ (wuquan and the lawmakers
held that ‘a yung-tien [yongdian] holder may transfer his right to another person’ 
(Article 843).167 All these suggested that yongdianquan was not just limited to a 
lease.168
Yet as the late Qing and Republican legal reformers were greatly influenced by the 
continental Civil Law, they did not intend to make yongdianquan permanent as this 
word literally suggested in Chinese and as the customs practiced in society. As a result, 
the accommodation of the custom in the code should not be exaggerated. The 
Republican Civil Code still stuck to the principle of exclusive ownership. Still in 
Article 842, following ‘yung-tien [yongdian] is the right to cultivate or to raise 
livestock permanently on the land of another person by paying a rent’, the provision 
was ‘where a yung-tien [yongdian] is created for a definite period of time, it is deemed 
to be a lease, and the provisions concerning lease shall apply’. This suggested that, the 
yongdian holder, like the lessee under Article 443,169 was ‘not entitled to sublet the 
things leased to another person without the consent of the lessor’. For instance, the 
yondian holder cannot lease the land to another person, if the yongdian holder acts 
contrary to the provision of the code, the landlord may revoke the yongdian (Article 
845, Article 846170).171 These provisions were contrary to the customary practice of 
‘two lords to one field’, in which the topsoil holder could transfer his rights to others 
freely without the consent of the subsoil holder.
167 See Fu and Zhou, eds., Zhonghua Minguo Liufa Liyou Panjie Huibian Xin Liushu [ Compendium 
o f  the Six Laws o f  the Republican o f  China with Rationales, Judgments, and ExplanationsJ, 452.
168 See Huang, Code, Custom and Legal Practice in China, 111.
169 See Fu and Zhou, eds., Zhonghua Minguo Liufa Liyou Panjie Huibian Xin Liushu [Compendium 
o f  the Six Laws o f  the Republican o f  China with Rationales, Judgments, and Explanations], 252.
1 0 On lease, see e.g., Article 458: ‘the lessor o f an agricultural land may terminate the lease for the 
purpose o f restoring such land for its own cultivation’.
71 Huang, Code, Custom and Legal Practice in China, 112.
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The Guomindang legislation saw various attempts to accommodate the custom, but 
eventually legislators stuck to the unitary and exclusive property rights theory and 
refused the custom of multi landownership. They could only allow the topsoil 
ownership within the lease arrangements of yongdian)11 The understanding of the 
attitude of the Guomingdang legislation towards yongdian should be put in a broader 
context of economic transformation in the twentieth century. As Huang notes, it 
entailed a fundamental shift in the factors that accounted for land values: ‘from mainly 
labour input to mainly market-price movements’.173
5. Conclusion
The examination of property and property rights in late imperial China demonstrates 
that there was no absolute ‘private’ property existed in late imperial China in the 
sense of the Civil Law tradition. Rather surprisingly, if we compare the land tenure 
system and legal practice in late imperial China with those in England, we could find 
some relevance of common law to China. We can find some similarities between the 
fragmentation of landownership in late imperial China and feudal tenure in England; 
between lineage property in late imperial China and strict settlement in England 
(from seventeenth to nineteenth century), both of which were intended to keep family 
property in perpetuity; between ancestral property in China and the trust in common 
law; and the pragmatic approaches towards legal practice (for example, substatutes in 
the Qing code and precedents in common law). Also significant property law reforms 
were conducted both in 1929-31 China and in 1925 England. However we should not 
equate the property regime in China with that in England owing to the differences of 
the socio-economic conditions and the governance system as discussed above. For 
example, in China we cannot see the emergence of non-landed wealth and the rising 
bourgeoisie174 as the power to push the property law reform.
172 See ibid, 114.
173 ibid, 118.
174 See e.g., M. R. Chesterman, ‘Family Settlement on Trust: Landowners and the Rising Bourgeoisie’, 
in Law, Economy and Society, 1750-1914: Essays in the History o f  English Law, ed. G. R. Rubin and 
David Sugarman (Abingdon: Professional Books, 1984), 124-167.
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The civil ‘law’ in the Qing does not fit into either the ‘Oriental despotism’ or the
17S‘liberal, laissez-faire’ model. ‘The Qing code did encompass a substantial body of 
stipulations about civil matters’,176 these stipulations, however, were not 
preconditions for protecting private property rights along the lines of liberalism, but 
adaptations of governmental practice over time to changing social realities and 
customs.177 In terms of the conversion from the Qing code into the 
Western-modelled Republican Civil Code, it was not the simple and linear historical 
change from ‘backward feudal law’ to ‘capitalist law’, nor the simple change from 
‘the irrational’ to ‘the rational’.178 Furthermore, neither the binary model o f ‘state 
versus society’ nor the ternary model of ‘state/the third realm/society’ is sufficient to 
explain the property regime in late imperial China. The property regime in late 
imperial China is rather a complex network of relations to be examined, with both 
vertical and horizontal relations cutting across.
The adoption of the civil code by the late Qing and the Republic was largely driven 
by the desire to overcome the extraterritoriality problem and not really by indigenous 
causes springing from Chinese society. Under the impulse to purge China of 
extraterritoriality, the late Qing and the Republic era moved towards adopting a 
civilian based system because it was then seen to be modem and in emulation of 
Japan. The research into property and property rights in late imperial China makes us 
realise the serious oversimplification of the current discourses on the conception of 
property rights in the property law reform since 1998,179 and these discourses were 
confined within the civil law framework. This point will be further developed in 
Chapter Three.
175 See Perdue, ‘Constructing Chinese Property Rights’, 35-68.
176 Huang, ‘Codified Law and Magisterial Adjudication in the Qing’, 176.
177 See Bernhardt and Huang, ‘Civil Law in Qing and Republican China’, 9.
178 See Huang, Code, Custom and Legal Practice in China, 3.
179 See Chapter Three on property law reform.
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Chapter 3: Property Law Reform and the Revival of ‘the Private’ in
Law in Post-Mao China
1. Introduction
Although subject to continuing controversy, a new Chinese property law came into 
effect on 1 Oct 2007. It provides equal protection for both public and private 
property for the first time since 1949 (Article 4). This has been regarded as a 
milestone of the revival of private property in the law. Therefore it is necessary to 
examine property law reform and the making of property law in the post-1978 era. 
This chapter examines the evolution of the legal definition of property rights in the 
post-Mao era, China’s recent movement to formalise its property regime1 through 
the making of property law (wuquanfa and the revival of ‘the private’ in
law and its limits.
In the General Principles of the Civil Law (1986),3 there is no specific definition of 
wuquan literally property rights over things; wu $34 means things,
particularly tangible things; quart means rights); instead the GPCL uses a broad 
but vague usage ‘ownership and the property rights relevant to ownership’ (caichan 
suoyouquan yu caichan suoyouquan youguan de caichanquan
Eft M z^ ^ ).5 Wuquan is defined in the 2007 Property Law. Although 
wuquanfa is translated into English as property law, wuquan refers only to property 
rights over things rather than a much broader concept of property rights {caichan
1 An important aspect o f the English approach of thinking about property is the distinction between 
rights to land and rights to other things, or between real and personal property (including tangibles and 
intangibles). See W. T. Murphy, Simon Roberts, and Tatiana Flessas, Understanding Property Law 4ed. 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), 56. Chinese property law has a distinction between immoveable 
(bu dongchan and moveable property (dongchan zft/^). See Article 2 o f the Property Law
(2007). But intangibles, like debts, patents, copyright and trademarks are not subject to Chinese 
property law, nor are shares in a limited company.
When it is translated into English, Wuquanfa is called ‘property law’, but we should note the 
different conceptions o f property between Civil Law and common law. In common law, there is no 
such a concept as wuquan, and property rights in common law does not equal with wuquan. Wuquan 
fa  is also translated Law on Real Property rights, Law on Real Rights or Law o f Things.
3 Minfa Tongze (f^^iMKU) (hereinafter the GPCL).
4 Article 2 o f the Property Law (2007) provides that ‘things’ include immovable and movable
(1986), Chapter 5, Section 1.
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property.
5 The GPCL
quart M/3^ ^ ) .6 Specifically speaking, wuquan refers to the exclusive rights
that directly control specific things. Wuquan includes ownership {suoyou quan 
$(), usufiuctuary rights (yongyi wuquan and security rights (danbao
wuquan
Chinese property law is modelled on the Civil Law system (German law in 
particular), in which the definition of property rights (Sachenrecht) is different from 
that in the common law system.8 The German Civil Code (The Burgerliches 
Gesetzbuch or BGB) is a marked feature of the books of Pandektenrecht or ‘Pandect 
law’9 which emerged from the university teaching of Roman law.10 The BGB
framework has great influence on the codification of civil law in China.11 In Roman
11law, ownership (dominium) was strictly regarded as corporeal things. Accordingly,
the conception of property rights {wuquan) in Chinese property law is significantly
1 Tinfluenced by ownership defined in the Romano-German Civil Law.
6 See Wang Shengming, ‘Woguo de Wuquan Faltl Zhidu [Legal Institutions o f the Property Regime 
in China]’, in Wuquanfa (Cao ’an) Cankao [References on the Property Law (Draft)], ed. the Legal 
Affairs Committee o f the National People’s Congress (Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi Chubanshe, 
2005), 1.
7 The Property Law (2007), Article 2.
8 Current debates are also over whether Chinese wuquanfa should adopt concepts and principles in 
the property law based on the common law system rather than those based on the Civil Law system.
9 Pandects is another name for Justinian’s Digest, and the lecture courses devoted to the Pandects 
came to deal with Roman law. See Alan Watson, The Making o f  the Civil Law (Cambridge, Mass.; 
London: Harvard University Press, 1981), 128.
10 The BGB is in five books. Book 1, the general part, is divided into seven sections: persons, things, 
legal transactions, periods o f time, prescription, exercise o f  rights (self-defence and self-help), and the 
giving o f security. Book 2 is the law o f obligations, book 3 is the law o f things, book 4 is family law, 
and book 5 is succession. See Watson, The Making o f  the Civil Law, 127.
11 This influence was also seen in the codification o f  civil law in late Qing and Republican China. The 
Civil Code o f the Republic China includes Book 1 General Principles, Book 2 Obligation, Book 3 
Rights over things. See Hsia Ching-lin, James, L. E. Chow, and Chang Yukon, The Civil Code o f  the 
Republic o f  China (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1930).
12 See Andrew Borkowski, Textbook on Roman Law, 2 ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
152-153.
13 ‘Property’ is derived from the Latin proprius, and property right is called a right in rem. The basic 
classification o f Roman Civil Law was persons {personae), things (res) and actions (actiones). 
Property and obligations were within the law o f things {res). In terms o f the public/private distinction, 
there are several categories o f  property that could not be privately owned, including res communes 
and respublicae, the former referred to things common to all men, e.g., the air, the sea, the latter was 
regarded as ‘public’ things belonging to the state. See Borkowski, Textbook on Roman Law, 152-153.
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Following its Civil Law models, Chinese property law is different from English 
property law. While Roman law Stresses dominium in the idea of ownership, ‘English 
legislation does not endow ownership with specific characteristics and consequences 
in the manner of the Civilian codes’.14 Such institutions of English property law date 
back to feudal times, when lord-vassal and lord-peasant relations were subjected to 
royal, feudal and manorial jurisdictions. Under the doctrine of estates, one piece of 
land can be ‘owned’ by several people at once.15 English law is thus more interested 
in title rather than ownership.
In China, the Property Law (2007) is the basic law for clarifying ownership of 
property, regulating utilisation of property and protecting property rights.16 The 
Property Law has been formulated to maintain the basic economic institution and the 
socialist economic order (Article 1). The drafting of the Property Law was conducted 
against the background of the emergence and expanding of the private sector as well 
as the diversification of property rights in China, and there has been a long legislative 
process in order to restore private property.17 Take the constitutional amendments for 
example. Up to 2004, constitutional amendments pertaining to the selective 
rehabilitation o f ‘the private’ included: the acknowledgement of the individual 
economy (geti jingji (1982); the recognition of private economy (siying
jingji fAH £5$F) to develop within the limits prescribed by law, and allowance of 
urban land use rights transfer (1988); the establishment of a ‘socialist market
14 See Murphy, Roberts, and Flessas, Understanding Property Law, 60.
15 Bryn Perrins, Understanding Land Law, 3 ed. (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2000), 43.
16 See Wang, ‘Woguo de Wuquan FalU Zhidu [Legal Institutions o f the Property Regime in China]’,
1.
17 In December 2002, the draft o f the Property Law, proposed as the first section (bian o f  the 
draft o f Chinese Civil Code (minfadian P ^ A ) ,  was submitted to the Ninth Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress (NPC) for the first review. The subsequent 10th Standing Committee of 
the NPC made the draft o f the Property Law a high priority o f the whole process o f the civil code 
legislation. Up to October 2006, there had been six reviews of the draft o f the Property Law, an 
unprecedented number o f reviews in the history o f legislation in China. See the report o f the sixth 
review o f the draft o f the property law, in Zou Shengwen and Zhang Zongtang, ‘Zhongguo Liushen 
Wuquanfa Cao’an, Chuang Falll Shenyi Cishu Zhizui [China Reviews the Draft o f Property Law for 
the Sixth Time,an Unprecedented Number o f Legislative Reviews]’, Xinhua Wang [Xinghua Net], 28 
October 2006. In
< http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2006-10/28/content_5259356.htm > (last visited 27 August 2008).
6 5
economy’ (1993); the acceptance of the individual and private economy as important 
components of the socialist market economy (1999); and the recognition of private 
property (2004).
Although the Property Law has been adopted and passed by the NPC, there was
1 ftendless debate over the Property Law (2007) during its making process. Apart 
from the question of how the German model could fit into the Chinese context, 
debates are also about the conception of wuquan and the status of the property law in 
the whole civil law system in China. Opponents of property law also argue that it 
contrasts with socialist principles and enlarges the gap between the rich and the poor. 
Controversies surrounding the 2007 Property Law are continuing: these controversies 
focus on the giving of equal status to public and private property, and whether 
property law has a solid constitutional base. These debates will be discussed in 
Section 3 of this chapter.
How to examine property law reform and revival of ‘the private’ in the law in the 
post-Mao era? This chapter tries to jump out of the ‘legal box’ or the shadow of the 
law which confines most Chinese property law reformists, and tries to put this 
question in broader settings of economic reform and political transformation in China. 
This chapter tries to look beyond the research paradigm that examines the Chinese 
property law regime only within the framework of German Civil Law. Of course this 
chapter cannot cover and does not intend to cover all aspects of the property regime 
in China. Instead, it focuses on the history of Chinese property law-making, 
legislating to promote a market economy, and the controversies surrounding 
conceptions such as wuquan, ownership and property rights, as well as the debates 
over both formal and substantive matters in the property law legislation.
18 The debate over whether China should have property law is extremely heated before the NPC and 
National Committee o f CPPCC Annual Sessions in March 2006. Professor Gong Xiantian at Beijing 
University submitted a public letter to the Legislative Affairs Committee (LAC) o f the NPC in August 
2005, and denounced that the draft o f the Property Law was unconstitutional and contrary to the 
socialist principles. This fuelled the debates over the draft o f the Property Law and delayed the 
subsequent drafting and reviewing processes. The draft was not passed by the NPC Standing 
Committee in 2005 as scheduled due to the hotly debates.
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2. The background of property law reform in the post-Mao era
Before examining property law reform and the revival of ‘the private’ in law, it is 
necessary to explore the historical context of the emergence of civil law in late Qing 
and Republican China. A ‘modem’ Civil Code emerged in the late Qing and the 
Republic, registering a departure from the legal system in imperial China.
2.1. The historical context—codification in the Qing and the Republic19
In its legal and political reforms, late Qing China was anxious to emulate Japan’s 
success in its modernisation programs, one of which was the Japanese legal reform. 
Japan at that time had already completed civil and commercial codification modelled 
principally on the German Codes. These works done by Japan provided a wide range 
of literature and ready-made legislative models for legal reformers in the late Qing. 
The intellectual background in the late Qing also backed up its legal reform. At that 
time, hundreds of Chinese, in search of modem knowledge, had gone to Japanese 
universities, and many of them studied law. The Da Qing Ltl Li therefore seemed not 
to be compatible with the new institutions introduced into China from the West, nor 
was it keeping pace with the development of ‘modem’ thinking of Chinese 
intellectuals at that time.
In 1904, Shen Jiaben ( i and Wu Tingfang (/{5J§^7) were commissioned to 
compile a commercial code, and the modem Chinese codification began. The first 
Codification Commission (.Xiuding FalUguan was founded in 1906. In
1907, Shen Jiaben, Yu Liansan ('fij JftH), and Ying Rui were appointed 
directors of the Commission. Staff of the Commission was composed of law students
19 This section was principally draw on the materials in Fu Bingchang’s introduction in Hsia, Chow, 
and Chang, The Civil Code o f  the Republic o f  China, ix-xxii; Liang Huixing, ‘Zhongguo dui Waiguo 
Minfa de Jishou [Derivation o f Chinese Civil Law from Foreign Civil Law]’, Shandong Daxue FalU 
Pinglun [Shandong University Law Review], no. 00 (2003): 1-13; Liang Huixing, ‘Zhongguo Minfa: 
Cong Hechu Lai Xiang Hechu Qu? [Chinese Civil Law: Where Does It Come From and Whither Goes 
It?]’, Zhongguo Gaige [China Reform], no. 28 (2006): 64-67.
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returned from Japan, Europe and America, and Mr. Y. M. Matsuoka R JSCIE) was 
a Japanese adviser. The Codification Commission worked in emulation of Japan, and 
the new Civil Code deviated from the general structure and principles of traditional 
Chinese law. A German model of a Civil Code was thus introduced to China, via 
Japan, and then had a great impact on Chinese legislation. The Codification 
Commission produced a draft Civil Code in five Books—General Principles, 
Obligations, Real Rights, Family and Inheritance.20 The whole work was entitled 
Draft Civil Code of the Qing Dynasty (.Daqing MinlU Cao ’an 'X'M The
Draft Civil Code, especially the books on General Principles, Obligations and Real 
Rights, as indicated above, was modelled on the Japanese and German Civil Codes.
After the foundation of the Republic and renouncing the throne of the last Qing 
Emperor (December 1911-February 1912), the Draft Civil Code was re-examined. A 
Committee for the Compilation of Codes (Fadian Bianzuan Weiyuanhui
was formed and commissioned to prepare a new draft. In 1916 the 
Committee was reorganised and directed by Wang Chonghui (j£5f£ji?). In 1918 the 
Committee was transformed into the Law Codification Commission (Xiuding Faltl 
guan j J K T ).
The Commission first compiled a draft including the General Principles and the 
Book on Obligations; then a draft on the Law of Things; and finally two drafts on 
Family Law, as well as a draft on Inheritance. A draft of the Civil Code was finished 
in 1925. But this code did not have time to take effect, because the Nanjing 
Nationalist Government led by the Guomindang then replaced the Beijing 
Government in 1927.
With the establishment of the government based in Nanjing, the duties of the 
Codification Commission were taken over by the Legislative Yuan {Ufa yuan,
1^), the legislative organ of the Government. The Civil Codification Commission,
20 Books I, II, and III were printed in 1911, Books IV and V were completed and published later on.
one of the five special commissions21 for the compilation of the principal codes, 
consisted of, for example, Fu Bingchang Chairman; Jiao Yitang (MM'si)',
Shi Shangkuan (j£i j!l); Wang Chonghui (3E;f§ll), President of the Judicial Yuan; 
Mr. G Padoux (French Minister Plenipotentiary) as advisers. The Commission 
started reworking the 1925 draft, took into consideration amendments submitted by 
its members and advisers, and was able to submit to the Li Fa Yuan in April 1929 a 
remoulded text of Book I. Book I was promulgated on 23rd May 1929.22
From the above historical context, we could see that the adoption of a Westem-style 
(German style in particular)23 Civil Code by the late Qing and the Republic was 
largely driven by the desire to move towards modernisation pushed by political and 
legal elites, rather than by indigenous causes springing from Chinese society.
2.2 The emergence of the private sector and the diversification of ownership
The Guomindang Civil Code was abolished after the establishment of the PRC. In 
the period between 1949 and 1978, party policy was the substitute for law, functions 
of civil courts were limited, and civil cases were largely mediated by Party and 
government organisations.24 The laws that were hesitantly created in the 1950s were 
in favour of criminal law. In the field of civil law, only the Marriage Law and the 
Land Reform Law were passed in 1950. There were also two abortive drafts of the 
civil law, one in 1956 (based on the 1922 Soviet civil law) and the other in 1964 (this 
draft resisted the influence of the USSR because of the tensions between China and 
the Soviet Union at that time), but both were interrupted due to political 
movements—the ‘Anti Rightist Movement’ in 1957 and the Cultural Revolution
21 The Li Fa Yuan established five special Commissions: the Commission on Civil Codification; the 
Commission on Commercial Codification; the Commission on Land Legislation; the Commission on 
Labour Laws; and the Commission on Local Administration Laws. This was a code for civil and 
commercial cases.
22 The Book on the General Principles o f  the Civil Code came into force on 10th October 1929. Books 
II and III were later completed. Books IV and V were promulgated by the end of 1930.
23 It also consulted Japanese civil law, Swiss civil law, Soviet civil law and civil law in Thailand.
24 See Ronald C. Keith, ‘Civil Law and “Civil Society” under a “Socialist Rule o f Law’” , in China’s 
Struggle fo r  the Rule o f  Law (Basingstoke: Mackmillan, 1994), 92.
25 See the history o f civil law making in China in e.g., ibid, 89-120.
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from 1966 to 1976 respectively.26 China had no formal civil law legislation until the 
GPCL came into effect in 1986.27 But provisions pertaining to property are very 
general in the GPCL as its name ‘general principles’ indicates. In terms of public and 
private property, the 1982 Constitution promulgated that ‘socialist public property is 
sacred and inviolable’ (shensheng buke qinfan bJ'MB), but no parallel
declaration was provided for private property. It should be noted that the Chinese 
Constitution is based on the 1936 Soviet Constitution, and there is no such a formal 
distinction between public law (gongfa and private law (sifa in the
Chinese legal system as that in the Civil law system.28
Property lawmaking in the post-1978 era was against the background of legislating 
for a ‘market economy’. The legal status of the private was lowered in both the 
constitution of 1975 and in 1978, and the private sector was tightly controlled by 
party policies.29 Private business in China has revived since the Third Plenum of the 
CPC’s 11th Central Committee Conference in December 1978. The Third Plenum 
marks the jettisoning of class struggle and the official adoption of economic 
modernisation and growth as the paramount agenda of the CPC.30 Since 1978, Deng 
Xiaoping’s ‘Reform and Opening-up’ policy has launched China into fast paced 
economic growth and the proliferation of new commercial activities, involving the 
reform of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), the expansion of private business, and 
the growth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
26 See Liang Huixing, ‘Zhongguo Minfadian Bianzuan de Jige Wenti [Several Issues Concerning the 
Compilation o f the Civil Code in China], Shanxi Daxue Xuebao [Journal o f  Shanxi University] 25, no. 
5 (2003): 13.
27 Also see the development o f civil law in China in Chen Jianfu, From Administrative Authorisation 
to Private Law: A Comparative Perspective o f  the Developing Civil Law in the People s Republic o f  
China (Dordrecht; London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995c).
28 For example, the property law provides not only private rights but also state rights. See Tong 
Zhiwei, ‘Wuquanfa (Cao’an) Ruhe Tongguo Xianfa Zhimen [How Could the Property Law (Draft)
Pass the Door to the Constitution]’, Faxue [Legal Science], no. 2 (2006): 4-23.
29 See Susan Young, Private Business and Economic Reform in China (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 
1995c), 14.
30 See ibid, 14-15.
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In this section, I sketch out how the private sector has been opened up in China and 
how ‘the private’ has been selectively re-admitted into the socio-economic 
framework. Broadly speaking, the evolution of central policies in relation to the 
private economy can be divided into four stages. The first stage covers the years 
from 1978 to 1984.31 During this period central authorities readmitted and started to 
encourage the ‘individual economy’ (geti jingji ' t v'fzt^ $ F ) ,32 that is, economic 
activities by self-employed entrepreneurs with fewer than eight employees. 
Individual economy was labelled a ‘complement’ (buchong to the socialist 
public economy (Article 11, Constitution). However, this stage did not involve many 
commitments to the introduction of market institutions. The second stage is 
1985-1989. This stage saw the emergence of the private sector with a rise of 
privately-run and ‘red hat’ enterprises {hongmaozi qiye ilf l 'F d k ^ k ),34 that is, 
enterprises which were established under the labels of SOEs or collective enterprises 
to disguise their private nature. The 1988 amendment of the Constitution allowed the 
private economy35 to exist and develop within the limits prescribed by law (Article 
11). The period 1989-1991 represents the third stage, which saw a major setback to 
private business development and the withdrawing of government support for private
31 In 1984 urban economic reform was formally launched. Before 1984, it was mainly the agricultural 
reform; since 1984, the focus has shifted from the agricultural economy to the urban economy. See 
e.g., Wang Hui, The Gradual Revolution: China's Economic Reform Movement (New Brunswick, N.
J.: Transaction, 1994c), 14. It should be noted that in 1981 central control over state enterprise activity, 
especially over decisions on selling and pricing, was reintroduced. This was due to inflation and 
labour resistance to employment changes. In order to maintain social and economic stability, the 
central government decided to bring its reform efforts to a temporary stop. See Martin Hart-Landsberg 
and Paul Burkett, China and Socialism: Market Reforms and Class Struggle (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 2005), 43.
32 Perhaps one o f the reasons for promoting the individual economy was the need to increase 
employment opportunities. Another important reason was to improve living standards in response to 
consumer demand.
33 It refers to economic activities by self-employed individual entrepreneurs with fewer than eight 
employers. This is according to Marx’s writing on ‘rate and amount o f surplus value’ in Chapter Nine, 
Part III o f Capital V ol.l: ‘the number o f employed workers distinguishes small proprietors from 
capitalists, and is the standard to judge exploitation’. See Karl Marx, Capital Vol.l trans. Eden and 
Cedar Paul, (London: Dent, 1930).
34 See Donald C. Clarke, ‘Legislating for a Market Economy in China’, The China Quarterly, no. 191
(2007): 569.
35 Private enterprises (siying qiye ^AHrfkik), which distinguished themselves from self-employed 
entrepreneurs (getihu ^ ^ 7 ^ ) ,  provide more scope for private entrepreneurs to perform political and 
economic roles. See Young, Private Business and Economic Reform in China, 102-105. Discussion of  
the initial intentions o f the central government to revive the private economy can be found in e.g.,
Ross Bamaut, ed., Private Enterprises in China (Camberra: Asia-Pacific Press, 2001); Young, Private 
Business and Economic Reform in China, 13-31.
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business. In this period, central policies tended to restrict the development of private 
business by imposing strict measures. But this period did not last long; already in 
May 1990, the Provisional Regulations on the Grant and Transfer of Use Rights in 
Urban Land paved the way for commodification of housing in urban China. The 
fourth stage began in 1992. After Deng Xiaoping’s ‘southern tour’, the central 
government set in motion a new wave of economic reform, giving the private 
economy unprecedented freedom to develop.36 This period also saw the removal of 
the hats of many ‘red-hat enterprises’.
Since the corporatisation programme, that is, the ‘modem enterprise system’ (xiandai 
qiye zhidu initiated in 1994, the focus of the SOE reform has been
shifted from delegation of decision-making authority to corporate governance and
fhownership. The 15 National Congress of the CPC in 1997 declared further reform 
of ownership. The report delivered by Jiang Zemin to this congress eulogised 
‘grasping the large and freeing the small’ (zhuaida fangxiao and this was
endorsed as the central economic reform strategy. The diversification of ownership in 
China has taken place against the backdrop of corporatising and restructuring the 
large SOEs while selling off some small and medium sized SOEs. The post-Mao 
Chinese economy has become a mixed system with different forms of ownership, 
including: ‘state-owned, collective-owned, private-owned, individual-owned, 
cooperative or joint-ventured, shareholding, foreign-owned, and others (Hong Kong, 
Macao, Taiwan and other overseas Chinese invested)’. Moreover, according to a 
report of the All-China Industrial and Commercial Federation, since the 1990s, there 
have been new enterprises established by social organisations and investment funds. 
These investment social and economic entities are neither public nor private. The 
boundaries between public ownership and private ownership therefore have been
36 See Zhang Jian, Government and Market in China: A Local Perspective (New York: Nova Science,
2004), 101.
37 Collective-owned enterprises include urban collectives and rural collectives; rural collectives are 
known as Township-Village Enterprises, or TVEs.
38 See Guo Sujian, ‘The Ownership Reform in China: What Direction and How Far?’, Journal o f  
Contemporary China 12, no. 36 (2003): 557.
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even blurred.39 Despite the mixed ownership, according to official policy, the 
direction of this transformation is that public ownership is dominant with 
state-owned economy controlling the ‘commanding heights’ of the national economy.
In 2001 a speech by President Jiang Zemin on 1 July extended membership of the 
CPC to owners of private businesses.40 The boundaries between the public sector 
and the private sector became fuzzy. One of the driving forces behind this changing 
environment for private business was the enlargement of the private sector 41 For 
example, according to a speech of Huang Mengfu, chairman of the All-China 
Federation of Industry and Commerce, in 2004, ‘private enterprises contributed over 
60 percent to the national economy and employed more than 100 million workers’. 
Private enterprises now play an equally important role in the national economy as state 
and foreign-invested enterprises.42 However, difficulties in balancing the interests 
between the public and the private sector are manifested in the making of the 
property law.
2.3.The civil law framework before the 2007 Property Law came into effect
During the past three decades, the formulation of a legal framework has paved the 
way for the drafting of a property law. First of all, a series of constitutional 
amendments have laid the constitutional foundation for ‘the revival’ of private 
property in law: the 1982 Constitution recognised ‘individual economy’ (geti jingji 
(Article 11) and extended protection to ‘lawful’ property (Article 13).43 - 
The 1988 amendment allowed the private economy (siying jingji to
develop within the limits prescribed by law (Article 11), and allowed the transfer of
39 See <http://www.gzimw.gov.cn/news/20081022/200810220955546540 Q.htnil> (last visited 9 
November 2008).
40 See the speech made by Jiang Zemin, General Secretary o f the Central Committee o f the CPC, at 
the meeting celebrating the Eightieth Anniversary o f the Founding o f the CPC.
41 See People s Republic o f  China: The Development o f  Private Enterprises (Asian Development 
Bank, 2003). In
<http://www.adb.org/documents/studies/PRC Private Enterprise Development/default.asp#contents 
> (last visited 31 January 2006).
42 See State and Private Enterprises Enter Integration Era (Hong Kong Trade Development Council,
2005). In <http://info.hlctdc.com/alert/cba-e0508g-l.htm> (last visited 31 January 2006).
43 Article 13 o f the Constitution (1982).
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urban land use rights (Clause 4 of Article 10). The Constitution was amended again 
in 1993 to affirm the socialist market economy (shehui zhuyi shichangjingji
as the foundation of the economy (Article 15). The 1999 amendments 
to the Constitution provided that the self-employed, private, and other non-public 
sectors constituted an important component of the socialist market economy, whose 
lawful rights and interests would be protected by the State (Article 11). Protection of 
private property rights was ultimately recognised by the Constitution in March 2004 
(Article 13).
Under the overarching constitutional framework, the legal framework concerning 
property issues consists of three levels. The first level is the GPCL (1986), which is 
the fundamental piece of legislation for China’s civil law system, and the equivalent 
of the general section of a Civil Code.44 But the GPCL does not contain detailed 
rules pertaining to contact, tort and property.
Provisions related to property are dispersed in some independent civil, commercial 
and property administration laws, which constitute the second level. Independent 
civil and commercial laws include the Company Law (1994),45 the Guarantee Law46 
(1995), the Marriage Law47 (1980, revised 2001), and the Inheritance Law (1985).48 
, A Rural Land Contracting Law49 was also passed in 2002, and has opened room for 
the commodification of rural land transfer for agricultural purposes. Property 
administration laws include the Land Administration Law50 (1986, revised 1988,
44 The framework o f China’s civil law system has been significantly influenced by German Civil Law, 
and Taiwanese legal scholars have also been influential because they translated and introduced 
German Civil Law concepts to China. Such Taiwanese scholars include Shi Shangkuan (5t |r5 jS), 
Zheng Yubo Wang Zejian Huang Maorong and Yang Renshou ( $ { ~
). They have had a great impact on civil law teaching and research in China.
45 Gongsi Fa
46 Danbao Fa, Chapters. 3 ,4 , 5, 7
47 HunyinFa
48 Jicheng Fa
49 Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Fa
50 Tudi Guanli Fa
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1998 and 2004), and the Urban Real Estate Administration Law51 (1994, amended 
2007).
The third level includes provisions in administrative regulations such as ‘the
I M
Provisional Regulations on the Grant and Transfer of Use Rights in Urban Land 
(1990).53 But there is still no clear distinction between public law and private law as 
well as the distinction between property protection and government administration. 
Following Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992, property lawmaking became an 
important legislative item, and increased attention has been paid to the 
transformation of ownership, but the existing legislation was insufficient to deal with 
these issues. This called for a special code for property.
Yet compared with other civil and commercial laws such as the Contract Law,54 
which has been largely streamlined, there were many barriers to property lawmaking. 
The primary reason was this: the Contract Law regulates the transfer of commodities, 
which is linked to socialist economic institutions; the property law formalises 
property rights and defines ownership, which is closely linked to socialist political 
institutions. The making of property law was thus constrained by many political and 
ideological concerns. We now need to look at the drafting of property law in detail.
2.4. The drafting of property law
thThe 15 National Congress of the CPC in 1997 made ‘adjusting and perfecting’ 
China’s ownership structure (tiaozheng he wanshan suoyouzhi jiegou #T
W rfrJ^ n^ sJ) a fundamental strategy of economic reform and economic development.55
51 Chengshi Fangdichan Guanli Fa
52 Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan Churang he Zhuanrang Zanxing Tiaoli
53 Also see this synthesis in Frank Xianfeng Huang, ‘The Path to Clarity: Development o f Property 
Rights in China’, Columbia Journal o f  Asian Law 17, no. 2 (2004): 200.
54 The Economic Contract Law (jingji hetongfa was adopted in December 1981, but it
was intended to regulate relations between SOEs. In March 1999, Chinese contract law has finally 
been unified by the adoption o f the Contract Law (hetongfa 'a'[5]v£), which was the unification o f the 
Economic Contract Law, the Foreign Economic Contract Law (shewai jingji hetongfa
v£), and the Technology Contract Law (jishu hetongfa
55 See Jiang Zemin’s report in ‘Gaoju Deng Xiaoping Lilun Weida Qizhi, Ba Jianshe You Zhongguo
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To meet this policy request, shortly after this conference, the drafting of a property 
law became an important task for the Legislative Affairs Committee (LAC) of the 
National People’s Congress in 1998.56
Two teams composed of jurists in civil law were commissioned to draft property law. 
One team was led by Professor Liang Huixing (I^H M ) at the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS), and the other was supervised by Professor Wang Liming 
( I f  ll BJ) at the People’s University (Renmin University). Each team prepared a 
proposed draft (the CASS draft and the Renmin University draft A
K  respectively), and submitted it to the LAC of the NPC. In 2001, the
LAC produced a LAC draft (zhengqiuyijian gao which was based on
cn
the two proposed drafts and then was publicised for comments in 2002.
3. Debates over property law
3.1. Debates over the status of property law in the proposed Civil Code (minfa 
dian P ^ jfc) in China
After looking at the background to the draft of property law in China, we shall move 
to the debates over it. One of the debates about property law is related to the 
codification of civil law in China—whether the civil code should be modelled on the 
German Civil Code (The BGB) or the French Code Civil (the Napoleonic code).58
Tese de Shehui Zhuyi Shiye Quanmian Tuixiang Ershiyi Shiji [Hold High the Great Banner o f Deng 
Xiaoping Theory for All-Round Advancement o f the Cause o f Building Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics into the Twenty-First Century]’, available in
<http://www.china.com.en/chinese/archive/l 31781 .htm> (last visited 6 November 2008).
56 See Wang Liming, ed., Zhongguo Wuquanfa Cao ‘an Jianyigao j i  Shuoming [Proposed Draft o f  
Chinese Property Law and Explanations] (Beijing: China Legal Publishing House, 2001).
57 It should be noted that although this draft was open to ordinary people’s comments, in terms o f the 
most important and controversial issues, the Political Bureau o f the CPC Central Committee had the 
final say. This was informed by an interview with a member o f the LAC, who was studying at the 
London School o f Economics in 2005. The interview was conducted at the London School o f  
Economics on 12 March 2005. It should also be mentioned that there is another influence from 
intellectuals in the so-called unofficial think tank (minjian zhiku !=?)#), which has currently been 
ignored compared with the mainstream scholars. Intellectuals in these unofficial think tanks have 
published extensively and widely about property law reform in China, for example, the analysis o f the 
housing market.
58 The French Code Civil followed the Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis, and is divided into personal 
status, property, and acquisition o f property.
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The different models reflect the different status of property law in the proposed civil 
code. The German model highlights the status of wuquan (the rights to things), while 
the French model stresses the importance of ‘personality’.59
In terms of specific structures of the Civil Code, there are also different proposals. A 
‘loose and assembled model’ (songsanshi, lianbangshi is proposed
by Fei Zongyi Jiang Ping and Wei Yaorong This
model of the proposed Civil Code is the compilation and synthesis of the existing 
laws, including the GPCL, the Contract Law, the Guarantee Law, the Inheritance Law, 
the Marriage Law, and the Property Law in China.61 Opponents such as Liang 
Huixing argues that this model indicates the influence of common law, to which he 
has a negative attitude, because Liang thinks that the imported Civil Law concepts 
and principles have already been rooted in and integrated into Chinese society. 
However, without an in-depth analysis, Liang takes for granted that the legislation in 
the past 100 years (roughly from 1898 to the 1990s) has already taken root in the 
‘legal tradition’ of China.63
An ‘idealised model’ (lixiang zhuyi silu is proposed by Xu Guodong
m m f o ) 64 This model traces its origin back to Roman Law, which was divided into 
renfa (law of persons K f k )  and wufa (law of things $%}'-&)■ Xu holds that renfa is 
more important than wufa. Liang responded to Xu’s proposal that it is no more than
59 Adopting the French model for the proposed Chinese civil code is also supported by some Chinese 
scholars, for example, Professor Xu Guodong at the Law School o f Xiamen University. He stresses 
‘personality’ and law of persons in the civil code legislation. See e.g., Xu Guodong, ‘Minfadian 
Cao’an de Jiben Jiegou [on the Basic Structure o f the Draft o f China’s Civil Code]’, Faxue Yanjiu 
[CASS Journal o f  Law] 1 (2000): 37-55. Xu also stresses the importance o f the relationship between 
Shiminshehui (Tfr civil society), Shiminfa (7U Jus civile) and the civil law. See Xu
Guodong, ‘Shimin Shehui yu Shimin Fa: Minfa de Tiaozheng Duixiang Yanjiu [Civil Society and Jus 
Civile: On the Subjects o f Civil Law]’, Faxue Yanjiu [CASS Journal o f  Law] 4 (1994): 3-9.
60 See Liang Huixing, ‘Dangqian Guanyu Minfadian Bianzuan de Santiao Silu [Three Current 
Thoughts on the Codification o f Civil Law]’, Ltlshi Shijie [Lawyer World], no. 4 (2003): 4-8.
61 See ibid, 4.
62 See ibid, 5.
63 See Liang Huixing, ‘Songsanshi Huibianshi de Minfadian Bushihe Zhongguo Guoqing [A Loose 
and Assembled Civil Code is Improper to the Situation o f China’, Zhengfa Luntan [Tribune o f  
Political Science and law] 1 (2003): 9-14.
64 See Liang, ‘Dangqian Guanyu Minfadian Bianzhuan de Santiao Silu [Three Current Thoughts on 
the Codification o f Civil Law]’.
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the order of the presentation of the law of persons and the law of things in the Civil 
Code, and is a futile question of which came first, the chicken or the egg.65
Instead of the two models above, Liang provides the ‘pragmatic model’ (xianshizhuyi 
silu J&CS1&), and emphasises ‘logic’ (luoji xing and
‘systematisation’ {tixi xing ^3^14) in his proposal.66 This model is based on the 
Pandects system and the German Civil Code that encompasses five books. Moreover, 
Liang argues that Chinese Civil Code should adopt the combination of civil and 
commercial law (minshang heyi —),67 and the structure of five books (bian
and there should be no special book provided for the right of personality (renge 
quan A tfr$ 0 .68
These debates over the codification of the proposed Civil Code and the status of 
property law in the Civil Code in China are not only different opinions on the 
structure of the Civil Code (for example, the presentation of the law of persons and 
the law of things) but also different points of view among Chinese scholars about the 
relationship between persons and things. The dilemma here is due largely to their 
conception of wuquan as property rights over youtiwu (corporeal or tangible 
things),69 which is not capable to deal with the fragmentation of property rights in 
the post-1978 era. Another problem with their arguments is that Chinese scholars talk
65 See ibid, 6.
66 See ibid.
67 This is the same as the Civil Code of the Republic of China, which was enlarged to a Civil and 
Commercial Code. The legislators o f the Republican Civil Code held that the distinction between 
Civil and Commercial law in the continental European countries was due to historical reasons such as 
the existence o f a merchant class with its own custom. But no such causes existed in China. Although 
the Chinese merchants did combine into guilds and chambers of commerce for the protection o f their 
interests, they did not form a class o f their own. See Fu Bingchang’s introduction to Hsia, Chow, and 
Change, The Civil Code o f  the Republic o f  China, xvi-xvii.
68 Liang also proposes that based on the German model, the Civil Code in China should contain seven 
sections: general principles, wuquan (real property rights), general principles on obligation (zhaiquan), 
contract, tort, relatives (qinshu quan), and inheritance. Also see Wang Liming, ‘Guanyu Woguo 
Minfadian Tixi Goujian de Wenti [on Several Basic Issues o f the System Construction o f the Civil 
Code in China’, Faxue [Law Science], no. 1 (2003): 30-39. Wang also highlights the importance of  
property rights over personality.
9 Liang Huixing and Wang Liming share the same opinion that the Intellectual Property Law should 
not be included in the proposed Civil Code. There is ongoing debate between Liang Huixing and 
Zheng Chengsi over the issue of Intellectual Property.
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only about the law, in particular the laws within the German law legacy, but ignore 
the Chinese social reality.70 They have not given much weight to the relationship 
between law and society. Following the German model, Chinese property law 
stresses the * thing ness'11 of the conception of property and property rights, which 
can be clearly identified in both the formal and substantive debates over property 
lawmaking.
3.2 Substantive debates
3.2.1. wuquan, ownership, and property rights
3.2.1.1. Ownership (suoyou quan and property rights {caichan quan M 
or chan quan ^ $ 0
Apart from the difficulties in defining ‘rights’ and ‘property rights’per se, the choice 
of usages pertaining to property rights in the lexicon of Chinese property law is not 
just a legal question, but involves political concerns. Before the drafting of property 
law was embarked on in 1998, a series of concepts pertaining to property were used 
in jurists’ debates in the 1980s and 1990s.72 In 1979, by confirming the central 
government policy of separating government administration from state enterprises 
(zhengqi fenkai JF), ‘autonomous operational and management rights’
(Jingying guanli zizhuquan £5111^11 ^  ± $ 0  first appeared in the State Council 
‘Regulations Concerning the Further Expansion of the Autonomous Operational and 
Management Rights of State Enterprises’ (1979),73 and the concept of state 
enterprises’ ‘operational rights’ (jingying quan £511 $ 0  was subsequently included 
in Article 16 of the 1982 Constitution and in Article 82 of the 1986 GPCL.74 On the 
one hand, ‘ownership’ (suoyou quan fjT^PlX) was provided in Article 71 of the 
GPCL, referring to the rights to possess, use, benefit from and dispose of one’s own
70 Although they claim that they have paid much attention to social reality in their writings.
71 I borrowed this term from C. M. Hann, ‘Introduction: The Embeddedness o f Property’, in Property 
Relations: Renewing the Anthropological Tradition, ed. C. M. Hann (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 8.
72 See Ronald C. Keith and Lin Zhiqiu, Law and Justice in China s New Marketplace (New York: 
Palgrave, 2001), 139. Keith and Lin give a comprehensive analysis o f concepts related to property and 
ownership, see ibid, 138-177.
73 Guanyu Kuoda Guoying Qiye Jingying Guanli Zizhuquan de Ruogan Guiding. This regulation has 
been ineffective since 6 October 2001.
74 See Keith and Lin, Law and Justice in China’s New Marketplace, 140.
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property. On the other hand, ‘property rights’ (caichan quan were broadly
and vaguely defined in Section 1, Chapter 5 of the GPCL.75 As state enterprises 
wanted to further strengthen their status such as a ‘legal person’, ‘ownership rights of 
a legal person’ (faren suoyou quan were emphasised in many legal
conferences.76 However, instead of ‘ownership rights of a legal person’ ‘property 
rights of a legal person’ (faren chanquan appeared in the 1993 Decision
of the third Plenum of the 14th National Congress of the CPC,77 and then was
•JO
incorporated into Article 4 of the Company Law. There are delicate meanings 
behind these wordings.
Property rights (chanquan are more widely used than ownership (suoyou quan 
H should be pointed out here that property rights can be translated both 
caichanquan and chanquan in Chinese. Although in most cases,
70caichanquan and chanquan are used interchangeably, caichanquan is much used 
in the legal context, while chanquan is more widely used in economic 
scholarship—largely influenced by the writings of Ronald Coase arguing that 
‘transaction costs’ are the key to the understanding of economic institutions. The 
concept of chanquan in post-Mao China emerged in the process of the SOE reform 
and is closely linked to resource allocation. The development of the conception of 
chanquan could be divided into four stages, involving freeing the control over SOEs 
by government and granting more autonomy to enterprises (1978- 1984); the 
separation of ownership and management rights (1984-1993), clarifying property 
rights (1993-2003), and establishing ‘a modem property rights system’
75 See ibid.
76 See ibid.
77 The 1993 Decision requires to establish a modem enterprise system with clear property rights, 
clarified rights and responsibilities, separation between the government and the enterprise, and 
scientific management M
‘Establishing and improving the modem property rights system’ is also
provided by the 2003 Decision o f the third Plenum o f the 16th National Congress o f the CPC in the 
‘Decision o f the Central Committee o f the CPC on Some Issues Concerning Improvement o f the 
Socialist Market Economy’.
78 Keith and Lin, Law and Justice in China's New Marketplace, 140.
79 Here again we come across the difficulty in analysing issues in China by using English translations.
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(2003-present).80 In terms of disposal of properties, chanquan are actually lesser 
rights than ownership, and their essentially economic dimension shields them from 
sensitive political controversy. Chanquan is also more widely used in daily life. For 
example, when ordinary people discuss the real estate market, they use chanquan 
more frequently. But the connotation of chanquan is narrower than caichanquan, 
because caichanquan includes property rights pertaining to person or personality 
(renshen quan A J f  $ 0  in marriage and labour law, and these rights concerning 
personality are beyond the scope of Chinese property law.
Apart from the vagueness of these concepts due to the translation from Chinese to 
English,81 we shall ask the question: what are the implications for the distinctions 
between ‘management rights’, ‘ownership’, ‘property rights’, ‘ownership rights of a 
legal person’, and ‘property rights of a legal person’? One answer to this question is 
that ‘the post-Mao regime has been successful in avoiding the politically explosive 
question of formal ownership without undermining the functionally capitalist 
character of the reformed economic system’.82 Keith and Lin also argue that these 
concepts indicate the endeavours (including legal and governmental) to deal with the 
diversified rights of the state, the collective and the individual,83 no matter whether 
these projects have been successful or not.
These concepts relating to ownership remain intricate and opaque. The difficulties in 
defining ownership in China also lie in the fact that by following the Civil Law 
tradition and adopting a unitary ownership concept, while lacking the doctrines of 
tenure and estates in English land law, it is hard to define the terms, conditions, 
extent and duration of an owner’s interest in Chinese property law.
80 See Lin Faxin, ‘ “Chanquan” Gainian de Faxue Sikao [a Legal Reflection on the Conception o f  
“Chanquan”]’, in Wuquanfa Bijiao Yanjiu [a  Comparative Study o f  the Property Law], ed., You 
Quanrong (Beijing: Renmin Fayuan Chubanshe, 2004), 82.
81 For example, the Chinese terms chanquan and caichanquan could be both translated property 
rights in English, but they vary in substance and scope in Chinese.
82 Maurice Meisner, The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate o f Chinese Socialism, 
1978-1994 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), 513.
83 Keith and Lin, Law and Justice in China's New Marketplace, 142.
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3.2.1.2. Wuquan (real property rights) and Jura in re aliena (other real property 
rights
Economic reform has generated changes in existing social groups and the emergence 
of new identities, with a new constellation of social interests created. These groups 
(for example, reform decision makers and other governmental officials, managers of 
SOEs, private entrepreneurs) in turn have an important impact on the course of the 
reform.84 However, as Wang Hui argues, market reform is ‘a long-term investment
QC
entailing risk and an uneven distribution of the benefits’. The problem of property 
lawmaking is how should the Property Law deal with these decentralised interests 
and de facto property rights generated in market reform?
Although there were debates on the conception of wuquan in drafting property law, 
Wang Liming’s opinion on wuquan is the dominant discourse. He holds that wuquan 
is a good vehicle to address the conception of ownership and other property rights, 
and has been integrated into the Chinese civil law system. Wang argues that wuquan 
can distinguish tangible property rights from intangible property rights, wuquan is 
also compatible with the level of development of the legal system in China and the 
quality of the legal profession. Therefore the basic principle of property law should 
be yiwu yiquan (one right over one thing, or one thing could establish only one right, 
—$().86 Wang further argues that the adoption of ‘property rights’
(caichanquan) will transform Chinese civil law into the common law model, which 
does not fit into Chinese reality. The main reason given by Wang is this: property 
rights in common law include both tangible rights and intangible rights, and property
84 See Gordon White, Riding the Tiger: The Politics o f  Economic Reform in Post-Mao China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 198.
85 Wang, The Gradual Revolution, 4.
86 See e.g., Wang Liming, ‘Wuquan Gainian zai Tantao [Another Examination o f the Concept o f Real 
Property Rights]’, Zhejiang Shehui Kexue [Zhejiang Social Sciences] 2 (2002): 82-90; Wang Liming, 
‘Wuquan Lifa Ruogan Wenti Xin Sikao [New Thoughts on Several Issues o f  the Legislation of 
Property Law]’, Faxue [Law Science], no. 7 (2004): 78-89. We can compare Wang’s arguments with 
those of Zheng Chengsi. Zheng holds that the draft o f wuquanfa should adopt a much broader concept 
o f property rights (caichan quan). See Zheng Chengsi and Huang Hui, ‘Faguo Minfadian Zhongde 
Caichanquan Gainian yu Woguo de Lifa Xuanze [the Concept o f Property Rights in the French Civil 
Law and the Legislative Choice o f China]’, Zhishi Chanquan [Intellectual Property] 3 (2002): 9-11.
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rights are different from wuquan, 8 7  However, it is not easy for the unitary and 
exclusive conception of wuquan to deal with the diversified and fragmented property 
rights in China, for example, the relationship between ownership and lesser rights. In 
order to solve this question, while labelling ownership ziwuquan (1=1 $?$(), Chinese 
scholars have introduced Jura in re aliena (other real property rights, or ta wuquan 
in Chinese), particularly the usufruct (yongyi wuquan $() to handle
these questions. This approach resembles the practice of Civil Law, but differs from 
the Common Law practice:
In Roman law, title and ownership were not distinguished. Rather, ownership and lesser 
rights were clearly differentiated. Separate remedies were available for the assertion 
before a tribunal of what were considered to be qualitatively different kinds of claims. 
The fulcrum of the English system of remedies is possession rather than ownership. In 
terms of the conceptual structure of English property law, the distinction between “true 
ownership” and merely possessory title is, at core, the difference between an earlier and 
a later taking of possession.88
Jura in re aliena (especially usufruct) is important in Chinese property lawmaking, 
because it is one of the approaches by which Chinese scholars and lawmakers 
‘propertise’89 the decentralised and fragmented lesser interests that have been set in 
motion by market reform.90 Article 40 in Chapter 4 of the Property Law (2007) 
divides property rights into three types: ownership, use rights/usufruct, and security 
rights. In terms of usufruct and landownership, the decentralised interests pertaining 
to land are mainly categorised as the ‘land use rights’ {tudi shiyong quan 
$() of state-owned urban land,91 and the ‘contractual management rights’ (chengbao
87 See Wang, ‘Wuquan Gainian zai Tantao [Another Examination o f the Concept o f Real Property 
Rights]’.
88 Murphy, Roberts, and Flessas, Understanding Property Law, 61.
89 This is not a real English word, so quotation marks are used.
90 Also see e.g., Yang Lixin, ‘Tawuquan de Lishi Yanjin he Woguo Tawuquan Zhidu de Chongxin 
Gouzao [the History o f Jura in Re Aliena and the Restructuring Ownership Structure in China]’, 2002. 
In < http://www.vanelx.com/dispnews.asp?id=88> (last visited 30 August 2008); Gao Fuping, ‘Tudi 
Shiyongquan Keti Lun: Woguo Budongchan Wuquan Zhidu Sheji de Jiben Shexiang [the Objects of 
Land Use Rights: The Planned Structure o f Property Rights over Real Property]’, Faxue [Law  
Science], no. 11 (2001): 44-51. Gao Fuping is the professor of Law at East China University o f 
Politics and law in Shanghai, and he has published extensively in the area o f the usufruct.
91 The Constitution (1982, amended in 1988, 1993,1999, 2004), Article 10.
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jingyingquan of collectively owned rural land,92 as well as other use
rights of rural land for residential93 and construction purposes.94
Yet there are many controversies surrounding the usufruct. One of the debates is 
whether ‘state-owned enterprise property rights’ (guoyou qiye caichan quan US Wdfe 
should be incorporated into usufruct, or it should be put into another 
category such as property rights of legal persons.95 Professor Liang’s drafting team 
believed that after corporatisation of the SOEs during the reform, the relationship 
between the state and SOEs, subjected to the Company Law, should be categorised as 
a relationship between shareholders and corporations,96 that is, the state has shares 
while the enterprise enjoys ‘property rights of a legal person’ (y£ A B y  
contrast, in the Renmin University Draft of the Property Law led by Wang Liming, 
‘state-owned enterprise property rights’ were defined a special type of the usufruct. 
But one of the paradoxes of defining ‘state-owned enterprise property rights’ in the 
Property Law is that some parts of assets of a company (especially SHEs) are from 
investment of shareholders, including intellectual property (for example, Articles 24 
and 27 of the Company Law). These intangibles are clearly beyond the scope of 
Chinese property law. The Property Law (2007) seems to have corresponded with 
Professor Liang’s opinion,98 and there is no special provision for ‘state-owned 
enterprise property rights’ as one kind of other real property rights {Jura in re 
aliena).
92 The GPCL (1986), Article 80; The Property Law (2007), Chapter 11. The debate surrounding the 
contractual management rights o f collectively owned rural land is also over whether these rights 
should be characterised as wuquan (real property rights or zhaiquan (obligation Also 
some Chinese scholars do not distinguish debt from obligation.
93 The Property Law (2007), Chapter 13.
94 The Property Law (2007), Chapter 12.
95 Liu Jingwei, ‘Zhongguo Dalu de Wuquan Lifa Jiqi Ruogan Wenti Tantao [the Property
Law-Making in Mainland China and an Analysis o f  Several Issues]’, in Wuquanfa Bijiao Yanjiu [a
Comparative Study o f the Property Law], ed. You Quanrong (Beijing: Renmin Fayuan Chubanshe, 
2004), 6-8.
96 The Company Law (1994), Article 4.
97 See Liang Huixing, ‘Zhiding Zhongguo Wuquanfa de Ruogan Jiben Wenti [Several Basic Issues in 
Drafting o f the Property Law in China], Faxue Yanjiu [Legal Research], no. 4 (2000): 7.
98 On the discussion between Liang and Wang on the matter o f the property relationship between the 
state and SOEs, also see Huang, ‘The Path to Clarity’, 208.
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Some scholars also question the applicability of usufruct to deal with the land use 
rights of state-owned land and the ‘contractual management rights’ of collectively 
owned rural land." They argue that, in the Chinese context, both ‘the state’ and ‘the 
collective’ are abstract entities constructed by law, and property in land held by these 
entities cannot be directly transferred in the market, which is at odds with the essence 
of market reform. Thus land use rights need to be further ‘propertised’ (caichan hua 
lb ).100 These concerns direct the attention of Chinese scholars to English 
property law, where land ownership is much more dispersed and fragmented than in 
many countries on the continent. These scholars’ advice is that ‘estate’ should be 
introduced into Chinese property law as the mechanism to deal with lesser property 
rights in land.101 However, estate is a very complex element in the English property 
law system, as it originated from the feudal system, evolved with the practice of 
inheritance and the tax system, and now is closely linked to the institution of the 
Trust. Moreover, after the 1925 Property Legislation, the language of ‘estates’ was 
abandoned, lesser freehold estates (life estates, entail) and all future estates 
(remainders, reversions) can exist only in equity behind a trust, and entails are 
abolished for the future by the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 
1996.102 Therefore the applicability of estate to the Chinese context needs to be 
tested further.
3.2.2. The debates over clarifying property rights—efficiency and equality
The long process of drafting property law in China took place against the background
of the development of ‘a market economy’. It was hoped by Chinese legislators that 
the clarification of property rights through legislation could help promote economic
99 See e.g., Gao, ‘Tudi Shiyongquan Keti Lun: Woguo Budongchan Wuquan Zhidu Sheji de Jiben 
Shexiang [the Objects o f Land Use Rights: The Planned Structure o f Property Rights over Real 
Property]’.
100 See ibid, 44.
101 See ibid, 47-49. In England before 1926, the legal fee simple could be split into a number of lesser 
estates, which could be possessed at different times. The doctrine o f estates ‘enabled owners of 
property to create a whole series o f successive interests in the same piece o f land’. See Murphy, 
Roberts, and Flessas, Understanding Property Law, 77.
102 See ibid, 92, 229-231.
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growth. Against this backdrop, property law legislation prioritises ‘efficiency’ over 
‘equality’. However, efficiency and equality are not easily balanced.
Within the neoclassical economics framework, clearly defined property rights are 
essential for the well-functioned market. Yet in the Chinese context, there are many 
cases that pose a challenge to the neoclassical framework. Take the township and 
village enterprises (TVEs)103 for example. TVEs developed fast with remarkable 
performance in the 1980s. However, the problem with the ownership of TVEs was 
the degree of the local government’s role in the appointment of TVE managers as 
well as its direct involvement in the management of TVEs. Moreover, most cases in 
practice suggest that local governments were the de facto owner of TVEs.104 
Therefore the question is why, given the usual emphasis by economists on the 
importance of clarifying private property rights for incentives, Chinese TVEs as 
‘vaguely defined cooperatives with weak or poorly developed property rights’ were 
so successful?105
In response to the question raised above, some scholars argue that whether China’s 
economic growth depends on or requires the clarity of property rights is highly 
questionable. For example some emphasise cultural elements, and suggest that 
economic growth in rural China is based on its cooperative culture that does not 
necessarily require the clarity of property rights.106 Some focus on the political 
context, and advocate that the shifting of political and rent-seeking power to local 
governments, legal persons and individuals has created '‘de facto private property
107rights’. While these de facto property rights are not easy to be systematically
103 TVEs are collective-owned enterprise located in townships or villages. Many TVEs are located in 
urban areas. They are called TVEs simply because they are supervised by rural township or village 
governments and the majority o f their employees are registered as rural labourers.
04 See Martin L. Weitzman and Xu Chenggang, ‘Chinese Township-Village Enterprises as Vaguely 
Cooperatives \  Journal o f  Comparative Economics 18(1994): 128.
105 See ibid: 124, 142.
106 See e.g., ibid.
107 See Huang, ‘The Path to Clarity’, 195.
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legalised, they are supported by local state corporatism108 and informal social 
networks (for example, guanxi ;£3^).109 Others stress the central government’s role 
in the allocation of economic resources and its link with economic growth.110 The 
implications of these arguments are that we should look beyond the legal framework, 
and explore the property regime in China through socio-economic transformation 
and governance.
Against the backdrop of prioritising ‘efficiency’, the Property Law (2007) largely 
ignores ‘equality’, and it does not change the legal and governmental rural-urban 
divide (chengxiang eryuanzhi nor the dual land ownership system.
Urban land is state owned, while rural land is collectively owned; in the primary 
property market, the state (represented by city governments in most cases) can 
acquire rural land collectively owned by villagers (represented by collective 
economic organisations and village committees) but not vice versa. City and county 
governments can therefore sell land use rights to property developers through auction, 
tender or negotiation. By contrast, while rural land is collectively owned, farmers 
cannot dispose of their land freely and are vulnerable to compulsory land acquisition. 
The unequal land ownership will be further discussed in Chapters Four, Six and 
Seven.
3.2.3. Tri-ownership and equal protection of public and private ownership
Equal protection of state, collective and private property, one of the most important 
principles of the Property Law (Article 4), is considered a milestone towards the road 
of the rule of law. However, as this principle contravenes the socialist doctrine that 
‘public property is sacred and inviolable’, the debates over the equal protection of
108 Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: The Institutional Foundations o f  Economic Reform (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 1999), 11.
109 See Jean C. Oi and Andrew G. Walder, eds., Property Rights and Economic Reform in China 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).
1,0 See e.g., Huang Yasheng, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy o f  
Central-Local Relations During the Reform Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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public and private ownership111 were very fierce during the legislation process of the 
Property Law. The debates focused on whether there should be a tri-ownership 
system by using the taxonomy of state, collective and private ownership, and 
whether there should be unified protection for public and private ownership. Liang 
Huixing believes that the ‘sanctity of public ownership’ principle (for example, the 
Constitution, Article 12; the GPCL, Article 73) as adopted in the current legal system 
is a relic of the planned economy and outdated former Soviet civil law theories.112 
Liang argues that the sanctity principle prioritises public property while ignoring 
private property.113 The sanctity principle of public ownership therefore should be 
replaced by ‘the principle of unified protection of all lawful properties’ (fiefa caichan 
yiti baohuyuanze 'n Based on the unified protection
principle, Liang argues that ownership is a civil right (minshi quanli and
there is no need to continue the traditional GPCL taxonomy of state ownership, 
collective ownership and individual ownership,115 which is based on the status of 
their holders. Instead, his proposed draft uses a taxonomy including landownership 
(tudi suoyouquan mineral ownership (kuangcang suoyouquan iTHc
FJj W$ 0  and public property (gongyouwu $J).] 16
Wang Liming disagrees with Liang’s proposal. Wang believes that wuquanfa should 
reflect the nature of the ‘ownership system’ (suoyouzhi which is a mixed
system with dominant public ownership in China.117 Wang argues that tri-ownership
111 See the analysis o f this question in Huang, ‘The Path to Clarity’, 204-206.
112 See Liang Huixing, ‘Zhongguo Wuquanfa de Qicao [Drafting o f Law o f Real Rights in China]’, 
Shanxi Daxue Xuebao [Journal o f  Shanxi University] 25, no. 2 (2002), 25. See the same argument of 
Chen Huabin at the CASS, in Chen Huabin, ‘Several Thoughts o f the Legislation on Real Rights in 
Our Country [Dui Woguo Wuquan Lifa de Ruogan Xin Sikao]’, Jinling FalU Pinglun [Jinling Law 
Review], no. 1 (2005): 14.
113 See Liang, ‘Zhongguo Wuquanfa de Qicao [Drafting o f Law o f Real Rights in China]’, 25.
114 See Liang Huixing, ‘Wuquanfa de Lifa Sikao [a Legislative Reflection on the Law of Real Right]’, 
Jiangxi Caijing Daxue Xuebao [Journal o f  Jiangxi University o f  Finance and Economics], no. 1 
(2001): 43.
115 See Liang Huixing, ed., Zhongguo Wuquanfa Canan (Jianyi Gao) [Proposed Draft o f  China s Law 
on Real Property Rights] (Beijing: China Social Science Documents Press, 2000).
116 See Liang, ‘Zhongguo Wuquanfa de Qicao [Drafting o f Law of Real Rights in China]’, 26; Liang, 
ed., Zhongguo Wuquanfa Cao ‘an (Jianyi Gao) [Proposed Draft o f  China s New Law on Real Property 
Rights].
1,7 See Wang, ‘Wuquan Lifa Ruogan Wenti Xin Sikao [New Thoughts on Several Issues o f the
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liftis a proper reflection of the Chinese ownership system. In the proposed draft of 
the Property Law led by Wang, state ownership, collective ownership, individual 
ownership and ownership by social and religious organisations are separately 
provided for. Moreover, Wang insists that state ownership should enjoy special 
protection (guoyou caichan teshu baohui zhidu under
several circumstances.119
At the core of the debates between Liang and Wang is whether ownership should be 
formulated as an economic institution (jingji zhidu or a social institution
(shehui zhidu rfrJjS). The LAC draft circulating for comments and the Property 
Law (2007) balanced the views in both proposed drafts. While keeping the traditional 
GPCL taxonomy of state ownership, collective ownership and private ownership, the 
LAC draft and the Property Law (2007) provide equal protection for state ownership, 
collective ownership and private ownership.120
Yet there are still two major problems with the tri-ownership system and equal 
protection for public and private property that have not been resolved. The first 
problem is that tri-ownership is not capable of dealing with the fragmentation of 
ownership, and this will be examined respectively in the chapters on state, collective 
and private ownership. The second problem is the relationship between property law 
and the Constitution121 as well as socialist principles,122 and this is the underlying 
reason for the problematic relationship between public and private property. 
‘Emphasis on public ownership of the means of production and distribution is always 
taken together as the central theoretical distinction between the socialist and
Legislation o f the Property Law]’, 84; Wang, ed., Zhongguo Wuquanfa Cao’an Jianyi Gao ji 
Shuoming [Proposed Draft o f Chinese Property Law and Explanations].
118 See Wang, ‘Wuquan Lifa Ruogan Wenti Xin Sikao [New Thoughts on Several Issues o f the 
Legislation o f the Property Law]’, 84.
119 See Renming Daxue draft, Articles 44, 112, 120.
120 See Liang, ‘Zhongguo Wuquanfa de Qicao [Drafting o f Law o f Real Rights in China]’.
121 Tong, ‘Wuquanfa (Cao’an) Ruhe Tongguo Xianfa Zhimen [How Could the Property Law (Draft) 
Pass the Door to the Constitution’, 4-23. Han Dayuan, ‘You Wuquanfa Cao’an de Zhenglun Xiangdao 
de Ruogan Xianfa Wenti [Some Constitutional Questions in the Debate over Wuquanfa (Draft)]’, 
Faxue [Law Science], no. 3 (2006): 24-32.
122 The 1982 Constitution is based on 1936 Soviet Constitution.
capitalist systems’.123 How property law treats public and private ownership is thus 
easily linked to whether property law is unconstitutional (weixian £ i ^ ) 124 or 
contrary to the socialist principles. In terms of the paradox of ‘an authoritarian state 
fostering a free-market economy while espousing socialism’,125 some scholars from 
the New Left wing do have reservations about providing ‘sanctity of private 
property’ in the Constitution,126 and they also highlight the importance of communal 
property.127 However, the question is: are there clear boundaries between public and 
private law in reality?128 Land acquisition in relation to the vaguely defined ‘public 
interest’ is an example to explore this question further (see Chapter Seven in 
particular).
4. Conclusion
The process of property lawmaking in post-Mao China involved endeavours to 
‘propertise’ the fragmented property rights that emerged in the process of economic 
reform; during these processes, private property has been gradually recognised by the 
law. However, there are still residual categories129 that are difficult to define or 
‘legalise’ in a systematic way. Therefore there are variations, tensions and intricacies 
in terms of different forms of ownership in reality. In terms of the limitation of the 
rehabilitation of ‘the private’ in the law, we need to take account of the broader 
context of economic reform from 1978 onwards when examining property law 
reform and property lawmaking. Economic reform is pragmatic and directed by the 
‘facts’ as such facts seemed at the time without clear guidelines or legal rules, which,
123 Ronald C. Keith, China's Struggle fo r  the Rule o f  Law, 121.
124 See e.g., Gong Xiantian’s public letter to the LAC.
125 See the interview with Wang Hui in Pankaj Mishra, ‘China’s New Leftist’, The New York Times,
15 October 2006.
126 See e.g., Cui Zhiyuan, ‘Caichanquan yu Xianfa zhi Guanxi de Bijiao Yanjiu [a Comparative Study 
o f the Relationship between Property Rights and the Constitution]’, Dushu [Reading], no. 4 (2003).
127 See Mishra, ‘China’s New Leftist’.
128 This is one o f the themes in this thesis.
129 Such categories include, for example, ‘minor property right apartments’ that are built on 
collectively-owned rural land, and will be analysed in Chapter Four.
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usually, lagged behind the pace of economic reform. Moreover, the boundaries 
between the public sphere and the private sphere are blurred. A lot of grey areas have 
been thus produced, among which there are policy-made products waiting to be 
legalised. In such a context, there is often a gap between ownership defined in law 
and ownership as understood and practised in society, and property lawmaking often 
lags behind social change.
The bottleneck of property lawmaking is the undifferentiated relationship between 
law and politics, as well as the constraints posed by socialist ideology. Another 
dilemma of property law in China is how to conceive the ‘tradition’ of property law. 
For example, the conception of wuquan, as formulated by German Civil Law, was 
introduced to China, via Japan in the late Qing. Can we now take for granted that the 
wuquan has taken root into Chinese legal tradition? Rather than getting stuck in the 
contrasts between the German model and Chinese social complexity, it is more 
important to explore how the Chinese define ownership, draw and redraw the 
boundaries between the public and the private in context of dynamic governance and 
changing socio-economic conditions. Chapters Four and Five wish to elaborate these 
issues.
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Chapter 4: The Transformation of Collective Ownership in Rural 
China: Governing Farmers under Collective Ownership
1. Introduction
The revival of private property started from the rural area marked by the introduction 
of the household responsibility system (HRS). However, there has been an odd 
phenomenon involved in the transformation of collective ownership and the 
re-emergence of private property in rural China. In theory, the collapse of 
collectivism should pave the way for the emergence of private ownership. But in the 
wake of dismantling rural communes in China, private ownership has not been 
granted to Chinese farmers;1 instead, collective ownership has been maintained. This 
odd phenomenon invites an examination of the socio-legal roots of collective 
ownership in China. Collective ownership in rural China and its transformation in 
Maoist, Deng, and post-Deng China thus deserve in-depth analysis. Looking beyond 
dichotomies such as tradition versus modernity, past versus future, and rural versus 
urban that were often embedded in the examination of Chinese rural transformation, 
this chapter examines the blurring boundaries between public and private, and 
between rural and urban. This chapter further explores how this examination sheds 
light on in-depth questions of the continuities and discontinuities in governing 
farmers under collective ownership in Maoist and post-Mao China, as well as what 
kinds of authority and power are involved in the change of rural China (for example, 
the shift from the plan to the market).
The legal and administrative urban-rural distinction was entrenched in the Maoist era. 
Although economic reform commenced in the rural area in the late 1970s, since 1984, 
the focus of the reform shifted from the rural economy to the urban economy, and
1 I use farmers rather than peasants in this chapter. ‘Farmers’ is the ordinary term used to describe 
people in the Chinese countryside, while ‘peasants’ (as opposed to landlords) emphasises the feudal 
mode o f production in the Marxist sense.
2 Within such boundary thinking, rural society in the pre-1949 era is labelled as ‘feudalism’, while 
decollectivisation o f rural society in the post-1978 era is seen as a step towards capitalism. However, 
the transformation o f rural China is far more complex and intricate.
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rural development and urban development then proceeded in an uneven and 
unbalanced way. Yet in post-Deng China, as cities expand into their rural peripheries, 
legal and administrative distinctions between the urban and the rural become 
blurred.3 For example, in the area of the real estate market, a de facto property 
market is emerging in the rural area with affordable prices under the label of ‘minor 
property rights’ (xiao chanquan or ‘township property rights’ (xiang
chanquan Such real estate market contravenes the ‘formal’, ‘written’ law,
and this issue will be explained in detail in Section 4.2 of the chapter.
Here it is necessary to define the scope of this chapter. There is a huge amount of 
literature on the study of both ‘traditional’ and ‘modem’ rural China, and it is not 
easy and unnecessary to provide a comprehensive list here. This chapter cannot and 
does not intend to cover all aspects of the transformation of rural China, but focuses 
on collective ownership and governing farmers in China.4
Different from either ‘the commons’ or ‘common property’5 in the Western 
discourses on communal resources, collective ownership is mainly a fabrication of 
Chinese law and politics that marks a departure from customary landholding in late 
imperial China as examined in Chapter Two. In 1958, rural landownership was 
formally taken away from farmers and put into the category of collective ownership. 
Although in the early 1980s the communes were dismantled and the household
3 The blurred urban-rural divide is manifested on, for example, migrant workers who work legally or 
illegally in urban areas. On this see e.g., Rachel Murphy, How Migrant Labor Is Changing Rural 
China (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 2002).
4 On the study o f  rural China from the perspective o f ownership and governance, see e.g., Benjamin 
James, ‘Expanding the Gap: How the Rural Property System Exacerbate China’s Urban-Rural Gap’, 
Columbia Journal o f  Asian Law 20, no. 2 (2007): 451-491; Frank Xianfeng Huang, ‘The Path to 
Clarity: Development o f Property Rights in China’, Columbia Journal o f  Asian Law  17, no. 2 (2004): 
191-223; Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: The Institutional Foundations o f  Economic Reform 
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1999); Jean C. Oi and Andrew G. Walder, eds., Property 
Rights and Economic Reform in China (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999); Chih-Jou 
Jay Chen, Transforming Rural China: How Local Institutions Shape Property Rights in Rural China 
(New York: Routledge, 2004).
5 See e.g., Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy o f the Commons’, Science 162, no. 3859 (1968): 1243-1248; 
Michael A. Heller, ‘The Tragedy o f the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets’, Harvard Law Review 11, no. 3 (1998): 621-688; Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: 
The Evolution o f  Institutions fo r Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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responsibility system was adopted in which farmers were allocated plots to farm, 
collective ownership of rural land was maintained. Farmers have been prohibited 
from using the land for mortgages or selling the land in the market. Moreover, in 
China’s property regime, public ownership (including state ownership and collective 
ownership6) and private ownership are often regarded as polar opposites. The 
Property Law {wuquan fa  $ 3 $ ® ), which came into effect on 1 Oct 2007, 
reinforced this system of tri-ownership.7 However, it is unclear who owns rural land 
in China: farmers themselves, collective economic organisations, or local 
governments. Moreover, rural land has been misappropriated by various ‘middlemen’ 
or ‘agents’.8
In order to capture the complexity of collective ownership, we need to understand 
collective ownership in its socio-political context, and this chapter focuses on 
middlemen or agents in the Chinese governance system and how such middlemen 
affect collective ownership. Middlemen or agents refer to the groups of ‘Janus-faced’ 
people serving both as a part of the state machinery and as a part of rural society. 
Specifically, the middlemen in imperial China refers to clerks and runners9 in the
6 The Constitution (2004), Article 10: ‘Land in the rural and suburban areas is owned by collectives 
except for those portions which belong to the state in accordance with the law; house sites and private 
plots o f cropland and hilly land are also owned by collectives’. The Land Administration Law (2004), 
Article 9 defines collective ownership in the same way as Article 10 o f the Constitution.
7 See the Property Law (2007), Chapter 5.
8 On the analysis o f middlemen or agents in the Chinese governance system, see e.g., Philip A. Kuhn, 
Origins o f  the Modem Chinese State (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002); Elizabeth J. 
Remick, Building Local States: China During the Republican and Post-Mao Eras (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2004c); Helen F. Siu, Agents and Victims in South China: Accomplices in 
Rural Revolution (London: Yale University Press, 1989); Madeleine Zelin, The Magistrate’s Tael: 
Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-Century Ch ’ing China (Berkeley, Calif.; London: 
University o f California Press, 1984c).
9 In imperial China (the Qing Dynasty in particular), clerks referred to xuli (W ^ )in  yamen (^j H), 
and runners referred to yayi in yamen. Clerks and runners worked under the direct supervision 
o f the county magistrate on the lowest rung o f the administration ladder. Yamen clerks were employed 
for the purposes o f ‘copying and composing documents, the management o f public affairs, and the 
processing o f all legal cases’, (p.35) Runners were responsible for carrying out the majority o f all 
nonclerical administrative tasks and enforcing the state authority at the local level, (p. 122), see Bradly 
W. Reed, Talons and Teeth: County Clerks and Runners in the Qing Dynasty (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000). Also see e.g., Guo Runtao, Guanfu, Muyouyu Shusheng: 'Shaoxing Shiye' 
Yanjiu [Magistrates, Assistants and Scholars—Research on ’Shaoxing Shiye’]  (Beijing: Zhongguo 
Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1996); Melissa Macauley, Social Power and Legal Culture: Litigation 
Masters in Late Imperial China (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998).
local administration system; the local gentry10 acted as political brokers and took the 
advantages of the literati culture11 and their economic power often derived from 
landholding. The middlemen in the post-revolutionary (post-1949) period refer to 
rural party cadres and local governments. Middlemen are even more multiple in the 
post-1978 era, because in this period political and economic power is decentralising, 
and local governments are gaining more power to control resources. Local 
governments and local cadres become the de facto owners of rural land, and rural 
landownership is fragmented.
Furthermore, collective ownership in post-Mao China needs to be understood in the 
context of economic activities by taking account of local diversity. The definition of 
collective ownership in China neglects local variations and intricacies (for example, 
in climate, communications, fertility, local traditions, which may make a 
one-size-fits-all approach inappropriate) in rural China. Subsistence farming is 
perhaps self-explanatory but production for the market needs markets—so how are 
these markets organised? Moreover, in ‘modem’ China, what are the ties that bind 
farmers together? What is the structure of landholding in detail?12 In the following 
sections of this chapter, Part Two focuses on rural governance in traditional China; 
Part Three discusses collectivisation, Part Four analyses decollectivisation; and Part 
Five explores reorganisation of rural society in post-Mao China.
10 Local gentry refers to shen (Pf) or xiangshen , See e.g., Wu Han and Fei Xiaotong [et al],
Huangquan yu Shenquan [Imperial Power and Gentry Power] (Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1988 
[1948]).
11 For example, the Pearl River delta was ‘a literati-mediated political economy’. See Siu, Agents and 
Victims in South China, 8.
12 These questions were raised in a discussion with Professor Tim Murphy. Further questions are: 
what are the respective gender roles in relation to agricultural labour and inheritance? Who do farmers 
sell their surplus to and through what mechanisms? How is transport o f produce to local markets 
arranged? Do farmers share ownership of a truck etc? How are decisions made about what crops to 
grow or animals to rear? What is the importance o f migrant labour in China? Where are the migrants 
in the cities from? What resources are transferred over time from migrant workers in cities back to 
their parents or siblings in the countryside? What about the not-infrequent clashes between farmers 
and police? Although this chapter cannot cover all o f these questions, they all deserve careful 
investigation.
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2. Rural governance in traditional China and its transformation
Chapter Two has already given a historical background of property and property 
rights in China. This section deepens the analysis in Chapter Two and focuses on 
rural governance in traditional China. In traditional China, owing to the 
large-community political tradition and ‘familism as the essence of Chinese 
Confucianism’,13 there were few formal social groups but various middlemen or 
agents between the family and the state. Nevertheless, certain degree of autonomy 
and self-governance did exist in traditional China, and this section explores this 
question in its historical context.
2.1. ‘Large community’ vs. ‘small community’: centralization vs. kinship
Throughout Chinese history there have been tensions between the large community 
(da gongtongti and the small community (xiao gongtongti 'h ^ l^ O ^ ):14
kinship as the most powerful small community might produce ‘self-govemance’, but 
the central government tended to break such communities down and diminish their 
autonomy. Since the early Zhou (1046 BC-256 BC) dynasty, the idea that ‘under 
Heaven there should be only one ruler’ has been a dominant theme.15
13 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation o f  Prosperity (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1995), 61.
14 These two concepts are proposed by Professor Qin Hui at the Department o f History Research, 
Tsinghua University. ‘Large community’ refers to centralisation o f government, and ‘small 
community’ refers to self-governing organisations, for example, kinship and grassroots associations. 
Qin Hui’s analytical model is derived from the writing o f Ferdinand Tonnies— Community and Civil 
Society. See Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Civil Society, trans. Jos6 Harris and Margaret Hollis 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Tonnies focuses on a contrast linked to a theory of 
modernisation between small-scale, kinship and neighbourhood-based ‘communities’ and large-scale 
competitive market ‘societies’. But in Qin’s works, he points out that Tonnies’ distinction of 
community and civil society cannot be transposed to the Chinese context. See Qin Hui, ‘Ping Tengnisi 
“Gongtongti yu Shehui” [Comments on Tdnnies’ “Community and Civil Society”] ’, Shuwu, no.2 
(2000). In < http://www.gongfa.com/gongtongtiqh.htm> (last visited 2 September 2008).
15 Derk Bodde, ‘The State and Empire o f Ch’in’, in The Cambridge History o f  China, Vol. 1, the 
Ch ’in and Han Empires, 2 2 1 B. C.-A. D. 220, ed., Denis Twichett and Michael Loewe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 38. On the reform o f Shangyang, also see Zhang Jinfan, Zhang 
Xipuo and Zeng Xianyi, Zhongguo Fazhi Shi [The Legal History o f  China] (Beijing: Zhongguo 
Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 1981), 88-90.
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The reform of the Qin political system in the year 356 BC, known as the reform of 
Shang Yang16 (,shangyang bianfa S  was a significant move towards
centralising Qin administrative power.17 In 350 BC, the Qin was divided into 
counties (jun f$) that were administered by centrally appointed magistrates. In the 
same year, based on state ownership of land, Shang Yang ‘opened up’ both the 
longitudinal paths (qian Pf) and horizontal paths (mo PS) of the cultivated land. He 
replaced the well-field system (jing tian ^ f f i ) 18 by which each household of 
farmers had fixed landholding with a more flexible system in which the size of land 
plots varied.19 This is shoutian zhi (the system of granting land by the state 
under the Qin, and has been documented in Qin Bamboo slips at Shuhuidi in 
Yunmeng County (If
During the reform of Shang Yang, the principle of collective responsibility for crime 
was emphasised. The population was divided into units, and each unit was composed 
of five or ten families; the wrongdoing of any individual made all members in the 
unit hold group responsibility.20 These measures of dividing the population into
small units for control purposes laid down the legacy for the bao jia  ( ^  PP) system,21
which continued to be used in imperial times and even into Republican China.
O0)Moreover, from the Qin unification (221BC) onwards, individual households were 
transformed into the category of ‘common people listed in the household register’ 
(bian hu qi min ^r K),23 subject to the direct control of the central government.
The centralised government, an emblem of the large community, constrained the 
autonomy of small communities and individuals.
16 Shang Yang was the leader and designer o f the reform.
17 See Bodde, ‘The State and Empire o f Ch’in’, 35.
18 Cultivated land plots were divided into roughly equal size, and the boundaries between plots 
resembled the Chinese character # .
19 See Bodde, ‘The State and Empire o f Ch’in, 35.
20 See ibid, 36.
21 Ten family households were organized into a bao ((£), and 10 bao made up a j ia  (T ).
22 China’s imperial unification in 221 B.C. is a major milestone in history. Also see Ray Huang,
China: A Macro History (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 32.
23 See Du Zhengsheng, Bian Hu Qi Min: Chuantong Zhengzhi Shehui Jiegou zhi Xingcheng
[ Common People Listed in the Household Register: the Formation o f  the Traditional Political Society] 
(Taibei: Lianjing Chuban Gongsi, 1990).
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Yet, as Francis Fukuyama argues, ‘strong community can emerge in the absence of a 
strong state’.24 Kinship could gain room to develop in the areas where the control of 
the central government was weak. For example, kinship was vulnerable in the North 
but strong in South China (for example, the Pearl River Delta). Although 
lineage-based communities were exclusive, they also linked together and formed a 
larger community.25 Lineages performed a number of economic functions and 
played important roles in rural governance. For example, lineages managed lineage 
land, raised funds for famine relief, social welfare and education. They also played 
important roles in dispute resolution within the lineage. Lineage-based 
communities were important not only in the economic sense but also in the political 
sense. There were often interactions and tensions between lineages and the central 
government. When the lineage power began to threaten the power of the centre, the 
centre then tended to crack down on the power of the lineage. In fact, in the Qianlong 
court of the Qing, the Guangdong government felt the threats of the powerful 
lineages to the centre’s control over localities, made several efforts to diminish the
onpower of lineages, but did not succeed.
2.2. Landholding, taxation and middlemen
Apart from the perspective of conflicts and interactions between the large community 
and the small community, when examining governance in traditional China, the 
aspect of middlemen should also be taken into account. Although the large 
community is the political tradition, it is necessary to revisit the question: how did
24 Fukuyama, Trust, 29.
25 Siu, Agents and Victims in South China, 5.
26 On the literature on lineage organization in south eastern China, see e.g., Maurice Freedman, 
Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwantung (London: Athlone Press, 1966); Maurice 
Freedman, Lineage Organisation in Southeastern China (London: Athlone Press, 1957); James 
Watson, ‘Hereditary Tenancy and Corporate Landlordism in Traditional China’, Modem Asian Studies 
11 (1977): 161-182; James Watson, ‘Chinese Kinship Reconsidered: Anthropological Perspectives on 
Historical Research’, The China Quarterly, no. 92 (1982): 589-672.
27 Qin Hui, ‘From Traditional Non-Governmental Public Welfare Organizations to Modem “Third 
Sector”— Several Issues Concerning Comparison o f the History o f Chinese and Western Public 
Welfare’, in <http://www.cydf.cn/gb/conference/speech/paper-e/ll.htm> (last visited 2 September
2007).
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the ruler in the centre govern China? Zhu Yuanzhang, the first emperor of the Ming 
Dynasty (1368-1644), as Siu points out, launched political programs such as 
restricting mobility through strict household registration, controlling an army and 
making it directly responsible to the emperor, restraining the commercial sector, 
monopolising ideology through the foundation of academies with strict curricula, and 
choosing officials through the civil service examinations.28
Cadastral mapping and registration were also important to the emperorship. In the 
Ming dynasty, two types of registers were used to consolidate the tax system: 
cadastres (yulin ce which recorded the amount and the quality of taxable
land, as well as the owners of that land; and household registers or the Yellow Book 
(huang ce which listed details of each household in order to collect land tax
and labour service.29 The tax-collection duty was performed by local headers under 
the early Ming // jia  (M ¥ )  system. However, by the sixteenth century, because of 
commercialisation and a population boom, the link between land ownership and 
residence had been broken, and both types of register had become unreliable.
In order to control rural society, the imperial state had to work through a complicated 
web of middlemen. From the mid-Qing period onwards, tax collection depended 
more heavily on lineages. However, lineages estate managers and gentry leaders 
usually misused their power (for example, distributing tax burdens unequally) to seek 
advantages for themselves and their relatives. Taxes due therefore often failed to be 
collected.32 Tension concerning tax collection also existed between the central and
28 See Siu, Agents and Victims in South China, 7. Siu points out that ‘there is a remarkable 
resemblance between Mao’s ideals for the rural commune and Zhu Yuangzhang’s political programs in 
the early Ming’.
29 See Kuhn, Origins o f  the Modem Chinese State, 86.
30 See ibid, 86-87.
31 See Siu, Agents and Victims in South China, 6 . Also see Ye Xian’en and Tan Dihua, ‘Lun 
Guangdong Zhujiang Sanjiaozhou de Zutian [on the Ancestral Estates o f the Pearl River Delta]’, in 
Mingqing Guangdong Shehui Jingji Xingtai Yanjiu [a  Study o f  the Socioeconomic Conditions o f  
Guangdong During the Ming and Qing Dynasties], ed., Guangdong Lishi Xuehui (Guangzhou: 
Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 1985a).
32 See Siu, Agents and Victims in South China, 6 .
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local governments.33 Portions of revenue which were supposed to hand in to the 
central government were retained by provinces and counties in order to pay official 
salaries as well as local administration expenses.34 Country magistrates also relied 
on clerks and yamen runners to collect tax. As most of the middlemen were often 
unsalaried by the central government, they were predatory in tax collection.35
Eliminating the middlemen problem and establishing ‘the fiscal linkage between land 
and residence’ were important targets of the Old Regime; they are also agenda items 
that every Chinese central government has had to confront thereafter. In the late 
Qing reforms (xinzheng §t5&) and in the Nationalist regime, such attempts involved 
extension of local administration in the rural area. For example, after 1928, the 
Nationalists implemented the xiangzhen (township IK) system, by which the state
*57
extended its control to the rural area. When Mao Zedong declared that the Old 
Regime was finally dead, his government faced the same problems of the old 
regime.38 Collectivisation to some extent was the endeavour to eliminate middlemen 
from the tax system as well as the whole governance system.39
3. Collectivisation (1949-1978)
3.1. The land reform (tugai)
The land reform {tugai ikSft) was the major project launched by the CPC in rural 
areas during the period after the founding of the PRC 1949-1952:40 land and other 
property of landlords (including corporate landlords such as lineages, temples, and 
monasteries) was confiscated and redistributed so that each household in a rural
33 See Madeleine Zelin, The Magistrate s Tael, 6.
34 See ibid.
35 See e.g., Kuhn, Origins o f  the Modem Chinese State, 91.
36 See ibid, 91.
37 See Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942 (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1988), 63.
38 See Kuhn, Origins o f  the Modem Chinese State, especially 80-113.
39 See generally in ibid.
40 The early land reform was launched by the CPC in 1946 in some liberated areas (jiefangqu MWi 
[x), three years before the foundation of the PRC; thorough land reform was conducted after the 
promulgation o f the ‘Law o f Land Reform of the People’s Repulic o f China’ in 1950.
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village would have a comparable land holding. The land reform was not particularly 
socialist; rather it was a project through which the CPC wanted to consolidate its 
newly established regime and gain support from farmers who constituted most of 
Chinese population. Land reform therefore was a project of ‘land-to-the-tillers’
(gengzhe you qitian and this kind of reform was pursued by farmer
inciting peasant revolts whenever there was a change in dynasty. In the case of the 
CPC land reform, each owner-cultivator was responsible for paying the taxes on his 
or her household’s land. Land taxes were levied at progressive rates, ranging from 3 
percent to 42 percent.41 The land reform policy was set forth in the ‘Law of Land 
Reform of the People’s Republic of China’42 promulgated in 1950, and in Liu 
Shaoqi’s ‘Report on the Problem of Land Reform’43 at the National Committee of 
the People’s Political Consultative Conference in June of the same year. The land 
reform gave farmers a sense of security in land; but it was also an extension of 
government control to the countryside.
Yet land reform was not just a top-down programme propelled by the state, it also 
sprang from the social conditions prevailing at that time and had met some 
psychological expectations of farmers. Seeking ‘land-to-tillers’ was not only driven 
by farmers’ sense of security stemming from private ownership in land, but also, as 
Lu Huilin points out, the attitudes of farmers towards ‘equalitarianism’ (pingjun 
zhuyi On the one hand, farmers had respect for private property and the
boundaries of ownership; on the other hand, they were deeply influenced by an 
equalitarianism that confused the boundaries of property, in other words, an attitude 
of chi dahu (B^A/^44 literally mass seizure of food from rich households).45 In
41 See Audrey Donnithome, China s Economic System (New York: Praeger, 1967), 338.
42 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Gaige fa  promulgated by the
central government on 28 June 1950, implemented on 30 June 1950. The formal text was published in 
People’s Daily, 30 Junel950. The Chinese version is available at
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-12/14/content 2331893.htm> (last visited 2 September 2008)
43 Guanyu Tudi Gaige Wenti de Baogao ft). The Chinese version o f this
report is available at <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/73583/73601/74120/5039321.html> (last 
visited 2 September 2008).
44 Zhou Xiaohong, Chuantongyu Bianqian [Tradition and Transition] (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 
1998), cited in Lu Huilin, ‘Geming Qianhou Zhongguo Xiangcun Shehui Fenhua Moshi Jiqi Bianqian:
1 0 1
periods of social unrest, their attitude towards equalitarianism outweighed their 
respect for private property, but this attitude should not be confused with so-called 
farmers’ consciousness o f ‘class contradictions’ (jieji douzheng 
However, during and after the land reform, farmers’ equalitarianism gradually 
transformed into socialist political slogans such as ‘class contradictions’ and fanshen 
(11 Jf), which went to play an important role in the formation of collectivisation.47
Property rights encoded in the land reform established complete private ownership. 
Every farmer was equally allocated an amount of private land, enjoying both 
ownership and use rights. Land could also be freely transferred in the market. Private 
ownership of land therefore stimulated farmers’ enthusiasm for agricultural 
production. However, the land tenure of small landholdings and private ownership 
did not last long. In 1953, the CPC initiated its first Five Year Plan (1953-1957), 
‘socialist transformation’ (shehuizhuyigaizao JJCc&ia) and
‘industrialisation’ (gongyehua I4k{fc) became the key programs and were strongly 
modelled on the Soviet Union. Farmers were later encouraged to form mutual aid 
teams (huzhu zu based on arrangements among several households for
sharing labour and means of production. Later still mutual aid teams were 
transformed into primary cooperatives (chuji she in autumn 1954,48 which
were based on apportioning of agricultural income from the amount of land that the 
household owned and on the labour input of that household. During this period, land 
ownership still belonged to farmers, but use rights were held by primary cooperatives: 
in other words, rural land was ‘privately owned and publicly run’ (siyou gongying fA 
W ). Income distribution was still according to the quantity and quality of 
farmers’ land. In spring 1956, primary cooperatives were updated to advanced 
cooperatives (gaoji she ] the formation of which was beyond the boundaries
Shequ Yanjiu de Faxian [The Model and Transformation o f Rural Social Stratification before and after 
Revolution: the Findings o f Research on Community]’, Zhongguo Xiangcun Yanjiu [Rural China] 1 
(2003): 160.
45 See Lu Huilin, ibid.
46 See ibid, 161-162.
47 See ibid, 169.
48 The exact time varied depending on different localities.
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of ‘natural’ villages (ziran cun §  In rural areas during this period, farmers 
joined advanced cooperatives by handing in their assets, including land and also 
large production materials that had been distributed to them in the previous land 
reform. After being incorporated into advanced cooperatives, farmers could only 
keep a few ‘private plots’ (ziliu di §  ©fik) to grow subsidiary food such as 
vegetables and fruits. Except for these private plots, both land ownership and use 
rights belonged to advanced cooperatives, and rural land was publicly-owned and 
publicly-run (gongyou gongying Public ownership replaced private
ownership. Farmers were no longer permitted to be landowners, or even land users, 
but were transformed into members of cooperatives, that is, employees of advanced 
cooperatives. Income distribution was implemented through a system of work points 
(gongfen X ^ ) —according to the socialist principle, income is based on the work 
done by each person.
The doctrine established in the collectivisation period was that agricultural land 
should be concentrated into large collective farms in line with Soviet doctrine, 
because such collective farms were thought to provide better conditions for 
modernising and planning the agricultural sector than small farms. Against this 
backdrop, private ownership was weakened, and kinship and its self-governance also 
went into decline. In the process of collectivisation, the farmer proprietors of North 
China were more easily collectivised. Most of the resistance to collectivisation 
happened in south and southeast China, for example, Guangdong and Zhejiang, since 
kinship there was strong and active.
3.2. Formation of People’s Communes
Based on primary and advanced production cooperatives, people’s communes 
{renmin gongshe A K M )  were formed in 1958. This led to the formation of a 
collectively owned land system. There are differences between people’s communes 
and advanced cooperatives. For example, farmers could withdraw from advanced 
cooperatives, take away his or her properties and get remuneration for his or her
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work in the cooperatives. After the formation of people’s communes in 1958, farmers 
were deprived of such ‘withdrawal rights’. Public ownership replaced farmer’s 
private ownership over land.49 Rural land ownership and land use rights were 
collectivised. In 1962, rural landownership was formally transformed into three-level 
agricultural collectives each headed by a branch of the Party: production teams 
(shengchan xiaodui ^fe/^'hPA), production brigades (shengchan dadui ^/^AcPA,) 
and people’s communes. Based on collective ownership, production and 
consumption were put under highly centralised and extended state-party control. And 
yet, free riding continued to plague the efficiency of the communes.50 For example, 
in 1958, communal dining halls (gonggongshitang were established in
villages, cooking and dining were done in the communal kitchens, and free meals 
were provided for members ‘to eat as much as they wished’ no matter how much 
work they had done. To many farmers at that time, free dining meant communism. 
However, because of waste and over-consumption, food was quickly exhausted.51
The crucial driving forces behind collectivisation were several. Among them, the 
desire to supply the cities through collecting revenue from farmers, to fund the 
industrialisation then underway, and to pay the money owed to the USSR were 
paramount. Collectivisation was accompanied by a substantial decrease in the 
number and scope of markets and the formation of planned purchase and supply. 
Both purchase and sales were thus handled by government agencies through 
‘compulsory procurement and purchase’ (zhengshou zhengguo tlE^tlD^I).53 
Starting in late 1953, farmers were subject to a system of unified procurement and 
sale of grain. At that time, the state began creating a grain monopoly, and farmers
49 In 1958, even private plots became public property, but private plots were soon restored in 1959.
50 On the ‘free rider’ problem with collective agriculture in China see e.g., Victor Nee, ‘The Peasant 
Household Economy and Decollectivization in China’, Journal o f  Asian and African Studies 21, no. 
3/4 (1986): 185-203.
51 See Gene Hsin Chang and Guanzhong James Wen, ‘Communal Dining and the Chinese Famine o f  
1958-1961’, Economic Development and Cultural Change 46, no. 1 (1997): 1-34.
52 See Joshua Goldstein, ‘Introduction’, in Everyday Modernity in China, ed. Madeleine Yue Dong 
and Joshua L. Goldstein (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 17.
53 See Kuhn, Origins o f  the Modem Chinese State, 105-106.
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were required to sell their ‘surplus’ grain to the state at fixed prices.54 The grain 
quotas that farmers had to finish became a great burden, even a disaster for farmers, 
especially during the Great Leap Forward (dayuejin which led to the
1959-61 famine.55
The possible exodus of farmers from villages to cities was prohibited by the 
household registration system, which was formed in the process of collectivisation in 
1958. Mobility was prohibited, especially mobility from rural to urban areas. In the 
meantime, daily necessities, including food, clothing, water, and electricity, were 
allocated through systems of rationing or coupons based on the household 
registration system.56 The abolition of private property and assets after 1956 
replaced the rich-poor distinction but ironically created a new urban-rural disparity. 
The urban-rural disparity is still a root of social inequality.58
4. Decollectivisation
4.1. The emergence of land use rights in post-Mao China
From economic reform commenced in 1978 onwards, the communes began to be 
dismantled, and collectivised agriculture was gradually abandoned by the 
introduction of the ‘household responsibility system’.59 This system was first
54 See Vivienne Shue, Peasant China in Transition: The Dynamics o f  Development toward Socialism, 
1949-1956 (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1980), 214-226.
55 See Jean C. Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy o f  Village 
Government (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1989c); Yang Dali, Calamity and Reform in 
China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change since the Great Leap Famine (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1996).
56 See Goldstein, ‘Introduction’, 17.
57 Dorothy J. Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the 
Logic o f  the Market (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1999), 32.
58 For example, the compensation for personal injuries o f urban residents is much higher than that of 
farmers. See Article 29 o f the ‘Interpretation o f the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues 
Concerning the Application o f Law for the Trial o f Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury’ 
[Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Renshen Sunhai Peicheng Anjian Shiyong Faltl Ruogan 
Wenti de Jieshi] (2003). This article mandates a lower rate o f compensation for deceased rural hukou 
holders, even if  they have been residents in urban areas for many years. For example, in the year of 
2006, the gap o f the compensation between the urban and rural residents is 160,000 RMB. This 
interpretation has received a lot criticism, and the Supreme Court is expected to revise this.
59 On the communes, see e.g., Vivienne Shue, ‘The Fate o f the Commune’, Modem China 10, no. 3 
(1984): 259-283.
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initiated in 1978 at Fengyang County in Anhui Province, and expanded on a 
nationwide scale between 1980 and 1983:60 the land of collectives was divided up 
and assigned to individual households. In terms of responsibility land (zerentian 3f 
H  09), once their grain quota to the state had been fulfilled, farmers owned and could 
sell the rest of the grain beyond the quota. Farmers thus began to pursue economic 
goals in the re-emerging market. Farmers were also allowed to have residential plots 
(zhaijidi However, collective ownership has been maintained.61 In other
words, farmers just own use rights of rural land rather than ownership.
Contractual management rights are one kind of land use rights (LURs),62 and are in 
the form of contracts for the possession and use of rural land for farming purposes. 
The original duration increased from 15 years in 1984 to 30 years under the 1998 
LAL (Article 14).64 Now under the Property Law (2007), when the contract expires, 
the contract may be renewed according to relevant provisions of the state.65 De facto 
inheritance of responsibility land is allowed within the duration of the contract,66
60 The third Plenum o f the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1978 did not recognise the household 
responsibility system. The recognition was given by the No. 1 Document (yihao wenjian — 7^ ) 
issued by the CPC Central Committee in the Spring 1982. From 1982 and 1986, each year the CPC 
Central Committee published its policies on rural reform and economy in the form of the No. 1 
document. The initial 15-year contractual period was also confirmed in these five documents. On the 
Chinese Rural Policy in the late 1980s, see e.g., Flemming Christiansen, ‘Stability First! Chinese 
Rural Policy Issues 1987-1990’, in From Peasant to Entrepreneur: Growth and Change in Rural 
China, ed., E. B. Vermeer (Wageningen: PUDOC, 1992), 21-40.
61 See e.g., the Constitution (2004), Article 10; the Property Law (2007), Chapter 5; the Land 
Administration Law (2004), Article 2.
62 After 1988, citizens and legal persons could gain possession and use o f land owned by the state or 
collectives in the forms o f contracts, granted (churang tb it )  LURs, and allocated (huabo M W )
LURs. See William Valletta, ‘The Land Administration Law of 1998 and Its Impact on Urban 
Development’, in Ding Chengri and Song Yan, eds., Emerging Land and Housing Markets in China 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2005c), 62. The emergence o f LURs in urban 
China will be discussed in Chapter Six.
63 Contracts for occupancy and use are available to peasant families for farming and residential 
purposes, and LURs for construction purposes (jiansheyongdi shiyongquan are’ 
available to rural enterprises.
64 The initial contractual period was 15 years. In 1993 when the contractual period was soon to expire, 
the CPC central committee called for an extension to 30 years, and this party decision was confirmed 
in the Land Administration Law (1998).
65 The Property Law (2007), Article 126.
66 The contract is signed with the household. Within the duration o f the contract, the amount o f land 
will not be changed if the number of people in that household changes. The result is that there is de 
facto  inheritance o f responsibility land. The point has been confirmed in my discussion with Mrs Zhan, 
a farmer at Zhengyang, Henan Province on 18 April 2008. But there is gender difference in 
inheritance, for example, although there are local variations, a household would lost the portion of
1 0 6
LURs of collective rural land include contractual management rights, LURs of rural 
residential plots, and LURs for construction purposes. Under the Property Law 
(2007), LURs of collective rural land were put into the category of ‘ usufruct’ (yongyi 
wuquan which refers to the right to use another’s property. Since
ownership of agricultural collective land is not transferable, leaseable or 
mortgageable per se, the so-called alienability of rural land actually refers to the 
transfer of LURs of rural land, which could happen between the state, legal persons 
and individuals. In terms of transferring contractual management rights, according to 
the 2002 Land Contracting Law (tudi chengbaofa £fe),68 contracts could
be transferred but cannot be mortgaged. A more controversial question is whether or 
not residential plots and LURs for construction can be transferred or sold. Without 
approval from the government at the county level, farmers cannot assign cultivated 
land for residential purposes, and the LURs for residential purposes cannot be 
transferred.69 The use of agricultural land is unchangeable;70 without approval from 
the people’s government at or above the county level, farmers cannot contribute 
LURs to joint enterprises or joint ventures as investments, or assign LURs to 
township enterprises.71
Many rules in fact have given a range of rent-seeking opportunities for local 
government officials or under-the-table partnerships between property developers
TOand local officials. In terms of selling LURs for both farming and residential uses,
land to the married daughter’s name when the village committee redivided the land once every few 
years. See Heather Xiaoquan Zhang, ‘Gender Difference in Inheritance Rights: Observations from a 
Chinese Village’, in Rural Development in Transitional China: The New Agriculture, ed., Peter Ho, 
Jacob Eyferth, and Edward B. Vermeer (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 263-267. Zhang examines the 
interaction o f the inheritance regime with both the patriarchal structure and broader socio-economic 
changes.
67 See Chapter Three.
68 Promulgated by the Standing Committee o f the NPC on 29 August 2002, implemented on 1 March 
2003.
69 Article 62 o f  the LAL (2004): ‘Reapplication for a house site by a villager in a rural area who has 
sold or rented out his/her house shall not be approved’.
70 The LAL (2004), Article 63.
71 The LAL (2004), Article 60.
72 Something perhaps similar happened in the UK in the 1970s in cities, for example, John Poulson, a 
British architect, used bribery to senior politicians. Also see Patrick Dunleavy, The Politics o f  Mass
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transactions directly with farmers are illegal and prohibited by a system of land use 
certificates. Developers must obtain land use certificates from land administrative 
bureaux at or above city or county level before proceeding with projects. Thus, 
LURs must be reclaimed by the state first before entering into the market. The 
Property Law still does not allow mortgaging contractual management rights and the 
transfer of LURs for residential purposes. The ambiguity of collective ownership is 
also one of the major sources of land disputes and conflicts in the rural area. This 
will be examined in Chapter Seven.
4.2. Grassroots initiatives: ‘minor property rights’ apartments
In the rural area, a de facto real estate market is emerging with affordable prices in 
the name of ‘minor property rights’ (xiaochanquan, or ‘township property
rights’ (xiangchanquan, which is not a formal legal concept. The so-called
minor or township property rights apartments are commodity housing (shangpinfang, 
^  Fmj^)74 built on rural residential plots. The buyers of these properties cannot get 
property rights certificates (chanquan zheng because they are built on
collectively owned land which is reserved for residential use by farmers and thus 
cannot be commodified in the real estate market according to the Land 
Administration Law (2004) and the Property Law (2007). The buyers can only get 
certificates issued by village committees to confirm their property rights over the 
apartment per se not the LURs of the land. To some extent, this sort of ‘minor 
property rights’ equates to ‘non property rights’. When purchasing these properties, 
buyers cannot use mortgages or apply for bank loans. Yet the market for the ‘minor 
property rights’ apartments flourishes, because prices are low compared with those in 
the urban property market.75
Housing in Britain, 1945-1975 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981). This book is on the construction o f  
large-scale council housing in Britain in the 1960s.
73 See Anthony Gar-On Yeh, ‘Dual Land Market and Internal Spatial Structure o f Chinese Cities’, in 
Ding and Song, eds., Emerging Land and Housing Markets in China, 40.
74 Until the early 1990s, urban housing was provided by the state as a social welfare to the 
public-sector employees. Houses could be swapped but could not be transferred as commodities in the 
market. See more detail in Chapter Six.
75 Take Beijing for example: at present, it has been impossible to find an apartment with a price below
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Although the ‘minor property rights’ apartments are popular, their legality has been
76subject to investigation. For example, in the 17th National Land Day campaign, 
jointly sponsored by the Ministry of Land and Resources and the Beijing municipal 
government, one of the issues that seized people’s attention was concern about the 
‘minor property rights’ apartments. The Ministry of Construction also warned 
purchasers of the risks involved in buying these apartments. By contrast, township 
governments clearly acquiesced in the development of the ‘minor property rights’ 
apartments,77 which is another illustration of the complex relationship between 
central and local governments. The ‘minor property rights’ apartments have even 
been declared illegal. On 11 December 2007, the State Council declared that ‘city 
and township residents should not purchase the “minor property rights” apartments in 
the rural area’.78 The ‘minor property rights’ apartments in some areas were 
demolished by force.79 So what will be the fate of this kind of apartments? This 
question will be further discussed in the postscript on the recent changes to the rural 
land system and the rural-urban divide.
10,000yuan/sq m within the second ring road which is near central Beijing, but on the outskirts o f 
Beijing (outside the fifth ring road) like Tongzhou and Shunyi, the price o f ‘minor property rights’ 
apartments is just between 2500 and 4000 yuan/sq m. This means that in Beijing with 300,000 yuan 
people can buy only a 20-square-meter apartment within the second ring road but a 100-square-meter 
apartment outside the fifth ring road despite the latter’s vague property rights. See Li Qian, ‘Minor 
property right’—better than none?’ China Daily, 12 July 2007.
<http://www.chinadailv.com.cn/bizchina/2007-07/ll/content 6000839.htm> (last visited 2 September
2008).
76 The 17th national land day is on 25 June 2007.
77 Township governments do not have the authority to grant land use rights, therefore they cannot 
profit from collecting LUR transfer fees. By contrast, township governments could get more profits by 
making use o f these grey areas such as the ‘minor property rights apartments’, and compete for more 
income from land with the superior governments. On the role o f township governments, see e.g., 
Hsing You-tien, ‘Broking Power and Property in China’s Townships’, The Pacific Review 19, no. 1 
(2006): 103-124.
78 See Wu Jiandong, ‘Xiaochanquan Fang Bude Mai Bu Yiweizhe Bujiejue Wenti [A Ban on the 
“Minor Property Rights” Apartments Does Not Mean that the Problem Will Not be Resolved]’, 
Nanfang Zhoumo [South China Weekend], 20 December 2007. In
<http://bi.house.sina.com.cn/dcpl/2007-12-20/1417230527.html> (last visited 16 October 2008).
79 See Ding Rui, ‘Guotu Bu: Yanzhong Weigui de Xiaochanquan Fang Jiangbei Chaichu [The 
Ministry o f Land Resources: Minor Property Rights Apartments that Contravene the Regulations Will 
be Demolished],’ in Beijing Shangbao [Beijing Business Today], 13 December 2007. In 
<http://news.hexun.com/2007-12-13/102266679.htmXlast visited 20 October 2008).
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‘Minor property rights’ apartments had existed ‘underground’ for more than 10 years. 
The central government has issued various regulations concerning them which
QA
suggest some uncertainty about how best to deal with them. Chapter 13 of the 
Property Law deals with the LURs of rural residential plots, but still does not make 
clear about their transfer. Therefore, the transfer and sale of rural residential plots and 
the sale and transfer of LURs for construction purposes by farmers (if not reclaimed 
by the state first) are still banned. Despite this uncertainty, various kinds of 
experiments of land use rights circulation have been conducted by localities. In 1992, 
a farmland shareholding system {tudi gufen zhi was trialled in Nanhai,
a county level city of Guangdong Province. Land use rights of individual farmers 
were collectivised by ‘natural’ villages and then by the administrative village to 
which these villages belonged. The value of farmland was appraised and divided into 
shares. A shareholding cooperative was thus formed. The farmland was rented out by 
the cooperative for industrial purposes. Farmers could enjoy the profits of 
industrialisation according to the shares they had. In this case, the use purpose of 
agricultural land had been changed through the circulation of land use rights. This 
system was called the Nanhai model {nanhai moshi I11 1995, Suzhou in
Jiangsu Province was the first to approve the transfer of LURs for construction 
purposes. Similar experiments were subsequently conducted at Huzhou in Zhejiang 
Province in 1997, and at Wuhu in Anhui Province in 2000.81 The practice of 
Guangdong is notable. In 2005, the Guangdong provincial government announced 
the promulgation of a law entitled ‘Guangdong Regulations for the Transfer of Land 
Use Rights of Collectively Owned Land for Construction Purposes’.82 This was the
80 In terms o f the central government’s policy, in 2004, the State Council published ‘On deepening the 
reform and tightening the land administration’ (2004, No.28), which stressed that LURs of 
collectively owned land could be transferred according to law; however, it did not go beyond the 
limits provided by the LAL and the Guarantee Law (Danbao Fa JS {£££). The newly published 
property law is still within the framework o f the LAL. See Article 153 of Property law and Article 62 
o f the LAL.
81 See Chen Xu, ‘Xiaochanquan Fang Shi Gaige Chiyi Bujue de Chengben [“Minor Property Rights” 
Apartments Are the Cost o f  the Hesitation o f Reforms]’, Dongfang Zaobao [Oriental Morning Post],
10 July 2007. In <http://news.sina.com.cn/pl/2007-07-10/135513415529.shtml> (last visited 04 
September 2008).
82 Guangdong Sheng Jiti Jianshe Yongdi Shiyongquan Liuzhuan Guanli Banfa
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first time in China that LURs for construction purposes were legalised via 
provincial-level legislation. It was also a sign of the marketisation of LURs of rural 
collective construction land.83 In 2007, Guangdong introduced further reforms 
permitting rural residential plots to be transferred in the market.84
Further local reforms of the rural LURs focus on allowing farmers to contribute rural 
land contractual management rights as shares to enterprises or joint ventures. The 
Land Contracting Law and the LAL conflict at this point.85 Despite these 
contradictory laws and regulations, on 1 July 2007, Chongqing allowed farmers to 
contribute LURs to joint enterprises or joint ventures as shares, provided that the use 
purpose of arable land is not changed. Shanghai’s reform is even more extensive: on 
2 July 2007, the Shanghai Industrial and Commercial Administration Bureau allowed 
farmers to use and rent their residential plots to run village inns as so-called ‘family 
farms’, which exceeds the limits within which the use purpose of arable land cannot 
be changed and paves the way for farmers to participate in urbanisation and 
industrialisation directly. Yet these reforms are clearly against Articles 60 and 63 
of the LAL.
83 See Tan Jialong, ‘Zhongguo Nongcun Tudi Zhidu ji Tudi Liuzhuan de Zhengce Yanbian [The 
Chinese Rural Land System and Policy Transformation of Land Transfer]’, Zhongguo Jingji Zhoukan 
[Chinese Economic Weekly], 29 August 2005. In
<http://www.china.com.cn/zhuanti2005/txt/2005-08/29/content 5953496.htm> (last visited 04 
September 2008).
84 See Tan Jialong, ‘Guangdong Nirang Nongcun Zhaijidi Shangshi Liuzhuan [Guangdong Plans to 
Permit Rural Residential Plots to be Transferred in the Market]’, Xinhua wang [Xinhua Net], 26 June 
2007. In <http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/5912261.html> (last visited 4 September 2008).
85 Article 42 o f the Land Contracting Law allows farmers to contribute rural land contractual 
management rights as shares; according to article 60 o f the LAL, farmers cannot contribute LURs to 
joint enterprises or joint ventures as investments, or assign LURs to township enterprises without 
approval from the government at or above county levels.
8 See ‘Shanghai: Nongmin Zhaijidi Ke Ban “Nongjiale” [Shanghai: Rural Residential Plots Could 
Run “Family Farms”] ’, Xin Nongcun Shangbao [New Countryside Commerce], in 
<http://xncsb.mofcom.gov.cn/listx.asn?id=112335> (last visited 3 October 2008).
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5. Reorganisation of rural China and governing farmers in post-Mao 
China: neo-collectivism and post-collectivism
5.1. Governing farmers under collective ownership and its problems
Article 10 of the LAL and Article 60 of the Property Law provide that collectively 
owned land shall be managed and administered by the village collective economic 
organisation87 (jiti jingji zuzhi or the villagers’ committee (cunmin
weiyuanhui fcj’P afl.w ^), but villages’ groups, the rural self-governing organisations 
at the basic level, do not hold much power. This situation has been shaped by the 
transformation of reorganising rural China in the post-1978 era. In the early 1980s, 
when the communes were dismantled, the production teams at the lowest level of the 
communes diminished fastest. After the township (xiangzhen % |j |)  replaced the 
commune, the administrative village (xingzheng cun f f  fl&tl’) took the place of the 
production brigade, and the villagers’ group (cunmin xiaozu Pa'MIL) superseded 
the cooperation team,88 the villagers’ group was weak while power was diverted to 
the administrative village level and the township level. This kind of arrangement of 
collective ownership has entered into a paradoxical situation: although the de jure 
owner is the collective, the de facto owners (middlemen) are multiple.
Many villages now have direct and competitive elections, a form of direct democracy 
(zhijie minzhu lit tic Pa i )  at the grassroots level that was expected to supplement the 
indirect democracy (jianjie minzhu iXIflcPaii:) of the People’s Congress at the higher
OQ
levels. However, under the dual authority of Party and government, the Party 
secretary of the village is still appointed by the higher-level authority of the CPC.
87 ‘The village collective economic organisation’ is not clearly defined in law. Article 5 o f The 
Organic Law on the Villagers’ Committee o f the PRC (1998) (zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Cunmin 
Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Fa T1 ^  A ffl ^  promulgated by the Standing Committee
o f the NPC on 4 November 1998, implemented on 4 November 1998) provides that ‘the villagers’ 
committee must respect the power o f decision-making o f the village collective economic organisation 
in conducting economic activities according to the law’. In reality, however, a lot o f controversies 
have arisen, for example, whether the villages’ committee or the village collective economic 
organisation should be the subjects o f litigation in the cases on disputes over rural landownership.
88 See Peter Ho, ‘Who Owns China’s Land? Policies, Property Rights and Deliberate Institutional 
Ambiguity’, The China Quarterly, no. 166 (2001): 405.
89 See Jean C. Oi and Scott Rozelle, ‘Elections and Power: The Locus o f Decision-Making in Chinese 
Villages’, The China Quarterly, no. 162 (2000): 515.
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Furthermore the locus of power in villages (for example, in the Party secretary or in 
the elected head of villagers’ committee) varies in different localities depending on 
the socio-economic conditions of the villages; whether village cadres have power 
largely depends on whether they have the ability to control and mobilise resources.90 
The fifth plenum of the 16th CPC Central Committee which ended on 11 October 
2005 put forward ‘Constructing the New Socialist Countryside’ (jianshe shehui zhuyi 
xin nongcun as the foremost task facing China in the
2006-2010 five year period, aiming to reduce the urban-rural disparity, illegal 
confiscation of rural land for development projects, unauthorised conversion of 
agricultural land to industrial projects and so on.91 Agricultural tax was also 
abolished in 2006. However, rather than encouraging self-governance of farmers, 
‘Building the New Socialist Countryside’ is a strong state intervention into 
countryside construction influenced by new-left ideas, and privatising the land has 
not so far been accepted.
In order to solve the problems with collective ownership, there are two major 
approaches proposed by Chinese scholars.92 One is nationalisation of rural land, and 
this approach is similar to permanent tenancy (yongdian 7jc{H),93 which was once 
popular in Qing and Republican China. This approach supports the reclaiming of all 
the land by the state, and granting permanent land use rights to farmers by the state. 
But the problem with nationalisation or state ownership is: does government 
ownership refer to state (Beijing?) ownership or local government ownership? To 
what extent or in what sense can the state own, if various kinds of agencies or other 
users can gain access to resources and have the de facto power to make decisions on
90 See Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: The Institutional Foundations o f  Economic Reform 
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1999); Oi and Rozelle, ‘Elections and Power’: 513-539.
91 See e.g., Richard McGregor, ‘China Launches “New Deal” for Farmers’, Financial Times, 22 
February 2006. In <http://www.ft.eom/cms/s/74029202-a389-llda-83cc-0000779e2340.html.> (last 
visited 29 April 2007).
92 On the summery o f different models o f land ownership reform suggested by Chinese scholars see 
e.g., Liu Rongcai, ‘Dangqian Zhongguo Nongcun Tudi Suoyouzhi Gaige Moshi Yanjiu Zongshu [A 
Literature Review of the Research on the Current Rural Land Ownership System Reform in China]’, 
Shangye Yanjiu [Commercial Research] 18 (2006): 149-155.
93 On permanent tenancy, see Section 4.3 o f Chapter Two.
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how to use resources? The other proposal is privatisation of rural land so-called ‘the 
third land reform’ (disanci tudi geming But China’s rural
economy develops under a variety of local institutions (for example, patron-client 
relations),95 and the emergence of markets and private ownership does not 
necessarily lead to the decline of patron-client relations.96
The polarisation of nationalisation and privatisation ignores the fact that rural China 
needs a communal sphere. The flaw of the household responsibility system is that it 
just grants farmers the tenure of small landholdings similar to what farmers had in 
the pre-1958 era, but ignores the difference between subsistence farming and farming 
for the market, as well as between ordinary farming activity and collective or 
pooled-labour activities (for example, the need to build or repair buildings or fences) 
in the post-1978 period. Farming for the market needs markets and cooperative
07working; pooled-labour activities need cooperation between farmers as well. For 
example, in the village I visited in Henan province in June 2007, there was 
reciprocity among villagers over time in relation to pooled labour. Household A
QQ
helped household B last year, household B should help household A this year. 
Furthermore, when other opportunities exist (for example, working in village 
enterprises or cities) and may bring more income, farming responsibility land is less 
attractive for farmers. For instance, given the fact that farming for the market brings 
less income for farmers99 than working in cities as a migrant worker,100 in many
94 When the People’s Communes were dismantled by the introduction of the household responsibility 
system in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was called ‘the second land reform’ as to differ from the 
land reform during 1949-1952.
95 Chih-Jou Jay Chen, Transforming Rural China: How Local Institutions Shape Property Rights in 
Rural China (New York: Routledge, 2004), 7. It is worth pointing out that the rural situation varies 
greatly from region to region. For example, the rich tea farmers in Zhejiang province have three story 
brick houses, while farmers in Northwest China or remote mountain villages cannot be sheltered from 
rain. The role and character o f local governments also varies a lot from region to region.
96 See Chen, Transforming Rural China, 11.
97 On the possible common property regime and collective arrangements, see e.g., Richard Sanders, 
‘Organic Agriculture in China: Do Property Rights Matter?’, Journal o f  Contemporary China 15, no. 
46 (2006): 113-132.
98 But unlike mutual aid teams in the 1950s, this reciprocity does involve cash payment. On this also 
see e.g., Scott Wilson, ‘The Cash Nexus and Social Networks: Mutual Aid and Gifts in Contemporary 
Shanghai Villages’, The China Journal, no. 37 (1997): 91-112.
99 The reason is due largely to the existence o f ‘peasant burden’ (nongmin fudan $iK;j%tI), for
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cases farmers sub-contract their responsibility land to migrant farmers from other 
poorer rural areas.
Economic activities in the post-Mao era require a communal and cooperative sphere 
for farmers; this requirement also highlights the importance of self-governance. In 
fact, the importance of self-govemance has already been emphasised by some 
Chinese scholars, for example, Liang Shuming. Liang worked as the leader in the 
village reconstruction in the 1930s at Zouping in Shandong Province. He argued that 
adopting the land-tax system in order to fund local governments was ‘the worst 
method of all’.101 The key to Liang’s rural reconstruction was this: ‘it was to be a 
movement of society not only independent of the government bureaucracy, but in
109some circumstances a movement against bureaucracy’. Bureaucratisation such as 
extending government administration into the lower levels of rural society was not 
local self-governance. 103 Unless village self-govemance was a grassroots and mass 
mobilisation of farmers by themselves, it would not succeed. 104 Liang Shuming 
points out that a problem waiting for research and experimentation is how to make 
the Chinese have self-govemed group organisations. Today this question remains 
unresolved.
5.2. TVEs. and variations of collective ownership
The question of rural governance in post-Mao China is how to reorganise farmers 
after the dismantling of communes, especially in the case of the increasing gap
example, various fines and fees, although agricultural tax was abolished in 2006. On agricultural taxes, 
see e.g., John James Kennedy, ‘From the Tax-for-Fee Reform to the Abolition o f Agricultural Taxes: 
The Impact on Township Governments in North-West China’, The China Quarterly, no. 189 (2007): 
43-59; Ray Yep, ‘Can “Tax-for-Fee” Reform Reduce Rural Tension in China? The Process, Progress 
and Limitations’, The China Quarterly, no. 177 (2004): 42-70.
100 See e.g., Guang Lei and Zheng Lu, ‘Migration as the Second-Best Option: Local Power and 
Off-Farm Employment’, The China Quarterly, no. 181 (2005): 22-45.
101 See Guy S. Alitto, The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-Ming and the Chinese Dilemma o f  Modernity 
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1979), 168.
102 Quoted in ibid, 169. Italics are in original.
103 See ibid.
104 Liang Shuming, ‘Xiangcuan Jianshe Dayi [Gist o f Rural Reconstruction]’, in Liang Shuming 
Quanji [Completed Works o f  Liang Shuming], ed. Xueshu Weiyuanhui Zhongguo Wenhua Shuyuan 
(Jinan: Shandong Renmin Chubanshe, 1989[1936]); Alitto, The Last Confucian, 168.
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between available arable land and proliferating population that generates ‘surplus’ 
labour. 105 Collectively managed enterprises (TVEs) were such a mechanism for 
reorganising farmers. ‘Leaving the soil but not leaving the village, entering into the 
factories but not entering into cities (// tu bu li xiang, jin  chang bu jin  chengff106 was 
once used to portray the situation of farmers who worked in the TVEs, and was 
thought highly to promote the development of small towns (xiao chengzhen 'h ^ iS )  
and welfare of farmers.107 Through most of the reform era up until the mid-1990s, 
township and village enterprises grew fast. However, ‘to identify village-owned 
enterprises as some kind of “collective owned enterprise” with Chinese-socialism
10Rcharacteristics, misleads and oversimplifies’.
There are different explanations of the reasons for the ‘take-off’ of the TVEs. Some 
focus on the ‘cultural reasons’ and trust.109 Some emphasise the role of local 
governments.110 But the development of TVEs seemed to have owed more to 
political economy rather than culture.111 In the 1980s and mid-1990s, setting up 
TVEs was one of the most important strategies for local governments to explore 
indigenous resources of their localities, and to mobilise such resources for local 
economic growth. Against this backdrop, a ‘sunan model’ {sunan muoshi 
i £ ) 112 emerged at the Yangtze Delta region in the 1980s and mid-1990s. This model 
is a mode of rural industrial development that characterised by ‘[the proliferation of] 
the collective ownership of TVEs, the dominant role of the local government and
105 See Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China, 154.
106
107 See e.g., Fei Xiaotong’s article ‘Xiao Chengzhen Zai Tansuo’ [Small Towns, Another Exploration] 
in Fei Xiaotong, Fei Xiaotong Xueshu Zixuanji [Self-Selected Works o f  Fei Xiaotong] (Beijing: Shifan 
Daxue Chubanshe, 1992), 205.
108 Chen, Transforming Rural China, 39.
109 For example, Martin L. Weitzman and Xu Chenggang, ‘Chinese Township-Village Enterprises as 
Vaguely Defined Cooperatives’, Journal o f  Comparative Economics 18 (1994): 121-145. In terms of 
trust, there is no trust in systems but just personal trust in China. On personal trust and trust in systems, 
see e.g., Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power (Chichester: Wiley, 1979).
110 See e.g., Oi, Rural China Takes Off.
111 In terms o f trust, there is no trust in systems but just personal trust in China. On personal trust and 
trust in systems, see e.g., Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power (Chichester: Wiley, 1979).
112 Sunan usually refers to Suzhou, Changzhou and Wuxi in Jiangsu province.
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party cadres in rural industrialization, and social services provided by local 
governments’.113
Rather than unified collective ownership, there were different forms of hybrid 
ownership in the TVEs with variations depending on localities. For example, in order 
to avoid policy risks as private firms and share favourable policies enjoyed by 
collective firms, in the 1980s many private firms were set up in the name of, or 
attached to (guakao l iH ) ,  the TVEs. Such enterprises were called ‘red-hat 
enterprises’ (hongmaozi qiye Especially when the control of private
firms tightened after 1989, the number o f ‘red-hat enterprises’ increased rapidly. In 
the mid-1990s, the central government paid attention to this phenomenon and began 
to get rid of these ‘fake’ collective enterprises. Owners of these enterprises were also 
struggling with the choices between enjoying policy favours with vague ownership 
and clarifying ownership for potential development. 114 However, during the process 
of cleaning up ‘red-hat enterprises’, a more puzzling change in the strategy of local 
governments began in the promoting of the private sector, in which some of the real 
collectively owned enterprises were sold for private operation, 115 and the procedure 
of privatisation was not transparent.
Apart from registration as collective enterprises, investment through shareholding is 
also one of the strategies of private entrepreneurs to break through the ownership 
constraints and gain more room for development. After the mid-1990s in southern 
Jiangsu Province and the Pearl River Delta, shareholding cooperatives (gufen 
hezuozhi 15:# n‘f^ $ lJ)116 appeared to be a major form of the TVEs. Shareholding 
cooperatives were called ‘neither donkey nor hors o’{fei 111 fei ma The
113 Chen, Transforming Rural China, 33.
114 On the transformation o f ‘red-hat enterprises’ within the collective sector, see e.g., Wu Xiaobo, 
Jidang Sanshinian: Zhongguo Qiye 1978-2008 [Chinese Business 1978-2008], vol. 1 (Beijing: 
Zhongxin Chubanshe, 2008), 235-250.
115 Oi, Rural China Takes Off, 11.
116 On shareholding cooperatives, see e.g., Edyard B. Vermeer, ‘Shareholding Cooperatives: A 
Property Rights Analysis’, in Property Rights and Economic Reform in China, ed. Jean C. Oi and 
Andrew G Walder (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999), 123-144.
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first shareholding cooperative was set up by 26 farmers with shares amount to 72,000 
RMB at a shoe factory in Wenzhou117 in May 1985. These farmers became both 
shareholders and employees of that factory, and this cooperative was called ‘a new 
form of collective economy’.118 In 1988, a beer factory at Cangnan County at 
Wenzhou experimented with a shareholding cooperative and designed a rule for its 
cooperative: ‘15 percent of enterprise assets should be collective and undivided 
assets owned by enterprise employers’.119 On the one hand, because of this 
collective asset, shareholding cooperatives could be labelled as one form of 
collective ownership and therefore still conform to socialist principles. On the other 
hand, the shift from a private enterprise to a shareholding cooperative was easy, 
private enterprises just needed to claim that there were 15 percent of collective assets 
in that enterprise; conversely, returning to a private enterprise just needed to get rid
1 *)C\of these collective assets.
5.3. New collectivism and Post-collectivism? Huaxi Village and Nanjie Village
In the industrialisation and marketisation of rural China, there have been two 
trends—new collectivism (xin jiti zhuyi SL) and post-collectivism (hou jiti
zhuyi C). New collectivism refers to re-collectivisation based on the
needs of the market after the disintegration of rural communes, while 
post-collectivism refers to industrialisation based on collective ownership, which 
then transforms into ‘clan capitalism’ (jiazuhua shichangzibenzhuyi 
^ ^ i f c X ) . 121 Huaxi Village in Jiangsu Province— the so-called ‘N o.l’ (officially
117 The wenzhou model (wenzhou moshi is another mode of rural industrial development.
This model encourages private businesses, and promotes rural industrialisation based on 
marketisation.
118 See Wu, Jidang Sanshinian, 241.
119 ibid, 242.
|20 ibid.
121 See Zhou Yi, Huaxi Cun: Zhuanxing Jingji Zhongde Hou Jiti Zhuyi [Hua Xi Village: 
Post-Collectivism in a Transitional Economy] (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2006). On clan 
capitalism see e.g., Max Boisot and John Child, ‘From Fiefs to Clans and Network Capitalism: 
Explaining China’s Emerging Economic Order’, Administratively Science Quarterly 41, no. 4 (1996): 
600-628.
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China’s wealthiest village) Village in China—illustrates the transformation of 
post-collectivism.122
Huaxi Village stuck to collective ownership as well as socialist ideology while the 
household responsibility system spread nationwide after 1978. At the same time, 
Huaxi Village embraced the market and encouraged the development of TVEs. Albeit 
guided by socialist ideology, the attitudes towards village development were in fact 
pragmatic. In 1999, Huaxi Village became the first collective that listed shares on the 
stock market. Farmers in Huaxi have become shareholders. But these farmers have 
less freedom to spend their money and little cash from their paper assets: ‘eighty 
percent of their annual bonus and 95 percent of their dividend must be reinvested in
12Tthe commune’.
Huaxi Village is a unity that combines the governance functions of the party, 
government and the enterprise, and farmers in the village are under dual rule—the 
village and the TVEs. From the perspective of management control, Huaxi Village 
has become a family enterprise of Wu Renbao—the former village party secretary 
who is regarded as the hero of Huaxi’s miracle. Wu’s son has now replaced him as 
leader. At least half of the village enterprises (mostly in steel mills and textiles) are 
run by Wu’s children and grandchildren.124 Huaxi also employs a large number of 
migrant workers, who do not enjoy the same social welfare benefits as native Huaxi 
villagers. A ‘village membership’ (cunji ^ 1 1 )  even emerged for migrant workers to 
purchase with the price of 100,000 RMB. 125
122 Albeit with variations, other examples are Liuzhuang (^(JiT) in Henan Province, Nanjie Cun (^ l#j  
fcf) in Henan Province, Da Qiuzhuang (zk£Pl£) in Tianjin.
123 See Jonathan Watts, ‘In China’s Richest Village, peasants are all shareholders now—by order o f  
the party’, The Guardian (online), 10 May 2005.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/mav/10/china.ionathanwatts> (last visited 18 August 2008).
124 See ibid.
125 See Zhou Yi, ‘Xunqiu Zhenghe de Fenhua: Quanli Guanxi de Dute Zuoyong— Laizi H Cun de 
Yixiang Yanjiu [Differentiation that Seeks Integration: the Special Function o f Power Relations— an 
Empirical Research from H Village]’, Shehuxue Yanjiu [Social Sciences Research], no. 5 (2006): 55.
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It is difficult to define the nature of these villages like Huaxi. As Wu Xiaobo points 
out, from the administrative perspective, these villages are the basic administrative 
units in the state governance system; from the economic perspective, they are 
profit-making organisations. In these villages, farming becomes less important. 
Companies belonging to these villages are listed on the stock market, and the village 
heads or village party secretaries are both administrators of that village and directors 
of the companies. The families of the village leaders are often the most powerful 
family in that village, and children of the leaders are the core persons in villages, and 
could inherit their father’s (both administrative and economic) power. It is 
worthwhile to explore the role of Wu and his family in the village governance, which 
seems to function along similar lines to that of the gentry in late imperial China. It is 
also interesting to investigate how such a village, aiming for ‘getting rich together’, 
ends up with the differentiation of social strata between village cadres, ordinary 
villagers and migrant workers in the village. 127
In terms of new collectivism, it refers to reintroduction of collective farming by some 
villages after the household responsibility system spread nationwide in the late 1970s. 
Nanjie Village {nanjie cun is a famous example. Nanjie Village is located at
Linying County of Henan Province, and it was once known as ‘the red billionaire 
village’ (hongse yiyuancun as a model of a communist village.
In 1981, the household responsibility system was introduced to Nanjie Village, but 
this system did not bring more income to farmers in the village; rather farmers’ 
income was diminishing. Nanjie thus re-collectivised the land and other property of 
farmers in 1985 and 1986, and has been a showcase of an equal world since then. 
Apart from collectivisation of the means of production, the means of subsistence 
were also collectivised. In 1996, Nanjie reconstructed communal dinning halls;128
126 See Wu, Jidang Sanshinian, 163.
127 See generally Zhou Yi, ‘Xunqiu Zhenghe de Fenhua’.
128 See Xiang Jiquan, Jiti Jingji Beijing Xiade Xiangcun Zhili [Rural Governance under Collective 
Economy] (Wuchang: Huazhong Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 2002), 116.
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129there were even attempts to restore the name of People’s Communes. On the 
surface, village enterprises prospered, and farmers enjoyed free food and housing and 
cradle-to-grave social welfare (except that migrant workers in Nanjia are excluded 
from social welfare provision) . 130 But villagers did not have private property.
Some recent news reports have investigated the truth of Nanjie’s legend and found 
that Nanjie’s prosperity heavily relied on the support of administrative power and 
bank loans, as well as exploiting cheap migrant labour. The legend of Nanjie is now 
broken. An investigation of its current situation reveals that in fact, since 2004, the 
collectivist Nanjie Group has been converted into a shareholding system. The village 
party secretary got nine percent of the stock. Collective property has been quietly 
privatised into the pockets of village leaders. Now the Nanjie Group is on the edge of 
bankruptcy (mainly because it cannot get new bank loans) . 131 Unlike Huaxi, Nanjie 
seemed not to have found a way that is committed to market principles.
6. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the transformation of private property in rural China. 
Private property has been selectively granted to farmers since the dismantling of 
rural communes and the introduction of the household responsibility system in 1978. 
Along with the revival of private property, there have been a series of changes in the 
rural area. For example, in post-Deng China, legal distinctions between the urban and 
the rural, and between the public and the private have blurred. Some grassroots 
initiatives (for example, ‘minor property rights’ apartments) did emerge from the 
under-defined legal and governmental boundaries as attempts of farmers to engage in 
marketisation.
129 See ibid, 190.
130 On Nanjie Village, also see Liu Qian, Cunji, Diyuan he Yeyuan— Yige Zhongbu Zhongguo 
Cunzhang de Shehui Fenceng [Village Membership, Land Power and Professional Relationship— the 
Social Stratification o f a Village in Central China], 2004. In
<http://www.sociologv.cass.net.cn/shxw/xcvi/t20040508 2Q89.htm.>(last visited 14 July 2008).
131 See Shangguan Jiaoming, ‘Nanjie Zhenxiang [The Truth o f Nanjie Village], in South China Post, 
26 February 2008. .
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Yet we could find that although private property has re-emerged in the rural area, 
rural land is still owned by collectives rather than farmers. Farmers only enjoy 
limited land use rights. Collective ownership remains a constraint for farmers to fully 
engage in and enjoy benefits from marketisation. Moreover, there is no clear 
distinction between public property and private property in the rural property regime,
and the problem of middlemen pervades the rural property regime and the rural
1 ^governance system: while Beijing may be ‘seeing like a state’, local governments 
have the ability to mobilise resources and are seeking for their own benefits. The lack 
of self-govemance by farmers and the lack of communal governance of resources 
still hinder the revival of private property in rural China. The lack of the communal 
sphere is also one of the reasons that the rights of farmers are vulnerable to the 
predatory local governments in land seizure.
132 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998c).
133 This issue will be explored in Chapter Seven.
Chapter 5: The Transformation of State Ownership in Market 
Reform: Privatisation of the SOEs?
1. Introduction
The making of property law in post-Mao China had to deal with the selective 
recognition of de facto property rights emerged during economic reform and the 
rehabilitation of such property rights in the law.1 However, there are still dispersed 
and fragmented property rights that are hard to define in the law. In the area of state 
ownership, during economic reform especially through the SOE reform, state 
ownership is no longer absolute and indivisible, and private property has re-emerged. 
Such fragmentation of state ownership calls for many questions: in which manner 
have the dispersed property rights generated through the SOE reforms been assigned? 
What kind of privatisation has been going on? Who are now the owner(s) of state 
assets? This chapter would like to approach these questions by examining the 
transformation of state ownership in China.
When the CPC came to power in 1949, they followed a united front (tongyi zhanxian 
strategy to cooperate with a wide range of non-communist groups; private 
ownership was not immediately abolished. The 1954 Constitution provided a mixed 
ownership structure including state ownership (guojia suoyouzhi 
cooperative ownership (hezuoshe suoyouzhi ownership of
individual working people (geti laodongzhe suoyouzhi and
capitalist ownership (zibenjia suoyouzhi Article 5). However, the
mixed ownership structure in reality was only maintained for a short period. In fact 
in 1952 the CPC had already launched the ‘Five-anti Campaigns’ (wufan yundong
1 See Chapter Three.
2 That is, ownership by the whole people. See Article 5 o f the Constitution (1954).
3 That is, collective ownership by the masses, see Article 5 o f the Constitution (1954). Article 7 also 
provides: ‘cooperative ownership is either socialist, when collectively owned by the working masses, 
or semi-socialist, when in part collectively owned by the working classes’. English translation is 
according to Albert P. Blaustein, ed., Fundamental Legal Documents o f  Communist China (South 
Hackensack, New Jersey: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1962).
4 Including farmers and handicraftsmen.
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against large-scale entrepreneurs; in 1953, the government announced 
the ‘socialist transformation’ (shehuizhuyi gaizao that called for
eventual supersession of private ownership by public ownership in 1956, with some 
compensation given to their former private owners.6 Moreover, provisions regarding 
the mixed ownership in the 1954 Constitution were virtually abandoned after the 
CPC launched the ‘Anti Rightist Movement’ (fanyoupaiyundong in
1957 and the establishment of ‘People’s Communes’ (renmin gongshe in
1958.8
Between 1956 and 1978, the Central planned economy9 in the PRC was based on 
public ownership. The conception of ownership was overwhelmingly influenced by 
former Soviet jurisprudence, in which ownership was regarded indivisible and 
absolute. According to the Constitution (1975 and 1978), public ownership in China 
consisted of state ownership and collective ownership (Articles 6  and 7). Although 
state-owned assets were supposed to belong to the people as a whole in China, 
individual interests were subordinate to the overarching public and collective 
interests. 10 During this period, there were no comprehensive property law, since the 
Civil Code formulated by the Guomindang in 1929-1931 was abolished in 1949, and 
no alternatives were promulgated.
State ownership is based on the Soviet version of state ownership—the factory model 
(socialisation of the means of production). The 1954 Constitution prioritised state
5 Its main target was ‘the capitalist class’. The targets o f the ‘Five Antis’ were: bribery, tax evasion, 
doing shoddy work and using inferior materials, stealing state property, and stealing state economic 
information.
6 See e.g., Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., The Politics o f  China: The Eras o f  Mao and Deng, 2ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 40-45.
The main targets were intellectuals as well as legal professions. The first wave o f attack started 
immediately after the end o f the ‘Hundred Flowers Movement’, which involved pluralism o f opinion 
expression and criticism of the government.
8 But in reality, whether a complete public ownership system was established is not clear. For 
example, farmers still kept ‘private plots’ (ziliu di §
9 In this period the central planned economy was also subject to the effects o f decentralisation in 
localities, and this point will be discussed in Section 3 o f this chapter.
10 See Pitman Potter, ‘Globalization and Economic Regulation in China: Selective Adaptation of 
Globalized Norms and Practices’, Washington University Global Studies Law Review 2, no. 119 
(2003): 126-127.
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ownership as ‘the leading force in the national economy and the national basis on 
which the state carries out socialist transformation’ (Article 6 ). Prioritising state 
ownership was also in line with the Chinese socio-economic conditions prevailing at 
that time. In a family-oriented and ‘non-organisational’ society11 such as China’s, in 
order to achieve the modernisation project quickly, as Fukuyama argues, the state 
must step in to help create large-scale businesses ‘through subsidies, guidance, or 
even outright ownership’; to some extent, ‘state ownership may be the only way for 
such a society to develop large-scale enterprises’-.12 The result is:
a saddle-shaped distribution of enterprises, with a large number of relatively small 
family firms at one end of the scale, a small number of large state-owned enterprises at 
the other, and relatively little in between.13
Since 1978, there has been a great change in the public sector. The first round of 
reforms dismantled rural communes and introduced the household responsibility 
system to rural China.14 Special economic zones (SEZs) were established along the 
coast as the means to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). In the mid-1980s, the 
focus of the reforms was shifted from rural areas to the sector of the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). For instance, contracts were made between the state and 
enterprise managers: enterprises were granted more management autonomy, and 
managers could be rewarded with a portion of the enterprise profits if certain 
performance targets had been met. Later on, the government began to lease out 
enterprises in order to improve the efficiency of the enterprises. In 1994, 
corporatisation of SOEs was embarked on. Since 1997, China has embraced the 
policy of zhuada fangxiao (grasping the large and freeing the small 
which entails the corporatisation of the large SOEs while selling the small and 
medium-sized SOEs (for example, through management buyouts).
11 See Section 3.2 of Chapter Two.
12 See Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation o f  Prosperity (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1995), 30, 72.
13 Ibid, 30.
14 See Chapter Four.
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While market reform has led to the gradual acceptance of commodification 
(,shangpinhua and corporatisation (gongsihua as the means to
invigorate the economy, privatisation (,siyouhua has not yet been officially
recognised. For example, corporatisation focuses on ‘diversification of ownership’, 
whereas privatisation entails ‘the sale of state-owned assets’, 15 which stands in sharp 
contrast to the fundamental socialist principles. The alternative term to privatisation 
is thus transformation of ownership (gaizhi r£'J) or restructuring (<chongzu ![£§.) 
of SOEs. Yet, the policy of ‘grasping the large and freeing the small’ has triggered 
the question: has ‘privatisation’ (often described as ‘the Chinese route to 
privatisation’16 or ‘privatisation with Chinese characteristics’) been taking place in 
China? How to ascertain the nature and process of the reconfiguration of China’s 
state-owned sector?
It is difficult to assess privatisation in China without taking account of Chinese 
peculiar political institutions and social conditions. Therefore, we need to investigate 
what kind of privatisation has been taking place in China, under what conditions and 
with what limitations, and what are the consequences of ‘privatisation’? In order to 
explore the nature and process of privatisation taking place in China, this chapter is 
divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the relationship between the plan and 
the market. This part also compares the SOE reforms in the 1980s with those in the 
1990s, as well as different approaches for reconstructing large SOEs and small and 
medium SOEs. The second part focuses on the relationship between the central and 
local governments and their roles in resource control and allocation in China.
15 See e.g., Mary M. Shirley, ‘Bureaucrats in Business: The Roles o f Privatisation Versus 
Corporatisation in State-Owned Enterprise Reform’, World Development 27, no. 1 (1999): 115; 
Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics o f  Government Ownership, ed. World Bank 
(Washington, D. C.: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1995); Qian Yingyi, ‘Enterprise 
Reform in China: Agency Problems and Political Control’, Economic o f  Transition 4, no. 2 (1996): 
427-447.
16 See Ma Shu Y., ‘The Chinese Route to Privatisation: The Evolution o f the Shareholding System 
Option’, Asian Survey 38, no. 4 (1998): 379-397.
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2. Economic reforms stalled between the plan and the market
2.1. The relationship between the plan and the market
The dominant conceptualisation of Chinese reforms is gradualism. The gradualist 
mode of reforms often stands in sharp contrast with the ‘shock therapy or big bang’ 
(rapid market liberalisation and mass privatisation) approaches by Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU) in the early 1990s.17 In the context of 
post-Mao China, gradualism refers particularly to ‘the trial-and-error approach’ to the 
reform programs described by Chinese leaders as ‘crossing a river by groping for 
stepping stones’ (mo zhe shitou guo he However, the questions at
issue are: has economic reform in China since 1978 been pursued in a coherent 
manner, that is, the gradualist model? In addition, in terms of post-Mao China’s 
reform approaches, do the merits of gradualism really outweigh those of ‘shock 
therapy’?
In post-Mao China the market cannot easily be divorced from a plan or 
administrative power. China’s reformers adopted ‘a planned economy as a priority, 
market regulations as a supplement’ (jihua jingji wei zhu, shichang tiaojie weifit i f  
TjJfJgiJilff j*j$$) at the 12th National Congress of the CPC in 1982; ‘a 
planned commodity economy’ (you jihua de shangpin jingji Wi+ic'J at
the third Plenum of the 12th Central Committee of the CPC in October 1984; ‘an 
economy where the state regulates the market and the market guides the enterprises’
(guojia tiaojie shichang, shichangyindao qiye TtTi^ j, TfT fjg *71 dJi^ lk) at
the 13th National Congress of the CPC in October 1987; ‘an economy with an 
integration of the planned economy and market regulations’ (jihua yu shishang 
tiaojie xiang jiehe at the fourth Plenum of the 13th
17 See the comparison o f reforms between China and the EEFSU in Steven M. Goldstein, ‘China in 
Transition: The Political Foundation o f Incremental Reform’, The China Quarterly, no. 144 (1995): 
1105-1131; Louis Putterman, ‘The Role o f Ownership and Property Rights in China’s Economic 
Transition’, The China Quarterly, no, 144 (1995): 1047-1064.
18 See e.g., Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics o f  
Governance in China (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2004), 8.
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Central Committee of the CPC in June 1989.19 The term ‘socialist market economy’ 
(shehui zhuyi shichang jingji as the reform goal only appeared
at the 14th Party Congress in 1992. The choices and adoptions of different terms are 
based on the complex relationship between the plan and the market.
If a planned economy is fully converted into a market economy, the market economy 
should bear characteristics including: privatisation of SOEs, price liberalisation, and 
the transfer of economic decision-making power from the government to enterprises 
and individuals. However, as the market cannot be easily separated from the plan, a 
dual-track price system emerged in 1985. The ‘state’ (Beijing, a provincial 
government, or a local government below the provincial level) would keep control 
over the prices of goods produced and distributed inside the plan through 
administrative channels, while the ‘market’ could decide the prices of goods
90 •produced outside the plan. This is because policy makers had to make sure that 
state-owned enterprises were able to acquire resources and did not lose the 
competition with private enterprises, although the centrally planned allocation 
system was gradually converted to the allocation system according to the needs of 
the market. The distinction between ‘inside the system’ (tizhinei ^rfrjp^) and 
‘outside the system’ (tizhiwai ^rfrj^h) also emerged, although it is hard to give a 
specific definition of this distinction. ‘Inside the system’ could mean inside the plan 
especially having easy access to resources. Those with the political influence to gain 
access to goods (people inside the system) bought goods at low state-set prices that 
could vary across and within provinces and sold those goods at higher prices, and 
thus made enormous profits. Resources are transferred from the inside system to the 
outside system by privileges, and great profits are made. This phenomenon is termed 
guandao (l=f fill), which means officials (usually through companies that were set up 
and controlled by them) get goods from the inside system to sell them to the outside
19 On the synthesis o f the relationship between the market and the plan, also see Woo Wing Thye, 
‘The Real Reasons for China’s Growth’, The China Journal, no. 41 (1999): 123.
20 See Shahid Yusuf, Kaoru Nabeshima, and Dwight H. Perkins, Under New Ownership: Privatizing 
China's State-Owned Enterprises (Washington: World Bank), 61.
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system. The dual-track price system, a unique feature of ‘the dual approach’
(shuanggui zhi to Chinese economic reform, evolved into rent-seeking that
will be discussed in the chapter below.
Apart from the non-separation of the plan and the market, if we compare the reforms 
in the 1980s and those in the 1990s,21 we can see that reforms in China since 1978 
have not been proceeding in a coherent manner; instead they could be divided into 
different periods (for example, 1978-1984, 1984-1989, 1989-1992, 1992-present), in 
which different people have had different gains and losses.22 Since the mid-1990s, 
the central government has strengthened its macroeconomic regulation and control 
(hongguan tiaokong or macro-control)23 of the economy and rolled back
its power over economic decision- making. The path of economic reform has been 
diverted from the gradualist model since then.
Another question of gradualism is whether it is the main reason that has contributed 
to China’s economic growth.24 We should note that the term ‘gradualism’ itself does 
not just mean ‘piecemeal’ reform but also implies that the elements in the old 
planned economy are hard to be eliminated, that is to say, the market reform is partial
21 Many scholars have done this comparison, for example, Huang Yasheng, Ya Dali, He Qinglian. See 
e.g., He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong, eds., Zhongguo Gaige de Deshiyu Chengbai [the Gains and 
Losses o f  China s Reform] (Hong Kong: Boda Chubanshe, 2007); Huang Yasheng, Selling China: 
Foreign Direct Investment During the Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); 
Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan.
22 See He and Cheng, eds., Zhongguo Gaige de Deshi yu Chengbai [the Gains and Losses o f  China s 
Reform], 155.
23 In the past three decades o f economic reform, macro-control— so-called ‘regulation and 
rectification’ (zhili zhengdun before the 1990s— has appeared frequently in Chinese policy 
making. When the economy is overheated and competition for resource is fierce, the central 
government regulates different enterprises belong to different ownership sectors and reallocates 
resource among these enterprises through direct government intervention. In the regulation and 
reallocation, state-owned enterprises, joint-venture enterprises (multi-national enterprises), and private 
enterprises enjoy different treatment. Macro-control happens every four to six years, and since 1981, 
each macro-control only claims its start, but never claims its end. See Wu Xiaobo, Jidang Sanshinian: 
Zhongguo Qiye 1978-2008 [Chinese Business 1978-2008], vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongxin Chubanshe, 
2008), 233, 289. In order to cool down the market, there have been various macro-control measures 
(for example, tightening tax, loan, and land regulations; controlling market demand and increasing 
supply).
24 See the analysis in Jeffrey Saches, Woo Wing Thye, and Yang Xiaokai, ‘Economic Reforms and 
Constitutional Transition’, CID Working Papers, no. 43 (2000); Woo, ‘The Real Reasons for China’s 
Growth’.
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reform,25 or market reform without constitutional transition.26 The state (central and 
local) still plays an important role in market reform. In terms of the state-market 
relationship, the ‘distorted market school’27 has tended to look beyond the 
short-term benefits of state involvement in the market and ‘highlight the 
market-distorting aspects of state entrepreneurship’ such as the barriers such state 
intervention sets up to long-term market reforms. The unrestrained government 
intervention in the economy is problematic. As Susan Shirk notes,
while local officials draped themselves in the mantle of market reform, what they meant 
by reform was, in fact, the perpetuation of the hybrid, partially reformed system, not a 
genuine market economy. They preferred to maintain their ‘quasi-ownership’ rights 
over local factories and to exploit these rights to collect rents for themselves rather than 
playing only the role of referee in market competition.29
*1A
The place where market and power intersect has been the hotbed for rent-seeking. 
Rent-seeking is also an organisational phenomenon—‘public agencies seeking 
profits generated by their monopolies over certain resources or power for their own 
gains’.31 Indeed, in the context of gradualist reform, rents could be ‘monetised more 
easily by arbitraging between the market and the plan’,32 because the market is 
embedded in political power, and governments act as regulators, investors, and 
referees.33
25 See He and Cheng, eds., Zhongguo Gaige de Deshi yu Chengbai [the Gains and Losses o f  China s 
Reform/ ,  186.
26 See Saches, Woo, and Yang, ‘Economic Reforms and Constitutional Transition’.
27 See Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan, 11. According to Yang, there are two opposite views 
on the growing state-market nexus in Chinese reforms: the ‘developmental school’ sees the strong 
state involvement in China as an important attribute to economic success; while the ‘distorted market 
school’ holds that ‘bureaucratic entrepreneurialism’ in China has become the main obstacle to the 
market economy.
28 See ibid.
29 Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic o f  Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), 196.
30 Compared with ‘corruption’, ‘rent-seeking’ is more neutral and general: rent-seeking 
‘de-individualises’ corruption and stresses the systematic dimension o f ‘a consequence o f regulatory 
control in the absence o f effective means o f regulating or controlling the regulators’. See W. T. 
Murphy, ‘China’s Laws and Flaws’, The Modem Law Review 70, no. 6 (2007): 1010.
31 Liu Xiaobo, ‘From Rank-Seeking to Rent-Seeking: Changing Administrative Ethos and Corruption 
in Reform China’, Crime, Law and Social Change 32, no. 4 (1999): 354.
32 Andrew H. Wedeman, From Mao to Market: Rent Seeking, Local Protectionism, and Marketization 
in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 27.
33 This point will be examined in detail in Chapters Six and Seven.
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Furthermore, ‘the dual approach’ to China’s reform, that is, the unbalanced progress 
between market reform and political reform, also reveals the dilemma in dealing with 
the complexity of governance in post-Mao China. In Maoist era, the Party sought 
self-legitimation through ideology and the monopoly of truth.34 However, the Party’s 
self-legitimation was one cause of a tension in legitimacy, because ‘a political system 
can never create a foundation for itself; it has to come from society’.35 After the 
turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, the Party had to restore its legitimacy of 
governance. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping returned to the leading Party position and the 
‘four modernisations’ (sige xiandaihua 0 were endorsed with a focus on 
the economic sphere, entailing a shift from planned economy to market economy as 
well as ‘reforms’ and ‘opening-up’. Economic modernisation has served as an 
important means of rebuilding the legitimacy of governance by the Party-state, and 
maintaining a commitment to socialism. However, this kind of modernisation 
emphasises economic growth (without concurrent political reforms) while ignoring 
equality and transparency in distribution; numbers and statistics36 (for example, 
GDP) have been the most important indications to gauge the progress of 
modernisation and an important criterion for cadre evaluation. The high economic 
growth seems to have maintained a trade-off between economic reform and political 
reform, yet the fact that political reform lags far behind economic reform may give 
birth to a potential legitimacy crisis.
2.2. The SOE reform in the 1980s versus in the 1990s
The above section has discussed the relationship between the plan and the market, 
and this section focuses on another important aspect of economic reform and change 
in the ownership structure—the SOE reform. SOEs were established by 
administrative fiat rather than market forces, and their governance systems were
34 See He Baogang, The Democratic Implications o f  Civil Society in China ( Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1997), 107.
35 ibid.
36 On the unreliable statistics especially at local levels in China see e.g., Liu, ‘From Rank-Seeking to 
Rent-Seeking’: 351.
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based on a central planned economy. SOEs were supervised by governments at 
different levels—the central, the province (sheng # ) ,  the city (shi Tff), and the 
county (xian H-).37 SOEs themselves also held administrative ranks. As Cao, Qian 
and Weingast point out, most large SOEs were supervised by the central government, 
and this kind of SOEs was often in monopolistic industries such as 
telecommunications, railroad transportation, petrol and petrochemicals. Most small 
and medium SOEs were supervised by local governments at different levels, and this 
kind of SOEs was often in competitive industries such as textiles and food 
processing.38 SOEs also performed social functions such as providing housing, 
education, medical care, pensions and lifetime employment for their employees. In 
fact, each SOE was a self-contained community, and some big SOEs even had their 
own courts, procuratorates, and police. Through the control of SOEs, the government 
was able to carry out its social objectives, one of which was to provide social 
security for urban residents as well as govern the urban sector.39
China’s SOEs were burdened by a mix of productive and social functions, and 
possessed ill-designed governance structures with vague property rights.40 Most 
SOEs were therefore highly inefficient loss-makers. Because of their poor 
performance, SOEs required more fiscal and quasi-fiscal public subsidies.41 SOEs 
thus imposed a huge burden on the government and the entire economy.
Since 1978 the Chinese government has been trying different schemes to revitalise 
SOEs. The first period, from 1978 through early 1984, saw the reforms that 
emphasised the agricultural sector, but central planning did not withdraw from the
37 Township {xiang % ) is one level below county (xian H-), and village (cun til) is one level below 
township, neither the township level nor the village level supervises SOEs. In this chapter, the local 
refers provincial, city, and county governments.
38 See Cao Yuanzheng, Qian Yingyi, and Barry R. Weingast, ‘From Federalism, Chinese Style to 
Privatisation, Chinese Style’, Economics o f  Transition 7, no.l (1999): 108.
39 See Zhao Yaohui, ‘The Nature o f Chinese State-Owned Enterprises’, in The Reformability o f  
China’s State Sector, ed., Guanzhong James Wen and Xu Dianqing (Singapore; River Edge, N. J.: 
World Scientific, 1997), 304.
40 See Harry G. Broadman, Meeting the Challenge o f  Chinese Enterprise Reform, World Bank 
Discussion Papers (Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 1995), xi.
41 See ibid, xii.
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market and the ownership structure was still within the old framework. Since the 
third plenum of the 13th National Congress of the CPC in 1984, the focus of reform 
has been shifted from the rural sector to the urban sector. The second period thus 
began in 1984. In this period, inspired by the ‘household responsibility system’ 
practised in rural areas, contractual arrangements made between an SOE and its 
governmental supervisor were introduced to the SOE reforms: such contracts 
rewarded enterprise managers for certain portions of enterprise profits. In 1988, ‘the 
State-Owned Enterprise law’42 came into effect to grant the SOEs legal status with 
the state as the owner (Article 2). The reforms were interrupted by the political 
turmoil in 1989. Since Deng Xiaoping’s tour to China’s southern provinces in 1992, 
the reform efforts have been restored.43 From 1992-1994, the expansion of 
managerial autonomy of SOEs was emphasised in order to make enterprises more 
efficient. Since 1994, reforms have stressed the establishment of ‘a modem 
enterprise system’ and the transformation of the ownership system into a mixed 
structure with a dominant public sector.44 In this period, the non-public sector has 
developed rapidly.
Yet there have been many limits of the SOE reform. In the 1980s, resources and 
assets were still concentrated in the hands of the government, and were redistributed 
to society according to the rank and status of members. Reform was ‘not fully based 
on market competition but on the bargaining between state agencies45 and individual
42 Quanmin Suoyou zhi Gongye Qiye Fa [the State-Owned Enterprise Law], promulgated by the NPC 
on 13 April 1988, implemented on 1 August 1988.
43 This synthesis is based on Yusuf, Nabershima, and Perkins, Under New Ownership, 45; Cao 
Yuanzheng, Qian Yingyi, and Barry R. Weingast, ‘From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatisation, 
Chinese Style’: 103-131; Louis Putterman, ‘The Role of Ownership and Property Rights in China’s 
Economic Transition’.
44 See e.g., Guo Sujian, ‘The Ownership Reform in China: What Direction and How Far?’, Journal o f  
Contemporary China 12, no. 36 (2003): 557.
45 State agencies in China could be divided into two categories: jiguan danwei andshiye
danwei The former refer to party organisations and governmental departments at both the
central and local levels, while the latter include non-profit units that do not perform regulatory 
functions, for example, newspapers, research institutes, and hospitals. See Lin Yi-min and Zhang 
Zhanxin, ‘Backyard Profit Centers: The Private Assets o f Public Agencies’, in Property Rights and 
Economic Reform in China, ed. Jean C. Oi and Andrew G. Walder (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), 205. In this chapter, state agencies refer to jiguan danwei.
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managers’.46 Old elements of a planned economy were maintained in economic 
reform: certain privileges were granted to cadres and work units (<danwei 
based on their hierarchical status. Higher ranks meant better treatment and more 
privileges 47 Rather than egalitarianism, a political and administrative hierarchy 
based on status pervaded the whole political system.48 Even most SOEs were 
assigned certain administrative ranks according to the ranks of their governmental or 
departmental supervisors. The reallocation of resources according to ‘ranks’ and the 
monopoly of resources by privileged groups stimulated ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour that 
plagued economic reforms. For example, the side-effect of the SOE ‘contract 
responsibility system’ was that it created ‘insider control’ by which enterprise 
managers could use their control over the assets of SOEs to seek their own benefits.49
Due to the limits of the SOE reform mentioned above, after more than a decade of 
these reforms, the performance of SOEs remained poor. More extensive reforms of 
the ownership structure were needed in order to clarify the property rights in SOEs and 
separate the management of enterprises from government intervention. SOEs 
underwent further reforms in the 1990s; however the question is are the reforms in the 
1990s pursued in the same manner as those in the 1980s?
If China pursued a gradualist and coherent manner throughout its process of reforms, 
the SOEs should be steadily privatised. Yet, whether the SOEs have been privatised 
along the lines of gradualism is debatable. As Huang Yasheng points out that 
privatisation in China seems to have diverted from the gradualist framework, and the 
gradualist account seems relevant to the reformist policies in the 1980s rather than 
those in the 1990s.50 Huang’s arguments are based on several empirical
46 Guo Sujian, ‘The Ownership in China’: 557.
47 See Liu, ‘From Rank-Seeking to Rent-Seeking’: 349.
48 See ibid.
49 See Cao, Qian and Weingast, ‘From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style’:
121.
50 See e.g., Huang Yasheng and Tarun Khanna, ‘Can India Overtake China?’ Foreign Policy, no. 137 
(2003): 74-81; Huang Yasheng, ‘Did the Chinese Government Pursue a Gradualist Reform Strategy in 
the 1990s’, thematic paper on government, prepared for China Transition Workshop, 15-17 November
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inconsistencies with the gradualist framework in his study of reforms in China:51 
first, Chinese leaders in the 1980s worried about the problems with the SOEs such as 
their incentive mechanisms; however, from the 1990s onwards Chinese leaders just 
focused on the technical capabilities of the SOEs rather than their incentive structure. 
Secondly, there were some aspects of both economic and political liberalisation52 in 
the 1980s (except for the turmoil in 1989), but the extent of such liberalisation was 
less in the 1990s. Thirdly, China already implemented substantial privatisation in the 
1980s and early 1990s, but did so in ‘a roundabout fashion’ through the specific 
mechanism of FDI, so called ‘FDI-financed privatisation of SOEs’, in which the 
transactions were actually acquisition deals. Although FDI has brought positive 
aspects of ‘the rule of law’ to China, in terms of the roles and effects of FDI, another 
negative aspect should be considered: by making a partnership with rent-seeking 
officials, foreign investors are seeking for their own benefits, and loopholes have 
been made in relevant laws that are beneficial for foreign acquisition. The lawmaking 
process has become even more complicated.54
Apart from Huang’s empirical observations, if we look at Jiang Zemin’s party school 
speech, which stresses the establishment of a ‘socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics’ (you zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi shichang jingji W 4 *
2002; Huang Yasheng, ‘Growth Dynamics in China and India: Getting the Story Right’, Public 
Lecture, the London School o f Economics, UK, 11 October 2006.
51 See e.g., Huang, ‘Why China Will Not Collapse’, Foreign Policy, no. 99 (Summer 1995): 54-68; 
Huang, ‘Did the Chinese Government Pursue a Gradualist Reform Strategy in the 1990s’; Huang 
Yasheng and Tarun Khanna, ‘Can India Overtake China?’; Huang Yasheng, Selling China.
52 Liberalisation is one of three focal points (the others being privatisation and stabilisation) o f the 
Washington consensus for economies in transition. Although economic liberalisation is often 
associated with privatisation, the two can be quite separate processes.
53 See generally, Huang, Selling China. The Chinese version o f this book is entitled Gaige Shiqi de 
Waiguo Zhijie Touzi [The Foreign Direct Investment in the Reform Era ^  l!ltl ,
which seems to have avoided the indications o f the English title Selling China.
54 See recent cases in Xu Yunqian, ‘Guo Jingyi Luoma, Waizi Bingguo Fagui Shuoyi [The Arrest o f 
Guo Jingyi Poses Doubts on Foreign Acquisition Regulations]’, in
<http://business.sohu.com/20080906/n2594Q5974.shtml> (last visited 29 September 2008); Wang 
Heyan, ‘Another Arrest at the Ministry o f Commerce’, Caijing Magazine, 28 September 2008, 
<http://english.caiiing.com.cn/2008-09-28/110016811.html> (last visited 29 September 2008). This 
case involved officials that took charge of drafting laws and regulations for foreign investment at two 
departments o f  the Ministry o f Commerce, namely the Department o f Foreign Investment and the 
Department o f  Treaty and Law. These rent-seeking officials formed a partnership with lawyers and 
foreign investors, and drafted laws and regulations that have been beneficial for foreign enterprises.
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in 1992,55 the comprehensive economic reform agenda outlined by 
Jiang in fact marked a move away from the gradualist model. Compared with the ad 
hoc fashion in the 1980s, Jiang and his colleagues clearly strengthened government 
macroeconomic regulation and control of Chinese economy.56
In November 1993, the decision57 made by the third Plum of the 14th National 
Congress of the CPC outlined a 50-point agenda for establishing a ‘socialist market 
economy’, including creating a ‘modem enterprise system’ (xiandai qiye zhidu 
Since the corporatisation program initiated in 1994, the focus of the 
SOEs reform has been shifted from delegation of decision-making authority to 
corporate governance and ownership. However, it is worth distinguishing the 
approaches for restructuring large SOEs from those for restructuring small and 
medium SOEs. In light of large SOEs, in November 1994, 100 large and 
medium-sized SOEs were selected to be corporatised within two years in the form of 
limited liability companies (LLCs, youxian zeren gongsi WPlIjfr'fS'&W]) or 
shareholding companies (SHCs, gufen youxian gongsi According
to the Company Law that took effect on 1 July 1994, as for a LLC, the shareholder 
(less than 50) shall be responsible for the company to the extent of the capital 
contributions they have made; as for a SHC, the shareholders shall be responsible for 
the company to the extent of the shares they have subscribed for.59 Later some of 
these SHCs listed on the Chinese stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen.
The corporatisation reform also involves the creation of state-owned investors or 
entities such as state asset administration departments.60 The state shares in the
55 Jiang delivered a party school speech before the 14th Party Congress, the speech was circulated 
among central and provincial leaders. This speech also laid the theoretical background for the 14th 
Party Congress in 1992.
56 See Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan, 7-8.
57 Guanyu Jianli Shehui Zhuyi Shichang Jingji Tizhi Ruogan Wenti de Guiding [The Decision on 
Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic System], available at 
<http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/archive/131747.htm> (last visited 11 September 2008).
58 See Ma, ‘The Chinese Route to Privatisation: 381.
59 Gongsifa [The Company Law] o f the PRC, Article 3.
60 Before 2003, there were many state agencies bearing the responsibilities o f guiding the SOE reform,
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corporatised SOEs are to be allocated to these asset administration entities, which 
would represent the state owner.61 LLCs do not issue shares to the public. When a 
SOE is corporatised as a LLC, it could be a state-controlling LLC, if the state 
controls more than 50% of the shares; or a wholly state-owned LLC, if the state is the 
sole investor.62 By contrast, corporatisation of SOEs into SHCs is through share 
offers. Shares are issued to the state, enterprises, and individuals. Non-state entities 
thus can be shareholders. Private individuals can acquire partial ownership of 
SOEs.63 However, through various means, ‘the state’ can still retain the control over 
the ‘commanding heights’ of the national economy. For example, the Party select the 
senior management of large SOEs. Large SOEs also have direct contact with the 
decision-making ministries, and managers of the large SOEs could be appointed 
provincial governors.64 Corporatisation of large SOEs has not amounted to 
privatisation. Problems with the shareholding system have been identified. For 
example, the performance of the listed SOEs in the stock market is poor.65 The 
disappointing performance casts doubt on whether the shareholding system with a 
dominant public shareholder can solve China’s SOEs problem.
In the report delivered by Jiang Zemin at the 15th Party Congress in 1997, ‘grasping the 
large and freeing the small’ {zhuaida fangxiao was endorsed as the centre
of the economic reform strategy. ‘Grasping the large’ refers to mergers (jianbing 
3#1), groupings (<chongzu M£R) of large SOEs into conglomerates; ‘freeing the small’
for example, the former State Economic and Trade, the former CPC Enterprise Work Commission, the 
Ministry o f Finance, and the Ministry o f Labour and Social Security.
61 See Lau W. K. ‘15th Congresses o f the Chinese Communist Party: Milestone in China’s 
Privatization’, Capital & Class, no. 68 (1999): 55.
62 See Article 5 o f Qiye Guoyou Zichan Fa [The Law of the State-Owned Assets o f Enterprises], 
promulgated by the Standing Committee o f the NPC on 28 October 2008; will take effect on 1 May 
2009.
63 See Ma, ‘The Chinese Route to Privatization’: 379.
64 Since the 17th National Congress o f the CPC, many managers o f the large SOEs have been 
appointed provincial leaders. For example, general manager o f the FAW (First Automobile 
Manufacture) Group Corporation, Zhu Yanfeng, has been appointed deputy governor of Jilin Province; 
director o f  the Aluminium Corporation o f China, Guo Shengkun, has been appointed Party Secretary 
o f Guangxi Province.
65 See Tian Guoqiang and Liang Hong, ‘What Kind o f Privatization?’, in Dilemmas o f  Reform in 
Jiang Zemin s China, ed. Andrew J. Nathan, Hong Zhaohui, and Steven R. Smith (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999), 83-84.
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implies that small and medium SOEs can been ‘privatised’, for example, through 
management buyouts. Most of the schemes in respect to ‘freeing the small’ were 
initiated and led by local governments,66 leaving mass lay-off of SOE workers 
without any guarantee of social welfare. However, the controlling shareholding of 
the state in large SOEs was maintained. In the same report, Jiang elaborated on the 
point of mixed ownership by saying: ‘the public economy includes not only the state 
economy and collective economy, but also the state and collective elements in the 
sector of mixed ownership’. According to Jiang, the dominant position of public 
ownership should manifest itself as follows: ‘public assets dominate the total assets of 
society, and the state-owned economy controls the “commanding heights” of the 
national economy and plays a leading role in economic development’.
The fact that SOEs are the pillar of the national economy has been reaffirmed in 
many meetings. In 1998, at the ninth National People’s Congress, Zhu Rongji 
announced a package of reforms (for example, the reforms of the tax68 and banking 
systems) and aimed to strengthen government’s macro-control capacity.69 A new 
leadership was selected at the 16th National Congress of the CPC in November 2002 
and at the 10th NPC in March 2003. In the policies set by these meetings and 
conferences, SOEs still enjoy a superior status in China’s modernisation and
70industrialisation programs.
In China, the fate of SOEs is in the hands of governments. Take the state asset 
management system for example. In 2003, authorised by the State Council, the 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was
66 Cao, Qian and Weingast, ‘From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style’: 105.
67 See Jiang Zemin, ‘Gaoju Deng Xiaoping Lilun Weida Qizhi, ba Jianshe you Zhongguo Tese de 
Shehui Zhuyi Quanmian Tuixiang Ershiyi Shiji [Hold High the Great Banner o f Deng Xiaoping 
Theory for All-Round Advancement o f the Cause o f  Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 
into the Twenty-First Century]’, (Beijing: Remin Chubanshe, 1997).
68 The reform of the tax system will be discussed in Section 3 o f Chapter Six.
69 See Tony Saich, Governance and Politics o f  China 2ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2004), 
81. Also see the discussion on China under reform in 1997-2002 in ibid, 80-90.
70 In fact since 1994, Beijing has invested massively in the state sector, including providing more 
financial support for existing SOEs and launching new SOEs. SOEs were actually not only maintained 
but also expanded. See Huang, ‘Can India Overtake China?’, 79.
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founded to perform the responsibilities of the investor in the State-owned asset on 
behalf of the central government (SASAC at provincial and municipal levels are the 
investor in the state-owned asset on behalf of the provincial and municipal 
governments). The SASAC combines functions previously performed by a half-dozen 
regulatory bodies,71 and guides the SOE reform and the management of SOEs. 
However, no monitoring and enforcement mechanism (for example, an independent 
judiciary or independent regulatory body) yet exists other than the government
79supervisors in China.
2.3. The debates on the restructuring of SOEs
7TIn the process of the SOE reform, management buyouts (MBOs) have, in recent 
years, become a common approach to privatise SOEs in China. MBOs are 
acquisition of a company in essence, in which the buyers are managers of the 
acquired company. If the company is publicly owned such as a SOE, MBOs will turn 
this company into a private one. However, in most MBOs of listed SOEs in China, 
the process of MBOs is not always transparent. In addition, managers in Chinese 
SOEs do not have sufficient funds for their purchases, but conspire with bureaucrats 
to make deals. Especially when the managers of SOEs who are actually 
governmental officials, MBOs of SOEs are used as a means to ‘turn political power 
into financial capital’.74 MBOs of SOEs thus have become a hotbed for rent-seeking, 
leading China’s economic reform to ‘a market economy under crony capitalism’
(quangui ziben zhuyi This issue has already seized the attention
7£
of many scholars.
71 See ‘SASAC’s Responsibilities & Targets’, People’s Daily, 22 May 2003. In 
<http://english.peopledailv.com.cn/200305/22/eng20030522 117060.shtml>(last visited 11 September 
2008).
72 On this, also see Yusuf, Nabershima, and Perkins, Under New Ownership, 104.
73 In Chinese, MBOs are translated ‘guanliceng shougou'
74 See Kwan Chi Hung, ‘The Huge Debate over Privatization and MBOs— Can the Drain on 
State-Owned Assets Be Jusitified?’, China in Transition, 15 September 2004. In <http: 
www.rieti.go.ip/en/china/04091501 .html> (last visited 28 May 2006).
75 See e.g., Wu Jinglian, ‘The Road Ahead for Capitalism in China’, The McKinsey Quarterly, Special 
Edition (2006): 117-121; Wedeman, From Mao to Market, 2-3.
76 For example, Liang Xianping, Wu Jinglian, Qin Hui, He Qinglian.
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Professor Lang Xianping at the Chinese University of Hong Kong has argued that 
China’s privatisation of SOEs through MBOs has undermined state-owned assets, 
given the lack of a solid legal framework and a transparent mechanism for the 
reconstruction of SOEs. Especially since 2004, Lang has stirred up a hotly debate 
over the nature and direction of privatisation in China, especially between Chinese 
neo-liberalists and the new-left.
Supporters of privatisation base their arguments on the economic analysis of property 
rights,77 which attempts to reconcile private ownership and overall efficiency.78 The 
discourses of property rights in contemporary China have also been largely 
influenced by the writings of Ronald Coase in which ‘transaction costs’ are the key
70to the understanding of economic institutions. Specification and enforcement of
property rights serve to lower transaction costs and make economic development 
more likely. Privatisation is considered an important means to introduce clearly 
defined private property rights that are essential for the most efficient use of 
resources and well-functioning markets.80
Yet supporters of privatisation along the lines of neoliberalism do not capture the 
complexity of China’s economic growth. While transformation of ownership is 
taking place under the slogan of promoting the efficiency of the SOEs, China’s 
economy performance and its relation with clarity of property rights challenge the 
above premises of the economic theory of property rights. For example, China has 
achieved economic growth, whereas ownership and property rights remain vaguely 
defined. Furthermore, the economic analysis of property ignores the diversified
77 See e.g., Harold Demsetz, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’, The American Economic Review 
57, no.2 (1967): 347-359; Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis o f  Law 2ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1977c).
78 See Alan Ryan, Property and Political Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 104, 106.
79 See e.g., R. H. Coase, ‘The Nature o f the Firm’, Economica 4, no. 16 (1937): 386-405; R. H. Coase, 
‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal o f  Law and Economics (Oct. 1960): 1-44. Coase’s thinking is 
not without its critics, for example, Roberts Ellickson’s (1991) study o f Shasta, California ranchers 
points out that Coase adopted the ‘legal centralist’ view. See Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: 
How Neighbors Settle Disputes (London: Harvard University Press, 1991), 4.
80 See Joshua Getzler, ‘Theories o f Property and Economic Development’, in Property Problems from 
Genes to Pension Funds, ed. J. W. Harris (London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 193.
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landscape within the field of ownership in China (for example, cooperative 
companies or firms) .81 Different points of view on the argument that clear definition 
of property rights can bring about a flourishing market also depend on what we mean 
by a market.82 For instance, markets have thrived for centuries in south 
China—Guangdong, Fujian, where a handshake can seal a deal. Moreover, 
although privatisation could bring economic liberalisation and modernisation, it does 
not necessarily go hand in hand with democracy. Efficiency in the economist’s 
sense has nothing to do with social justice.
Sided with Lang, opponents of privatisation argue that state-owned assets have been 
undermined by privatisation. Although these critics have identified the problems with 
the ongoing privatisation in China, the real question at issue may not be whether 
privatisation is a good thing or not, but rather how ‘property rights’ have been 
assigned, which is a wider issue of ‘social justice’. We need to gauge the degree to 
which the government (both the central government and local governments) can 
control resources and decide resource allocation. For example, separation of 
ownership and management is not as simple as the central government had expected. 
In the process of marketisation, the authority of the Party-state and the centralised 
control of Beijing have declined, and the political and economic powers have been 
gradually converted to local governments.
Despite various measures attempting to strengthen macro-control of the central 
government, ‘hidden privatisation’ is undermining absolute state ownership. A casual 
reading may find it contradicting the above argument that SOEs enjoy a superior 
status. We need deep scrutiny, and there are two more points deserving in-depth 
examination. The first one is the nature of private businesses and private 
entrepreneurs. For example, according to a report of the Private Enterprises Study,
81 See Chapter Four.
82 Detailed analysis will be given in Chapter Six.
83 On the discussion o f trust and cooperative relations, also see Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making 
and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
84 See Fukuyama, The End o f  History and the Last Man, 34.
1 4 1
the percentage of private enterprises owners who were also party members rose from 
13.1% in 1993 to 29.9% in 2001.85 In the year 2001, private entrepreneurs were 
allowed to join the Party.86 What does this tell us? The new recruitment policy of the 
Party was only a confirmation of the fact that many private enterprises had been set 
up or controlled by party members.87 The second point is that the so-called ‘absolute’ 
state ownership has become government agencies’ ownership under the slogan of 
‘state ownership’. The central-local relationship therefore deserves in-depth analysis. 
Section 3 focuses on the decentralisation of state power and the shift in the power of 
resource allocation by using fiscal decentralisation as the example for explanation.88
3. The central-local relationship: ‘market-thwarting federalism’89
Viewed in light of both Chinese history and the contemporary Chinese governance 
system, there are often confrontations and interactions between the central 
government and its various agents (local governments in particular). How to evaluate 
the transformation of the central-local relation in the post-1978 era? Like ‘civil 
society’ and ‘corporatism’, federalism has been widely used to characterise the 
changes in the Chinese polity.90 Scholars have described (albeit in different ways) 
the nature of the decentralisation from the central to local governments in 
contemporary China as quasi-federal or simply, federal,91 although the Chinese
85 See Kwan Chi Hung, ‘Privatization o f State-Owned Enterprises Gathering Pace— Whither Chinese 
Socialism’, China in Transition, 26 September 2003. In 
<http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/china/03092601.html> (last visited 28 May 2006).
86 See Jiang Zemin, ‘Jiang Zemin zai Qingzhu Jiandang Bashi Zhounian de Jianghua [Jiang Zemin’s 
Speech at the Eightieth Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party]’, Renmin Ribao [People’s 
Daily], 02 July 2001. In <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizhene/16/20010702/501591 ,html> (last 
visited 20 March 2005).
87 See Kwan Chi Hung, ‘Privatization o f State-Owned Enterprises Gathering Pace— Whither Chinese 
Socialism’.
88 For using the fiscal decentralization as a case study-methodology, see generally Nicholas R. Lardy, 
Economic Growth and Distribution in China (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1978).
89 I borrow this term from Kellee S. Tsai, ‘Off Balance: The Unintended Consequences o f Fiscal 
Federalism in China’, Journal o f  Chinese Political Science 9, no. 2 (2004): 1-26.
90 See Goldstein, ‘China in Transition’: 1127.
91 See e.g., Cao, Qian and Weingast, ‘From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style’; 
Huang Yasheng, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy o f  Central-Local 
Relations During the Reform Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Tsai, ‘Off Balance’: 
4.
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political system is different from ‘constitutional federalism’, and local governments
92in China do not have ‘formal political autonomy vis-a-vis the centre’.
Some scholars in the scholarship studying federalism in China hold that federalism is 
market-preserving, and federalism underpins economic growth in China.93 These 
scholars also use federalism to gauge privatisation undertaken in China. For example, 
they argue that ‘federalism, Chinese style, is a key to the understanding of economic 
and political dynamics underlying privatisation in China... [The Chinese style of 
privatisation] rests on a Chinese style economic and political foundation of 
federalism’.94 However, ‘market-preserving federalism’ does not provide a 
comprehensive account for the origin, motivations, constraints and consequences of 
federalism in the Chinese context. For example, they have not taken much account of 
the broader political framework that is often characterised as ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’:
it was no longer socialist but was not yet capitalist, and instead stood awkwardly 
between the old Maoist command economy and the market. Moreover, China’s 
reformers rejected political reforms. Instead, they implemented a program of 
decentralization that increased the power of local governments but failed to 
institutionalize legal structures that would prevent local officials from selectively 
applying economic regulations.95
Although the pre-1978 economy is generally labelled as ‘central-planning’, the 
presumption that the fiscal system was unitary in the pre-1978 period is an 
oversimplification. Decentralisation in China has some roots dating back to the 
1950s. Unlike the Soviet Union, where the strong vertical administration sidestepped 
local governments and allocated plans directly to enterprises, ‘the Maoist system
92 See Tsai, ‘Off Balance’: 4.
93 See e.g., Qian Yingyi and Barry R. Weingast, ‘China’s Transition to Markets: Market-Preserving 
Federalism, Chinese Style’, Journal o f  Policy Reform 1 (1996): 149-185; Qian Yingyi and Barry R. 
Weingast, ‘Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives’, The Journal o f  Economic 
Perspectives 11, no. 4 (1997): 83-92; Barry R. Weingast, ‘The Economic Role o f Political Institutions: 
Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’, Journal o f  Law, Economics & 
Organization 11, no. 1 (1995): 1-31.
94 Cao, Qian and Weingast, ‘From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style’: 115,
123.
95 Wedeman, From Mao to Market, 5.
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decentralised economic and administrative power to the localities’, and most of the 
reform initiatives were from the ‘bottom up’.96 For example, as Lardy points out, in 
the latter years of the first Five-Year Plan (1953-1958) a Soviet approach to 
economic planning had already been modified in China by the introduction of a 
significant degree of decentralisation in economic planning and management.97 The 
power of provinces was expanded, and a large number of industrial and commercial 
enterprises were transferred to local management.98 Also at that time the efficiency 
of vertical administration was constrained by the variations in China’s geography, 
transportation conditions and communications capacity.99
Despite the fact that decentralisation in the 1950s did not change the whole 
central-planned scheme in the pre-1978 era, this kind of decentralisation introduced a 
certain degree of economic power at the local levels that survived into the 1960s and 
1970s, leaving an imprint on the fiscal decentralisation in the post-1978 era. In the 
early 1980s the embracement of economic development by local officials stemmed 
directly from two institutional changes: one is decollectivisation and the second is 
fiscal decentralisation.100 While the centre has political control over the local 
through the system of party-sanctioned appointments of officials, its fiscal capacity 
has been forced into decline. For instance, state revenues dropped from 36 percent of 
the GDP in 1978 to only 16 percent in 2001.101
Prior to 1978, revenue collection and redistribution were highly centralised: local 
governments handed in most of their revenue to the central government and then the
96 See Jean C. Oi, ‘The Role o f the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy’, The China 
Quarterly, no. 144 (1995): 1134.
97 See Lardy, Economic Growth and Distribution in China, 3-4.
98 See ibid, 33.
99 See ibid, 20.
100 See Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: The Institutional Foundations o f  Economic Reform 
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1999), 14. The Chinese economic transition— from a 
planned economy to a market economy— is built on four pillars o f reform: price reform, industrial 
reform, banking and financial sector reform, and the reform o f public finance. See Donald J. S. Brean, 
Taxation in Modem China (New York: Routledge, 1998), 2.
101 See Tony Saich, Governance and Politics in China 2ed., 155. Also see Tamar Manuelyan Atinc 
and Bert Hofman, ‘China’s Fiscal Deficits, 1986-1995’, in Taxation in Modem China, ed. Donald J. S. 
Brean (New York: Routledge, 1998), 31-42.
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central government reallocated expenditures to local governments from the national 
budget.102 A fiscal reform started in the 1980s, and the old system of ‘eating from 
one big pot’ {chi daguofan was replaced with a revenue-sharing
system—the ‘fiscal contracting system’ (caizheng chengbao zhi 
colloquially referred as ‘eating-in-separate-kitchens’ (fenzao chifan 
As a result of the fiscal reform, revenue was divided into three categories: central 
revenue, local revenue, and shared revenue. The new revenue-sharing system granted 
more control power over expenditures and budgets to local governments, and 
motivated local governments to collect taxes.104 However, during the 1980s, local 
governments created a series of local taxes, fines and fees, meanwhile the revenue of 
the central government was diminishing. As a result, excessive fines and fees 
charged by local governments have imposed great burden on farmers, giving rise to 
farmers’ resistance and lawsuits submitted by farmers against local governments.105
In order to deal with these problems stemming from the revenue sharing system, in 
1994 a tax sharing system (fenshuizhi took the place of the
eating-in-separate-kitchens system, that is, the revenue sharing system, intending to 
increase the revenue of the central government.106 This tax sharing system separated 
national taxes from local taxes, and value added tax was to be shared by the central 
and local governments. For clarifying the responsibility for tax collection, both a 
national tax bureau and local tax bureaux were set up accordingly.107 This reform 
has posed more constraints on local revenue from taxes. Therefore, the incentives of
102 See Tsai, ‘Off Balance’: 6.
103 See ibid. On fiscal reforms, also see e.g., Christine P. W. Wong, Christopher Heady, and Woo Wing 
Thye, Fiscal Management and Economic Reform in the People s Republic o f  China (Oxford; New  
York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
104 See Tsai,‘Off Balance’: 6.
105 See e.g., Thomas P. Bernstein and LU Xiaobo, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary 
Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Kevin O’Brien and Li Lianjiang 
‘Villagers and Popular Resistance in Contemporary China’, Modem China 22, no. 11 (1996): 28-61.
106 See Tsai, ‘Off Balance’: 7. On the 1994 fiscal problem and tax reform also see e.g., Tsang Shu-ki 
and Cheng Yuk-shing, ‘China’s Tax Reforms o f 1994: Breakthrough or Compromise’, Asian Survey 
34, no. 9 (1994): 769-788; Zhang Le-Yin, ‘Chinese Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations, Budgetary 
Decline and the Impact o f the 1994 Fiscal Reform: An Evaluation’, The China Quarterly, no. 157 
(1999): 115-141.
107 See Cao, Qian and Weingast, ‘From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style’:
116.
1 4 5
local governments to privatise local enterprises have been largely driven by the 
financial pressures from harder budget constraints. Privatisation of local enterprises 
can increase revenue of local governments, meanwhile local governments can get rid 
of the burden of supervising SOEs.
Yet the tax reform did not affect the major revenue sources of local governments, 
because the tax reform concerned only the official ‘budgetary’ (yusuannei zijin WM- 
and ‘extra-budgetary’ (yusuanwai zijin accounts.108 Local
governments still have other important revenue sources in the unofficial ‘self-raised’ 
fund (zichou zijin account which is ‘off-budgetary’.109 Extra-budgetary
funds rely on various fees, local surtaxes, and income from fines. Self-raised funds 
are collected by local governments without clear restraints on the measures.110 For 
example, land tax has become the major ‘extra-budgetary fund’ of local governments, 
while income from selling land use rights is one of the most important self-raised 
funds of local governments. Local governments are therefore keen on selling land 
use rights, and the emerging urban property market has given local government more 
such opportunities to collect revenue. In the urban property market, the central-local 
relationship becomes even more complex. The relationship between the tax reform 
and the urban property market will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.
In order to better understand the tax reform, it is necessary to outline briefly the 
monetary and banking systems that are closely linked to the tax system. Local 
branches of the central bank were once under dual supervision—they were 
responsible to both the central bank and the local government of the region where 
they were located.111 The banking system based on regions was restructured in 1999.
108 See ibid: 117.
109 ‘Local off-budget funds -i-increased local expenditures=>Declining central tax ratios’, see Tsai, 
‘OffBalance’: 8.
110 See Andrew Wademan, ‘Budgets, Extra-Budgets, and Small Treasuries: The Utility o f Illegal 
Monies’, Journal o f  Contemporary China 9, no. 25 (2000): 498.
111 See Cao, Qian and Weingast, ‘From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style’:
117. On the close relationship between local governments and bank branches, also see Goldstein, 
‘China in Transition’: 1120. There is ongoing trend that the centre has been recollecting the
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Since then, local bank branches have been supervised only by the central bank. 
Nonetheless, local governments still have the power to exert pressures on state banks 
to extend loans (for example, to SOEs) for considerations of local economic 
performance and social stability.112 SOEs have continuing privileged access to bank
• 113loans, whereas private enterprises have restrained access to bank credit.
The sharp decline in the ratio of government revenue to the gross national product 
(GNP) is an illustration of the unintended consequences of the fiscal and tax reforms: 
the fiscal and financial capacities of the central government have been eroded and 
local protectionism has been stimulated. As Lardy argues, despite the ongoing trend 
of decentralisation, the Chinese search for a model for economic reform has focused 
‘almost exclusively on administrative forms of decentralisation’:114 local leaders 
clearly prefer ‘a decentralisation of administrative powers’ that would enhance their 
power in controlling and mobilising resources rather than ‘a market decentralisation’ 
that would reduce such power.115 As a result of the ‘administrative decentralisation’, 
much administrative decision-making power has been shifted from the central 
government to local government, whereas the scope of market and market activities 
have been limited. Against this background, local governments have de facto 
ownership over state assets.116
In the decentralisation of power from the central government to local governments, 
the previously assumed ‘zero-sum model’ of the relationship between the centre and
administrative power from local governments, for example, in the areas o f administration for industry 
& Commerce, administration o f customs, tax, auditing and so on.
112 See Tsai, ‘OffBalance’: 16.
113 See e.g., Huang, Selling China; Huang Yasheng and Tarun Khanna, Can India Overtake China?’ ; 
Kellee S. Tsai, Back-Alley Banking: Private Enterprises in China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2002).
114 See Lardy, Economic Growth and Distribution in China, 28.
115 See ibid.
116 See e.g., Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China, chapter 2; Huang Yasheng, ‘Web o f  
Interests and Patterns o f Behavior o f Chinese Local Economic Bureaucracies and Enterprises During 
Reforms’, The China Quarterly, no. 123 (1990): 413-458; Andrew G. Walder, ‘Evolving Property 
Rights and Their Political Consequences’, in Chinas Quiet Revolution, ed. David S. Goodman and 
Beverley Hooper (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1994), 3-18.
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117the local is not sufficient anymore. First, local governments have cultivated 
various kinds of strategies to cope with the central government in decentralisation. In 
this sense, rather than stimulating the market, ‘federalism’ has also set up barriers to 
marketisation. For example, local protectionism {difang baohu zhuyi 
has emerged during the reforms involving ‘the illicit and irregular use of 
administrative controls by local governments to interfere with the flow of 
commodities between localities’.118 Huang Yasheng also demonstrates that domestic 
capital mobilising across regions in China is very low.119 Secondly, some scholars 
also remind us of the possible check function of local governments. For example, 
various kinds of reform have conducted across different regions in China. In the 
wake of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the centre could not bring these local 
reforms to a halt and restore the central planning completely, due partly to the
170resistance of local leaders. Thirdly, regional inequality and variations should also
be taken account into examining the transformation of the governance system. In 
Beyond Beijing, Yang Dali argues that in order to understand the dynamics of 
regional change it is necessary to consider the attitudes of inland provinces and 
central government separately and in relation to the coastal regions, rather than only 
through examining the development and behaviour of the coastal regions.
Furthermore, the centre government’s macro-control measures and regulation are in 
fact an attempts to shift powers from local governments {difang zhengfu 
to various industrial ministries and departments {buwei because China’s
bureaucracy is organised in the pattern of the ‘tiao ’ (^c)- 'kuai’ffk )  system.
‘7mo’—vertical branch agencies of the state including industrial ministries or 
departments {bumen nPiH)—rely on higher-level political and budgetary support, 
while ‘kuaV—horizontal agents of local governments {zhengfu S&jfr)—generally
117 See generally, Linda Chelan Li, Centre and Provinces—China 1978-1993: Power as 
Non-Zero-Sum (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
1,8 Wedeman, From Mao to Market, 17.
119 See Huang, Selling China, 66.
120 See Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China, 1-2.
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depend on local resources.121 There are often tensions and disputes the tiao and the 
kuai, which demonstrate the key competitors for the economic decision-making 
power: the tiao and the kuai. For example, in China more than eight buwei signed the 
document of macro-control measures to curb soaring house prices,122 whereas in the 
US there is only the Federal Reserve, which plays the major role in the macro-control
19^of the housing market.
In sum, China’s economic performance is not due to ‘the structural laissez-faire logic 
of market-preserving federalism’, but the local governments’ intervention in 
economy, which is in fact ‘the market-thwarting federalism’.124 Furthermore, 
reassignment of property rights to local jurisdictions has increased the economic 
power of local officials, making them look more like ‘principals’ rather than ‘agents’ 
of public assets as compared to their pervious status.125 As Li Yi-min points out, ‘a 
market-like’ place has emerged, where the power of controlling and mobilising 
resources has shifted from the central government to local governments, and 
state-owned assets are propriated by state agents at different levels for seeking their 
own benefits.126
121 See Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko, ‘The “State o f the State”’, in T he Paradox o f  China s 
Post-Mao Reforms, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFaquhar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 340.
122 On the macro-control o f China’s Housing Prices see ‘China’s New Macro-Control Measures 
Expected to Curb Soaring House Prices’, People’s Daily Online, 22 May 2006. In 
<http://english.peopledailv.com.cn/200605/22/eng20060522 267532.html> (last visited 22 May
2006).
123 See Qiu Feng, ‘Zhongguo Yao Zhemoduo Buwei Canyu Hongguan Tiaokong ma? [Does 
Macro-Control in China Need So Many Industrial Ministries?]’,18 September 2006. In 
<http://business.sohu.com/20060918/n245391437.shtml.> (last visited 16 October 2006). The 
relationship between the dualism o f tiao versus kuai and the urban property market will be explored in 
Chapter Six.
124 See Tsai, ‘Off Balance’, 5.
125 See Jean C. Oi and Andrew G. Walder, eds., Property Rights and Economic Reform in China 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).
126 See Lin Yi-min, Between Politics and Markets: Firms, Competitions and Institutional Change in 
Post-Mao China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6; Lin Yi-min and Zhang Zhanxin, 
‘Backyard Profit Centers: The Private Assets o f Public Agencies’, 203-225.
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4. Conclusion
The emergence and maintenance of state ownership in post-Mao China is based on 
the modernisation and industrialisation program, nation-building, as well as socialist 
ideology. However, the examination of the fragmentation of state ownership in 
reality poses challenges to such unitary theory of ownership in present-day China. 
On the one hand, private property has revived in economic reform especially the 
SOE reform; on the other hand the owner(s) of public assets have become even more 
ambiguous, and this has been demonstrated, for example, in the changing 
central-local relation and the control and allocation of resources by the central 
government and local governments.
Moreover, the nature of ‘privatisation’ in China is ambiguous. Privatisation in China 
has not followed the gradualist model. Since the mid-1990s, the central government 
has strengthened its macro-control of the economy and tightened policies towards 
domestic private enterprises, but significant privatisation has been done through FDI 
and foreign acquisition. As reforms have stalled halfway between the plan and the 
market,127 and more and more ‘rents’ have been produced, such privatisation only 
amounts to ‘hidden privatisation’: the control of public assets has been gradually 
transferred to the persons or privileged groups who hold political power. Political 
power has thus been capitalised, and the capitals are inclined to find their way into 
the hands of those in political power. If capitalism may be said to be emerging in 
China, it might only amount to ‘crony capitalism’ characterised by rent-seeking and 
‘a market economy under crony capitalism’.
The fragmentation of state ownership also challenges the assumption that 
privatisation is the most efficient way to utilise and manage resources. The deep 
problems with SOEs are not due to vague property rights nor inefficient corporate 
governance, but link to unbalanced economic reform and political reform.
127 See e.g., Wedeman, From Mao to Market, 2-3.
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Privatisation should not be just the conversion of public assets to private owners, but 
also needs a transparent procedure. It is worth examining the political and social 
frameworks within which private property might make sense. This point will be 
developed further in Chapter Six on the emerging private ownership in the urban 
property market.
1 5 1
Chapter 6: Emerging Private Ownership in Urban China: the 
Meaning of Private Property in the Property Market
1. Introduction
The revival of private property has triggered disputes between different theoretical 
and political camps in China, especially between Chinese neo-liberalists and the new 
left.1 The emergence of the property market in urban China puts the question of 
China’s future in issue: whether China’s future is transforming towards capitalism. 
For example, although the new left has criticised ‘primitive accumulation’ and the 
ills unleashed by capitalism, what they and the neo-liberalists hold in common is the 
assumption that the revival of private property will lead China to capitalism. 
However, is this assumption correct? Seeking a possible answer to this question 
involves an in-depth analysis of Chinese society. The simple ‘ism’ debate (that is, 
socialism versus capitalism) is futile if it is detached from broader settings of culture, 
society and politics. After examining the revival of private property in both rural 
China and the SOE reform, this chapter looks at the re-emergence of private property 
in another important area—the urban property market in post-Mao China. This 
chapter focuses on the nature of private property from the perspective of the 
emerging property market and the spatial, legal and political transformations 
accompanying it in urban China.
In China there has been a long history of ‘the culture of poverty’,2 and the private (si 
^A) has long been inferior to the public (gong ^ ) .  The advent of socialist rule in 
1949 brought significant changes to the official conception of property. Between 
1956-1978, ‘the private’ was deemed evil and virtually abolished. Since market 
reform commenced in 1978, the private sector has re-emerged, and the status of
1 On Chinese neo-liberalism and the new left see Chapter One, Section 3.
2 ‘The culture o f poverty’ is a term borrowed from Oscar Lewis, Five Families: Mexican Case Studies 
in the Culture o f Poverty (New York: Basic Books, 1975). In pre-1978 China (rural China in 
particular), people lived in poverty and infertile environment, and they struggled for basic food and 
shelter, and lost the ambition for making wealth.
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private property has been gradually recognised by the law.3 For example, the status 
of private property was acknowledged by the Constitution in 2004, and the Property 
Law came into effect in 2007, providing equal protection for public and private 
property. However, the private is still often regarded as a contrast to, or as 
subordinate to, the public.
Urban land, one of the most important state-owned assets, became leaseable and 
transferable in the late 1980s through the mechanism of the land use rights (LUR) 
system, which has separated the ownership and use rights pertaining to urban land.4 
The lease and transfer of LURs have given rise to the emergence of an urban 
property market, which is regarded as one of the most important indications for the 
revival of private property in China.
In parallel with changes to the urban land system, the urban housing sector involves 
many transformations: When the PRC was established in 1949, private ownership 
was not formally abolished immediately; in the cities, people owned real estate. The 
1954 Constitution acknowledged the status of private ownership. However, since the 
‘socialist transformation’ in 1956, private housing had been virtually abandoned 
during the late 1950s and 1970s.5 In the 1980s there was a massive construction of 
public housing and the dominant form was public rental.6 The housing was built on 
allocated state-owned land, and work units {danwei Jp-'tfc)7 or urban Real Estate
3 See Chapter Three.
4 The duration o f an LUR varies from 40 to 70 years, depending on the types of land use. In order to 
acquire LURs, property developers have to develop good relationships with local governments, and so 
more rent-seeking opportunities have been generated.
5 In the late 1980s, state policies permitted the original owners and their heirs to claim partial 
property rights over houses which were once managed by the state, but even today there is not a good 
mechanism for the original owners and their heirs to claim complete property rights.
6 See Huang Youqin, ‘The Road to Homeownership: A Longitudinal Analysis o f Tenure Transition in 
Urban China (1949-1994)’, International Journal o f  Urban and Regional Research 28, no. 4 (2004): 
778.
7 Danwei is a special form o f social organisations. On danwei see e.g., LU Xiaobo and Elizabeth J. 
Perry, eds, Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective 
(Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Shape, 1997c). Danwei is powerful in China. For example, Chinese people 
needed the approval o f danwei for marriage, and danwei is still controlling various aspects o f people’s 
daily life nowadays. There are two major views on danwei, one is the analogy drawn by Lu Feng 
between danwei and traditional Chinese social structure— the clan. Lu argues that the work-unit is a
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Administration Bureaux represented the de facto ‘public’ owners. In the late 1980s, 
based on the LUR system, urban households in China were given the opportunity to 
purchase their flats or houses for the first time.8 In March 1998, Premier Zhu Rongji 
introduced a package of reforms that included terminating housing provision and 
allocation by work units.9 The subsequent direction of the housing reform has been 
to let the individual household purchase the houses, and the private housing market 
has since been flourishing. In 2000, housing began to be commodified in China.10 
As Huang Youqin points out, a class of homeowners began to emerge.11 Yet 
precisely who the owner(s) of urban landed property are remains opaque, because
12
while a LUR system has opened up the use of the state-owned land, the ‘state’ 
maintains its ownership of urban land. Moreover, the extent to which Chinese people 
‘own’ their private property (for example, their apartments) is debatable: although 
urban land has been commodified, it is far from being privatised.
closed system (the buildings o f danwei resemble the expanded closed compounds) led by non-contract 
connections. We could compare Lu Feng’s observation with that o f Andrew Walder’s ‘communist 
neo-traditionalism’, which refers to the special type o f authority represented by danwei. Although they 
are two different points o f view about the authority o f danwei, both o f them identify the working of 
danwei within tradition. See Lu Feng, ‘Danwei: Yizhong Teshu de Shehui Zuzhi Xingshi [the Work 
Unit: A Special Form o f Social Organization]’, Zhongguo Shehui Kexue [Chinese Social Sciences], no.
I (1989): 71-88; Lu Feng, ‘The Work Unit: AUnique Form of Social Organization’, in Streetlife 
China, ed. Micahel Dutton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998 [1989]), 53-58; Andrew G. 
Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in China Industry (Berkeley: University 
o f California Press, 1986c).
8 At that time, there was a need to stimulate the economy, and the real estate market has served as 
such an engine since then.
9 During the course o f the housing reform until 1998, a new kind o f housing (the so-called ‘reform 
housing\fanggaifang  emerged. Public housing had been sold, mostly to sitting tenants at 
discounted prices. Because this housing was built on allocated state-owned land, and LUR transfer 
fees were not paid, buyers just ‘owned’ the houses themselves. When resale becomes necessary, the 
work unit had the right o f first refusal, and the owner must hand back to the land management bureaux 
a proportion o f  the profits made as LUR transfer fees. On this see Wang Ya Ping, ‘Urban Housing 
Reform and Finance in China: A Case Study o f Beijing’, Urban Affairs Review 36, no. 5 (2001): 625. 
According to the new housing policies introduced in 1998, employees should go to the real estate 
market to purchase their housing; work units should not be involved directly in housing construction 
and provision, but could provide housing subsidies for their employees. This new policy was in 
response to the Asian financial crisis, and the government strategy at that time was to expand internal 
consumption. On Zhu Rongji’s reform package see e.g., David Zweig, ‘China’s Stalled ‘Fifth Wave’: 
Zhu Rongji’s Reform Package o f 1998-2000’, Asian Survey 41, no. 2 (2001): 231-247.
10 On housing commodification see e.g., Zhou Min and John R. Logan, “Market Transition and the 
Commodification o f Housing in Urban China’, in The New Chinese City: Globalization and Market 
Reform, ed. John R. Logan, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 137-152.
II Huang Youqin, ‘The Road to Homeownership’: 774.
12 Here the question is who can represent the state.
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The second part of this Chapter discusses the emergence of the rural-urban divide 
and the state housing allocation system. The third part analyses the emergence of the 
property market in urban China and explores the nature of private ownership in 
relation to the complexity of urban governance in post-Mao China. The fourth part 
analyses the reconfiguration of the spatial, social and political spheres in urban China 
from the perspective of the revival of private property.
2. The emergence of the rural-urban divide and the state housing 
allocation system
Urbanisation and the formation of ‘modem’ cities in China from early Republican 
China (1911-1949) on began to smash urban-rural uniformity13 and gave birth to the 
urban-rural divide. The gap between the urban and the rural has become even wider 
in the post-1949 era. The Maoist regime, although it claimed to be pro-village and 
anti-city, ‘was fundamentally urban after all’.14 The regime has been deeply 
alienated from the countryside.15 Industrialisation was the priority in the making of 
the modem state, and transferring agricultural resources to the industrial sector 
accelerated the urban-mral divide. Furthermore, the mobility of rural people to cities 
is controlled by the state through the household registration system (huji zhidu P  H  
rjjiJjflt)-16 The rural-urban divide has given rise to two different land systems—the 
rural land system and the urban land system.
Before 1978, urban land was not a commodity, and was allocated by administrative
17methods. The state could grant land use rights to its agencies, for example, 
governments, SOEs, hospitals, and universities.18 These state agencies were not just
13 On urban-rural uniformity, see Chapter Two, Section 3.5.
14 David Strand, ‘New Chinese Cities’, in Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National 
Identity, 1900-1950, ed. Joseph W. Esherick (Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press, 2000c), 223.
15 See Kate Xiao Zhou, How the Farmers Changed China: Power o f  the People (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 1996), 243-244.
16 See e.g., Cheng Xuan, ‘Problems o f Urbanization under China’s Traditional Economic System’, in 
Chinese Urban Reform: What Model Now? ed. R. Yin-Wang Kwok [et al] (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1990c), 67-68.
17 Land in cities in pre-1949 China was privately owned.
18 See e.g., Hsing You-tien, ‘Land and Territorial Politics in Urban China’, The China Quarterly, no.
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land users, but also held management rights and acted as the de facto owners.19 
Under the PRC between 1949-1978, the local referred to the establishment of the 
‘basic units’ (jiceng danwei One important means of administrative
allocation for urban land was through work units {danwei Until 1999, most of
China’s urban residents lived in state-owned housing built and distributed by their 
public-sector employers,21 that is, work units.
Danwei used their land for building workplaces and providing housing for their 
employees as social welfare and as a constituent of the wage. Danwei such as SOEs 
were keen to acquire more land; land was given to SOEs but often failed to return 
back to the state.22 Moreover, the assumption that housing allocation in Chinese 
society before 1978 was egalitarian is an illusion. Although the criteria for allocating 
houses were not based on economic strata, the standards were based on martial status, 
the length of service, and most importantly, the administrative ranks. Staff with 
higher ranks enjoyed privileges in housing allocation and distribution, although they 
lived in the same danwei compounds as those with lower ranks. Chinese society was 
(and still is) a ‘rank-seeking’ society.23
As analysed in Chapter Five, as partial market reform has stalled between the plan 
and the market, a dual-track reform has emerged since 1985, including the 
‘dual-track system’ of prices (jiage shuanggui zhi During economic
reform, the power of control and mobilise resources that once enjoyed by the central 
government has been decentralised and shifted into localities. Against this backdrop, 
it is not easy to define what the Chinese ‘state’ is and explain how the state works to
187(2006): 579.
19 See ibid: 580.
20 For example, Street offices (jiedao banshichu and residents communities (jumin
weiyuanhui ^  Street offices are the basic level o f government in the city; residents
communities are self-governing organisations o f local residents in the city.
21 Public-sector employers included government agencies, service units (for example, educational and 
cultural institutions), large SOEs, and other social organisations affiliated with the government.
22 See Li Ling Hin, Urban Land Reform in China (London: Macmillan, 1999), 32.
23 See Liu Xiaobo, ‘From Rank-Seeking to Rent-Seeking: Changing Administrative Ethos and 
Corruption in Reform China’, Crime, Law and Social Change 32, no. 4 (1999): 347-370.
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govern China and control localities given the vast landscape of China. It is thus 
necessary to explore the central-local relationship and its impact on property-holding 
in urban China. The dual-track reform and the changing central-local relation have 
shaped the urban property market. The land use rights allocation system and the 
property market that will be discussed in the chapter below are legacies of the partial 
economic reform.
3. The emergence of urban property markets
3.1. The dual-track land use rights allocation system
Urbanisation has speeded up since the late 1980s and Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour 
(nanxun j©  in particular. Rapid urbanisation fuelled the commercial value of 
urban land in the 1990s. This change called for a new mechanism to improve the 
market efficiency of the urban land system while maintaining the doctrine of state 
landownership. It was in response of this challenge that the LUR system emerged.
The LUR system, along with the change in housing provision, has led to the 
formation of urban property markets in China. The LUR system-in emulation of 
‘legacy’ leasehold in Hong Kong—was first developed to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in order to fund the construction of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
such as Shenzhen.24 Urban land was leased to foreign investors so that they could 
access and use the land for a certain period of time.25 The establishment of the LUR 
system also served as an engine to boost economic growth; since the mid-1980s, the
24 Leasing the land in return for cash was the solution to the funding shortage in constructing 
Shenzhen, but leasing publicly-owned land to ‘capitalists’ was regarded as a betrayal of the socialist 
principles. In order to justify the LUR system, cadres and policy makers found a quotation in Lenin’s 
The State and Revolution in which Lenin cited Engels’ The Housing Question (1872): ‘the “working 
people” remain the collective owners of the houses, factories and instruments o f labour, and will 
hardly permit their use, at least during a transitional period, by individuals or associations without 
compensation for the cost. In the same way, the abolition o f property in land is not the abolition of 
ground rent but its transfer, if  in a modified form, to society’. See V. I. Lenin, The State and 
Revolution: The Marxist Theory o f  the State and the Tasks o f  the Proletariat in the Revolution 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1949[1917]), 57.
It is said that at that time every cadre in Shenzhen could recite this quotation. On this see e.g., Wu 
Xiaobo, Jidang sanshinian: zhongguo Qqiye 1978-2008 [Chinese Business 1978-2008, Vol.lJ (Beijing: 
Zhongxin chubanshe, 2008), 52-53.
25 See Ding Chengri, ‘Land Policy in China: Assessment and Prospects’, Land Use Policy 20 (2003): 
112.
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Chinese economy was in need of an engine for growth, and the real property market 
became such a mechanism.26 Although there are some similarities between the LUR 
system and leasehold in the UK or Hong Kong, there are also differences: Chinese 
landownership is not divided into freehold and leasehold; furthermore, in China ‘the 
dual land use rights allocation system’ has led to ‘the dual land property market’ as 
the legacy of the partial market reform. Therefore, the property market is actually a 
policy market and has been largely politicised. This chapter will explain this in detail 
below.
The lease of state-owned lands has been legalised since the promulgation of the 1986 
Land Administration Law. In April 1988 the Constitution was also amended to 
provide that ‘the right of land use can be transferred in accordance with the law’ 
(Clause 4 of Article 10). However, rather than establishing a land use rights system 
based on market principles, a ‘dual-track’ land use rights allocation system was 
introduced to assign LURs in urban areas. A dual-track allocation system means that 
LURs are assigned in two ways: allocation (huabo Jc'Jil) and grants (churang ifjit). 
Allocation is the transfer of LURs to state owned or non-profit users without either 
time limits or LUR transfer fees (tudi chiyongquan churangjin zfci&'fliffi !±1 
grant is the transfer of LURs to commercial users for a fixed period (40 years for 
commercial purpose, 50 years for industrial purpose and 70 years for residential 
purpose) in return for LUR transfer fees. Together allocations and grants constitute 
the ‘primary market’ for LURs. The ‘Provisional Land Regulations’28 were enacted 
by the State Council in May 1990, whereby LURs were separated from ownership 
and became transferable (for example, sale, rental) in the market by tender ([zhaobiao
26 See Wu Fulong and Laurence J. C. Ma, ‘The Chinese City in Transition: Towards Theorizing 
China’s Urban Restructuring’, in Restructuring the Chinese City: Changing Society, Economy and 
Space, ed. Laurence J. C. Ma and Wu Fulong (New York, N. Y.: Routledge, 2005), 267. However, if  
the real property market is the major contributor to the GDP in China, we need to be cautious about 
the high GDP and the potentiality o f Chinese economy.
27 See Samuel P. S. Ho and George C. S. Lin, ‘Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China: 
Policies and Practices’, The China Quarterly, no. 175 (2003): 687.
28 Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan Churang he Zhuanrang Zanxing Tiaoli [The Provisional 
Regulations on the Grant and Transfer o f Use Rights in Urban China], promulgated by the State 
Council on 19 May 1990; implemented on 19 May 1990.
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# 3# ) ,  auction (paimai # 3 ^ ) or negotiation (xieyi LURs can also be
mortgaged. The transfer of LURs has, in effect, created a secondary property market. 
However, in reality, sale by negotiation without a transparent procedure is the most
29popular way of transferring LURs in the secondary property market.
The Urban Real Estate Administration Law of the PRC was promulgated in 1994 
(amended in 2007), for the purpose of administering urban land and real estate in 
China. It confirms the dual land allocation system and the dual property market. 
Article 3 of the Real Estate Law decrees that the state shall adopt a paid transfer of 
LURs system (guoyou tudi youchang shiyong zhidu H W i f f e W r f r J i S )  for 
the use of state-owned land for a limited period, except where LURs are obtained 
through the state land allocation system in accordance with this law. Article 12 
provides that the grants of LURs could adopt tender, auction, and negotiation. Under 
the dual allocation system, the property market is largely controlled by 
administrative power. To explore this issue further, we need to look at the governance 
complexes in China.
3.2. The governance complexes in post-1978 China
3.2.1. Elite dualism30
1In analysing governance of China, the ‘organisational complexes’ in China cannot 
be ignored. In general, ‘organisational complexes’ includes elite dualism, the 
''bianzhV (^ !^sy stem , the system of *tiao’ ( ^ )  and <kuaV (i&), the registration 
(dengji system, and the establishment of Party organs (dangzuzhi in
business associations. These ‘organisational complexes’ are labelled as bearing 
Chinese characteristics and may seem confusing in the eyes of Western readers. It is 
worth noting that these are not separate aspects but form a complex web of
29 See e.g., Ding Chengri and Gerrit Knaap, ‘Urban Land Policy Reform in China’s Transitional 
Economy’, in Ding Chengri and Song Yan, eds., Emerging Land and Housing Markets in China 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Lincoln Institute o f Land Policy, 2005), 22; Li Ling-Hin, Urban Land Reform in 
China, 26.
30 See Zang Xiaowei, Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China (New York, London: 
Routledge Curzon, 2003).
31 I borrowed the term ‘organizational complex’ from Kenneth W. Foster, ‘Embedded within State 
Agencies: Business Associations in Yantai’, The China Journal, no. 47 (2002): 41.
1 5 9
governance. This section focuses on the tiao-kuai system, and briefly analyses elite 
dualism and the bianzhi system.
Elite dualism refers to the undifferentiated Party-state. Although some scholars 
observe that the leadership transition in the reform has seen some aspects of 
functional differentiation between the Party and the government,33 in Chinese reality, 
it is not easy to draw a sharp line between the Party and the government because of 
their overlapping structure under the one-party rule. For example, party secretaries 
are the top honchos in universities, and party secretaries of provinces keep an eye on 
governors.34
3.2.2. The ‘bianzhi9 system
The analysis of the organisational complexes cannot be detached from the bianzhi 
system, which refers to organisation establishment and staffing: each organisation is 
allocated a certain personnel quota and relevant official posts.35 There are two major 
types of the bianzhi—the administrative bianzhi (xingzheng bianzhi and
the ‘public service units’ bianzhi (shiye danwei bianzhi rfrj). The
‘administrative unit’ (xingzheng danwei I f  holds an administrative bianzhi.
Civil servants (gongwuyuan who work in administrative units have the
administrative bianzhi accordingly, their salary is from the fiscal appropriation 
(caizheng bokuan by the state.
3.2.3. The tiao-kuai system
The tiao-kuai system is an important aspect, because the complexity of the primary 
property market is due largely to this system. This system combines the vertical 
administrative line (tiaotiao of government bureaus or ministries with the
32 The registration system will be discussed in Chapter Seven, Section 6.
33 See e.g., Zang, Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China, 11.
34 Thanks for Professor Tim Murphy to raise this point. Also see W. T. Murphy, ‘China’s Laws and 
Flaws’, The Modem Law Review 70, no. 6 (2007): 1008-1022.
35 On the bianzhi system, also see Foster, ‘Embedded within State Agencies: Business Association in 
Yantai’, 45-48.
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horizontal line (kuaikuai that is, local governments.36 The tiao-kuai system is
an important aspect to examine the central-local relation. In the tiao-kuai system, 
state agencies are often subject to ‘dual subordination’, which means that a state 
agency may be controlled by both a higher-level agency and a local government at 
the same administrative level.37 The extent of an agency’s subordination to either the 
tiao or the kuai depends on its sources of budget and personnel appointment of ‘the 
first person in command’ (yibashou —JE^-, for example, chairman, director). For 
instance, taxation bureaux and industrial and commercial administration bureaus are 
subordinate to their vertical higher levels, because their higher levels control their 
budget and personnel appointment. Another important example is that although the 
revised 1998 LAL was designed to centralise power in the State Council to enable 
better management of land, ‘real’ power is dispersed between different levels of
o o
government and mobilised in the dynamics of their interactions. For example, at 
the national level, the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Land and 
Resources39 under the State Council may coordinate with each other in regulating 
the property market.40 At provincial and local levels, however, real estate and land 
management departments are directly responsible to provincial or local 
governments.41 The central Ministries do not have direct control over these local 
departments, but just provide working guidance. There are often tensions and 
conflicts between the tiao and the kuai, which reflect the conflicts between the
36 See Carolyn Cartier, ‘Scale Relations and China’s Spatial Administrative Hierarchy’, in 
Restructuring the Chinese City: Changing Society, Economy and Space, ed. Laurence J. C. Ma and 
Wu Fulong (New York, N. Y.: Routledge, 2005), 26.
37 See ibid.
38 For example, Article 6 o f the Real Estate Law defines the functions and powers of government 
departments at various levels. See Li, Urban Land Reform in China, 32.
39 Now five new ‘super ministries’ have been established, including the conversion of the Ministry of 
Construction into the Ministry o f Housing and Urban-Rural Construction. See ‘China to set up five 
new “super ministries’” , in
<http://www.chinadailv.com.cn/china/2008npc/2008-03/ll/content 6526802.htm> (last visited 11 
March 2008).
40 For example, they made regulations to cool down the property market, and to warned the risk of  
purchasing ‘minor property right apartments’. There are also function overlaps and conflicts between 
these ministries.
41 See Li, Urban Land Reform in China, 32.
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central and the local, zhengfu (local governments) and bumen (departments or 
ministries).42
The administrative hierarchy at the local level in China is also complicated. Local 
governments could refer to provincial, city or county governments. This complexity 
even exists at the city-level per se. The ‘city’ in China could mean a directly 
administered municipality (zhixiashi Jl^T|T) of China, for example, Beijing; a 
prefecture-level city (dijishi J&ISTtJ), for example, Zhengzhou (in Henan); or a 
county-level city (xianjishi J l lS ’rtj), for example, Xinmi (in Zhengzhou). This links 
to expanding urbanisation, which is mainly through three measures in the process of 
economic reform—turning prefectures into cities (di gai shi itili&itf) carried out 
mainly in the 1980s; replacing counties with cities {xian gai shi H-SfcTjT) 
implemented during the early and mid-1990s; and transforming cities and counties 
into urban districts (xian shi gai qu t&I*) throughout economic reform 43
These changes in the ‘administrative zoning’ (xingzheng quhua are at
odd with the three-tier system—provinces, counties and townships—stipulated in 
Article 30 of the Constitution. These changes also reflect the complex relationship 
between the central and the local, for example, their competition for the power of 
policy-making and resource (for example, land) control. For instance, while ‘turning 
prefectures into cities’ was promoted by Beijing, ‘turning counties into cities’ was 
propelled by local governments rather than by the central government44
The complexity of governance gives rise to the conflicts between the central 
government in Beijing and local governments in the provinces and below.45 One of
42 On the tiao-kuai system, and the disputes between the central and the local, see e.g., Jonathan 
Unger, ‘The Struggle to Dictate China’s Administration: The Conflicts o f Branches vs. Areas vs. 
Reform’, Australian Journal o f  Chinese Affairs, no. 18 (1987): 15-45; Richard Baum and Alexei 
Shevchenko, ‘The “State o f the State’”, in The Paradox o f  China s Post-Mao Reforms, ed. Merle 
Goldman and Roderick MacFaquhar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 340-342.
43 See Chung Jae Ho and Lam Tao-chiu, ‘China’s “City System” in Flux: Explaining Post-Mao 
Administrative Changes’, The China Quarterly, no. 180 (2004): 945-964.
44 See ibid: 955.
45 The central government regularly rotates the officials between provinces; the Party secretaries o f 
Beijing and Shanghai have traditionally been members o f the Politburo; before taking positions as
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the most important reasons for the tensions between central and local governments is 
competition for financial resources. A tax sharing system (fenshuizhi was
adopted in 1994 in attempts to enhance the revenue of the centre and increase the 
transparency of tax revenues (at least to Beijing).46 As a result, central government 
grants to cities for urban infrastructure have been significantly reduced, local 
governments need more financial resources to administer the city and finance urban 
construction, and so they are reluctant to share land revenue with the central 
government47
Land has become an important source of revenue and the main vehicle for local 
governments to compete and bargain with the central government in the fiscal and 
administrative decentralisation.48 There are many sources of revenue that can be 
extracted from land, for example, tax. Land-use taxation developed in parallel with 
the LUR system. The State Council passed the ‘Provisional Act of Land-Use Tax on 
State Owned Urban Land’49 in 1988. In 1993, the State Council passed the 
‘Provisional Act of Land Value-added Tax on State-Owned Land’.50 Both users and 
transferors of LURs should be taxpayers.51 However, as value-added tax is one of 
the shared taxes between the central and local governments, in order to collect more 
tax revenue, local officials have a range of implements in the name of modernisation,
provincial governors, many officials have worked extensively in central ministries. See generally 
Huang Yasheng, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy o f  Central Local 
Relations During the Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Provincial 
officials’ career achievements are assessed by statistics; as a result, ‘statistics make officials, and 
officials make statistics (shuzi chuguan guanchu shuzi T, There are
central-local conflicts within provinces as well.
46 See Chapter Five, Section 3.
47 See Xie Qingshu, A. R. Chanbari Parsa, and Barry Redding, ‘The Emergence o f the Urban Land 
Market in China: Evolution, Structure, Constraints and Perspectives’, Urban Studies 39, no. 8 (2002): 
1392.
48 See Hsing, ‘Land and Territorial Politics in Urban China’: 576.
49 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengzhen Tudi Shiyongshui Zanxing Tiaoli, T1 ^ A  H ^
promulgated by the State Council on 27 September 1988, implemented on 1 
November 1988; revised version was promulgated by the State Council on 30 December 2006, 
implemented on 01 January 2007.
50 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Zengzhishui Zanxing Tiaoli
'fX^ #!l, promulgated by the State Council on 13 December 1993; implemented on 01 January 1994.
51 See Ding, ‘Land Policy in China: Assessment and Prospects’, 113-114.
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for example, seizure of farmland and extension of infrastructure in urban expansion, 
which led to the property market boom.
There are more important sources of revenue that could be extracted from land, 
which, under the current system, local governments do not have to share with the 
central government. This is because of the existence of ‘extra-budgetary’ revenue 
(yusuanwai zijin for example, local taxes and land use rights transfer
fees.52 In addition, the income from selling LURs is the major source of 
off-budgetary or self-raised revenue (zichou zijin for local governments.
Such income from selling LURs has increased rapidly along with the property booms 
of the 1990s and 2000s.
Apart from the conflicts between central-local governments, there are also conflicts 
between government departments in land administration. Although the State Council 
attempts to define the functions of different departments, multiple government 
departments have been involved in land administration and their functions are 
overlapping and conflicting.53 For example, the macro-control measures of the 
Ministry of Construction (MC) attempted to tight tax, loan, and land regulations, to 
control market demand and to increase supply of LURs, however, the MC does not 
have power over regulating banks, finance, and land, let alone tax. If the regulators 
clash with each other, how could we expect effective regulation? Now five new 
‘super ministries’ are to be set up, including the conversion of the MC to the Ministry 
of Housing and Urban-Rural Construction.54 Although this change is an attempt to 
reduce the overlaps between different government department functions, it is still
52 See e.g., Ho and Lin, ‘Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China’; Hsing You-tien, 
‘Brokering Power and Property in China’s Townships’, The Pacific Review 19, no.l (2006): 108.
53 See e.g., Xie, Parsa, and Redding, ‘The Emergence o f the Urban Land Market in China’,
1394-1395. The Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) administers both urban and rural land. The 
Ministry o f Construction (MC) is in charge o f urban construction and real estate administration. 
However, there is still an overlap o f the functions between the two ministries. In addition, the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (S AS AC) has also got involved in 
urban land management. On SASAC, see Chapter Five, Section 2.2.
54 See ‘China to set up five new “super ministries’” , In
<http://www.chinadailv.com.cn/china/2008npc/2008-03/ll/content 6526802.htm.> (last visited 11 
March 2008).
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hard to clarify the responsibility of each ministry and reduce redundancy in the 
governmental structure.
3.3. The black market
Since the beginning of economic reform, there have been three periods of ‘enclosure 
movement’ in China, which happened in the late 1980s, 1992, and 2003.55 Unlike 
the English enclosure movement, which was the process of fencing off common land 
and turning it into private property,56 enclosure movements in China are usually 
conducted on the outskirts of cities, which are not common field. The land was 
enclosed but not fully developed, leaving numerous half-finished buildings 
colloquially referred as ‘rotten-tail buildings\lanwei lou and a huge amount
of non-performing loans to the banking system, because local governments offer land 
as collateral for bank loans. The real estate boom has resulted in the economic bubble 
and corruption, for example, the scandal in Shanghai about the misappropriation of a 
1.2 billion social security fund for real estate development.57 Many officials 
involved have been tried in court, and the former Party chief in Shanghai has been 
convicted.58
The black market is emerging from the dual-track land use rights allocation system, 
and the great gap of the prices of LURs between the primary and secondary property 
market.59 As analysed above, when the LUR system was introduced, it was hoped
55 See the discussion on the enclosure movement in the 1990s in e.g., He Qinglian, Xiandaihua de 
Xianjing: Dangdai Zhongguo de Jingji Shehui Wenti [Pitfalls o f  Modernization: Socioeconomic 
Problems in Contemporary China] (Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1998), 49-77.
56 See the discussion on enclosure movement in the West, see e.g., James Boyle, ‘The Second 
Enclosure Movement and the Construction o f the Public Domain’, Law and Contemporary Problems 
66 (2003): 33-74.
57 See Hu Renfeng [et al], ‘Shanghai Pension Fund: A Story o f Risk’, Caijing Magazine, 21 August
2006. In <http://www.chinaelections.net/newsinfo.asp?newsid=80> (last visited 5 September 2008).
58 See ‘Ex-Shanghai Boss Jailed for Graft’, BBC News, 11 April 2008. In 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/7342062.stmX4ast visited 1 May 2008).
59 Given the dual land allocation system and dual property market, it is difficult to define what the 
legal or illegal property market is. The same situation also applies to the rural area as discussed in 
Chapter Four. For example, the emergence o f the ‘minor property rights’ or ‘township property rights’ 
does not have a legal basis, but is emerging fast. Especially under the compulsory requisition o f LURs 
o f rural land, which is stipulated in Article 44 o f the Property Law, the boundaries between 
legal/illegal property markets have been blurred. The blurring boundaries between the legal and illegal 
property markets are also manifested in land disputes and conflicts that will be examined further in
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that value of land would be reflected properly through the market. However, a high 
proportion of land allocation is still carried out on an administrative basis,60 and only 
a small portion of land is leased by the state to the users through paid transfer of use 
rights.61 This means that local governments actually monopolise the supply of 
LURs.62 The LAL (1998) attempts to remove authority that could approve land 
requisition from local governments below provincial level. However, local 
governments often exceed their authority to approval land use.63 Numerous public 
and private brokers with links with state agencies that have the power to allocate and 
manage land have arisen to pursue rents generated from the gap which exists 
between the dual level property markets.
In the black market, hidden LURs transactions mainly take four forms:
1. Land-use rights are indirectly transferred through the sale and purchase of buildings 
on it; 2. land-use rights are used as a share of investment in joint ventures; 3. land use 
rights are used as security for borrowing; 4. land-use rights are used to pay debts. Most 
such transactions involve the SOEs which have access to administrative allocation of 
land-use rights.64
The black market is also manifested in the role of the ‘private’ property developers. 
Although there has been a rapid development of private property developers,65 the 
question of private property developers is how ‘private’ they are. Commodification 
of the public housing provision system has been one of the most important aspects of 
economic reform, however is it the same as privatisation? The liberal assumption of
Chapter Seven.
60 For example, Huabo Tudi Shiyongquan Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations on 
Administratively-Allocated Land use Rights], promulgated by the State Land Administration Bureaux 
on 8 March 1992; implemented on 8 March 1992.
61 See Anthony Gar-On Yeh, ‘The Dual Land Market and Urban Development in China’, in Ding 
Chengri and Song Yan, eds., Emerging Land and Housing Markets in China, 40.
62 See Anthony Gar-On Yeh, ‘Dual Land Market and Internal Spatial Structure o f Chinese Cities’, in 
Restructuring the Chinese City: Changing Society, Economy and Space, eds. Laurence J. C. Ma and 
Wu Fulong (New York, N. Y.: Routledge, 2005), 60.
63 See Xie, Parsa, and Redding, ‘The Emergence o f the Urban Land Market in China’, 1392.
64 See Zhang Xing Quan, ‘Urban Land Reform in China’, Land Use Policy 14, no. 3 (1997): 196.
65 There are three kinds o f property developers in today’s China: state enterprises, private companies 
and foreign companies (there have been more restrictions on foreign property developing companies 
since 2006). See Richard Walker and Daniel Buck, ‘The Chinese Road: Cities in the Transition to 
Capitalism’, New Left Review, no. 46 (2007): 48.
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the distinction between public and private cannot be easily transposed to the Chinese 
context. Gong (public) and si (private), state and market, are intertwined in the 
context of the complexity of governance of China. The party-state defines, regulates 
and directly participates in the market.66
The nature of private developers is even more ambiguous given their embeddedness 
in the Party-state. The development of the private sector has led the Party to link 
itself to the private sector for its strategies of governance. One strategy is to co-opt 
the individual ‘red capitalists’, who demonstrate ‘entrepreneurial skills and business
fn
success’ and exert more impact on the CPC. Co-opting private entrepreneurs has
so
affected the party’s recruitment policies, its institutional links, and its ability to 
monitor and control society.69 For example, private entrepreneurs are keen on 
joining the People’s Congress and People’s Political Consultative Conference, and 
now are also enjoying greater access to political power. Many private owners become 
party members. According to a set of statistics released by the Organisation 
Department of the CPC Central Committee, at the end of 2006, ‘more than 2.86 
million party members work in privately owned enterprises, including 810,000 
running their own business’.70 Moreover, it is becoming increasingly common for 
party or governmental officials to set up private businesses by various informal 
means.71 Such combination of political power and capital has generated more 
rent-seeking opportunities for officials. This is one of the reasons why some people 
are hostile to ‘private property’ and hold a negative view toward private property.
66 See e.g., He Shenjing and Wu Fulong, ‘Property-Led Redevelopment in Post Reform China: A 
Case Study o f Xintiandi Redevelopment Project in Shanghai’, Journal o f  Urban Affairs27, no. 1 
(2005): 1-23; On ‘a government for capital’, see Walker and Buck, ‘The Chinese Road’, 61.
67 See Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Chinese Communist Party, Private 
Entrepreneurs, and Political Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 4-5.
68 The membership o f the CPC was extended to private entrepreneurs in 2001; and in the 16th 
National Congress o f the CPC in 2002 private entrepreneurs and individual entrepreneurs were 
labelled for the first time as ‘Builders of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ (you zhongguo tese 
shehui zhuyijianshe zhe W T1 ).
69 See the political influence o f  red capitalists and business associations in Dickson, Red Capitalists 
in China, 56-85.
70 See Li Qian, ‘Entrepreneurs with a Charitable Heart’, China Daily, 9 August 2007. In 
<http://chinadailv.com.cn/china/2007-08/09/content 6019716.htm.> (last visited 13 August 2007).
71 See Gordon White, Jude Howell, and Shang Xiaoyuan, In Search o f  Civil Society: Market Reform 
and Social Change in Contemporary China (New York: Clarendon Press, 1996), 199.
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Private property is thought attached to the ‘original sin’ of private entrepreneurs and 
is a way to legalise their illegal or grey income.
Land-related corruption or rent-seeking cases usually happen at the local level, and
72are associated with, for example, land approval and bidding processes. In order to 
eradicate local governments’ income from the real estate market and the transfer of 
LURs, the central government has made many efforts. For example, the central 
government has targeted on value added tax, one source of local government revenue 
that could be extracted from land. The National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) suggests that, instead of local governments, the central 
government should collect the value added tax.73 Targeting the issue that local 
governments do not keep clear records of how the land use rights transfer fees are 
collected and used, the National Audit Office (NAO) has started auditing the 
collection and use of these fees in 10 cities in order to better regulate them.74
Apart from the above measures, another target is the banking system. Aiming at local 
governments and local lenders, the central bank also warned in a report that 
excessive investment in real estate market and the high concentration of long-term 
loans have increased the risks of loans turning bad. The central government calls for 
cooling down over-investment and tightening credit policy. However, given the 
investment-driven economy and the fact that economic performance is still the main 
mechanism to assess local officials and decide their political future, it is unclear 
whether these efforts can achieve their goals. Some risks have already emerged. For 
example, in May 2008, Shenzhen saw the plummeting house prices from the peak in
72 See e.g., Ho and Lin, ‘Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China’ ; Walker and Buck, ‘The 
Chinese Road’.
73 See Rong Xiandong, ‘NDRC Suggest Removing Sales o f Pre-Owned houses’, China Daily, 24 July
2007. In <http://www.chinadailv.com.cn/bizchina/2007-07/24/content 6001828.htm> (last visited 06 
September 2008).
74 See Li Fangchao, ‘National Auditor Checking into Land Transfer Fees’, China Daily, 11 July 2007. 
In <http://www.chinadailv.com.en/china/2007-07/l 1/content 5432232.htm >(last visited 06 
September 2008).
75 See ‘Smaller Banks Warned o f Bad Loans’, South China Morning Post, 02 August 2007. 
<http://www.chinadailv.com.cn/bizchina/2007-08/02/content 6009738.htm> (last visited 06 
September 2008).
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2007. Considering the fact that most people finance their house purchase in China 
through banks, mortgage risks are growing.76
4. Spatial, social and political transformations
4.1. Spatial transformation
The revival of private property in the urban area has given rise to spatial, social and 
political changes in post-Mao China. This section focuses on the exclusive function 
of private ownership manifested in the spatial transformation. The spatial sphere of 
urban China is rapidly being reconfigured by the private ownership of housing, and 
‘new forms of social inclusion and exclusion’ are being produced by the expanding 
private ownership.77 The city is being reconstructed through diverse processes and 
new spatiality is reflected in different forms such as the ‘globalised’ space (for 
example, the 2008 Olympic Games Village in Beijing); the space for the elite and the 
upper social strata (for example, the gated residential compounds for rich and middle 
strata families, shopping malls full of luxuries); the marginalised space (for example, 
the migrant enclaves, or ‘the village within the city’); the space organised by 
tongxiang (f^]^ the same origin) relationships and kinship extended from the rural 
area (for example, Zhejiang Village in Beijing, Henan Village in Shenzhen).78 
However, public space in the urban area is increasingly limited by these processes of 
quasi-privatisation.
Among the aspects mentioned above, it is worth studying the emergence of 
chengzhong cun (i$c ^  ^  village within the city),79 usually symbolised with the
76 Hu Yuanyuan, ‘Shenzhen Home Buyers Bugged by Mortgage Dilemma’, China Daily, 4 August
2008. In <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-08/04/content_6900309.htm > (last visited 6 
September 2008).
77 Zhang Li, ‘Spatiality and Urban Citizenship in Late Socialist China’, Popular Culture 14, no. 2 
(2002): 329.
78 See Laurence J. C. Ma and Wu Fulong, ‘Restructuring the Chinese City: Diverse Processes and 
Reconstituted Spaces’, in Restructuring the Chinese City: Changing Society, Economy and Space, ed. 
Laurence J. C. Ma and Wu Fulong (New York, N. Y.: Routledge, 2005), 7.
79 On chengzhou cun, see e.g., Zhang Li, China s Limited Urbanization: Under Socialism and Beyond 
(New York, N. Y.: Nova Science, 2004); Zhang Li, ‘Migrant Enclaves and Impacts o f Redevelopment 
Policy in Chinese Cities’, in Restructuring the Chinese City: Changing Society, Economy and Space 
ed. Laurence J. C. Ma and Wu Fulong (New York, N. Y.: Routledge, 2005), 243-259; Zhang,
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images such as poverty, crimes, and chaos. Chengzhong cun are generally located in 
suburban areas that have been increasingly swallowed up by the rapid urbanisation 
process.80 ‘Village within the city’ is more than a semi-undifferentiated urban/rural 
space: the land in the suburb is mainly for rental, that is, renting their houses or 
rooms by local people for rural migrants. It is also hard to define the identities of the 
owners of houses and flats in the village within the city: they live in the city, but are 
called ‘villagers’; they do not farm, but rely on rents. Although there is ongoing 
reconstruction of ‘villages within the city’, which means that the property owners can 
obtain urban household, few measures have done to improve the situation of rural 
migrants living as tenants in these ‘villages’. The situation of these rural migrants has 
not been much changed. Rural migrant workers that usually live in chengzhong cun 
are still administratively included in the category of the rural population. They 
receive no financial support from the state for their housing needs, and they could not
o 1
afford the property prices that far outweigh their income.
4.2. Social transformation
Chinese culture is now preoccupied with wealth and ‘getting rich’.82 For example, 
even the Shaolin Temple (a famous Buddhist temple in Henan Province) has set up a 
commercial company, where the abbot of the temple is also chairman of the board. 
Economic reform since 1978 enables Chinese families to accumulate more wealth 
compared with the pre-reform era, and, since the 1990s, consumerism has arisen and 
accumulation of wealth has been highlighted. Chinese people now could say
‘Spatiality and Urban Citizenship in Late Socialist China’.
80 New style suburbs along US or UK lines are also emerging, but suburbs in this context o f ‘village 
within the city’ are different.
81 According to Economy Daily, 2 January 2002, the ratio between housing price and annual personal 
income in Beijing is 31:1, Shanghai 20:1, Guangzhou 21:1, Shenzhen 18:1, Chengdu 12:1, National 
average 22:1, cited in Zhang, ‘Migrant Enclaves and Impacts o f Redevelopment Policy in Chinese 
Cities’, 247.
82 See Kerry Brown, Struggling Giant: China in the 21st Century (London: Anthem Press, 2007), 85.
83 Between 1978 and 1985, both rural income and rural consumption increased rapidly. The increase 
of urban income and consumption slowed down through the 1980s; in the 1990s, rural rises slowed, 
whereas urban rises speeded up. See Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, ‘China’s Consumer 
Revolution: the 1990s and Beyond’, Journal o f  Contemporary China 7, no. 18 (1998): 353-354;
Kevin Latham, ‘Introduction: Consumption and Cultural Change in Contemporary China’, in 
Consuming China: Approaches to Cultural Change in Contemporary China, ed. Kevin Latham, Stuart 
Thompson, and Jakob Klein (London: Routledge, 2006), 1.
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farewell to the period during the 1950s-1970s in which people only have three large 
pieces o f private property: bicycle, watch and sewing machine, luxuries at that time. 
Consumerism has prevailed in Chinese cities, people’s self-perceptions, as well as 
‘social interactions in ways similar to [...] the “mailing” of Hong Kong in the 1960s 
and 1970s’.84 Nowadays, shopping malls are filled with luxuries such as Armani, 
Louis Vuitton, and Dior (Small commodity markets and some wholesale markets are 
filled with fakes of these luxuries). However, it is unclear what is happening in these 
luxurious shops, how many luxuries have been consumed, and who are the 
consumers?
Furthermore, to what extent does consumerism reflect the wealth of ordinary people? 
Far from being a credit economy, China’s economy is still a saving economy and the 
expenses of education, housing, and medical care are increasing. Ordinary people 
tend to save rather than consume. This situation also demonstrates the defect in the 
process of China’s privatisation in which social security has been largely ignored.
The state has got rid of the burden of social welfare provision, but the empty space it 
leaves behind has not been filled properly. In fact, the Chinese government is trying 
to stimulate consumption through a number of schemes, including facilitating access
Of
to bank loans. Yet it is doubtful whether these government’s efforts have achieved 
their goals. For example, it is hard for low-income people to get access to bank loans
Of
from state-owned banks, and they begin to turn for help to private banks. These 
small, private banks are developing fast in Zhejiang province, and are regarded as the 
equivalent to the Grameen bank—‘the banks for the poor’. The focus of these banks
84 See Latham, ‘Introduction: Consumption and Cultural Change in Contemporary China’, 2; Lui 
Tai-lok, ‘The Mailing o f Hong Kong’, in Consuming Hong Kong, ed. Gordon Mathews and Lui 
Tai-lok (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001).
85 See Latham, ‘Introduction: Consumption and Cultural Change in Contemporary China’, 8.
86 These banks are also named as private-owned banks or private-governed banks. For example, 
Zhejiang Tailong Commercial bank is a small Chinese commercial bank in Zhejiang. The bank began 
as a credit union with the original name Taizhou city Tailong urban credit union. In 2006, it was 
upgraded to commercial bank named as Zhejiang Tailong Commercial bank. The link to Zhejiang 
Tailong Commercial bank homepage is: http://www.tlxvs.com/ (last visited 30 April 2007). Also see 
‘Round o f Private Banks Begins’, People’s Daily, 12 November 2000. In
<http://english.people.com.cn/english/200011/12/eng20001112 54928.html.> (last visited 30 April
2007).
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is on the small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Their clients include peasants 
whose land was confiscated and had to do business as well as laid-offs of the SOEs.
It is difficult to generalise the level of wealth the Chinese people hold, because:
There are the top 100 million, who are the real winners of the reform process over the 
last three decades. There are the second level wealthy and the 200 million who are 
doing OK, but have aspirations for something better. Then there are the vast numbers of 
the rural and urban poor -  people who in some areas earn far less than the UN 
designated one dollar a day to quality for absolute poverty.87
Apart from the difficulty in generalising gains and losses of different strata in China, 
the rise of consumerism has also given risen to a paradox -  since market reform and 
‘opening-up’ in 1978, socialism and market, once imagined by Mao as severe 
contradictions, has been fused together (labelled as Socialism with Chinese 
characteristics).88 The boundaries between public property and private property have 
also been fuzzy.
The division between persons and things is also blurred. Economic reform and 
consumerism in China have transformed the relationship between persons and things,
OQ
and have produced new identities and new socio-economic relationships. Social 
relationships (guanxi are being commodified. Hence it is argued that there are 
now three economies in China -  ‘state redistribution, the commodity, and the gift 
economies’.90 ‘Everything and everyone has their price. Souls are nothing more than 
the basic stock, up one day, down the other -  commodified, packaged, abandoned 
and bought’.91 Social Darwinism also pervades, people compete for wealth 
according to the principle of ‘the survival of the fittest’.
87 Brown, Struggling Giant, 17.
88 Also see ibid, 26.
89 See Elisabeth J. Croll, ‘Conguring Goods, Identities, and Culture’, in Consuming China: 
Approaches to Cultural Change in Contemporary China, ed. Kevin Latham, Stuart Thompson, and 
Jakob Klein (London: Routledge, 2006), 22.
90 See Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art o f  Social Relationships in China 
(Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), 178.
91 Brown, Struggling Giant, 55.
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Mobility from the lower social strata to the upper social strata is becoming more 
difficult. The in-depth reason rests upon ‘the anomie in the social structure’ and 
‘structure strain’ that first put forward by American sociologist Robert Merton. 
Merton used ‘structure strain’ to illustrate what kind of social structure would under 
what conditions produce social problems.92 Some Chinese scholars have applied 
Merton’s theory and characterised the social structure in China since the mid-1990s 
as an ‘Inverted T-shaped social structure’ (dingzixing shehui jiegou 
$J).93 This structure manifests the social polarisation, that is, the enlarging gap 
between the rich and the poor, the increasing concentration of wealth into small 
groups of people, and the small proportion of the middle stratum94 of society. In 
China, the Gini Coefficient of the per capita income had reached a level of no less 
than 0.5 in 2003, with a tendency to go up further.95 It is also worth emphasising that 
‘while the 2003 GDP of China amounted only to US$1,400 billion, the total wealth 
of these rich people exceeded US $ 969 billion’.96 These statistics or surveys 
indicate that wealth has been monopolised by groups of privileged people.
‘Inverted T-shaped social structure’ is a barrier to the upward mobility in society. If 
we compare the social mobility during the 1980s with that in the late 1990s and since 
the turn of the century, we can see that comparatively the poor had more chances to 
get rich in the 1980s, but these opportunities were significantly reduced in the late
Q7
1990s and onwards. As the opportunities of upward mobility have dropped for the 
lower social groups, room of the middle stratum is limited and it only constitutes a 
small proportion of society.98 Furthermore, property has been equated with wealth.99
92 See Robert K. Merton, ‘Social Structure and Anomie’, American Sociological Review 3, no. 5 
(1938):672-682.
93 For example, Li Qiang, ‘ “Dingzixing” Shehui Jiegou yu Shehui Jinzhang [“Inverted T-Shaped” 
Social Structure and Social Strain’, Shehui Keixue [Social Sciences], no. 2 (2005): 55-73.
94 I would use stratum rather than class, because ‘the middle class’ does not have a fixed definition in 
the context of post-Mao China, even in the US or the UK.
95 See Liang Qing, ‘New Trends in the Changes in Social Stratification in Today’s China’, Zhongguo 
Shehui Kexue [Social Sciences in China] 4 (2005): 124.
96 ibid, 125.
97 See ibid, 128-129.
98 According to a research on social strata in contemporary China, more than 80% common people 
are the lower middle stratum and low stratum, and only 12% people are the middle stratum. See Yang 
Jisheng, Zhongguo Dangdai Ge Jieceng Fenxi [An Analysis o f  the Social Strata in Contemporary
1 7 3
Poor people are unhappy with rich people, the new left has criticised the process of 
‘converting public property to private property’, ‘massive loss of state-owned assets’ 
and ‘the original sin’ of private entrepreneurs. In addition, the small middle stratum 
could hardly decrease these social strains. In fact, many so-called Chinese middle 
class have become ‘house slaves’ (fangnu J^itX).100 The tension between different 
social strata is one of the important reasons for social instability and social 
conflicts.101
4.3. Political transformation
Emerging private ownership in the urban area perhaps provides the most significant 
instantiation of the new private sphere in post-Mao China, and now it seems to be an 
oversimplification to characterise China simply as a totalitarian state. For example, 
Yan Yunxiang’s ethnographic study (although this study focuses on rural China)
1 O ')explores the rise of private life in post-Mao China. Individuals, at least within the 
family, can now have autonomy in marriage choice, premarital sex among engaged 
couples, family planning by choice, and so on. Nevertheless, the development of the 
private sphere has many constraints and limitations. The state has played a key role 
in the transformation of private life.103 In the pre-1949 era, local gentry played an 
important role in governing rural China. However, in Maoist era the state eliminated 
the governance of the gentry and became a major force in changing people’s family 
lives and morality. From the 1950s to the 1970s, patriarchal power was challenged by 
several generations of young people encouraged and even led by the state.104 The
China] (Gansu: Gansu Renmin Chubanshe, 2006), 345-346.
99 For example, terms relating to wealth and high status are often used in the advertisements by 
property developers such as ‘Luxury’, ‘Wealth’, ‘Palace’, ‘Elite’, while ordinary people have been 
excluded.
100 ‘House slave’ refers to people who have to spend a large part o f their income on a mortgage. 
Although they have bought a house or flat, their life is not easy. In order to pay off the mortgage, they 
dare not spend on entertainment and travel, worry about falling ill and losing jobs.
101 See more detail in Chapter Seven on land disputes and conflicts.
102 See Yan Yunxiang, Private Life under Socialism: Love, Intimacy, and Family Change in a Chinese 
Village, 1949-1999 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003).
103 ibid, 16.
104 See Yan, Private Life under Socialism, 16. On rural life in China, see e.g., Yan Yunxiang, The 
Flow o f  Gifts: Reciprocity and Social Networks in a Chinese Village (Stanford, C. A.: Stanford 
University Press, 1996); Deborah Davis and Stevan Harrell, eds., Chinese Families in the Post-Mao 
Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
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result was that these generations ‘gradually gained more autonomy and independence 
in their private lives yet became dependents of the collectives and the state in public 
life’.105 Later the withdrawal of the state that started in the early 1980s left an empty 
space of morality and social norms that was soon filled by egoism and ‘the uncivil 
individualism’.106 Yan concludes that a growing consciousness of individuality in 
the sphere of private life has not coordinated with respect for the individual citizen in 
the public sphere.107
We should not exaggerate the political implications of the revival of private property 
that it would propel democracy. As there are both continuities and discontinuities in 
the Chinese legal and governmental system, such a revival of private property is 
bounded by a deep legal and governmental structure that has persisted through late 
imperial, Republican (1911-1949), Maoist (1949-1978) and post Mao China 
(1978-present). Traditional China was governed by a ‘Confucian ethics’, and modem 
China during both the Maoist era and the reform era has seen the re-emergence of 
tradition as an aspect of the same project of social control.108 For example Jin 
Guantao, a leading Chinese social scientist, attributes the sinicisation (zhongguohua 
4 1IH^k)109 of Marxism to the impact of Confucianism, with the result that Marxism 
in China became more ethical than scientific, and the distinction between the public 
and the private was closely linked to the Confucian division between yi 
(righteousness in the moral sense J*C) and // (profits ^>J).110 The rulership of Mao was 
still a Confucian mlership— ‘being an inner sage so as to rule the outside world’
(neisheng waiwang f*3
105 Yan, Private Life under Socialism, 16.
106 See ibid.
107 ibid, 226.
108 See Barge Bakken, The Exemplary Society: Human Improvement, Social Control, and the 
Dangers o f  Modernity in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 4.
109 It may be better translated hanhua ('$.{&).
110 Jin Guantao, ‘Rujia Wenhua de Shenceng Jiegou dui Makesi Zhuyi Zhongguohua de Yingxiang 
[the Impact o f the In-Depth Structure o f Confucianism on Sinisation o f Marxism]’, in Gaobie Zhushen: 
Cong Sixiang Jiefang dao Wenhua Fansi 1979-1989 [Farewell to the Gods: From Revolution o f  
Thoughts to Reflection on Culture 1979-1989], ed. Lin Daoqun (Hong Kong: Niujin Daxue 
Chubanshe, 1993), 172-187.
1 7 5
The same pattern of rulership has continued in post-Mao China. The central 
government largely rules by ‘examples’, which have a moral character which is to be 
imitated.111 ‘Exemplary society’ is a society ‘with roots [in] and memories [of] the 
past, as well as one created in the present to realise a future utopia of harmonious 
modernity’.112 The Chinese technocracy seeks legitimacy for its governance through 
ethical solutions as well as the performativity of economic growth, highlighting both 
‘stability’ and ‘order’113 (for example, the projects of ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’, ‘construction of a new socialist countryside’, and ‘the harmonious 
society’). This exemplary society is not so much governed through the imposition of 
force from the top, but through ‘discipline, education, and morality [which] 
constitute the three pillars of Chinese society’.114 Chinese society is governed 
largely by morality rather than the rule of law.115 This is one of the important 
reasons for social conflicts in post-Deng China and the transformation in the role of 
local government: in the area of land and real estate, local government has formed a 
partnership with the property developers, and this partnership is competing resources 
with the people while largely ignoring the laws.116
In this exemplary society, there is a need for ‘consent’ to maintain the rule of the 
technocrats; exemplary society is in opposition to totalitarianism, albeit that ‘the 
exemplary utopia is about the attempts at total control’.117 ‘Soft totalitarianism’118 
rather than ‘totalitarianism’ is much better to characterise the situation in China since 
the post-1989. As Geremie Barme observes ‘mainland China enters the phase of 
“soft” technocratic socialism, the parameters of the cultural Velvet Prison119 are
111 W. T. Murphy, ‘Durkheim in China’, in Law and Sociology, ed. Michael Freeman (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 114.
112 Bakken, The Exemplary Society, 1.
113 ibid, 5-6.
114 ibid, 86. Durkheim is lurking here. See Emile Durkheim, The Division o f  Labour in Society, trans. 
W. D. Halls, 2ed. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984 [1893]). Also see Murphy, ‘Durkheim in China’.
115 Bakken, The Exemplary Society, 9.
116 See Chapter Seven.
117 See Bakken, The Exemplary Society, 73.
118 Geremie Barm6, In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1999), 10.
119 Miklos Haraszti, The Velvet Prison: Artists unde State Socialism, trans. Katalin Landesmann and
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being measured out in everyday practice’.120 The party attempts to define the 
parameters of rehabilitation and debate ‘rather than let the momentum of public, 
intellectual and academic pressure lead where they might, as was to happen, for 
example, in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev’.121 Therefore, ‘the ruling ideology 
has gone through a transformation rather than a collapse, absorbing both communist 
and capitalist ideas’.122 In such society, freedom is within a cage: within this cage, 
you are safe; out of it, you will be in trouble.
5. Conclusion
This chapter analyses the emerging property market in China accompanied by the
spatial, social and political transformations, and it reflects on the questions about
private property in the context of post-Mao China: what do we mean by owning
private property? What are the limits of emerging private ownership? In terms of the
assumption that private property works in the market, we need to ask: what do we
mean by ‘market’, and what kind of market do we have? Although the LUR system
was introduced, which is a big change in the state-owned urban land system, LURs
are still allocated administratively to both primary and secondary property markets.
State agencies get LURs free or at low prices and without time limits, but ‘new
1 ^economic players’ now bid or negotiate for urban LURs for a fixed period, and 
they have to have a good relationship with state agencies such as local governments. 
In China, there is no land market, but just a ‘real estate’ market. Far from a free 
market, the property market in China has been largely politicised, which is illustrated 
in the central-local relationship. Furthermore, the ambiguous relationship between
Stephen Landesmann (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
120 Barmd, In the Red, 386.
121 See Geremie Barme, ‘History for the Masses’, in Using the Past to Serve the Present: 
Historiography and Politics in Contemporary China, ed. Jonathan Unger (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1993c), 261.
122 Barmd, In the Red, 328.
123 See Ho and Lin, ‘Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China’: 705.
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central government, market and local governments as entrepreneurs has blurred the 
boundaries between the public and private sectors.124
In the past thirty years of economic reform, Chinese policy makers have favoured 
efficiency rather than equality or fairness. What private property means in the 
Chinese context is wealth, which echoes Arendt’s observation about ‘the modem 
equation of property with wealth’. Given this equation, the accumulation of wealth 
serves as the justification for expropriation, as Arendt argues: ‘for the enormous and 
still proceeding accumulation of wealth in modem society, which was started by 
expropriation.. . ,125 We also need to note the contradiction of the private and the 
public in both the Chinese political ideology and the debates between the 
neo-liberalists and the new-left. What at issue in these tensions and debates is not 
property but rather wealth or the political ordering of social wealth. The zigzag path 
of the revival of private property in urban China -  the conversion of public property 
to private property but with ambiguous content and nature—shows the urgency to 
rethink and redefine property in China.
Rather than justifying private property or justifying the justifications, it is more 
worthwhile to explore the content and nature of private property in China. This also 
links to a broader question: how we understand the relationship between law and 
society. In Eastern and Western Cultures and their Philosophies, Liang Shuming 
points out that Western culture has two characteristics which Chinese culture did not 
have: one is a scientific spirit, and the other is the respect for individuality and the 
developed public life.126 Similarly, Western law has the same two dimensions: the 
scientific dimension and democratic dimension including checks and balance and
124 According to the Vice-Chairman o f the Standing Committee o f NPC-Sheng Huaren’s report on the 
Land Administration Law at the Tenth NPC in 2004, the local government’s income from selling land 
use rights from 2001 to 2003 was Renminbi 910 billion, in 1998 this kind o f income was just 
Renminbi 6.7 billion.
125 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2ed. (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1998), 66.
126 See Liang Shuming, ‘Dongxi Wenhua Jiqi Zhexue [Eastern and Western Culture and Their 
Philosophies]’, in Liang Shuming Quanji [Completed Works o f  Liang Shuming], ed. Xueshu 
Weiyuanhui Zhongguo Wenhua Shuyuan (Jinan: Shandong Renmin Chubanshe, 1989 [1922]), 309.
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rule of law.127 It is possible for Chinese legal reform to borrow the scientific 
dimension from Western law, but to borrow the democratic dimension is difficult. 
The revival of private property in urban China has been bounded by the Chinese 
legal and governmental systems as well as socio-economic conditions.
127 See ibid, 370.
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Chapter 7: Changing State-Society Relations: Land Disputes, 
Conflict and Resistance in Rural and Urban China
1. Introduction
In rural China, the loss of rural land to urban development and commercial and 
industrial projects (for example, illegal conversion of rural land to urban land)1 in 
China demonstrates the tragedy: ‘over the past seven years, China has lost 66,670 
square kilometres or about 6.7 million hectares of farmland’, according to the
7 'XMinistry of Land and Resources in 2006. By contrast, there are booms and bubbles 
in the property market. All the 40 people on Forbes Asia’s 2007 China Rich List are 
billionaires; among these 40 richest people, more than a dozen are property 
developers.4 Since 2002, disputes and conflict relating to land have become the 
major subject of farmers’ rights protection, and there has been a significant shift in 
the focus of farmers’ activism—from conflicts regarding the burden of taxes and fees 
to land rights protection.5 In January 2006, the Ministry of Public Security reported 
87,000 protests and riots associated with land loss.6 Farmers are calling for ‘the third
1 See e.g., Guo Xiaolin, ‘Land Expropriation and Rural Conflicts in China’, The China Quarterly, no. 
166 (2001): 422-439; Ho, Samuel P. S., and George C. S. Lin, ‘Non-Agricultural Land Use in 
Post-Reform China’, The China Quarterly, no. 179 (2004): 758-781.
2 ‘China Grapples with Thorny Issue o f Rural Land Rights’, People s Daily Online, 1 September 2006. 
In <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200609/01/eng20060901_298824.html> (last visited 20 August 
2008).
3 Bubbles in the property market have now emerged as seen in the recent plummeting house prices in 
Shenzhen in 2008.
4 See ‘Fubusi Bangdan Jieshi Fangdichan Baoli [Forbes Rich List Reveals Profiteering in the Real 
Estate Market]’, Xinhua Wang [Xinghua Net], 2 November 2007. In
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-ll/02/content_6999804.htm> (last visited 7August 
2008).
5 See Zhao Ling, ‘Nongmin Weiquan Zhongxin Zhongda Bianhua: Cong Shuifei Zhengyi Dao Tudi 
Weiquan [A Significant Shift in the Focus o f Peasant Activism: From Conflicts Regarding Tax and 
Fees to Land Rights Protection]’, Nanfang Zhoumo [Southern Weekend], 2 September 2004. In 
<http://www.southcn.com/news/china/china05/sannong/snpol/200409020413.htm> (last visited 15 
August 2008). Other issues that could cause social conflicts in rural China include taxation and fees, 
family planning, and environment contamination. On environmental issues in China see e.g., Peter Ho 
and Richard Louis Edmonds, ed., China’s Embedded Activism: Opportunities and Constraints o f  a 
Social Movement (London; New York: Routledge, 2008); Michael Palmer, ‘Towards a Greener China? 
Accessing Environmental Justice in the People’s Republic o f China’, in Access to Environmental 
Justice, ed. A. J. Harding (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2006), 205-235.
6 See ‘China Grapples with Thorny Issue of Rural Land Rights’.
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land reform’, that is, privatisation of rural land by which they could obtain genuine
n
private land rights.
In urban China, many tragedies have also occurred in relation to housing demolition. 
On 22 August 2003, a man named Weng Biao in Nanjing poured gasoline on himself 
and set fire to himself at a local housing demolition and relocation office, because 
this office evicted Weng from his house by force without reasonable compensation 
and due process.8 On 9 January 2005, an old couple in Shanghai died in a fire 
deliberately set by a housing demolition company in order to evict the couple from 
their home.9 According to a speech of the Vice Minister of Construction at the 
National Conference on the Management of Urban Demolition and Relocation in 
September 2002, in January-August 2002, the Ministry of Construction received 
1,730 complaint visits {shangfang JiT^f),10 70% of which were related to housing 
demolition; 123 group visits or petitions (jiti shangfang M W -hVl), 83.7% of which 
were associated with housing demolition.11 Another set of statistics of the Ministry 
of Construction revealed that in January-July 2002, housing demolition had caused 
26 deaths and 16 injuries.12
Thus, although the CPC aims to build a ‘harmonious society’ (hexie shehui 
£ ) ,  there are still tensions and conflict between officials (especially local officials)
7 See Zhao Xiao, ‘Qidong Disanci Tudi Gemin Zhengdang Xishi [It is the Time to Start the Third 
Land Reform]’, Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan [Chinese News Weekly], 28 December 2007, 
<http://news.sina.com.en/c/2007-12-28/100114621930.shtml> (last visited 4 August 2008).
8 See ‘Nanjing Chaiqian hu Zifen Shijian Diaocha [An Investigation on An Evictee’s Immolation in 
Nanjing]’, Xinming Zhoukan [Xinmin Weekly] ,  1 September 2003. In 
<http://news.sohu.com/33/67/news212706733.shtml> (last visited 12 August 2008).
9 See ‘Shanghai Dongqian Gongsi Zonghuo Shaosi Guxi Fufu: She An Renyuan Quanbu Shouchen 
[A Demolition company set a fire and killed an old couple in Shanghai: killers have been punished], 
Xinhua Wang [Xinhua Net], 9 October 2005. In
<http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=180331> (last visited 12 August 2008).
10 In China, complaints about injustice are often made through an administrative route known as the 
petitions or the ‘Letter and Visits’ (xinfang fsi^j) system. Most government departments are required 
to set up xinfang offices at county level and above to receive and respond to petitions. See e.g., Palmer, 
‘Toward a Greener China?’, 222.
11 See ‘Chaiqian Shinian Bei Xi Ju [Tragedies and Comedies in Ten-Year Housing Demolition]’, 
Nanfang Zhoumo [Southern Weekend], 4 September 2003. In
<http://news.sina.com.en/c/2003-09-04/l 131691557s.shtml> (last visited 12 August 2008).
12 See ibid.
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and the people, and there are limited opportunities to alleviate these tensions and 
conflict. This chapter explores one important aspect of the re-emergence of private 
property—the changing state-society relations pertaining to land disputes and 
conflict in post-Mao China.13 This chapter focuses on the enforceability of property 
rights under the dual land ownership and the land allocation system.14 This chapter 
also examines the roles played in land disputes and social conflict by government 
(both central and local), the judiciary (for example, local people’s court), media and 
public opinion (gongzhong yulun as well as social organisations, and
how land disputes, conflict and the changing state-society relations are closely 
linked.15 Part Two of this chapter examines vulnerable property rights from the 
perspective of land requisition and forced eviction. Part Three examines the lack of 
opportunities for farmers and urban residents to seek remedies. Part Four analyses 
four typical cases of land requisition and forced eviction. Parts Five and Six look at 
the implications of these cases for the changing relation between the state and society 
in post-Mao China.
2. Vulnerable property rights: land requisition and forced eviction
As analysed in previous chapters, the answer to the question about who are the 
owner(s) of both urban and rural property in land is vague. This is because while
13 The previous chapters have analysed the rehabilitation o f  private property in the law and the revival 
o f private property in both rural and urban China.
14 See Chapter Four on rural collective ownership and Chapter Six on the emerging urban property 
market.
15 On land disputes in historical context, see e.g., Kathryn Bernhardt, Rent, Taxes, and Peasant 
Resistance: The Lower Yangzi Region, 1840-1950 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); 
Madeleine Zelin, ‘The Rights o f Tenants in Mid-Qing Sichuan: A Study o f  Land-Related Lawsuits in 
the Baxian Archives’, Journal o f  Asian Studies 45, no. 3 (1986): 499-526. On land disputes in modem 
China, see e.g., Guo Xiaolin, ‘Land Exproriation and Rural Conflicts in China’; Peter Ho, ‘Contesting 
Rural Spaces: Land Disputes, Customary Tenure and the State in China’, in Chinese Society: Change, 
Conflict and Resistance, 2nd edition, ed. Elizabeth Perry and Mark Selden, (London: Routledge, 2003), 
93-112; Peter Ho, Institutions in Transition: Land ownership, Property Rights, and Social Conflict in 
China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Pamela N. Phan, ‘Enriching the Land or the Political 
Elite? Lessons from China on Democratization o f the Urban Renewal Process’, Pacific Rim Law & 
Policy Journal 14, no. 3 (June 2005): 607-657; Eva Pils, ‘Land Disputes, Rights Assertion, and Social 
Unrest in China: a Case from Sichuan’, Columbia Journal o f  Asian Law 19, no.l (2006): 235-283. On 
general conflict and resistance in modem China, see e.g., Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden, eds., 
Chinese Society: Change, Conflict, and Resistance (London; New York: Routledge, 2000).
1 8 2
state-owned land can be leased through the LUR system, the ‘state’16 maintains its 
ownership of urban land and the ‘collective’ keeps its ownership of rural land (it is 
unclear who owns rural land in China: farmers themselves, collective economic 
organisations, or local governments).17 Under these circumstances, the extent to 
which the Chinese people ‘own’ their private property is unclear.18 Land use rights 
(LURs) are vulnerable to compulsory requisition by the state, and ordinary owners 
do not have security for their properties. House demolition (chai qian #fx£) in urban 
China, and land seizure in rural areas, are thus the two major problems that have 
generated much social unrest and even public riots in contemporary China.
Although equal protection of state, collective and private property is one of the 
principles of the Property Law (2007) (Article 4), two kinds of unequal ownership 
exist in the contemporary Chinese land system. Urban land is owned by the state, 
which can grant and allocate LURs, and local governments therefore can transfer 
these LURs. By contrast, while rural land is collectively owned, farmers cannot 
dispose of their land freely and are vulnerable to compulsory land acquisition by the 
state. In the process of urbanisation and industrialisation, rural land is generating 
significant profits; however, local governments, officials, and property developers 
are enjoying these profits, while farmers are often excluded and sometimes exploited. 
Rather than protecting property rights of farmers and urban residents, the dual land 
ownership and land allocation system provides a ‘legal’ framework of land 
requisition and housing demolition. This section focuses on vulnerable property 
rights in relation to land requisition and forced eviction as one of the major sources 
of land disputes and conflict.
16 Here the question is who can represent the state, the central government or local governments?
17 On collective ownership over rural land, see Chapter Four.
18 See especially Chapter Six on the urban property market.
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2.1. Land acquisition and compulsory requisition of LURs
In Contemporary China, there is a body of law that provides protection for property 
rights.19 In the area of procedural laws, the Administration Litigation Law (ALL)20 
is a safeguard protecting ordinary people from the abuse of administrative power. 
Article 26 of the ALL specifies that an administrative case may be brought as a 
‘collective suit’ (gongtong susong where two or more persons share the
same cause of action, and their cases can be handled together. The ‘collective suit’ 
provides a mechanism for the people to protect their property rights in the form of 
collective action.
At the international level, China has signed and ratified the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).21 Article 11 of the ICESCR 
guarantees ‘the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living.. .including 
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living 
conditions’. China has also signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),22 but not yet ratified the ICCPR.23
Yet private property rights are still vulnerable to land acquisition (tudi zhengshou d: 
and requisition of LURs (tudi shiyongquan zhengyong 
Both the Chinese Constitution24 and the Land Administration Law (LAL)25 specify 
that the state, in the public interest, may lawfully acquire land owned by collectives.
19 On substantive law, see Chapter Three on property law reform.
20 Xingzheng Susong Fa, promulgated by the NPC on 4 April 1989 and implemented on 1 October 
1990.
21 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 
2200A(XXI) o f 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976. On China’s implementation o f  
the ICESCR, see e.g., Leila Choukroune, ‘Justiciability o f Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: the 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ Review o f China’s First Periodic Report on 
the Implementation o f the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, 
Columbia Journal o f  Asian Law 19, no.l (2005): 30-49.
22 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 
2200A(XXI) o f 16 December 1966; entry into force 23 March 1976.
23 On the ICCPR and China’s possible ratification, see e.g., Sun Shiyan, ‘The Understanding and 
Interpretation o f the ICCPR in the Context o f China’s Possible Ratification’, Chinese Journal o f  
International Law 6, no. 1(2007): 17-42.
24 The Constitution (2004), Article 10(3)
25 The LAL (2004), Article 2 (4)
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9 f\This sets the stage for compulsory land acquisition. The LAL states that 
compensation shall be given in accordance with the original use of the acquired 
land,27 and the compensation is through a package that includes compensation for 
the land, resettlement subsidies and compensation for fixtures (tudi fuzhuowu diffe 
to, and young or green crops (qingmiao T=f1g) on, the acquired land. 
Although Article 42 of the Property Law (2007) expands the scope of compensation 
to ‘the premiums for social security of the farmers’ in order to guarantee their normal 
lives and safeguard their lawful rights and interests, the compensation is still not 
specified to be paid at full market prices. Furthermore, local governments can 
acquire rural land from farmers at a low price and sell it to property developers at a 
high price. A great profit thus could be made because of the huge gap between these 
two different prices.28
What the ‘public interest’ (gonggong liyi IIm) means is very vague in both the 
Constitution and the Property Law. Moreover, the Supreme People’s Court has not 
issued any interpretation on the meaning of the ‘public interest’ or ‘public use’. 
Mansions, golf courses, and lavish government buildings are being established in the 
name of the ‘public interest’ at the expense of productive agricultural land. 
Governments are ill equipped to address the issues that have emerged from land 
acquisition and requisition of LURs because their own interests are involved in these
29issues.
Moreover, because rural land is collectively owned, what farmers actually hold are 
land use rights. When the state acquires rural land ownership from rural collectives, 
LURs of farmers are lost accordingly. In practice, land requisition in rural China is
26 Zhengshou is the compulsory acquisition o f collective landownership; it is related to but different 
from zhengyong, which is taking o f LURs. In this chapter zhengshou is translated land acquisition, 
and zhengyong is translated requisition o f land use rights; land seizure is a general term that refer to 
both zhengshou and zhengyong, as well as illegal conversion o f rural land to urban use.
27 The LAL (2004). Article 47
28 See Anthony Gar-on Yeh, ‘The Dual Land Market and Urban Development in China’, in Ding 
Chengri and Song Yan ,eds., Emerging land and Housing Markets in China (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Lincoln Institute o f  Land Policy, 2005c), 43.
29 This will be discussed in detail in Sections 4 and 5 o f this chapter.
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requisition of LURs of farmers for purpose of the urban development; land 
requisition in urban China is through housing demolition and forced eviction, that is, 
requisition of LURs of urban residents.30 Compulsory requisition of LURs of (both 
rural and urban) land is stipulated in Article 44 of the Property Law (2007): ‘for the 
purpose of emergency handling and disaster relief’, real and movable properties of 
. institutions or individuals may be reclaimed in line with the procedure and within the 
authority provided by law. The purpose of requisition of LURs of rural land is 
different from that of the permanent acquisition of collective ownership— ‘for the 
purpose of the public interest’. Moreover, after zhengyong, the reclaimed properties 
are to be returned to the owner. According to Article 42 (3) of the Property Law 
(2007), when houses and other real properties owned by farmers are acquired, 
compensation for demolition and resettlement shall be paid, which is more than the 
compensation for the fixtures on land, as which farmers’ houses were once treated. 
However, like the vague definition of the ‘public interest’, the definition of 
‘emergency handling and disaster relief’ is still at the discretion of the government. 
Furthermore, there are no specific provisions for compensation. Apart from the 
compulsory requisition of LURs, farmers are also vulnerable to the predatory 
behaviour of local governments and cadres usually associated with illegal conversion 
of farmland to commercial and industrial projects.31
2.2. Forced eviction and housing demolition
Housing demolition usually involves developers, demolition and eviction 
management departments (affiliated to local land administration bureaux), residents, 
and a private demolition company (subcontracted by developers). State Council’s
30 Requisition o f LURs o f urban residents leads to housing demolition, this is according to a principle 
established in the law that LURs are inseparable from rights in the buildings, colloquially referred as
‘fang sui di zou, di sui fang zou’ See the Urban Real Estate Administration
Law (1994, revised 2007), Article 32; The Guarantee Law (1995), Article 36; The Property Law * 
(2007), Article 182.
31 See Cai Yongshun, ‘Collective Ownership or Cadres’ Ownership? The Non-Agricultural Use of 
Farmland in China’, The China Quarterly, no. 175 (2003): 662-680.
32 Sara Meg Davis and Lin Hai, ‘Demolished: Forced Evictions and the Tenants’ Rights Movement in 
China’. Human Rights Watch 16, no. 4 (March 2004). In
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/china03Q4/index.htm> (last visited 08 August 2008).
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‘Regulations for Management of Urban Residential Demolition and Eviction’ 
provides the procedures through which local governments may evict residents’ 
houses and apartments (2001, hereinafter the 2001 Regulation). Qiangzhi Chaiqian 
(US forced eviction) is provided in Article 17 of this regulation, by which city
and county governments can ask relevant departments (often through the demolition 
and eviction department) to proceed with forced eviction, or the demolition and 
eviction management department can apply for forced eviction by the people’s court, 
even when residents (including both homeowners and tenants) refuse reallocation. In 
reality, there is a lack of compensation, due process and remedies. Forced eviction in 
most cases has been transformed into violent eviction or savage eviction (yeman 
chaiqian I f  Ifatjrif:) including cutting off water and electricity, physical harassment 
and assaults, breaking into properties and arson by using secret societies and thugs.
The 2001 Regulation, as an administrative regulation, goes against provisions of the 
higher-level laws. For example, the Constitution (amended 2004, Article 13), the 
Property Law (2007, Articles 42 and 44), and the Urban Real Estate Administration 
Law (1994, Article 19) stress the ‘public interest’ as the reason for land acquisition 
and ‘emergency handling and disaster relief’ as the reason for requisition of LURs. 
But Article 7 of the 2001 Regulation does not specify either the ‘public interest’ or 
‘emergency handling and disaster relief’. Requisition of LURs in the 2001 
Regulation is in fact the taking of properties through administrative means 
(xingzheng shouduan tfJ&^Fi^).34 Furthermore, in the requisition of LURs, the 
property rights of evictees are often ignored; no negotiation mechanism is provided
33 Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Guanli Tiaoli [Regulations for Management o f Urban Residential 
Demolition and Eviction], promulgated by the State Council on 22 March 1991; implemented on 1 
June 1991. This regulation was revised and promulgated by the State Council on 6 June 2001, 
implemented on 1 November 2001. After the implementation o f the Property Law (2007), the 
implementation o f provisions in the 2001 Regulation that contradict the Property Law has been 
terminated. But the Property Law does not specify procedures o f housing demolition and leaves empty 
space in the enforcement of the law. The amendment o f the Urban Real Estate Management was 
adopted by the standing committee o f the NPC on 30 August 2007, but the amendment still grants 
power to the State Council to promulgate regulations concerning housing demolition and 
compensation standards.
34 This also goes against Lifa Fa [The Legislation Law o f the PRC], promulgated by the NPC on 15 
March 2000, implemented on 1 July 2000. Article 79 o f the Legislation Law provides: ‘National Law 
has higher authority than administrative regulations... ’
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between evictees and developers, and between evictees and local governments; 
compensation standards in most cases are low; there is a lack of judicial remedies, 
for example, and even if the plaintiff wins the lawsuit, his or her home has already 
been demolished.
The conflict between regulations and laws such as between the 2001 Regulation and 
the higher-level laws should be understood in the context of urbanisation and the 
housing reform. The State Council’s ‘Regulations for Management of Urban 
Residential Demolition and Eviction’ emerged in 1991 (revised in 2001) and worked 
as a supplement to the Urban Planning law,35 in order to promote urban construction 
and improve the living conditions of the urban residents. But as the pace of housing 
reform and housing commodification has accelerated since the 1990s, commercial 
property developers have monopolised housing construction and provision, and have 
formed a partnership with local governments. As a result, the 2001 regulation 
seems to have satisfied the needs of commercial developers but ignored the interests 
of urban residents: developers can apply for housing demolition certificates from 
local governments; if developers and residents cannot achieve an agreement, local 
governments will adjudicate whether residents should be relocated; if residents still 
refuse to relocate, local governments or the court will proceed with forced eviction, 
even though such forced eviction contravenes the higher-level laws.
In order to examine the clash between different laws and regulations, we also need to 
take account of the relationship between law and party policy, as well as the relation 
between the central government and local governments in the process of lawmaking. 
In China, judicial law making is tightly restricted, and the main source of law is 
legislation.37 Legal modernisation was endorsed in 1978 and until 1986 legislative 
powers had been extended to selected provincial governments and people’s
35 Chengshi Guihua Fa, promulgated on 26 December 1989, implemented on 1 April 1990.
36 See Chapter Six on the emergence o f the urban property market.
37 Perry Keller, ‘Sources o f Order in Chinese Law’, American Journal o f  Comparative Law 42, no. 4 
(1994): 712.
congresses.38 In addition, a complex hierarchy of law-making power and legislative 
organs were created as ‘a highly pragmatic response to political and institutional 
pressures’.39 As Perry Kelly points out, ‘the Chinese legal order therefore effectively 
remained split between the formal legal powers of the NPC, which symbolised the 
unitary nature of the state, and the administrative power of the central and ... 
[provincial] bureaucracies to issue and enforce normative documents’.40 Under these 
circumstances, whether an informal institution is successful or gets legalised largely 
depends on the attitudes of local governments, which can play roles in either 
facilitating or obstructing the emergence of informal institutions 41
Laws are even ignored by local governments. For example, in March 2004, Article 
13 of the Constitution was amended, requiring the government to compensate 
citizens when their private properties are taken for public use 42 However, local 
government (for example, the demolition and eviction management department or 
office) often sets its own standards for compensation that is very low in most cases.43 
Apart from unfair compensation, there is also lack of consultation and short notice in 
order to prevent residents allying with each other and taking collective actions (for 
example, through petition or litigation) against the project. There are few 
opportunities for ordinary people to negotiate with either the developers or the local 
government.
38 See Difang Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui He Difang Geji Renmin Zhengfu Zuzhi Fa (The Local 
People’s Congresses and Local People’s Government Organisation Law), promulgated by the NPC on
1 July 1979, amended for the fourth time in 2004; Keller, ‘Sources of Order in Chinese Law’: 
713-714.
39 ibid, 714.
40 Perry Keller, ‘Sources o f Order in Chinese Law’, 723. Normative documents refer to ‘guizhang’
41 A typical example o f the success in individual cooperative housing construction is in Wenzhou, 
Zhejiang Province, because o f the strong business associations, local finance and support from local 
government in Wenzhou.
2 Article 13 o f the Constitution (amended in 2004) states:
‘The lawful private property o f citizens may not be encroached upon.
By law, the state protects citizens’ rights to own private property and the rights to inherit private 
property.
The state may, for the public interest, acquire or requisition citizen’s private property for public use, 
and pay compensation in accordance with law’.
43 Eva Pils, ‘Land Disputes, Rights Assertion, and Social Unrest in China’, 251. The compensation 
for farmers is even lower that urban residents.
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Another example that local governments turn a blind eye to laws is in the area of 
urban planning. The Urban Planning Law44 has been largely disregarded by local 
governments, and housing demolition could be conducted by local governments in 
the name of urbanisation with few constraints. According to the law (Article 21), 
provinces should submit their land-use plans to the State Council. A land-use plan at 
the city or the county level should obtain two levels of approval. First, the plan 
should be approved by the people’s congress at the same administrative level of the 
city or the county government; and then the plan should get approval from the 
government at the higher level. But in some cities, normative documents issued by 
the local government sidestep urban plans set by the State Council45 In April 1999, 
the State Council approved the Outline of National Land Use Plan (1997-2010)46, 
and land use quotas were allocated to local governments. However, the Outline has 
been set aside by local governments especially some provinces with developed 
economies. By 2004, Shandong province had used up 80% of its planned land quotas; 
Zhejiang province exhausted more than 99%; in Zhejiang, land quotas have been 
bought and sold; in the Pearl River Delta area, there is even no land available to
Local regulations and normative documents also contravene international 
conventions. For example, the 2001 Regulation is in breach of the ICESCR, 
especially ‘the right of adequate housing’ (Article 11, Paragraph 1). In the ICESCR 
and relevant UN documents, ‘the right of housing’ and human rights are closely
44 Urban Planning Law (1989) only provides planning for the city and could not keep pace with urban 
and rural development. Now The Urban and Rural Planning Law (2008) has replaced the Urban 
Planning Law. The Urban and Rural Planning Law was promulgated on 28 October 2007and 
implemented on 1 January 2008.
45 See Liu Chenglin, ‘Informal Rules, Transaction Costs, and the Failure o f the “takings” Law in 
China’, Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 29, no. 1 (2005): 12.
46 Quanguo Tudi Liyong Zongti GuiHua Gangyao (1997-2010).
47 Wang Libin, ‘Tudi Guihua Genzhe Shui Zai Zou? [Who Decides the Land Use Planning?]’, Xinhua 
Wang [Xinhua Net], 12 May 2004. In
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2004-05/12/content_1464972.htm> (last visited 18 August 2008). 
Also see Liu Chenglin, ‘Informal Rules, Transaction Costs, and the Failure o f the “takings” Law in 
China’, 13.
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linked: ‘forced evictions [are a gross] violation of human rights... the right of
48adequate housing.. .includes the right to be protected from forced eviction’. Some 
of the procedural safeguards required by the ICESCR cannot be found in Chinese 
national laws and local regulations.49
3. Access to justice
3.1. Administrative adjudication and reconsideration
The above section has analysed the flaws and loopholes in the legal framework 
concerning housing demolition and forced eviction, and the subsequent question is: 
can people seek remedies and get access to justice when their property rights are 
infringed upon? According to the 2001 Regulation (Article 16), if evictors and 
evictees cannot achieve an agreement on compensation and relocation, demolition 
and eviction management departments may adjudicate (caijue i£t&)50 the disputes 
between evictors and evictees. When demolition and eviction management 
departments are the evictees, the disputes will be adjudicated by the people’s court at 
the same administrative level of the demolition and eviction management department. 
According to Article 16(2) of the 2001 Regulation, against the decision of 
adjudication, the unsatisfied party may appeal to the People’s Court. However, 
housing demolition can continue while the appeal is pending. The Ministry of 
Construction issued the ‘Procedures for Administrative Adjudication Regarding 
Urban Housing Demolition’.51 According to the Procedures, if a large number of 
residents disagree with the compensation and relocation package, a public hearing 
should be held before the demolition and eviction management department accept the 
application for adjudication (Article 7), and evictors are forbidden to use forced
48 Office o f the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Fact Sheet No. 25, Forced Evictions and 
Human Rights’. In <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs25.htm#2> (last visited accessed 12 
August 2008).
49 See Davis and Lin, ‘Demolished’.
50 Administrative adjudication (xingzheng caiju is the adjudication o f disputes between
equal civil entities by the administrative authority who administrates the disputed issues.
51 Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Xingzheng Caijue Gongzuo Guicheng, promulgated by the Ministry of 
Construction on 30 December 2003, promulgated on 1 March 2004.
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measures in housing demolition such as cutting off water, electricity, gas and heating 
(Article 24).
According to ‘the Procedures’ mentioned above, if either party (usually the residents) 
is unsatisfied with the decision of administrative adjudication, the unsatisfied party 
has two choices to challenge the decision.52 The first is to apply for administrative 
reconsideration {xingzheng fuyi tTifcJCi^)53 of the decision. The other is to file suit 
against the decision in court.54 Moreover, if residents are not satisfied with the result 
of administrative reconsideration, they can appeal to the court for administrative 
litigation {xingzheng susong ^Tfl&i^i^).55 But neither administrative adjudication 
nor administrative reconsideration provides adequate remedies for residents. The 
disputes over housing demolition and eviction are adjudicated by demolition and 
relocation management departments in the first place, and these departments often 
have a close relationship with the evictors. Secondly, the Administrative 
Reconsideration Law provides that only concrete administrative acts (juti xingzheng 
xingwei can be reviewed,56 which means that the legality of local
regulations (for example, the 2001 Regulation) as the basis of housing demolition 
and forced eviction cannot be challenged.
3.2. Administrative litigation and mediation
Administration litigation is a possible channel that ordinary people could seek 
remedies when their property rights are infringed upon. Administrative litigation is 
also an important perspective to investigate the reshaped relation between the state 
and society in post-Mao China. The Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) passed in
52 See the ‘Procedures for Administrative Adjudication Regarding Urban Housing Demolition’ 
(hereinafter the Procedures), Article 16.
53 See Xingzheng Fuyi Fa [The Administrative Reconsideration Law], Articles 12-15, promulgated by 
the Standing Committee o f the NPC on 29 April 1999, implemented on 1 October 1999. Article 12, 
‘any applicant, who refuses to accept a specific administrative act o f the department under local 
people’s government at or above the county level may apply for administrative reconsideration to the 
people’s government at the same level; an applicant may also apply for administrative reconsideration 
to the competent authority at the next higher level’.
54 ‘The Procedures’, Article 16.
55 The Administrative Reconsideration Law (1999), Article 5.
56 The Administrative Reconsideration Law (1999), Article 7.
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April 1989 and implemented in October 1990. It offers ordinary people an important 
legal instrument to protect themselves from the abuse of state power by government
tV» •agencies and officials. In the report delivered at the 13 National Congress of the 
CPC in October 1987 by Zhao Ziyang, the CPC General Secretary at that time, 
proposed the separation of functions between the Party and the state (dangzheng 
fenkai and prioritised the ALL in legislation.57 In the late 1980s and
early 1990s, there was a rapid increase in the number of Administrative Litigation 
Cases (ALCs).58 But after 1989, the increase of ALCs slowed down.59 Most ALCs 
involved disputes over land use, forestry, urban planning and real estate.60 The 
ambiguity of property rights has become a main reason for the people to initiate an 
administrative litigation. According to the ALL, the courts can only review concrete 
administrative acts (Articlell). Courts have no power to review ‘the appropriateness 
of an act’, nor can courts review laws and local regulations.
In administrative litigation, mediation is prohibited. But now the Chinese judiciary 
is seeking to divert administrative cases away from litigation: Chinese judicial 
authorities are now encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution to resolve 
administrative litigation cases.64 Xiao Yang, former president of the Supreme 
People’s Court, in his speech on 29 March 200765 stressed the need to adopt new 
mechanisms to deal with administrative litigation disputes, particularly those relating
57 See Zhao Ziyang’s report in <http://wwwl.www.gov.cn/test/2008-07/01/content 1032279.htm> 
(last visited 9 October 2008). English version is in Zhao Ziyang, ‘Advance Along the Road o f  
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’, Report Delivered at the Thirteenth National Congress o f  the 
CPC on 25 October 1987, in Documents o f  the Thirteenth National Congress o f  the Communist Party 
o f  China, 3-77. Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1987.
5 See Pei Minxin, ‘Citizens v. Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China’, The China Quarterly, 
no. 152(1997): 836.
59 See ibid, 837.
60 See ibid, 839.
61 See e.g., Randall Peerenboom, China s Long March Toward Rule o f  Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 420. On administrative litigation in China, see ibid, 420-424.
62 Normative documents are not binding the court.
63 The ALL (1989), Article 50.
64 On this issue, also see Michael Palmer, ‘Compromising Courts and Harmonizing Ideologies: 
Judicial Mediation in Post-Deng China’, in New Courts in the Asia-Pacific Region, eds. Andrew 
Harding and Pip Nicholson (London: Routledge, 2009, forthcoming).
65 See Xiaoyang’s speech at the fifth National Administrative Adjudication Conference on 29 March 
2007, in <http://www.court.gov.cn/news/bulletin/activitv/200703300020.htm> (last visited on 16 
August 2008).
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to ‘mass administrative disputes’ {qunti xing xingzheng zhengyi 
such as land acquisition and housing demolition. Xiao called for the Supreme Court 
to issue judicial interpretations on xietiao coordination) and hejie
settlement) in order to deal with administrative disputes properly. Moreover, hejie is 
expected to promote the construction of a harmonious society.66 Hejie is mediation 
in essence, but as Article 50 of the ALL clearly bans mediation in administrative 
litigation, the use of xietiao and hejia simply circumvents the provisions of the ALL. 
Xiao stated:
administrative disputes are contradictions among the people {renmin neibu maodun A  
& f*3 rP^M). The reasons that generate administrative disputes are complex, and the 
situation of each administrative case is different. Therefore, the resolution of 
administrative litigation cases should adopt multiple mechanisms and means.. .it is 
particularly important to adopt coordinated means of xietiao to the greatest extent to 
handle administrative disputes.. .67
In order to introduce mediation to administrative cases, in January 2008, The 
Supreme People’s Court introduced new rules concerning the withdrawal of 
administrative suits. By permitting a plaintiff to voluntarily withdraw a lawsuit if the 
defendant (usually the government agencies) rescinds or changes its administrative 
conduct. These rules have opened room and provided a legal basis for using hejie
z*o
(settlement) in administrative suits. This is a two-edged sword: on the one hand, 
more mechanisms are provided to resolve ALCs; on the other hand, it is the effort to 
divert sensitive cases affecting a lot of people and attracting much social attention
66 On ‘Constructing a Harmonious Society’, see ‘Zhonggongzhongyang Guanyu Goujian Shehui 
Zhuyi Hexie Shehui Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding [Resolutions o f the CPC Central Committee 
on Major Issues Regarding the Building of A Harmonious Socialist Society]’, adopted by the Sixth 
Plenum o f the 16th CPC Central Committee on 11 October 2006.
67 See Xiaoyang’s speech at the fifth National Administrative Adjudication Conference on 29 March
2007.
68 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Xingzheng Susong Chesu Ruogan Wenti de Guiding [Supreme 
People’s Court Rules Concerning Several Issues in the Withdrawal o f Administrative Suits], approved 
by the 1441st Meeting of the Adjudication Committee of the Supreme People’s Court, promulgated by 
the Supreme People’s Court on 1 January 2008, implemented on 1 February 2008. In 
<http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show.php7file id= 124166 > (last visited 16 August 2008). On an 
explanation o f these rules see e.g., Wang Doudou, ‘Xingzheng Susong Xietiao Hejie Youle Faltl Yiju 
[Coordination and Settlement in Administrative Litigation have had legal basis]’, Fazhi Ribao, 17 
January 2008. In <http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/2008-01/17/content_782925.htm> (last visited 16 
August 2008).
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such as land seizure and housing demolition out of the courtroom. The ‘Rules of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning Jurisdiction in Administrative 
Cases’69 should also be considered. Article 1 lists a number of situations in which 
jurisdiction is vested in the Intermediate People’s Court rather than the basic people’s 
court. These situations include where the defendants are local governments at or 
above the county level, and a collective suit (gongtong susong that
attracts great social attention.
Introducing mechanisms of mediation to administrative cases attempts to prevent the 
interference of local government in administrative cases. But if cases are ‘settled’ as 
in the Rules concerning ‘the withdrawal of the administrative suits’, another door 
will be opened for local government to put pressure on the case, especially when we 
take account of the problems of China’s laws and regulations. The crux of China’s 
legal system is the single ‘political-legal system’ (zhengfa xitong \ w h i c h  
includes not only the courts, but also the political-legal committee of the CPC, 
procuratorates, police, prison/forced labour system etc.71 In such a system, any law 
should accurately reflect the concurrent Party policy. ‘The Supervision Law’ (2006)72 
has not made any difference to this situation. Under the Supervision Law, the 
Standing Committees of People’s Congresses have the power to supervise the 
government, people’s courts, and people’s procuratorates, but these congresses are all 
‘state organs under the leadership of the CPC’. In this system, the judiciary lacks 
autonomy, and their rulings are constrained by local party organs (for example, the
69 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Xingzheng Anjian Guanxia Ruogan Wenti de Guiding, 
promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court 14 January 2008, implemented on 1 February 2008. In 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2008-01 /16/content 7432428.htm> (last visited 16 August 2008).
70 The ALL (1989), Article 26.
71 On the political-legal system in China see e.g., Murray Scot Tanner, The Politics o f  Lawmaking in 
Post-Mao China: Institutions, Processes, and Democratic Prospects (Oxford, N.Y.: Clarendon Press, 
1999).
72 Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Jiandu Fa [The Supervision Law o f the 
Standing Committee of the People’s Congress at Different Levels], promulgated by the standing 
committee of the NPC on 27 August 2006, implemented on 1 January 2007.
73 See ‘Keep a Close Watch’, State Council Information Office o f the PRC, 1 October 2006, in 
<http://www.scio.gov.cn/zgxwvbd/en/2006/19/200610/tl01717.htm> (last visited on 18 August 2008).
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political-legal committees) and local governments.74 Judges are on the government 
payroll, and listed in bianzhi (III rfrj)75 as civil servants.76
4. Disputes, conflict and resistance in relation to land in post-Mao 
China
As administrative adjudication and reconsideration are unlikely to offer adequate 
remedies, residents have to pursue either ‘Letters and Visits’ outside the formal legal 
system or administrative litigation in the court. When the disputes cannot be resolved 
by either method, conflicts in extreme cases result in deaths and injuries. In this 
section, four typical cases are chosen to illustrate land disputes and conflict, as well 
as the broader picture of disputes, conflict and social unrest in post-Mao China.
4.1. Shengyou attack in Dingzhou
Shengyou is a village south of the Dingzhou City (a city at the county administrative 
level) in Hebei Province. Over two hundred armed thugs allegedly belonged to secret 
societies (hei shehui H t± ^ )  and, hired by corrupt local officials, attacked farmers 
in Shengyou village. These farmers were local residents and resisted requisition of 
LURs for a state-owned electricity company to build a power plant. Six farmers were 
killed and at least 100 others were seriously injured.77
74 The ‘Seed Case’ (Zhongzi An in Henan is a typical example illustrating the lack of
autonomy o f the judiciary. In this case, a judge ruled that the regulation promulgated by the Provincial 
People’s Congress went against the regulation promulgated by the Standing Committee o f the NPC, 
and this judge was removed from her post. On this case, see e.g., Jim Yardley, ‘A Judge Tests China’s 
Courts, Making History’, The New York Times, 28 November 2005. In
<http://www.nytimes.eom/2005/l l/28/intemational/asia/28judge.html?pagewanted=l&_r=l> (last 
visited 15 August 2008).
75 On the bianzhi system see Chapter Six.
76 It should be noted that most judges in most countries are paid by the government. In Europe (the 
UK is an exception), judges are rather like civil servants. But Chinese judges are embedded in the 
one-party system.
77 Philip P. Pan, ‘Chinese Peasants Attacked in Land Dispute’, Washington Post, 15 June 2005.
Also see Daniel Griffiths, ‘China Faces Growing Land Disputes’, BBC News, 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4728025.stm> (last visited 31 July 2008). On reports on 
Chinese media, see e.g., a special edition in <http://news.qq.com/zt/2005/hebeiding/index.htm> (last 
visited 11 August, 2008).
1 9 6
Campaigns by farmers on the disputed land began in the fall of 2003, when the 
power plant announced that it would build a facility to store coal ash. Twelve 
affected villages surrendered their land but fanners in Shengyou did not give up, 
because they regarded the compensation offered by the company as unreasonable and 
lower than the national standard for compensation. Fanners also accused corrupt 
local officials involved in land requisition and demanded full compensation. Farmers 
were then harassed by Dingzhou police,78 and assaulted by thugs before the severe 
final attack. The central and provincial government intervened in the investigation of 
this attack because of the death and serious injuries of farmers and media publicity.79
Issues involved in this case include land requisition with related social unrest, which 
is a great problem rooted in Chinese society. Rural land has been taken in order to 
make way for urban expansion and industrialisation (for example, in the name of 
construction of ‘high-tech zones’ and factories). For instance, a similar case like the 
Shengyou attack also happened at Zigong in Sichuan Province.80 In recent years, 
more and more farmers have become aware of their property rights, but there have 
been limited opportunities for them to claim and protect their property rights. Many 
farmers go to Beijing to file petitions, but are often blocked by checkpoints set up by 
local officials.81 Another important issue that should be considered is the 
transformation of the role and function of the local government and local policing 
power. Instead of protecting farmers’ property rights, the local government 
proceeded with land requisition by allying with thugs. As a result, farmers had to 
seek help from international and national media that played an important role in the 
disclosing of the truth of this attack.
78 See Pan, ‘Chinese Peasants Attacked in Land Dispute’.
79 The Party secretary and the city chief o f Dingzhou have been removed from their posts, and the 
party secretary has been sentenced to life imprisonment after the disclosure o f the attack. See Wang 
Jia and Han Pulu, ‘Heibei Dingzhou 6.11 Xiji Cunmin Shijian Shimo’ [The 6.11 Attack on Villagers in 
Dingzhou, Hebei Province]’.
80 On a comprehensive analysis o f the Zigong case, see Pils, ‘Land Disputes, Rights Assertion, and 
Social Unrest in China’: 235-283.
81 See Griffiths, ‘China Faces Growing Land Disputes’.
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4.2. Housing demolition in Beijing: the vanished hutong
In Beijing, housing demolition has often proceeded in the name of ‘dilapidated 
housing renewal’ (weifang gaizao or ‘old city renewal’ (jiucheng gaozao
From 1991 to 2003, 500,000 households were demolished in Beijing.82 
In the ‘old’ city of Beijing, there are two kinds of buildings (most of which are 
hutong #31^ 1 or old style housing) that have become targets of demolition. One kind 
is the house that was confiscated by the state during the ‘socialist transformation’ and 
allocated by the land administration bureaux to ordinary workers and work unit 
employees; the other is the house that was managed by the state during 1958-1978 
and returned to the original owners after 1978. When the house was managed by 
the state, while private ownership was recognised and property owners could receive 
a fixed percentage of rental income charged by the state to tenants, the state took 
control of rent standards and management of private rental housing, and the direct 
link between landlords and tenants was broken. When the Cultural Revolution started 
in 1966, state management was terminated, and the remaining private houses were 
mainly for owner-occupation. During the Cultural Revolution, many owner-occupied 
houses were even confiscated by Red Guards.84 Although ‘urban land was state 
owned’ was promulgated in Article 10 of the 1982 Constitution, the LURs of these 
houses (so-called jingzu fang  literally managed and rented houses) still exist.
In the late 1980s, state policies permitted the original owners and their heirs to claim 
partial property rights over houses which were once managed by the state, but even 
today there is not a good mechanism for the original owners and their heirs to claim 
complete property rights.
82 See Wang Jun, ‘Beijing Wenbao Qu zhi Huo [The Puzzle o f the Protected Historic Zone in 
Beijing]’, Xinhua She Liaowang Zhoukan [Xinhua News Agency Outlook Weekly], no. 23 (2007). In 
<http://lw.xinhuanet.com/htm/content_712.htm> (last visited 16 August 2008).
83 After ‘socialist transformation’ (shehuizhuyi gaizao in 1956, the housing market
was gradually abolished. Except for confiscation o f properties owned by war criminals and 
‘anti-revolutionaries’, the transition from private ownership to public ownership was gradual. One 
example was ‘state management and renting’ (guojia jingyingzulin fU S ) initiated in 1958.
Another was socialist purchase’ {guojia shumai HlsiC]@^)of privately owned properties.
84 See Zhang X Q., ‘Chinese Housing Policy 1949-1978: the Development o f a Welfare System’, 
Planning Perspectives, no. 12 (1997): 433-455; Huang Youqin, ‘The Road to Homeownership: a 
Longitudinal Analysis o f Tenure Transition in Urban China (1949-1994)’, International Journal o f  
Urban and Regional Research 28, no. 4 (2004): 111.
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LURs are vulnerable in the process of urban renewal. In Beijing, large-scale 
dilapidated housing renewal started in the 1980s, although some projects even started 
as early as the 1950s: at that time from the 1950s to 1980s, all the work was done by 
the government, including investment, setting compensation standards, and 
relocation of residents; most residents were re-housed (huiqian 033:) in the original 
area after the renewal was finished; conflicts in demolition were mainly disputes 
between family members.85 However, the situation has been changed by the rapid 
urban expansion and the joint renewal project conducted by government and 
commercial developers. According to Article 58 of the Land Administration Law 
(amended in 2004), the land administration department could take back the LURs of 
state-owned land in the case of ‘renovating of the old urban area’. By working with 
the government, urban renewal has become a profitable means for commercial 
developers to get LURs at low prices. Another way for developers to gain more 
profits is to lower the cost of demolition. For example, developers try to resettle 
residents in suburban areas rather than re-house them in the original inner city. In this 
‘commercial demolition’ (shangye chaiqian ^ 3 k ^ 3 £ ) , conflicts between family 
members in demolition have transformed into disputes and conflicts between 
residents and commercial developers allied with local governments.86
Disputes in relation to housing demolition have increased rapidly in Beijing, but it is 
not easy for ordinary people to protect their LURs through litigation. The most 
famous case is a so-called ‘Ten-Thousand-Person Mass Lawsuit’ (wanren susong 7] 
AVfi^). In February 2000, 10, 357 residents in Beijing filed an administrative suit 
in the Beijing Municipal Second Intermediate Court. However, the court refused to 
register this case and did not give any reply. The land administration bureaux, local 
people’s courts and property developers have formed a solid partnership and shared 
common interests; one vice-president of a district people’s court was found to be a
85 ‘Chaiqian Shinian Bei Xi Ju [Tragedies and Comedies in Ten-Year Housing Demolition]’.
86 See ibid.
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87manager of a housing demolition company at the same time. Initiating 
administrative litigation by ordinary people is still like ‘throwing an egg against a 
stone’. Commonly, people’s courts simply do not hear the cases or dismiss the 
appeals of the plaintiff,88 which is against the ALL.
Land use rights (LURs) are also vulnerable in local normative documents. For 
example, a document issued by the Beijing Land Administration Bureau (no. 434) on 
21 July1995 stated: ‘Article 12 of the 1982 Constitution provides that urban land is 
owned by the state.. .the state can reclaim land use rights without compensation for 
the need of city construction.. .the conclusion is: in the demolition of privately 
owned houses, compensation is only offered for the house and its fixture, no
OQ
compensation should be provided for land use rights’. There are also different and 
unequal treatments for LURs owned by different people. In Beijing, the demolition 
policies provided that: ‘in terms of the real estate owned by citizens whose 
administrative rank is above deputy minister, privileged people (for example, senior 
people in the democratic parties, foreign citizens, and former senior officials of 
Guomindang), the land use rights need to be assessed and compensated’.90
Issues in the Beijing housing demolition include the vulnerable land use rights; the 
encroachment upon property rights by the partnership between local government, 
commercial developers, and local people’s courts; flawed normative documents; the 
difficulties for residents to file an administrative suit. Another important issue is the 
need to protect the historic old city and the vanishing cultural roots of local residents.
87 See Guo Yukuan, ‘Jingcheng Chaiqian—Yige Hairen Tingwen de Zhenshi Gushi [Housing 
Demolition in Beijing, A Real Shocking Story]’, Zhongguo Fangdichanye Ltlshiwang [Chinese Real 
Estate Lawyers Website], 1 March 2006.< http://www.fc70.com/article.aspx?articleid=9322 >(last 
visited 04 August 2008).
88 See ibid. In 1995, in its no. 106 document, the Higher-Level Beijing Municipal People’s Court 
provided that ‘suits concerning the decision o f demolition, administrative adjudication, relocation and 
compensation should not be heard’. See Chen Xiao, ‘2003-2007: Chaiqian Xin Bianju [2003-2007: 
New Trends in Housing Demolition]’, Chinese News Weekly [Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan], 30 
March 2007. In <http://news.sina.com.en/c/2007-03-30/140912655316.shtml> (last visited 7April 
2007).
89 Guo Yukuan,‘Jingcheng Chaiqian’.
90 ibid.
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For example, for local residents in Beijing, hutong are not just real estate, they are 
also are associated with their family histories, values and memories.91
4.3. The case of Hunan Jiahe housing demolition92
In July 2003, the Jiahe County Government sold land to a property developing 
company (the Zhuquan Real Estate Sales Company) to start building the Zhuquan 
Commercial Mall {zhuquan shangmao cheng a project that took
up 120,000 square meter land in the business district of Jiahe.93 Although the county 
government claimed that this would be good for the renewal of the ‘old’ city in the 
‘public interest’, existing houses that were built after 2000 had to be demolished, 
adversely affecting 1,100 households and 7,000 people in Jiahe.
According to a China Central TV’s report, the property developing company 
obtained a contract before the bidding process at an extremely low price—RMB 30 
per square metre. Before the founding of the Zhuquan property developing company 
on 27 June 2004, the country government already promised to sell the LURs to this 
not-yet founded company. On 23 July 2004, the company obtained the LURs, but the 
bidding started one month later in August 2004, and the ‘Zhuquan Real Estate’ was 
the only one company that took part in the ‘bidding’. The county government and the 
property developer signed a so-called ‘Yin Yang Contract’ (yinyang hetong |$] K  'n* 
m 94 under which the property developers obtained the LURs with an extremely low
91 See Ian Johnson, Wild Grass: Three Stories o f  Changes in Modern China (London: Penguin Books, 
2005c), 87-182.
92 A series o f investigation reports were circulated on the Internet and national newspapers. Luo 
Changping, the reporter o f Xin jin g  bao [Beijing NewsJ, was the first to disclose the news to the public. 
Two major websites in China, Sina.com and Sohu had their special editions o f the Jiahe case reports. 
See e.g., <http://news.sina.com.en/z/hniiahe/index.shtml> (last visited 11 August 2008). On the Jiahe 
case, also see e.g., Anne S. Cheung, ‘Public Opinion Supervision— A Case Study o f  Media Freedom
in China’, Columbia Journal o f  Asian Law 20 (2007): 357-384; Liu Chenglin, ‘Informal Rules, 
Transaction Costs, and the Failure o f the “takings” Law in China’: 1-28.
93 The commercial mall itself took up 8,000 square meters. See ‘Hunan Jiahe Chaiqian Diaocha Er: 
Yin Yang Hetong [Investigation on Demolition in Jiahe, Hunan Province 2: Yin Yang Contract]’,
China Central TV (CCTV), 14 May 2004. In
<http://news.sina.com.en/c/2004-05-14/l 1203228616.shtml>(last visited 11 August 2008).
94 In Chinese philosophy, Yin ( |$ )  and Yang (P0) mean negative (or feminine) and positive (or 
masculine) principles in nature. In describing locations, Yin refers to the shadow (the hidden area), 
while Yang refers to the public area. Here the Yang Contract refers to a contract on the surface, the Yin
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price. In the Yin Contract, 70% of the LURs transfer fees (tudi shiyongquan churang 
jin  d iM  j jO T r i i  ihjfe) were even reimbursed to the ‘Zhuquan Real Estate’. As a 
result, the ‘Zhuquan Real Estate’ got the LURs with a price that only amounted to 
1.3% of the actual market value.
At the start of building this commercial project, the Jiahe county government posed 
big banners saying, ‘those who affect the development [of Jiahe] for a few days will 
be affected by me [the county government] for a life time’.95 On 7 August 2003, the 
county government initiated an administrative order (issued by the county party 
committee and county government, no. 136) entitled ‘Four Guarantees and Two 
Stops’ (si bao liang ting (Sl'&Mf?).96 The order forced civil servants in Jiahe to 
hold collective responsibility for guaranteeing the completion of the demolition 
work.97 This is the manner of holding collective responsibility (zhulian |^ i£ )  used 
in the Cultural Revolution. Specifically, these civil servants had to guarantee that 
their family members or relatives who were affected in demolition and relocation 
would provide cooperation in assessment of compensation within the provided time; 
sign the compensation agreement; vacate the property and hand in all relevant 
documents and certificates; and promise not to file petitions to the higher-level 
authorities or conduct any collective action.98 Otherwise the salaries of these civil 
servants and their jobs would be stopped with the possibility of being dismissed or 
relocated to remote areas to work. In order to protect their husbands from being 
dismissed, two sisters had to apply for divorce on the same day.99
Contract refers to a contract that is achieved privately and is not disclosed to the public.
95 ‘Shui Yinxiang Fazhen Yi Zhenzi, Wo Yingxiang Ta Yi Beizi’ ' ¥  
- f ), see ‘Hunan Jiahe Chaiqian Diaocha Er [Investigation on Demolition in Jiahe, Hunan Province 
2]’.
96 See ‘Hunan Jiahe Chaiqian zhi Tong [the Sufferings o f Housing Demolition in Jiahe, Hunan 
Province]’, CCTV, 26 May 2004. In <http://news.sina.com.en/c/2004-05-26/10553336990.shtml>
(last visited 11 August 2008).
97 See ‘Hunan Jiahe Chaiqian Diaocha Er [Investigation on Demolition in Jiahe, Hunan Province 2]’.
98 See ‘Hunuan Jiahe Chaiqian Diaocha: Chaiqian Nenggou Zhulian Jiuzu ma? [Investigation on 
demolition in Jiahe, Hunan Province: Collective Liability among Family Members?7 ’, CCTV, May 14
2008. In <http://news.sina.com.en/c/2004-05-14/l 1113228504.shtml>(last visited 11 August 2008).
99 The two sisters were both school teachers, who had to hold collective responsibility. The father of 
the two sisters did not cooperate in the housing demolition and was not willing to sign the 
compensation contact. In order to protect their husbands, both were civil servants, the two sisters had
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This case shows that local government actively and directly engaged in commercial 
demolition, forced eviction and relocation under the guise of constructing a ‘public 
project’ for the ‘public interest’. Local police100 and local people’s courts101 were 
accomplices with local governments. There was severe abuse of power in these 
forced evictions, and evictees had few ways to access justice. This case also 
illustrates the vagueness of the ‘public interest’. As a last resort, the residents sought 
help from the media. Land requisition in Conghui, Guangdong Province, followed a 
similar pattern.102
4.4. The case of ‘the most stubborn house owner’
Shortly after the passing of Property Law (2007) by the NPC, the case of ‘China’s 
most stubborn house owner’ (literally the nailed down house, dingzi hu 
meaning a stubborn household that is hard to be coerced)103 in history generated hot 
debates on enforcement of the property law and protection of property rights.104
to get divorced. But the two sisters were still relocated to remote areas to work. See Luo Changping, 
‘Hunan Jiahe Xian Chaiqian Yinfa Yidui Jiemei Tongri Lihun [Demolition in Human Caused Sisters 
to Petition for Divorce on the Same Day’, Xin Jing Bao [Beijing News], 8 May 2004. In 
<http://news.sina.eom.en/c/2004-05-08/03142474910s.shtml>(last visited 17 August 2008).
100 Three residents who stayed on the roof o f their houses as a sign o f protest, were detained and 
accused o f ‘violent resistance of law enforcement’ (baoli kangfa and ‘obstructing public
affairs’ (fang'ai gongwu See Luo Changping, ‘Hunan Jiahe Xian Chaiqian Yinfa Yidui
Jiemei Tongri Lihun [Demolition in Human Caused Sisters to Petition for Divorce on the Same Day’.
101 Two hundred stuff in local people’s court were involved in forced evictions in Jiahe: in 2004, the 
Country’s People’s Court sent out two hundred police to remove uncooperative residents. See Wang 
Lin, ‘Hunansheng Jiahexian Qiangzhi Chaiqian Shijian de Sange Yiwen [Three doubts in forced 
evictions in Jiahe County, Henan Province]’, Beijing News [Xin Jing Bao], 18 May 2004. In 
<http://news.sina.com.en/e/2004-05-18/03092554727s.shtml> (last visited 11 August 11 2008).
102 On the housing demolition in Conghua, Guangdong Province, see Zhang Xiaohui, ‘Guangzhou 
Conghui Baoli Chaiqian Chumu Jingxin, Neicang Juda Jingji Liyi [shocking housing demolition in 
Guangzhou Conghui, which involved a large amount o f economic profits]’. Zhonghua Gongshang 
Shibao [China Business Weekly], 24 May 2005. In
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2005-05/24/content_2994850_2.htm>(last visited 17 August 2008).
103 The name refers to the local residents who refuse the local government’s order to move out o f their 
homes for settlement. These households are usually forced to be relocated in order to make way for 
commercial projects and are compensated by property developers or local governments. But usually 
the compensation is not adequate, and this is the main source of conflicts between the residents and 
property developers. The residents refuse to move, even though construction is proceeding around 
their (literally) home. Before this case, ldizi hu’ was often a negative term referring to the 
trouble-making person, but in this case, the term delivers positive meaning referring to people who are 
brave to protect their property rights.
104 The images and reports o f the house were headlines o f newspapers, and discussions were flooded 
Internet chat rooms. For example, see
<http://www.danwei.org/bbs/propertv rights the coolest na.php> (last visited 8 August 2008). There
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Chinese bloggers were the first to spread the news, followed by newspapers and 
national television. The New York Times observed: ‘Wu Ping...[the] 49-year-old 
restaurant entrepreneur knows how to attract attention—a potent weapon in China’s 
new media age, in which people try to use public opinion and appeals to the national 
image to influence the authorities’.105 This case is seen as an achievement of the 
supervision by the media and public opinion.
This case was about a couple in Jiulongpo District of Chongqing, Ms Wu Ping and 
Mr Yang Wu, who refused to move out of their house to make way for a commercial 
project, even when the construction work was going ahead around their house and 
developers turned their house into an islet (even after the district court made a 
judgment of forced eviction). A Chinese flag was on the roof with a hand-painted 
banner—‘a citizen’s legal property is not to be encroached upon’, according to 
Article 13 of the 2004 Constitution. The ‘islet’ stood alone in a 20- meter deep 
man-made pit. Mr Yang had to carry gas to his house, because all utilities were cut 
off.106
This case was seen a milestone in the progress of the Property Law as the first test of
107the Property Law’s guarantees of private property rights in China. However, this 
case in reality does not contain novel elements. It is just one of the innumerable cases 
in which private houses and apartments were demolished by government backed 
development projects with unfair compensation and forced eviction, giving rise to 
complaints, resistance and a degree of social chaos. Moreover, the case ended when
were also different translations regarding the name of this case: apart from ‘the most stubborn house 
owner’, others include ‘the most uncooperative house owner’, ‘the most coolest’, or ‘the most 
persistent’, etc.
Howard W. French, ‘Homeowners Stares Down Wreckers, at Least for a While’, The New York 
Times, 27 March 2007. In <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/27/world/asia/27china.html?fta=y> (last 
visited 08 August 2008).
106 See Zheng Zhu, ‘Dingzihu Weihe Zheyang Niu? [Why is the Nail House owner so stubborn?]’, 
Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan [Chinese News Weekly], 30 March 2007. In 
<http://news.sina.com.en/c/2007-03-30/140912655314.shtml> (last visited 11 August 2008).
107 See Ni Ching-Ching, ‘A Tall Stand for Property Rights in China’, Los Angeles Times, 30 March 
2007, In
<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-nailhouse30mar30, l,3954342.story?ctrack=l 
&cset=true> (last visited 6 April 2007).
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the couple gave up and accepted the compensation offered by the developers through 
mediation by the court and the local government. The house was then demolished.108
The problematic issues in this case lie in, for example, the due process of demolition 
and the basis of the judgment made by the Jiulongpo district court in Chongqing. 
There are obvious contrasts between national legislation and local regulations, 
between the local judicial authority and protection of civil rights, especially when the 
district court made the judgment based on the local regulation which is clearly 
against national legislation (for example, the contrasts between ‘Regulations for 
Management of Urban Residential Demolition and Eviction’ issued by the State 
Council and those of Chongqing Municipality).109 According to Articles 12, 13 and 
58 of the Land Administration Law (LAL), the procedure for demolition should be 
that the local government requisitions the LURs owned by the former residents and 
changes the land registration, and then the local government can sell LURs to the 
developers; developers can then apply for the approval of demolition and then 
proceed to construction. However, in ‘the most stubborn house owner’ case, the 
district government did not requisition the LURs and change land registration before 
it sold the LURs to developers, and developers conducted demolition without the 
state-owned land use rights certificate (guoyou tudi shiyongquan zheng HI WdlitMJl 
Using a metaphor to describe this situation, it was the district government 
that ‘married the daughter twice’ (yi nil er jia  — ).110 In this situation, how
can the owner of the house claim rights through the Property Law, even though
108 The result o f the story is: albeit with strong resistance, the couple was finally surrendered and 
accepted the developer’s compensation mediated by the court and district government. See Zhang 
Jialin, ‘ “Chongqing Zuiniu Dingzihu Jianzhu” Yi Bei Chai Chu [“The house o f the most stubborn 
house owner” in Chongqing has been demolished]’. People.com [Renmin Wang], 2 April 2007. In 
<http://society.people.com.cn/GB/1062/5553732.html> (last visited 11 August 2008).
109 For example, Article 7 of State Council ‘Regulations for Management o f Urban Residential 
Demolition and Eviction’ (2001) and Article 10 o f Chongqing ‘Regulations for Management o f Urban 
Residential Demolition and Eviction ’ (2003). The latter does not stress the approval documents 
regarding state-owned land use rights as a condition to proceed with housing demolition.
110 See Duan Hongqing and Wang Heyan, ‘Chongqing Dingzihu Shijian: Meiyou Yingjia de Duizhi 
[The Case o f the Nailed Down House in Chongqing: Confrontation without Winners]'. In Caijing 
Magazine, 2 April 2007,
<http://www.caijing.com.cn/newcn/ruleoflaw/other/2007-04-02/17498.shtml> (last visited 10 April,
2007).
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Article 4 of the Property Law states that ‘private property shall not be infringed 
upon’? In this case, at least, we do not see much enforceability of the Property Law. 
Residents could only refer to general principles to claim their rights, but what were 
the specific mechanisms? For example, it seems that Article 4 of the Property Law is 
just a repetition of Articles 12 and 13 of the Constitution. Moreover, the fashion of 
property law reform in China is influenced by the German law tradition that focuses 
on the legal text and technical methods: property law mainly concerns ‘the technical 
issues’, while ignoring the social dimension.111
5. The transformation of the role of government
Why does local government directly and actively participate in land requisition and 
forced eviction, and in some cases ally with thugs and secret societies? As analysed 
in Chapters Four and Six, under the dual land ownership and land allocation system, 
a range of rent-seeking opportunities for local governments and under-the-table 
partnerships between developers and officials have been formed. In the 1990s, some 
coastal cities first experimented with Zhengfu Jingying Chengshi (3&Jft^^f$TiJ),112 
which means local governments run cities in the same way a CEO runs a for-profit 
company.113 Local GDP has become a major standard for assessing the ability of 
local officials. Local officials are enthusiastic about constructing ‘showcase projects’ 
(xingxiang gongcheng ^ I ^ I f S ) . 114 These showcase projects often lead to land 
seizure and housing demolition.
As analysed in Chapter Six, since the tax sharing system, local government’s major 
source of revenue has shifted from taxation to misappropriating publicly owned 
assets, that is, selling LURs to commercial developers. The nationwide loss of
111 I was informed about this concern by Professor Cai Lidong from Law School o f Jilin University, 
in discussion with him at the London School o f Economic on 26 April 2007.
112 Liu Chenglin calls this the GRC doctrine. See Liu, ‘Informal Rules, Transaction Costs and the 
Failure o f Chinese Takings Law’: 7.
113 On this also see Jean Oi, ‘Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations o f Local State 
Corporatism in China’, World Politics 45, no. 1 (1992): 99-126.
114 Liu, ‘Informal Rules, Transaction Costs and the Failure o f Chinese Takings Law’: 8.
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revenue from the state-owned LURs transfer fees reaches more than ten billions 
RMB each year.115 Paid transfer of LURs becomes the basis for partnership between 
governments and the private sector in China. Developing a good relationship with 
local government is essential for ‘private’ developers to acquire more LURs, because 
the primary property market is monopolised by the governments under the leasing 
system, and what private property developers get is only partial property rights for 
limited durations.116 Quite often district governments serve as active collaborators of 
the private developers, while city governments become authoritative mediators and 
supervisors.117
Yet emphasis on the conflicts between central-local governments does not imply a 
well-intentioned central government. In fact, both central and local government have 
created a monopoly over the land supply that is responsible for the difficulties in 
curbing real estate prices and land seizures. In terms of the central government, it has 
monopolised the primary property market. Since the 1990s, the central government 
has centralised the administration of land supply. The land-banking system (tudi 
shougou chubei zhidu was established in 1996, and the first
land-banking agency was founded in Shanghai. The Land consolidation and 
rehabilitation centre of the Ministry of Land and Resources was established in 1998. 
Generally speaking, land banking refers to purchasing land and holding it with the 
intention that selling it in the future will be more profitable than the original payment. 
In the Chinese context, land banking means that both the central and local
115 Chen Fang and Zhang Honghe, ‘Guoyou Tudi Churangjin Liushi Baiyi Yishang: Shui Huoli Zuida? 
[More Than Ten Billion Loss o f the State-Owned LURs transfer fee: Who gets most profits?]’, Xinhua 
Wang [Xinhua Net], 5 August 2004. In
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-08/05/content_1715703.htm> (last visited 11 August 
2008).
116 See Richard Walker and Daniel Buck, ‘The Chinese Road: Cities in the Transition to Capitalism’, 
New Left Review, no. 46 (2007): 39-66.
117 See He Shenjing and Wu Fulong, ‘Property-Led Redevelopment in Post-Reform China: A Case 
Study of Xintiandi Redevelopment Project in Shanghai’, Journal o f  Urban Affairs 27, no. 1 (2005): 
1-23.
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government, by using its public power, reclaims the LURs for their future use. It is a 
mandatory administrative behaviour,118 and is not grounded in the law.119
In response to ‘the Notification on Strengthening the Management of State-Owned 
Land Assets’120 (State Council, 2001), land-banking agencies have developed 
rapidly in localities. When the banking system combines with the dual land 
allocation system, the central government can monopolise the supply of LURs in the 
primary property market, while local governments can in fact take over the 
provisions of LURs in the secondary property market. Local governments especially 
city governments can get LURs at low prices, but resell LURs at higher prices. ‘Low 
purchase price and high sale price’ provides much room for rent-seeking. The role of 
the government has been transformed into ‘scrambling interests with the people’ 
(yumin zhengli K ^ ^ ll) .121
Now there have been grassroots initiatives attempting to break up the monopoly of 
government and commercial developers over the property market. In urban China, 
housing cooperatives have emerged in Beijing, Wenzhou, Hangzhou, and Chongqing. 
Each individual participant invests money and forms cooperatives to construct 
housing rather than relying on commercial property developers. But housing 
cooperatives have difficulties in getting land and financial support. The first 
successful cooperative housing project (hezuo jianfang 1=H'^lli^)122 was initiated in
118 See Wang Ling, ‘Xianxing Tudi Shougou Chubei Zhidu Buliyu Goujian Hexie Shehui [The 
Contemporary Land Banking System is Harmful to the Construction o f the Harmonious Society]’, 17 
November 2006. In
<http://www.acla.org.cn/forum/printthread.php?Board=57&main=694265&type=post > (last visited 
31 July 2007).
119 For example, it is at odds with Article 13 o f the Constitution (2004) and Article 8 o f the 
Legislation Law (2000), as well as ‘pubic interest’ provided in Article 42 o f the Property Law (2007).
120 ‘Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Guoyou Tudi Zichan Guanli de Tongzhi’, available in < 
http://www.cas.cn/html/Dir/2001/04/30/5769.htm> (last visited 26 November 2008).
121 ‘Tudi Chubei Zhidu Zaocheng Gongqiu Jinzheng, Buying Yuming Zhengli [The Land Banking 
System Has Caused Shortage o f Supply and Demand, This System Should Not Scramble Interests 
with the People]’, Xinhua Wang [Xinhua Net], 3 July 2007. In
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2008-07/Q3/content 8478649.htm> (last visited 20 August 2008).
122 This should be distinguished from cooperative housing constructed by work units.
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Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province.123 Compared with the power of the government, 
ordinary people’s power is still rather weak.
Moreover, there is no efficient mechanism to supervise local governments and 
restrain their abuse of power. The above four cases and examples above show that 
local People’s Congresses play only very limited roles in supervision of land 
requisition and forced eviction in which civil rights are seriously infringed upon;124 
the media have become alternative channels for the people to express grievances and 
seek remedies.125 Mass Media now play a prominent role in supervision of public 
opinion (yulun jiandu ), but mass media are still embedded in the
institutional framework. For example, one issue of an influential Chinese business 
magazine—Caijing magazine—was blocked, presumably because it touched on the 
sensitive continuing controversy surrounding the Property Law. As Anne Cheung 
points out, privately owned or run newspapers are still not allowed; public opinion 
supervision should be seen as ‘a dynamic, interactive process involving the CCP 
[CPC]’.127 Coverage of cases involving land requisition and forced eviction is still 
sensitive and controlled.
Social unrest in post-Mao China and the responses of central and local government 
are also important to the examination of the changing power structure between 
central and local government. Decentralisation in China has shifted economic and 
political power from the central government to local governments, and the abuse of 
power by local governments and officials is one of the most important sources of 
disputes and conflicts between the people and officials. But this kind of
123 See Chen Zhouxi, ‘Quanguo Shouli Geren Jizi Jianfang Xiangmu Qidong [The First Individual 
Cooperative Housing Construction Project Starts]’, Dongfang Zaobao [Oriental Morning Post], 16 
November 2006. In< http://business.sohu.com/20061116/n246428428.shtml >(last visited 17 August 
2008).
124 Cai Dingjian, ‘Lun Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhidu de Gaige he Wanshan [On the Reform and 
Perfection o f the People’s Congress System]’, Zhengfa Luntan [Tribune o f  Political Science and Law] 
22, no. 6 (2004): 10.
125 Phan, ‘Enriching the Land or the Political Elite?’, 634.
126 Andrew Batson, Geoffrey A. Fowler and Qin Juying, ‘China Magazine is Pulled As Property Law 
Looms’, The Wall Street Journal, 9 March 2007.
127 Anne S. Cheung, ‘Public Opinion Supervision— A Case Study o f Media Freedom in China’: 360.
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• • 128decentralisation also assists the central government to deal with social unrest. For 
example, the central government can avoid blame and direct involvement in conflicts, 
and it can intervene (in some cases together with provincial governments) later in the 
conflict depending on several conditions and factors such as media exposure, number 
of participants and results involving death and injury.129 This is one of the reasons 
that the party-state can deal with conflict and resistance and manage social stability. 
Another dimension to examine this governance system is the party-state’s co-opting 
of social organisations. This is discussed in the following section.
6. The associational dimension
This section investigate the possible associational channel that people could organise 
themselves in order to protect their property rights. This issue is of course a big 
research question and deserves further in-depth study, this section just briefly 
analyses some key points. The evictees have been aware of their property rights in 
urban renewal and demolition.130 For example, evictees have begun to use the 
Constitution and the Property Law, the authority of which is higher than the 2001 
Regulation, to claim and protect their property rights.131 Thousands of citizens have 
applied for the constitutional review of the 2001 Regulation regarding local 
demolition and relocation from the standing committee of the NPC.132 More and 
more ‘property owners’ associations’ (yezhu weiyuanhui have emerged.
A property owners’ association is organised by property owners in the same 
residential community. The association is a non-governmental organisation that 
represents the interests of the whole residents in that residential community and 
supervises the work of the property management company. The association has the
128 See Cai Yongshun, ‘Power Structure and Regime Resilience: Contentious Politics in China’,
British Journal o f  Political Science 38 (2008): 411-432.
129 See more detail in ibid.
130 See Chen Xiao, ‘2003-2007: Chaiqian Xin Bianju [2003-2007: New Trends in Housing 
Demolition]’.
131 See ibid.
132 Cai Dingjian, ‘Lun Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhidu de Gaige he Wanshan [On the Reform and 
Perfection o f the People’s Congress System]’, 10.
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power to decide important issues regarding real properties in the residential 
community, and the power of this association is based on ownership of the real 
properties. However, the Property Law (2007) has not recognised the authority of the 
property owners’ association as a legal person, the ambiguous legal status of these 
associations clearly restrains their roles played in property rights protection and 
relevant litigation.
In order to assess the property owners’ activist associations and their embeddedness 
in the institutional framework, there is a need to sketch out China’s associational 
sphere. It is necessary to define the terms ‘social organisations’ (shehui tuanti or 
shetuan ? i® ) and ‘associations’ (xiehui In view of registration,
social organisations are divided into ‘registration exempted’, ‘unregistered and 
registered as companies’, and ‘registered’. ‘Registration exempted’ social 
organisations encompass eight People’s Organisations, registration exempted by the 
State Council, and Inner organisations of the work unit; ‘Registered’ social 
organisations (Narrow CSOs) (CSOs is short for Civil Society Organisations include 
academic groups, commercial associations, professional organisations and united 
groups).133
In terms of the relative autonomy from the Party-state, social organisations can also 
be classified as ‘official’ (guanban 'IfjtJ'), ‘semiofficial’ (banguan ^ 'B '), and 
‘non-governmental’ (fei zhengfu xing #© [/fft£).134 Official organisations have a 
close relationship with the Party, and such organisations include the Communist 
Youth League and the Trade Union Federation. The semiofficial social organisations 
must be approved by a state agency in charge of that social organisation. The
133 Chu Songyan, ‘The Developing Differences of Civil Society Organisations among Three 
Provinces— Beijing, Zhejiang and Heilongjiang in China’. Lecture at the London School o f Ecnomics, 
London, UK, 18 February 2005. The term ‘social organisations’ is more general, and ‘the association’ 
is one kind o f  social organisations. See Kenneth W. Foster, ‘Embedded within State Agencies: 
Business Associations in Yantai’, The China Journal, no. 47 (Jan., 2002): 41.
134 See B. Michael Frolic, ‘State-Led Civil Society’, In Civil Society in China, ed. Timothy Brook and 
B. Michael Frolic (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 62.
135 See ibid, 62.
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restructured relationship between the Party/state and society makes the CPC develop 
links to other organisations, such as United Front Organisations, Labour Unions, and 
business associations.136 These organisations allow the party to organise interests 
emerging in the course of reform.137
The registration system {dengji f f f i )  plays an important role in controlling and 
regulating social organisations. The ‘Regulations on the Registration and 
Management of Social Organisations’, issued in draft form in 1989 and finalised in 
1998, established the corporatist strategy of the CPC.138 Although neither the 
Party-state nor the social organisations use the term ‘corporatism’139 for describing 
the links between them, the regulations reveal elements of corporatism: every 
organisation must register with the government (the bureaux of Civil Affairs) and be 
sponsored by a state unit or ‘parent’.
The danger for the ‘semiofficial’ associations is that they acquire too much 
administrative power, which in turn creates much room for rent-seeking. There are 
many examples of this problem. Some officials from the land administration 
departments ‘jumped into the sea’ (xiahai resigning from official posts and
doing business), and often they could be recruited immediately by property 
developers on high salaries as consultants or could establish joint ventures with 
property developers, because these former officials still possessed guanxi 0 £ )^ ) in 
land approval and allocating LURs. Such retired land administration officials can
136 Business associations have special meaning in English law and they refer to corporations, 
partnership, and other joint venture. But in China, they refer to a kind o f social organisations. Business 
associations in private sector o f China include, for example, the All-China Federation o f Industry and 
Commerce (ACFIC), the Self-Employed Labourers Association (SELA), and the Private Enterprises 
Association (PEA).
137 See Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Social and Institutional Dynamics o f One-Party Systems’, in The 
Dynamics o f  Established One-Party Systems, ed. Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (New 
York: Basic books, 1970), 34-36.
138 See Shehui Tuanti Dengji Guanli Tiaoli [Social Organisation Registration and Management 
Regulations’, promulgated by the State Council on 25 September 1998, implemented on 25 October 
1998.
139 On corporatism, see e.g., Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, Trends toward 
Corporatist Intermediation (Contemporary Political Sociology, Vol. I) (Beverly Hills; London: Sage 
publications, 1979); Jonathan Unger, and Anita Chan. ‘China, Corporatism and the East Asian Model’, 
Australian Journal o f  Chinese Affairs, no. 33 (January 1995): 29-54.
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work in the Real Estate Associations, and they are welcomed by property developers 
as well.
Considering the above constrains posed to the associational sphere, there are and will 
be many barriers to the development of non-governmental and grassroots 
organisations such as property owners’ associations. The property owners’ activism 
and their associational activities are limited in terms of their embeddedness in the 
party-state governance system and the apparatus of the Party/state. Moreover, when 
facing the power of local governments, property owners’ associations are in 
disadvantaged positions. For example, the Property Law does not recognise property 
owners’ associations as legal persons that enjoy rights to sue and arbitrate, and this 
clearly restrains these associations taking part in collective suits and actions.
7. Conclusion
From the examination of the enforceability of property rights, this chapter shows the 
blurred boundaries between public property and private property, between public 
power (gongquan £>&) and private rights (siquan This chapter also
illustrates the differences between legal and social understandings of property rights, 
between lawfulness and legitimacy, for example in what constitutes adequate 
compensation. Land requisition and housing demolition have been the focus of this 
chapter, providing a lens to examine one of the features of private property rights in 
China, which is vulnerable to state requisition. The revival of private property is 
limited in terms of the difficulties with the enforcement of private property rights. 
Land disputes and conflict also reflect the changing relation between the state and 
society in post-Mao China. Social activism and the emerging civil society are 
‘embedded’140 in the institutional framework.
140 See generally, Peter Ho, China s Embedded Activism.
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In market reform, economic growth has been prioritised but social equality has been 
largely ignored. Farmers are losing their land to urban expansion. In the urban area, 
the space of the city has been separated: through and after demolition and forced 
eviction, socially and economically disadvantaged people have been forced to move 
out of the inner city, while rich and privileged people are moving in. The huge gap 
between rich and poor is fuelling widespread hostility toward the rich, and this may 
adversely affect the long-term development of Chinese society and economy.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions: Private Property and China—the 
Trajectory of Change
1. Defining property in China
Thirty years after embarking on a programme of economic reform and attracting 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), property rights (those in real estate in particular) 
have become a crucial issue in China. Every person in China now dreams of owning 
his or her real estate and invests most of their savings in real estate. But in 
present-day China, to what extent do people really own their property—for example, 
their flats or houses? What does ownership really mean? And why is ownership 
important for people—is it important because it is closely linked to status, privilege, 
or wealth? Who has the authority to define ownership? And in which way do the 
Chinese leadership choose to draw the boundaries between the public and the private 
in property rights?
Some answers to these questions may be found in the new Property Law. The long 
process of drafting the property law in China took place against the background of 
the development of the private sector. The Property Law that came into effect in 
20071 defines ownership as an absolute and supreme right, and equal protection is 
provided for public and private property for the first time since 1949. There is also a 
clear demarcation of state ownership, collective ownership and private ownership in 
property law.2 It is hoped by Chinese lawmakers that the greater clarity of property 
rights through property law legislation will promote the market economy.
Yet many questions about the nature of the property law itself remain unresolved— 
for example, whether ownership should be an economic institution (jingji zhidu %x.
rfrJllQ or a social institution (shehui zhidu rfrJlS;). Current property law 
defines ownership as an economic institution, because being regarded as a social
1 The Property Law was promulgated by the National People’s Congress (NPC) on 16 March 2007, 
and implemented on 1 October 2007.
2 See Chapter Three.
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institution is closely linked to the sensitive dichotomy of socialism versus capitalism. 
By defining ownership as just an economic institution, the property law legislation 
prioritises ‘efficiency’ rather than ‘equality’. However, in China, the assumption that 
the clarity of property rights is a sine qua non of economic growth is highly 
questionable.
Furthermore, there is often a gap between the legal definition of ownership and 
ownership as understood and practised in society, and property lawmaking often lags 
behind social change. There exist variations, tensions and intricacies in terms of 
different forms of de facto ownership. At the same time, the boundaries between 
public ownership and private ownership are blurred. In contrast to the official, and 
indeed legal, support for unitary and exclusive property rights, the reality of the 
property regime has seen the fragmentation of property rights. For example, 
state-owned assets have been transferred to those who hold political power, local 
governments have de facto control over collectively-owned rural land, and property 
purchasers have ownership over buildings but not over the land on which their flats 
and houses are built. The long process of property lawmaking is a process to 
‘propertise’ the fragmented rights that emerged in the process of economic reform; 
however, there are still residual categories3 that are difficult to define.
The analysis of historical and cultural contexts of property rights demonstrates that 
no absolute and exclusive ‘private’ property existed in traditional China; the private 
usually referred to kinship not the individual, and the distinction between the public 
sphere and the private sphere was also blurred. The examination of property in land 
in late imperial China shows that private property was inferior to public property and 
property-holding in land was fragmented. For example, different people could claim 
‘ownership’ over both the topsoil and the subsoil of the land. Land was alienable,
3 For example, ‘minor property rights apartments’ that are build on collectively-owned rural land. See 
Chapter 4, Section 4.2.
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subject to sale and purchase.4 The concept of unitary and exclusive property rights 
only emerged in the Civil Code during the late Qing and the Republic. Under the 
impulse to purge China of extraterritoriality,5 the late Qing and the Republic moved 
towards adopting a Civil Law based system presumably because Civil Law was then 
seen to be modem and perhaps in emulation of Japan. This Civil Code was not really 
driven by indigenous causes springing from Chinese society at that time.6
Collectivisation (1956-1978) was intended to remove landlords7 and governance by 
gentry in rural China, to eliminate private ownership, and to create collective 
proprietorship by farmers. This was modelled on post-1917 Soviet collectivisation 
but ignored the differences in natural conditions and governance between the 
countryside in China and in the USSR. Russian farmers in pre-1917 worked in
Q
communes (the mir or obshchina)\ whereas China had limited urbanisation and a 
huge rural area, and farmers were governed by kinship especially in southeast China. 
The consequences of eliminating private ownership and gentry governance in mral 
China include the state stepping into the empty space left behind by the rural gentry. 
But there are so many unavoidable local variations in geography, agricultural 
products and economic activities in China9 that the central government is not able to 
make a comprehensive plan for mral development and direct every aspect of such 
development.
4 See Chapter Two on property and property rights in historical context.
5 See Chapters One and Two. Also see Philip C. C. Huang, ‘Civil Adjudication in China, Past and 
Present’, Modem China 32, no. 2 (2006): 145-147.
6 See Chapter Two.
7 ‘Landlordism’ was shorthand for something more complicated. For example, James L. Watson 
argues that ‘landlords’ were not necessarily individuals; they were landowning ‘corporations’ 
embedded in complex lineages. See James Watson, ‘Hereditary Tenancy and Corporate Landlordism 
in Traditional China: ACase Study’, Modem Asian Studies 11, no. 2 (1977): 161-182; Maurice 
Freedman, Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwantung (London: Athlone Press, 1966).
8 See ‘A False Start: The Birth and Early Activities o f the People’s Commissariat o f agriculture, 
1917-1920’, in James W. Heinzen, Inventing a Soviet Countryside: State Power and the 
Transformation o f  Rural Russia, 1917-1929 (Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 2004c), 11-46.
9 For example, picking tea in mountainous area in Zhejiang Province involves much manual labour, 
and this kind o f  work cannot just be done by a machine; wheat is grown in Northern China and rice is 
grown in Southern China, and growing rice is more labour intensive.
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Private ownership has re-emerged since the economic reforms and decollectivisation 
were introduced in rural China in 1978. With the introduction of the household 
responsibility system, the ‘private’ was selectively granted to farmers, and farmers 
were given more autonomy. Since 1984, the focus of economic reform has shifted 
from the rural area to the urban area, and economic reform has seen the selective 
re-admission of private property into the socio-economic framework in urban China. 
After the ‘southern tour’ of Deng Xiaoping in 1992, private enterprises flourished 
nationwide, and this included taking off the hats of many ‘red-hat enterprises’. Since 
the corporatisation program initiated in 1994, the focus of the SOEs reform has been 
shifted from delegation of decision-making authority to corporate governance and 
ownership. The 15th National Congress of the CPC in 1997 declared further reform 
of ownership. In the report delivered by Jiang Zemin to this congress, ‘grasping the 
large and freeing the small’ (zhuada fangxiao was endorsed as the focus
of the economic reform strategy. Small and medium sized enterprises were sold to 
private owners.
However, there are many limits to this revival of private property. For example, in 
rural China dismantling collectivism did not give rise to individualism. According to 
Article 39 of Property Law, ownership refers to the rights to possess, use, benefit 
from and dispose of one’s own property. But in terms of the collective ownership of 
rural land, controversies surround the appropriation and alienability of rural land. 
Land is the most important social security for farmers but collective ownership of 
rural land is an incomplete ownership, because farmers cannot dispose of rural land 
freely. Collective ownership over rural land is vulnerable to both compulsory 
acquisition by the state and illegal confiscation. Local governments and rent-seeking 
local officials become the de facto owners and farmers are excluded. Furthermore, as 
farming for the market has developed since 1978, ownership needs to be understood 
in the context of economic activity, but collective ownership defined in law is not 
sufficient to explain who owns what in terms of the production, harvest and 
distribution of agricultural products.
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In terms of the transformation of state ownership in urban China, the identity of who 
can represent the state as the owner of state-owned assets is not clear. As reforms 
have stuck halfway between the plan and the market, and more and more ‘rents’ have 
been ‘privatised’, the control of public assets has been gradually transferred to the 
persons or privileged groups who hold political power. In the era of fiscal and 
political decentralisation (from 1994 onwards, in particular), the quasi-federal 
character of local government gives it more power to control and allocate resources, 
and the owner(s) of public assets have become even more ambiguous.10
This ambiguity of private ownership is also demonstrated in the emerging urban 
property market, which is often regarded as the most important indication of the 
revival of private property. For example, no one could easily answer the question: 
what do we mean by owning private property in China? Although the land use rights 
(LUR) system was introduced, which is a big change to the state-owned urban land 
system, LURs are still allocated administratively in both primary and secondary 
property markets.11 In China, there is no land market, just a ‘real estate’ market, that 
is, a market only in buildings. Far from being a free market, the property market in 
China has been largely politicised, which is illustrated in the central-local 
relationship. Furthermore, the ambiguous relationship between the central 
government, the market, and local governments as entrepreneurs has blurred the 
boundaries between the public and private sectors. Private ownership over real estate 
is only a use right for a fixed period of years (for example, 40 years for commercial 
property and 70 years for residential property). Although property law does provide 
the possibility for renewal, it is not very clear who owns what after the expiration of 
the lease.
10 See Chapter Five.
11 See Chapter Six.
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From the examination of ownership and the socio-economic transformation in 
post-Mao China, we could see that ownership defined in the law and ownership as 
understood and practised in society often diverge significantly. For example, in 
contemporary China, there is a clear distinction between public property and private 
property in the law, but the boundaries between public ownership and private 
ownership in reality are blurred. The fragmentation of property rights in reality poses 
challenges to the unitary and exclusive theory of ownership in post-Mao China. 
Political elites define the conception of ownership in law and the distinction between 
the public and the private in property rights. These conceptions and distinctions are 
manifested in the rhetoric of rulers in imperial China, Mao’s revolutionary rhetoric 
and in Deng’s reform programme. They served (and still serve) the purposes of 
control and governance, but are often resisted in social practice and popular thinking, 
leading to alienation and conflict.12 The definition and distinction between the public 
and private in property rights give us a view of Chinese rulership and the role of ‘the 
state’, as well as the changing relations between the state and society.
2. Political implications of the revival of private property
The nature of private property and its social and political implications provide an
important vehicle for analysing the changing nature of modem China. As a result of
the recognition of private property in the law and the formation of the urban property
market, more and more capital has flowed into the property market, property
developers have prospered and a stratum of property owners is also in the making.
But what forces have been unleashed? What are the political implications of the
revival of private property in China? Much research has done on the political
orientations of the rich social strata or ‘the middle classes’ and their participation in
1 2voluntary organisations. There have been questions about the role of the new rich 
in society: whether they have political claims and pursue their goals through
12 See Chapter Seven.
13 See e.g., Benjamin L. Read, ‘Democratizing the Neighbourhood? New Private Housing and 
Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China’, The China Journal, no. 49 (2003): 34.
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autonomous associations14 that could form an embryonic civil society, or whether 
they simply use the current system to further their own interests.15 The research on 
civil society is particularly relevant here.
Many scholars have attempted to take the ideas of civil society and the public sphere 
out of their modem Western context and place them in the context of historical and 
contemporary China. Some historians have argued about whether civil society 
emerged against the backdrop of rapid socio-economic transformation in late Qing 
and Republican China, especially in some cities such as Hankou and Beijing.16 Some 
historians have focused on the public sphere in the same period. During this time, 
various kinds of associations were formed, including guilds (hang or hui f f , 
and trade guildhalls (hanghui t l ^ ) , 17 and, later, larger chambers of commerce 
were established by separate guilds and trade guildhalls, performing more important 
public functions.18 As a result of these developments, some historians have argued 
that taken together these institutions guilds, trade guildhalls, and chambers of 
commerce constituted ‘the public sphere’, which is expressed through the Chinese 
word gong (-£-). This concept of ‘the public sphere’ was influenced by the theories of 
Jurgen Habermas who defined the public sphere as an intermediate realm between 
the state and society, constituted by public opinion and debates in coffeehouses, 
salons and newspapers, and so on.19 In light of the search for civil society and the 
public sphere in contemporary China, their relationship with democratisation is also
14 For example, the development o f business associations such as local Chambers o f Commerce is 
considered as a further step to remove interference of direct state control from private business. See 
e.g., Jonathan Unger, ‘ “Bridges”: Private Business, the Chinese Government and the Rise o f New  
Associations’, The China Quarterly, no. 147 (1996): 795-819.
15 See Read, ‘Democratizing the Neighbourhood?’: 35-36.
16 See e.g., Mary Backus Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhejiang 
Province, 1865-1911 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986); William T. Rowe, Hankow: 
Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984); 
David Strand, Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics in the 1920s (Berkeley: University o f 
California Press, 1989).
17 See Chapter Two, Section 3.5.
18 See Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Chinese Communist Party, Private 
Entrepreneurs, and Political Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 16-17.
19 See Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation o f  the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category o f  Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity, 
1992).
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an important issue.20 However, both ‘civil society’ and ‘the public sphere’ are 
concepts based on a clear distinction between state and society, thus they do not 
capture the complex interaction between the state and society in late imperial China.
The concepts of civil society and the public sphere are embedded in European
01bourgeois society, and cannot be easily transposed to the Chinese context. The 
divergence of the Chinese practice and the Western model has led scholars to 
question whether civil society and the public sphere existed and could exist in 
China.22 As William Rowe claims, autonomy and state control were not clear cut, 
and maintaining a balance between these two aspects was actually ‘a process of 
continual negotiation’. In terms of contemporary China, as Dickson pomts out, if 
civil society may be said to be emerging, this kind of civil society is only qualified as 
‘nascent’ or ‘embryonic’.24
Rather than focusing on the associational sphere as the large literature mentioned 
above has done, my research looks at some of the foundations of an emergent civil 
society in China through the case of private property, which historically could be 
seen as the foundation of the state/civil society schema in the West (for example, in 
Marx’s thought). The model of civil society is based on a clear distinction between 
the public and private sector. When the same logic is applied to the legal field, there 
is a distinction between public and private property. However, the boundaries 
between the public and the private (for example, in ownership) in the context of
20 See Dickson, Red Capitalists in China, 17. Also see e.g., Heath B. Chamberlain, ‘On the Search for 
Civil Society in China’, Modem China 19, no.2 (1993): 199-215; Thomas B. Gold, ‘The Resurgence 
o f Civil Society in China’, Journal o f  Democracy 1, no.l (1990): 18-31; He Baogang, The Democratic 
Implications o f  Civil Society in China (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997); Timothy Brook and B.
Michael Frolic, ‘The Ambiguous Challenge o f Civil Society’, in Civil Society in China, ed. Timothy 
Brook and B. Michael Frolic (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 3-18.
21 Also see e.g., Brook and Frolic, ‘The Ambiguous Challenge o f Civil Society’; Frederic Wakeman, 
‘The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate: Western Reflections on Chinese Political Culture’, 
Modem China 19, no. 2 (1993): 108-138. .
22 See Philip C. C. Huang, ‘ “Public Sphere”/”Civil Society” in China? The Third Realm between 
State and Society’, Modem China 19, no. 2 (1993a): 216-240; Wakeman, ‘The Civil Society and 
Public Sphere Debate’.
23 William T. Rowe, ‘The Problem o f “Civil Society” in Late Imperial China’, Modem China 19, no.
2 (1993): 148.
24 See Dickson, Red Capitalists in China, 18.
2 2 2
post-Mao China are blurred. Thus, neither the binary model of ‘state versus society’ 
nor the ternary model of ‘state/civil society/the individual’ is sufficient to explain the 
dynamic property regime in both historical and contemporary China, for a number of 
complex and interrelated reasons.
For one thing, the very meaning of the concept of ‘private property’ is ambiguous. In 
the past thirty years of economic reform, Chinese policy makers have favoured 
efficiency rather than equality or fairness. Property is regarded as an instrument to 
promote economic growth. What private property means in the Chinese context is 
limited to wealth, that is, the connotation of private property is limited to its 
economic dimension and its monetary value. Yet accumulation of wealth does not 
necessarily give rise to private ownership; for example, communism has wealth too, 
but it is collectively owned. Rather, the accumulation of wealth could serve as the 
justification for expropriation.25 For example, the current rent-seeking is 
accumulation of wealth by privileged people who hold political power and 
misappropriation of public property. Returning to the contradiction between the 
private and the public in property rights in both Chinese political ideology and the 
debates between the neo-liberalists and the new-left, what is at issue in these tensions 
and debates is the accumulation and allocation of wealth.
In addition, there is a fundamental imbalance between the key terms involved. 
‘Private property’ does not enjoy equal status with ‘public property’. For instance, 
private companies are still excluded from ‘strategic sectors’ such as telecom services, 
newspapers, television, publishing, power generation, railways, and petrochemicals. 
Private firms also run into obstacles when trying to secure financing from a 
state-dominated banking system. On this issue, Huang Yasheng also points out that 
SOEs enjoy a superior status due to the ‘political pecking order’ in which SOEs are
25 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2ed. (Chicago: London University o f Chicago Press, 1998), 
66 .
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26at the highest rung, whereas private enterprises are at the lowest rung. As Yasheng 
Huang notes, private companies are even treated worse than foreign companies. 
There are still ideological, structural, and political constraints to the development of 
the private sector.27 These constraints were designed to prevent private enterprises 
from competing with SOEs.
It should also be noted that China has achieved rapid economic growth without a 
civil society or public sphere. To put it the other way round, civil society or the 
public sphere does not seem to have been of much importance for economic growth 
in China. Moreover, the private sector has even formed a partnership with local 
government.29 For example, the resurrection of private property is part of the 
economic reform programme launched in 1978, and ‘red capitalists’ have been 
welcomed into the ruling party as part of what it calls Socialism with Chinese 
characteristics. Business associations such as chambers of commerce are embedded 
in the Party-state apparatus, and do not enjoy fully-fledged autonomy.
Finally, so far as land in China is concerned, there is not an efficient and transparent 
conversion mechanism that could transform assets into capital. This is due largely to 
the dual landownership system and the two-level property markets: urban land is 
state owned, while rural land is collectively owned; in the primary property market, 
the state (represented by city governments in most cases) can acquire rural land 
collectively owned by villagers (represented by collective economic organisations 
and village committees), but not vice versa. City and county governments can 
therefore sell land use rights to buyers through auction, tender or negotiation. The 
transfer of LURs constitutes a secondary property market. Farmers cannot transfer 
rural land freely and cannot turn rural land into capital, and farmers’ property rights
26 Huang Yasheng, Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment During the Reform Era (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 117.
27 See generally ibid, especially 151-204.
28 See Huang Yasheng, ‘Can India Overtake China?’, Foreign Policy, no. 137 (2003): 76.
29 See Chapters Six and Seven.
30 On this issue, also see Dickson, Red Capitalists in China.
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are vulnerable to land seizure. Urban residents’ property rights are also vulnerable to 
housing demolition and forced eviction.31
By contrast, people who hold political power can misappropriate state-owned assets 
for their own interests. In this sense, political power is turned into capital, and such 
capital in turn is inclined to find its way into the hands of those in political power. 
Thus, if capitalism may be said to be emerging in China, this kind of capitalism 
might only amount to ‘crony capitalism’ or ‘political capitalism’ characterised by 
rent-seeking and ‘a market economy under crony capitalism’. We also need to note 
how state control or governance (whether central or local) affects the distribution and 
allocation of resources especially at the local level. Thus the examination of the 
relationship between the centre and localities is important.
3. Private property and China in the future
There is a need to reflect on both economic reform and legal reform in China. The 
reform is ‘groping for stones to cross the river’, as Deng Xiaoping called it. This 
metaphor indicates that economic reform is directed by the ongoing facts without 
clear guidelines or legal rules, or else that guidelines and legal rules often lag behind 
the pace of economic reform. It is pragmatic or even opportunistic. Although this 
attitude towards the reform shields it from the debates over socialism versus 
capitalism and has opened up much space for the growth of the private sector, China 
has become a laboratory in which people can take adventures. Economic growth and 
accumulation of wealth have been highly cherished, while morality and laws have 
been put aside. Everything in society can be commodified and materialised, but only 
in China’s own terms.
31 See Chapter Seven.
32 See Chapter Five. Also see e.g., Wu Jinglian, ‘The Road Ahead for Capitalism in China’, The 
McKinsey Quarterly, no. 2006, special edition; Andrew H. Wedeman, From Mao to Market: Rent 
Seeking, Local Protectionism, and Marketization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 2-3.
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As opposed to the power of elites that push for economic and legal reforms, the other 
source of power that is also of importance for reforms—the grassroots initiatives 
(either individual or communal)—are often ignored. China’s economic reform is not 
just a ‘planned and top-down’ project directed by Deng Xiaoping who is often 
regarded as the chief designer of market reform. Similarly, Beijing did not and is not 
able to conceive a unified and comprehensive plan that oversees every process and 
aspect of economic reform. The reality has been far more complex and intricate. In 
fact, many initiatives that have propelled the reforms are from the grassroots.
Yet these grassroots initiatives always run into obstacles to get recognition in the law; 
in many cases, these initiatives even get suppressed. In the property regime, for 
example, the rural area has seen the emergence of ‘minor property rights’ 
apartments,34 and the urban area has witnessed individual cooperative housing in 
attempts to get affordable housing.35 These grassroots property arrangements 
contradict the official, written law. ‘Extralegal property rights’36 have emerged in the 
course of economic reform. One of the difficulties in property lawmaking is how to 
define these extralegal property rights and how to gradually integrate them into the 
property law system.
Given the features of economic reform and legal reform in China, the private, 
informal power from the grassroots has always been the bearer of the risks generated 
by the reforms. The power from the grassroots breaks through the old planned 
system, but in the meantime it disobeys the law; or it obeys the law, but does not 
conform to policy. Power from the grassroots lingers in the grey area between ‘the
33 Also see James Kynge, China Shakes the World: A Titan s Rise and Troubled Future and the 
Challenge fo r  America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 12-14.
34 Opponents o f ‘minor property rights’ apartments base their arguments mainly on the law, because 
‘minor property rights’ is not a formal legal concept and its legal status is vague. However, should this 
kind o f apartments be banned? Is it possible to legalise these extralegal property rights like ‘minor 
property rights apartments’? On minor property rights apartments, also see Section 4.2 o f Chapter 
Four.
35 See Chapter Seven, Section 5.
36 This term is borrowed from Hernando De Soto, The Mystery o f  Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs 
in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (London: Black Swan, 2001).
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legal’ and ‘the illegal’. The scenario of lawmaking in China shows the pattern that 
reality pushes the law to reform, and it struggles to strike a balance between party 
policy and law as well as between central and local law-making. One of the most 
significant examples of this practice surfaced in 1987, when the Party approved and 
experimented with the grant of land use rights in selected localities such as Shenzhen, 
although this practice obviously contravened the Constitution.37 So could minor 
property rights apartments be legalised by following the legalisation of land leases in 
the future? The answer will depend primarily on Party policy rather than further 
lawmaking or amendments of the law. Moreover, under the ‘quasi-federal’ structure 
of government, whether an informal institution is successful or gets legalised is 
largely due to the attitudes of local governments, which can play roles in either 
facilitating or obstructing the emergence of informal institutions.
It is also necessary to rethink the nature of private property in post-Mao China. In 
addition to looking at the legal framework, it is also important to examine the 
political and social frameworks within which private property might make sense. The 
economic reform of the past 30 years shows the strong desire of both the government 
and ordinary people for wealth, and in the pursuit of resources there has been fierce 
competition between the state-owned sector, the private sector as well as foreign 
enterprises. In the course of economic reform, privileges based on rank and status 
have been transformed into capital, and rank and status decide the right to get access 
to resources and allocate resources. Property therefore is intimately linked to wealth, 
political power, privileges and status. A modernisation program that emphasises 
economic growth without concurrent political reform poses limits to the 
re-emergence of private property in post-Mao China, and the revival of private 
property is also constrained by socialist ideology. Reforms in the future need to
37 The first auction o f land use rights was done in Shenzhen on 1 December 1987; four months later, 
on 12 April 1988 the constitution was amended to allow the transfer o f land use rights (Clause 4 of 
Article 10).
38 Atypical example o f the success in individual cooperative housing construction was in Wenzhou, 
Zhejiang Province, because of the strong business associations, sufficient local finance and support 
from the local government in Wenzhou.
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eliminate ranks and privileges in order to provide an equal and fair environment for 
the private sector. Attention will also need to be given to the long-term consequences 
of the current property regime, especially in light of China’s current population 
policies39 and inheritance law. For example, the Law of Succession (1985)40 only 
provides two orders in statutory inheritance (fading jicheng and this
provision makes it relatively easy for property to fall into a category without a 
successor or legatee, so that such private property eventually belongs to the state.42
Apart from the above, this study also seeks to contribute to our broader and 
comparative understanding of property and Chinese law. Research into the 
fragmentation of property and property rights in historical and contemporary China 
makes us realise the serious oversimplification involved in the current discourses on 
the conception of property rights in the property law reform, which are based on the 
Civil Law framework in which a division of the public and the private took root.43 
Furthermore, private property should be defined, at least in China, not only as 
‘exclusive’ ownership but also as the right to get access to resources and share 
communal resources. This is particularly crucial for rural China that lacks market 
information, technological support, public service, and social security offered by the 
state. In the meantime, rural development is also restrained by the urban-rural divide. 
Establishing a communal sphere is thus a possible way to fill the empty space left by 
the state-provision system. Of course, achieving this goal needs further political 
reform involving promotion of self-governance or communal governance of 
resources, and this would be a large future research topic.
39 China’s population policies are colloquially referred as ‘one-child policy’, but the ‘one-child 
policy’ characterisation is not exact. China’s population policies are based on different conditions and 
local variations. In reality, the average Chinese family today contains 1.8 children.
40 Promulgated by the NPC on 10 April 1985; implemented on 1 October 1985.
41 Jicheng Fa [Law of Succession] (1985), Article 10: ‘First in order: spouse, children, parents.
Second in order: brothers and sisters, paternal grand parents, maternal grandparents’.
42 Jicheng Fa [Law of Succession] (1985), Article 32: ‘An estate which is left with neither a successor 
nor a legatee shall belong to the state or, where the decreased was a member of an organisation under 
collective ownership before his or her death, to such an organisation’.
43 This is the dominant perspective in current Chinese scholarship. For example, Liang Huixing at the 
CASS provided a model for property law drafting, and his model is based on the Pandectist system 
and German civil code which encompass five books. See Chapter Three.
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The concepts and theories of property rights that emerged from late imperial China 
onwards developed against the backdrop of modernisation and state-building in 
China. Unitary and exclusive property rights have been regarded as constitutive of 
modernity. However, such ‘imagined’ nationalism has overlooked variations between 
different localities and the complicated relationship between the central government 
and local governments. The imagined nationalism also ignored the continuities and 
discontinuities in values and institutions from historical to contemporary China. 
Capturing the complexity of property rights in China therefore requires a broader 
picture and analysis of modem Chinese history. We should focus on the manner in 
which the law has been shaped by both governmental complexity and dynamic 
socio-economic change.
This study also shows the limitations of the research paradigm (offered in particular 
by Lubman) ‘understanding China through Chinese law’.44 As demonstrated in the 
introduction and the subsequent substantive chapters, the dichotomy of China versus 
the West is problematic, and there is as much continuity as discontinuity in the 
transformation of Chinese legal and governmental systems. These observations 
should be applied to the comparison between Chinese law and ‘Western’ law. In 
China today the number of laws is dramatic: there are about 300 laws promulgated 
by the NPC and its Standing Committee; about 800 administrative regulations 
promulgated by the State Council; and more than 30,000 normative orders and local 
regulations.45 In the area of property, there has been a series of laws that protect 
property rights. However, property rights are fragmented and owners of property 
remain ambiguous. This research on the property regime in China also challenges 
liberalism or neo-liberalism that regard private property rights protected by ‘the rule
44 It is not sufficient to understand China just through Chinese law. Examples include, for example, 
Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reforms in China after Mao (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1999); Randall Peerenboom, China's Long March toward Rule o f  Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). Although both works give comprehensive review o f  the Chinese legal 
framework, both take a relatively narrow view of Chinese law. Also see Chapter 1, Section 2.
45 This is my calculation according to the Beijing University’s database o f Chinese laws and 
regulations, see <http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/ > (last visited 21 November 2008).
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of law’ as the sine qua non for sustained economic growth. China has achieved high 
speed economic growth while property rights remain vaguely defined and weakly 
enforced. In China, there exists a weak link between economic growth and the clarity 
of property rights. This research shows that in order to capture the complexity of the 
property regime, we need to examine ‘another art or science’46 of governance in 
China.
Rather than overstating the divergence of legal systems between China and ‘the 
West’ and confining the examination to the internal workings of legal institutions and 
their functions, it is better to give attention to the deeper question of how China is 
governed. Governance comprises not only the formal institutions (for example, legal 
and political institutions) but also informal institutions (for example, the dynamic 
central-local relationship, guanxi and social networks). We need to look beyond the 
law, and extend the analysis to the overarching framework under which the law 
works, including socio-economic conditions, governance of China, and the 
interactions between these two aspects. A Taw-in-society’47 approach should be 
adopted rather than a Taw-and-society’ approach. In this way, this study seeks to 
contribute to our broader and comparative understanding of property and Chinese 
law.
46 See e.g., Tim Murphy, ‘Durkheim in China’, in Law and Sociology, ed., Michael Freeman (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 108-118.
47 See e.g., Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, trans., Klaus A. Ziegert (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004); Tim Murphy, The Oldest Social Science? Configurations o f  Law and 
Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
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Postscript: New Changes to Rural Land Use Rights and the 
Rural-Urban Divide
As I was completing this thesis, the third Plenum of the 17th CPC Central Committee 
(hereinafter the Plenum) was held on 9-12 October 2008. The Plenum has set a new 
round of rural reforms in motion, and has brought new changes to rural land use 
rights. Here, in the conclusion, it is necessary to analyse these new changes and their 
implications. Before the analysis, there is a need to introduce some of the 
background to this Plenum. As discussed in Chapter Four, Xiaogang Village at 
Fenyang County of Anhui Province is the first place that adopted the household 
responsibility system (HRS). Through the HRS system, farmers have gained 
contractual management rights, one important form of land use rights to 
collectively-owned rural land. But such land use rights are incomplete and limited, 
and they cannot be freely circulated in the market. There are now differences 
between subsistence farming and farming for the market, and the latter does need a 
well-functioning market and cooperative working. The dispersed contractual 
management rights owned by individual households, however, cannot meet the 
income and production requirements of farmers in the changing economic context. 
Moreover, under the current legal system, the protection for farmers’ land rights is 
not sufficient. Land acquisition and land use rights requisition are the only way to let 
farmers’ land use rights enter into the market. This has opened up many rent-seeking 
opportunities for local governments. Nevertheless, grassroots initiatives by farmers 
have already broken through the legal and institutional constraints. For example, 
farmers at Xiaogang Village have now recollectivised their separate land use rights 
for more efficient use and management of land and in order to gain more money. 
Farmers have transferred contractual use rights to one commercial company (not set 
up by farmers) which specialises in agricultural production and management in order 
to achieve intensive and cooperative farming and management of rural land itudi 
jiyue hua jingying by which farmers could gain more income.
Before the opening up of the Plenum, Hu Jintao, the general secretary of the CPC 
Central Committee, visited Xiaogang Village. This visit signalled important policy
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changes to the rural land system and underscored the importance that the Party has 
placed on the issue of rural reform.
There are several important aims in the decision (jueding of the Plenum
published on 19 Oct 2008 (hereinafter the decision). First, it confirms that 
contractual management rights of rural land will remain unchanged and stable for a 
long period (baochi wending bing changjiu bubian The
decision also permits various means of contractual management rights circulation 
(tudi chengbao jingyingquan liuzhuan including
subcontracting (zhuangbao $t£L), leasing (chuzu tU fh), exchanging {huhuan 1L 
transferring (zhuanrang i t )  and shareholding cooperatives (gufen hezuo IS
^  pH ^).2 This decision emphasises that circulation of contractual management 
rights should not change the nature of rural land ownership and the agricultural 
purpose of land use. The decision retains the provisions as set in the Land 
Contracting Law (2002) and the Land Administration Law (2004).3
Secondly, the decision aims to improve the system of rural residential plots (zhaiji di 
^EiSitil), tighten the management of residential plots, and protect farmers’ 
usufructuary rights (yongyi wuquan $0 , which is the legal right to possess,
use and benefit from property that belongs to another person. Although some people 
claim that the decision has important implications for the possibility of legalising 
minor property rights apartments,4 the stress on farmers’ usufructuary rights in this 
decision is ambiguous. Usufruct is a lesser property right than ownership, and it does
1 ‘Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Tuijin Nongcun Gaige Fazhan Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding 
[The Decision o f the CPC Central Committee on Several Crucial Issues Regarding Rural Reform and 
Development available in
<http://politics.people.eom.en/GB/l 026/8194064.html > (last visited 19 October 2008).
2 Article 32 of Land Contracting Law (2002) already provides that ‘contractual management rights 
obtained through household contract may, according to law, be circulated by subcontracting, leasing, 
exchanging and transferring or other means’.
3 See this prohibition o f changing agricultural purposes in contractual management rights circulation 
in Clause 2 of Article 33 in Land Contracting Law (2002).
4 Jia Huajie, “Xiao Chanquan Fang Dengdai Diebian [Minor Property Rights Apartments are Waiting 
for Approval],” in <http://news.sohu.eom/20081010/n259947051.shtml> (last visited 19 October
2008).
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not include the right to dispose of the property. Thus, the decision has not granted 
farmers the right to dispose of their residential plots freely such as selling them as 
minor property rights apartments. From this perspective, the decision still limits the 
circulation of residential plots.5
The third aim is to reform the system of land acquisition and land use rights 
requisition. The decision emphasises that using rural land for construction purposes 
should clearly define whether it is for the ‘public interest’ or profit-seeking. The 
decision also calls for reducing the scope of land acquisition and improving the 
system of compensation.
Fourth, the decision treats rural and urban land use rights for construction purposes 
(jianshe yongdi shiyongquan equally, and aims to gradually set
up a unified market for circulation of such land use rights. Apart from rural land use 
rights for construction purposes, the decision also approves the use of collectively 
owned rural land in for-profit projects.
The reform is designed to boost rural income and rural productivity, stimulate rural 
consumption, and diminish the rural-urban divide by gradually abandoning the 
household registration system. This reform is also regarded as a prelude to the reform 
of the rural financial system, by, for example, providing loans for farmers. The 
reform will also bring changes to the relation between the state and farmers, as well 
as adjustment of interests gained by different groups throughout the economic reform 
commenced in 1978. However, the effect of the new measures regarding the 
circulation of contractual management rights is debatable. Some people worry that, 
without a functioning social security system, loosening the control over the 
circulation of rural land use rights may make farmers transfer contractual
5 On 22 October 2008, the CCP Central Committee declared that “minor property rights” apartments 
contravened the law, and construction of new apartments should not continue. Although the interests 
o f  current purchasers should be protected, the legalisation o f the existing apartments is still under 
review. On this see http://sc.people.com.cn/news/HTML/2008/10/24/20081024084319.htm (last 
visited 24 October 2008).
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management rights cheaply to big agricultural conglomerates. The number of 
landless farmers could increase, and a new form of inequality could thus emerge.
Clarifying the land rights (quequan of farmers is the focus of the new rural
reform. However, contractual management rights circulation does not equal 
privatisation, since collective ownership of rural land is maintained. Moreover, 
circulation of land use rights has been confined to contractual management rights, 
and circulation of residential plots and rural land for construction purposes has not 
yet been clarified. Nor does the new development of the circulation of contractual 
management rights amount to recognition of a permanent tenancy in which the state 
nationalises rural land and then grants farmers permanent land use rights. In the 
decision, contractual management rights will remain unchanged and stable for a long 
period rather than permanent. The word Tong’ (chang -fc) has been used rather than 
‘permanent’ (yong tR). Thus, it is too early to say that the long-term trend of the rural 
land system will follow the model of (urban) leasehold as practised in the UK.
Although the confirmation of the long period of contractual management rights and 
the encouragement of various experiments with land use rights circulation could be 
seen as further steps toward the revival of private property in rural China, the extent 
and effect of such a revival is a complex issue if we consider the following aspects.
The first question is how the existing legal system will respond to the new policy, 
and how the amendments to these laws can be made coherent. The changes to the 
rural land system again demonstrate that legal reform in China still relies on Party 
policy, and legal reform usually lags behind the policy change. Laws pertaining to 
property need to conform to Party policy. Such laws involve the Constitution (2004), 
the Property Law (2007), the Land Administration Law (2004) and so on. Moreover, 
there are already different experiments with the circulation of land use rights in 
different localities (see Chapter Four), and the question is how to deal with these 
local experiments that contravene the existing legal system? It is especially debatable
2 3 4
whether the circulation of rural residential plots such as selling and purchasing minor 
property rights apartments is constitutional. Article 10 of the Constitution (2004) is 
ambiguous regarding this issue. Although it provides that ‘land use rights could be 
transferred’, the Constitution does not specify the mechanisms for such transfers.
Secondly, how to deal with existing interest groups? Circulation of land use rights 
will gradually break through the monopoly of local governments over rural land use 
and management. Land use rights requisition will no longer be the sole means for 
land use rights to enter into the market. However, whether local governments and 
officials give up their power of land management through which they have gained a 
huge profit remains an open question.
Thirdly, how to promote self-govemance of farmers? Farmer do need a genuine 
communal sphere to manage their land use rights; in the meantime, they need a social 
security system. This is a question of further political and rural governance reform.
Lastly, land ownership in China has its roots in socialist ideology. With the 
deepening of rural land reform, the difficulty will be handling the tensions between 
the land system and the socialist legacy. Furthermore, apart from the rural land 
system, the urban land system is also expecting changes. In the long run, the dual 
land ownership in China may be transformed, and the process of change is a 
continuing one. These issues will be the subjects of my future research.
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Appendix: Chinese Laws and Regulations Pertaining to Property in 
Post-Mao China*
Constitution
Constitution 1982 (amended 1988, 1993, 1999,2004)
The General Principles of the Civil Law jftjj 1986
Civil, Commercial, and Property Administration Laws
Marriage Law 1980 (revised 2001)
Inheritance Law ^^C'^,1985
Land Administration Law i ! ^ ,  1986 (revised 1988, 1998 and 2004)
State-Owned Enterprise Law 1988
Urban Planning Law 1989
Urban Real Estate Administration Law 1994 (revised 2007)
Company Law ^  isfe, 1994
Guarantee Law 1995
Contract Law n'lWJvi, 1999
Rural Land Contracting Law 2002
Property Law 2007
Urban and Rural Planning Law 2008
Administrative Regulations
Provisional Regulations on the Grant and Transfer of Use Rights in Urban Land M
1990
Provisional Regulations on Administratively-Allocated Land use Rights 
1992
Regulations on the Implementation of the Land Administration Lawmmi 1998
Regulations for Management of Urban Residential Demolition and Eviction 
J, 1991 (revised 2001)
Other Civil and Commercial Laws on Property
Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 4* 1979
(revised 1990, 2001)
Trademark Law 1982 (revised 1993, 2001)
Patent Law 1984 (revised 1992, 2000)
Law on Foreign-Funded Enterprises 1986 (revised 2000)
Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy (for trial implementation) 1986
Law on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures d i i 1988
(revised 2000)
Copyright Law 1990 (revised 2001)
* This list focuses on the laws and regulations that have been referred in this thesis, but includes also 
several other civil and commercial laws on Property.
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Adoption Law 1991 (revised 1998)
Maritime 1992
Anti-Unfair Competition Law 1993
Law on Product Quality 1993 (revised 2000)
Law on Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests ^  1993
Law on Commercial Banks 1995 (revised 2003)
Negotiable Instruments Law 1995 (revised 2004)
Insurance Law 1995 (revised 2002)
Auction Law 1996 (revised 2004)
Law on Partnerships 1997
Law on Township Enterprises 1997
Securities Law iiE#£fe, 1998 (revised 2004)
Sole Proprietorship Law 1999
Bidding Law 1999
Trust Law 'fffiffife 2001
Law on Securities Investment Funds 2003
Law on Electronic Signature 'fk, 2004
Glossary of Chinese terms used in the text
B
baidui (=j.&
baiqi 1=1 M white deeds
banfengjian semi feudalism
banguan semiofficial
baojia
baolikangfa violent resistance of law enforcement
baqi A M  Eight Banners 
bian H  section
bianhuqimin tymA-frR, common people listed in the household register 
bianzhi
bieji yicai separating household registration and dividing family property
buchong#^5 complement
buwei oft ill ministries and departments
C
caichanhua propertise
caichan quan property rights
caijue adjudicate
caizheng bokuan WiWLWilfk fiscal appropriation
caizheng chengbao zhi the fiscal contracting system
chai qian house demolition
chang geng jXi# long-time cultivation
chanquan property rights
chanquan zheng property right certificates
chaxu geju the differential mode of association
chengbao jingying quan f  1X contractual management rights
chengxiang eryuanzhi —TtftlJ the rural-urban divide
chi daguofan eating from one big pot
chi dahu tfLAA  mass seizure of food from rich households
chongzu M%3. restructuring
chuji she primary cooperatives
churang tij if: grant
citang ancestral halls
cun village
cunji t t f !  village membership 
cunminhuyi the villages’assembly
cunminxiaozu EX''Mil the villagers’group
cunmin weiyuanhui village committees
D
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da gongtongti the large community
dagong wusi A ^ A f A  great altruism without selfishness
DaQiuzhuang ASPiEE
Danbao Fa Guarantee Law
danbao wuquan security rights
dangzuzhi Party organs
danwei work units
dangzheng fenkai the separation of functions between the Party and the state
Daqing Minlll Cao’an A^lt Draft Civil Code of the Qing Dynasty
DaQingLtl Li X\MW^\ Great Qing Code with Substatutes
dayitong A ~ ^  The great rule of all by one emperor
da yuejin AliAS the Great Leap Forward
dazuzhu A  IB A  large rent landlords
dengji JliiS registration
di itk prefectures
diannong cultivators
di-ding qian-liang f t k T t h e  land and head tax
difang baohu zhuyi local protectionism
difang zhengfu ilk A S /ft local governments
di gai shi itki&TU turning prefectures into cities
diji shi itkiS A  cities at the prefectural level
dingzi hu CTAA the nailed down house
dingzixing shehui jiegou T ‘Inverted T-shaped’ social structure 
disanci tudi geming the third land reform
dizhu itkA landlords
F
Fadian Bianzuan Weiyuanhui the Committee for the Compilation of
Codes
fading jicheng statutory inheritance
fangnu house slaves 
fanshen MM
fang’ai gongwu 1 4 ^  obstructing public affairs 
fanyoupai yundong Anti Rightist Movement
faren chanquan 'A AA I^ property rights of a legal person 
faren suoyou quan y£A#T ownership rights of a legal person 
fei 111 fei ma neither donkey nor horse
fei zhengfu xing non-governmental
FeiZongyi
fengjian i f  ill feudalism 
fenjia household division
fenshuizhi the tax sharing system
fenzaochifan eating-in-separate-kitchens
FuBingchang
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G
gaizhi t&rfrj transformation of ownership 
gaoji she advanced cooperatives
geming revolution
getihu self-employed entrepreneurs
getijingji individual economy
geti laodongzhe suoyouzhi ownership of individual working people
gengzhe you qitian land-to-the-tillers
gong &  the public
gongfa 4* public law
gongfen JLjfr work points
gonggongliyi the public interest
gonggong shitang communal dining halls
gongquan public power
gongshi bi ranhou ganzhi sishi and not till the public work is
finished, may they presume to attend to their private affairs
gongsihua corporatisation
gongtong susong collective suits
gongwuyuan ^  civil servants
gongyehua l i k i t  industrialisation
gongzhong yulun public opinion
guanliceng shougou If management buyouts
gufen youxian gongsi H'&i?] shareholding companies
guizhang $ 2 ^  normative documents
guoyou caichan teshu baohui state ownership should enjoy special
protection
guoyou tudi shiyongquan zheng the state-owned land use right
certificate
gongyouwu ^  public property
gongyou gongying publicly-owned and publicly-run
guakao attached to
guanban 'g’ official
guandao 'iT'O&J
guan tian Tlf ffl official land
guanxi social relationship
gufen hezuozhi shareholding cooperatives
guojia jingyingzulin state management and renting
guojia suoyouzhi state ownership
gu wei jin yong, yang wei zhong yong # ^ 4 ^  make the past serve the
present and foreign things serve China
guo 0  the state
guojia the nation
guojia shumai socialist purchase
2 4 0
guojia tiaojie shichang, shichang yindao qiye an economy
where the state regulates the market and the market guides the enterprises 
guoyou qiye caichan quan 0  state-owned enterprise property rights
guoyou tudi youchang shiyong zhidu rlljj® the paid transfer of LURs
system
H
hanghui f f  £  trade guildhalls
hefa caichan yiti baohu yuanze the principle of unified protection
of all lawful properties
hejie settlement
hei shehui secret societies
hetongfa o'Ir] ^  Contract Law
hexie shehui a harmonious society
hezuo jianfang cooperative housing project
hezuoshe suoyouzhi cooperative ownership
hongguan tiaokong macroeconomic regulation and control
hongmaozi qiye red-hat enterprises
hou jiti zhuyi X  post-collectivism
huabo tyWi allocation
huangce MM  the Yellow Book
Huang Maorong M73t^-
huang zhuang imperial estates
huiqian [EOif: re-house
hulu MW
hutong #30
heyi ting collegiate bench
hongmaozi qiye ‘red hat’enterprises
hongqi red deeds
hongse yiyuancun the red billionaire village
hou xinruxue post-neo-Confucianism
hua Chinese
huandong buhuan dian a change in landlords could not deprive of the tenants’
right to the land
huhun MM  household and marriage
huji zhidu MIf  the household registration system
huzhu zu £_§. mutual aid teams
J
jiage shuanggui zhi the ‘dual-track system’ of prices
jianbing mergers
Jiangnan 
Jiang Ping
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jianshe shehui zhuyi xin nongcun Constructing the New Socialist
Countryside
JiaoYitang
jiapu genealogies 
jiazhuang dowry
jianjie minzhu indirect democracy
jiansheyongdi shiyongquan Land Use Rights for construction purposes
jiazuhua shichang zibenzhuyi clan capitalism
jicengdanwei basic units
jiceng qunzhong zizhixing zuzhi 3£Hili¥;& S self-governing mass organizations
at the grassroots level
jicheng inheritance
jiedao banshichu Street offices
jiefangqu liberated areas
jieji douzheng class contradictions
jiguan danwei
jihua jingji wei zhu, shichang tiaojie wei fu a planned
economy as a priority, market regulations as a supplement
jihua yu shishang tiaojie xiang jiehe i f  integration of the
planned economy and market regulations
jingji hetongfa The Economic Contract Law
jingji zhidu an economic institution
jingtian #E0 the well-field system
jingying guanli quan operational and management rights
jingzu fang managed and rented houses
jishu hetongfa the Technology Contract Law
jiti shangfang MW-hijj group visits or petitions
jiucheng gaozao old city renewal
jumin weiyuanhui neighbourhood committees
jun counties
juti xingzheng xingwei concrete administrative acts
K
kuai
kuangcang suoyouquan ’QTWtflfWfe mineral ownership 
L
lanwei lou ‘rotten-tail’buildings
li #ij substatutes or codified precedents 
li !^j profits
lianhehui pf z? federation 
Liang Huixing
lifayuan the Legislative Yuan
lijia
li tu bu li xiang, jin chang bujin cheng
lingshi caipanquan consular jurisdiction
Liuzhuang F IF
lixiang zhuyi silu SMife J5CSE& an ‘idealised model’
lti W statutes
luanzong j§L^
luoji xing logic
M
meng leagues 
mengzi iS"? Mencius
Mengzi-Teng Weng Gong Shang _h Mencius-Teng Weng Gong I
min K the people
minfadian Civil Code
minjianzhiku unofficial think tank
minshangheyi — the combination of civil and commercial law
minshi people’s matters
minshi quanli civil right
min tian ffl private land
minting KJH civil chambers
mo PS the horizontal paths
mo zhe shitou guo he crossing a river by groping for stepping stones
N
nanhaimoshi the Nanhai model
NanjieCun
nanxun Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour
neisheng waiwang (*1 §£hj£ being an inner sage so as to rule the outside world 
nongminfudan peasant burden
P
paimai jSlfe auction
pingjun zhuyi equalitarianism
Q
qian Pf the longitudinal paths
qianzhai tJHJt money and debt
qiangzhi chaiqian forced eviction
qingmiao if It green crops
qingyi zhijiao friendly relations
qitian JKE0 bannerland
qiye enterprises
qiye jingying quan enterprise management rights
qu E  districts
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quan frigh ts
quangui ziben zhuyi crony capitalism
quanli !j rights
qunti xing xingzheng zhengyi mass administrative disputes
R
renfa A  &  law of persons
rengequan At&lX. the right of personality
Renmin Daxue jianyigao A lA iA ^ltiA II the Renmin University draft 
renmin neibu maodun A  F*3 contradictions among the people
renmin gongshe A  people’s communes
renshenquan A ^ f e  the right to person
S
shangfang _hiA complaint visits
shangpinfang I^rpJI commodity housing
shangpinhua commodification
shangyang bianfa the reform of Shang Yang
shangye chaiqian commercial demolition
shehui zhidu t±<z? MEl; a social institution
shehui zhuyi gaizao the socialist transformation
shehui zhuyi shichang jingji rff the socialist market economy
shen gentry
sheng #  provinces
shengchan dadui A  PA production brigades 
shengchan xiaodui 4 /^  A PA production teams 
shekeyuanjianyigao the CASS draft
ShenJiaben
shensheng buke qinfan RT{l<fB socialist public property is sacred and inviolable
shetuan ?A@3 social organisations
shewai jingji hetongfa the Foreign Economic Contract Law
shi TtT the city
shijing Book of Poetry
Shijing-Xiaoya-Datian • A f l  • Affl Book of Poetry-Book of Odes-Farm Work
Shimin Shehui Tj] civil society
Shiminfa A  Jus civile
Shi Shangkuan
shiye danwei IpUlkA'ffc
shiye danwei bianzhi rill the ‘public service units’ bianzhi
shoutian zhi £§ E3 ffi'J the system of granting land by the state 
shuanggui zhi the dual approach
shuihudi qinjian 
shuyuan academies
shuzi chuguan guanchu shuzi statistics make officials, and officials
make statistics 
si fA the private
si bao liang ting Four Guarantees and Two Stops
sige xiandaihua the‘four modernisations’
sifa A^'/A private law 
siquan fA$( private rights 
siquan xiangshou
siying jingji private economy
siyingqiye Private enterprises
siyouhua ^AW'Ml privatisation
siyou gongying ^AW4Mt privately owned and publicly run 
songsanshi, lianbangshi a ‘loose and assembled model’
sunan muoshi a ‘sunan model’
suoyouquan B ownership 
suoyouzhi the social institution
T
taihu JsiM TaihuLake 
tandingrumu |$ T A h  
tangyu If  till court decisions
ta wuquan Jura in re aliena (other real property rights)
tebie xingzheng qu special administrative regions
tiangen E9 tEt land roots
tiangu EH# land bones
tianmian EH ffi topsoil or surface soil
tianmianquan topsoil rights
tianpi IB land skin
tiantu EBi. land and real estate
tiao
tiaojie iMffl mediation 
tianxia ;A;T under heaven 
tixi xing ^ ^ '1 4  systematisation 
tizhinei inside the system
tizhiwai outside the system
tong [wj
tongju gongcai living together and sharing household property together
tongxiang I^ J % the same origin
tongyi zhanxian a united front
tudi zhengshou land acquisition
tudi shougou chubei zhidu the land-banking system
tun tian 4i EH the land of a military colony
tong xiang [s] & the same native-place
tudi chengbaofa The Land Contracting Law
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tudi fuzhuowu fixtures to land
tudi gufen zhi dii&lKt'fftfl!] a farmland shareholding system
tudi shiyong quan land use rights (LURs)
tudi chiyongquan churangjin LUR transfer fees
tudi shiyongquan zhengyong requisition of land use rights
tudi suoyouquan landownership
tugai d:c& the land reform
W
Waiguo Zhijie Touzi Foreign Direct Investment
wanrensusong TJAifciQ ‘Ten-Thousand-Person Mass Lawsuit’ 
WangChonghui 
Wang Liming 3 :^0^
WangZejian
weifang gaizao dilapidated housing renewal
weixian unconstitutional
WeiYaorong
wenzhou moshi innJ'Htljt the wenzhou model
wu $J things
wufa law of things
wufanyundong Five-anti Campaigns
wuquan rights over things
wuquanfa the Property Law
WuTingfang
wu zuzhi non-organisational
X
xian M r county
xiandai chanquan zhidu the modem property rights system
xiandai qiye zhidu the modem enterprise system
xiahai T$5 jumped into the sea
xiang chanquan township property rights
xian gai shi H-t&rfj turning counties into cities
xianghuo ^ ‘K
xiangshen ^  local gentries
xiangzhen townships
xianji shi Mr^kM cities at the county level
xian shi gai qu JI-Tffi&E turning cities and counties into urban districts
xianshizhuyi silu the ‘pragmatic model’
xiao chanquan minor property rights
xiao chengzhen 'hMfil small towns
xiao gongtongti the small community
xiaoyezhu petty proprietors
xiaozuzhu small rent landlords
xiehui associations 
xietiao tthili coordination 
xieyi negotiation 
xiguanfa customary law
xinjiti zhuyi new collectivism
xinzheng the late Qing reforms 
xin ziyou zhuyi Iff |lj Eh neoliberalism
xin zuopai ifftEM. the new left
Xing’an Huilan JPJI^ 'vCjaL The Conspectus of Penal Cases 
xingxiang gongcheng showcase projects
xingzheng administration
xingzheng bianzhi the administrative bianzhi
xingzheng caiju administrative adjudication
xingzheng cun f f l the administrative village 
xingzheng danwei administrative units
xingzheng fuyi administrative reconsideration
xingzheng quhua administrative zoning
xingzheng shouduan administrative means
xingzheng susong Administration litigation
xishi MW minor things
Xiuding Falllguan Codification Commission
xue nong yu shui JfiL^c^zK blood is thicker than water
xuetian ^  ffl scholar estates
XuGuodong
xuli #3^ clerks
xuehui scholarly society
Y
yamen lUff]
YangRenshou
yanjiuhui research association
yayi runners
yeman chaiqian savage eviction
yezhu weiyuanhui property owners’associations
yi M barbarians
yi SL righteousness in the moral sense 
yibashou the first person in command
yihao wenjian the No. 1 Document
yitian erzhu — ffl—ife two lords to one field 
yitiansanzhu —ff lH i  three lords to one field 
yiwu yiquan —$)— one right over one thing 
yong tK permanent 
yongdian zK'fES permanent tenancy 
yongdianquan tR {[!]$£ the rights to permanent tenancy
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youxian zeren gongsi limited liability com panies
you zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi jianshe zhe Builders o f
Socialism  w ith Chinese Characteristics
yong xiaozuo quan A'M 'frlX  right o f  permanent tenure
yongyi wuquan usufiuctuary rights
yongzu  Af-fi long-tim e rent
you jihua de shangpin jingji W a planned com m odity econom y
you zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi shichang jingji 
socialist market econom y with Chinese characteristics 
Y in gR u i
y in tl er jia  — iC — ^  married the daughter tw ice 
yinyang hetong Yin Yang Contract
yitian erzhu — H — i  two lords to one field  
Yu Liansan
y u lin c e  cadastres
yulun jiandu supervision o f  m ass media
yum in zhengli % scrambling interests with the people
yusuannei zijin the official budgetary accounts
yusuanwai shouru extra-budgetary revenue
yusuanwai zijin extra-budgetary accounts
yu w o gongtian, sui ji w osi M2k.$C$L m ay it first rain on our public fields, and
then upon our private
Z
zerentian responsibility land
zhaijidi residential plots
zhaiquan obligation
zhaobiao tender
zhengfa xitong the single political-legal system
zhengfu Jingying Chengshi
zhengqi fenkai the separation o f  state administration from state enterprises
zhengqiu yijian gao IDE A ®  the LAC draft 
zhengshou zhengguo compulsory procurement and purchase
Zheng Yubo
zh ijiem in zh u  direct democracy
zhili zhengdun f n S l ' i  regulation and rectification
zhiwai faquan extraterritoriality
zhixia shi municipalities
zhongguohua sinicisation
Z h on gziA n  T h e ‘Seed C ase’
zhuaida fangxiao grasping the large and freeing the sm all
zh u bin zh ifen  $$  the relationship o f  master and guest
zhulian collective responsibility
zhuquan shangmao cheng the Zhuquan Commercial Mall
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zhuzijunfen the equal-male-division of household property
zibenjia capitalists
zibenjia suoyouzhi capitalist ownership
zichouzijin self-raised revenue
zigengnong farm proprietors
ziliudi il ©ilk private plots
zirancun natural villages
zisi 1=1 selfish
ziwuquan
ziyou zhuyi [=1 liberalism
zizhi zhou (I autonomous prefectures
zuchan IS/3* ancestral estates
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